The Dreadful Renegade: A Thrilling Espionage Novel (Techno thriller, Mystery & Suspense)

by Charles Z David

  Nagib returned home that evening and told Alia about the debate and explained that by getting responsibility for sampling he would gain access to the actual warheads and the storage area which could help facilitate their plans. Alia said that the name of Dr. Max Level sounded very familiar but could not recall from where. She asked Nagib if he wanted tea or coffee and went into the kitchen to switch on the electric kettle and make two cups of tea. Suddenly Nagib heard her laughing hysterically and when he rushed into the kitchen he saw her bent over the kitchen counter and holding her belly. Nagib thought that she was ill or suffering cramps but saw that her right hand was pointing at the kettle and wondered if she had been electrocuted so quickly unplugged the kettle. With great difficulty, still laughing hysterically, Alia stood upright and pointed to the line signifying the maximum amount of water that should be used to boil water. He looked closely at the line that prescribed the words Max Level and also burst out laughing.

  January 31st, Los Alamos National Laboratory

  Nagib and Max Level presented their arguments about taking the responsibility for sample collection and the Deputy Director listened impatiently to both of them and after ten minutes cut them short and said that he had more important things on his agenda. He ruled that for a trial period of five weeks samples would be collected by Nagib's laboratory personnel and if this led to improved results they would continue this practice but if no significant progress was found then the old procedures would be reestablished. Nagib and Max were both displeased with this decision which probably indicated that it was a wise one. When they left the Deputy Director's office they set an appointment with their senior staff members to discuss the details for implementing the decision.

  Nagib brought his chief analytical chemist who was in charge of carrying out the analyses and his senior technician who did most of the actual sampling. Dr. Max Level brought his own executive officer who was the mechanical engineer in charge of dismantling the warheads selected for periodic testing and evaluation and the chemical engineer who oversaw the sample collection. Nagib emphasized that his team would not interfere with the dismantling procedure but would only be present as observers of this stage, and they would then guide Max's people to perform the sample collection to ensure that representative samples were collected from all the components of the dismantled warhead. Max did not like being supervised by people who knew nothing about the dismantling and sampling of the unique components, and he avidly rejected the notion of having his team's work criticized or even observed by academic laboratory types who knew nothing of the real world of nuclear weapons. He expressly told Nagib that receiving samples and analyzing them in the laboratory was miles removed from physically handling and disassembling the delicate, highly radioactive components. Nagib said that he was well aware of that and his people would not touch anything or intervene with work and, as he stated before, would only ascertain that the samples collected were truly representative of each component. Max had to accept this as decreed by the Deputy Director, but then raised the point that Nagib had been concerned about and feared – allowing only people with high level security clearance to participate. Nagib played it cool by saying that he would make sure that his staff got the appropriate clearance, worrying that he may fail to get approved which would undermine the whole exercise from his point of view.

  February 21st, Los Alamos National Laboratory

  It took three weeks but two of Nagib's laboratory staff received the required security clearance and participated in the dismantling and sampling of operational nuclear warheads. The samples they brought were no different than those that had been received by the analytical laboratory in the past. So Nagib was concerned that the whole matter would lead to nothing and it would be hard for him to explain to the Deputy Director what the fuss was all about. He decided that he personally had to get involved and that necessitated upgrading his own security level. He asked Alia, who worked in the Lab's security office, if this could be expedited and she told him she would speak to her boss who was the Head of the Security Office, Colonel (Ret.) Dick Groovey. Her boss agreed to set up a meeting with Nagib and see what could be done.

  Nagib entered the Security Office and was greeted with warm smiles from Alia's colleagues and then ushered into the conference room where the Col. Groovey was seated. The Colonel picked up a thick file that was placed in front of him and looked at Nagib with a stern face. He asked Nagib to repeat his life's story and Nagib did so briefly going over his early years in Palestine and describing at length his life in the USA, emphasizing that he felt privileged to be an American citizen and honored to be able to contribute to the security of his adopted country. The Colonel's expression did not change throughout this whole tirade and he asked Nagib if he still had contact with his relatives in the Palestinian Authority. Nagib said that he exchanged a phone call with his parents on their wedding anniversary and they called him on his birthday. He stressed that they had not attended his wedding or even met his wife. The Colonel stiffly admitted that Alia was a model worker and very dependable and reliable. He concluded the meeting by saying that he would be able to issue the requested clearance if Nagib would successfully pass a polygraph test, to which Nagib promptly agreed.

  February 23rd, Los Alamos National Laboratory

  Nagib sat quietly while the security investigator who was a senior member of the American Polygraph Association hooked him to the polygraph. Nagib had prepared for the test by reading about the polygraph in Wikipedia (where else?). He knew that the machine recorded his blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration rate and skin conductivity (perspiration) while required to answer some questions. He was also aware of the fact that its reliability was questionable and it was regarded by many scientists as nothing more than pseudoscience. He was asked to answer some trivial questions, honestly at first and then to deliberately lie as part of Control Question Technique, he did so without flinching. Then the more serious part of the test began. He was asked about details of his personal history which he had no problem answering truthfully without hesitation. He was then asked the real key questions:

  "Are you now, or did you ever work for a foreign government?"

  "No".

  "Were you approached by a foreign intelligence service?"

  "No".

  "Are you now or were you ever a member of a terrorist organization?"

  "No".

  "Are you now or were you ever a member of the communist party or a sympathizer?"

  "No".

  "Are you now or were you ever connected to an extreme racist or Nazi movement?"

  "No".

  "Did you obtain your student visa or your US citizenship under false pretenses?"

  "No."

  This series of questions was repeated twice more. Nagib's reply to all these questions was negative and the investigator appeared to be pleased with the answers and thanked Nagib for his cooperation and released him from the machine. Nagib laughed to himself quietly – he was not an agent of a foreign government, was not contacted by intelligence services, was not a member of any organization (terrorist, communist or racist) and did not lie in his visa application. He was never asked if he plotted to harm the US or its allies, if he planned to betray the confidence of the Lab or steal any secret information from it and use it.

  March 3rd, Los Alamos National Laboratory

  At last Nagib received the clearance to attend the dismantling of the nuclear warhead that was selected for a thorough analysis of its state of fitness, or degradation, as part of the stockpile stewardship project. All he saw were a lot of small components that were carefully dissembled from a strange looking device. He was impressed by the skill and confident way that Dr. Max Level's people handled these parts. No one bothered to explain to him what each component was and what function it performed and he did not want to raise suspicion by being overly inquisitive. After observing the procedure for a couple of hours he could not come up with astute remarks or useful suggestions, so he return
ed to the analytical laboratory and supervised the analysis of the samples that were collected. He already knew the isotopic composition of enriched uranium and plutonium that were in the core, or pit, of each warhead type, as did anyone who could surf the net and read Wikipedia, so did not learn anything new from the analyses that were performed in his laboratory. He also read some things about the construction of atomic weapons - once again things that were common knowledge in the public domain. So far, he had not gained a single fact that could be used for bartering and he was deeply disappointed.

  In the evening he returned home and told Alia about his frustration with the failure of their idea. He knew he would have to return to the Deputy Director and admit that Dr. Max Level knew his job, so he wondered if he could use this to befriend Dr. Level and get some useful information from him. Alia encouraged him to continue with the efforts to obtain classified information that could be used for bartering.

  The next day, Nagib submitted his report to the Deputy Director of the Lab, with a copy to Dr. Max Level. He was summoned to a meeting in which he praised Dr. Level's professional approach and said that there was no need for personnel from the analytical laboratory to be present during the dismantling process for sample collection. Max was pleased with the report and even the Deputy Director smiled and said that it took an honest man to admit that he had been wrong. After they left the office Max thanked Nagib for his frank report and said that they should meet for coffee or for a drink some time and asked him if he and his wife were free on Friday afternoon.

  The two couples met in the Pyramid Café that had become Alia's favorite place after the first date with Nagib. When Max introduced his wife as Minnie, Alia and Nagib could barely suppress their laughter because both of them remembered the other line on the kettle that said Min Level. Minnie, who had a degree in mechanical engineering, was also employed at the Lab so the four of them had a lively conversation about life in Los Alamos and work in the Lab. The two couples hit it off despite the age gap between Alia and Nagib who were in their early thirties and the Levels who were in their early fifties. The Levels had a daughter who was attending college in Denver and came home only for Christmas and in the summer. While the women were engaged in their own conversation Max asked Nagib if their two departments could increase their professional cooperation and hold regular meetings and seminars on issues of mutual interest. Needless to say that Nagib was overjoyed with this suggestion but managed to appear as if he was considering the idea and asked if this wouldn't raise security issues. Max said that he would work through channels and try to obtain the Deputy Director's approval and permission from the security office. The two couples departed agreeing to meet again soon.

  March 23rd, Los Alamos National Laboratory

  The first meeting of Nagib's analytical laboratory people with Max's operations division personnel was held in a small conference room, and kicked off on a positive note. After a short round of introductions, each section leader presented the responsibilities and capabilities of his group. It appeared as if some of the problems that arose in the operations division, like evident corrosion and degradation of components could be addressed by the use of analytical tools to study the extent of the problems and the rate of the processes. Max said that viewing the blueprints and pointing out the areas in which the degradation was most prominent would be helpful and Nagib gladly approved. So they agreed to meet on a bi-weekly basis and devise an action plan, pending proper approval from management and permission from the security division, of course. Max said that he would be responsible for carrying out the bureaucratic procedures to gain the necessary clearances.

  April 20th, Los Alamos National Laboratory

  Max entered the small conference room with a big smile and immediately switched on his laptop and connected it to the overhead projector. Nagib could hardly believe his eyes – on the screen there was a detailed diagram of one of the most advanced warheads in the US nuclear arsenal. Max described each component, its exact dimensions, materials of construction, and once he started to describe the problems that were encountered enlargements of the relevant areas were displayed. Nagib had to clear his throat and drink some cold coffee before he allowed himself to speak. He said that they should address one problem at a time and asked Max where he thought they should start. Max zipped through the presentation until he found the best view of the problematic component and reviewed the problems that they had encountered with that component. Before long a brainstorming session was in full gear with the analytical chemists raising questions and making proposals after hearing the answers from the operations people who had hands on experience with the component. Nagib and Max exchanged a look that showed how pleased they were with the way the two teams were interacting.

  In the evening Nagib returned home and told Alia about the way the meeting had progressed and said that they had struck gold or at least a gold bearing vein. Alia suggested that they go and celebrate at their favorite restaurant and Nagib readily agreed. So off they went, ordered the best and most expensive bottle of wine, and drank it raising toasts to each other. That night they got very little sleep as both were feeling a need for close physical contact and a strong desire for each other.

  May 3rd, Tel Aviv, Israel

  "The Fish" called David Avivi and apologized for the long delay, since it had been almost half a year since David asked him to check if the ISA had any information on Dr. Nagib Jaber. "The Fish" said that Nagib had left the Middle East several years earlier, which David already knew, and the ISA had nothing on him regarding any illegal activity. However, he added, his brother Yassir may he rot in hell, had been a prime target of the ISA. Apparently, Yassir was convicted for kidnapping and murdering a young Israeli student near Hebron and given a life sentence by a military court. However, he was released from prison with many other terrorists in return for an Israeli soldier and banished from his home to Gaza. There were reports that he was killed by an Israeli drone while attempting to fire a rocket on an Israeli town near Gaza. David asked if Nagib had any known contacts with Palestinian terrorist organizations and "The Fish" said that he was not suspected of any wrongdoings. David thought that this information should be passed on to the Americans and called his friend, Dr. Eugene Powers in Washington DC. Eugene received David's call and said he would look into the matter and get back to him.

  May 4th, Washington, DC

  Eugene called the Deputy Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and conveyed the information he had received from the Israelis. The Deputy Director said that he knew Dr. Nagib Jaber personally and that he was highly regarded as a responsible and trustworthy scientist and had recently been promoted to head his own section in the analytical laboratory. He related the episode of the attempted cooperation with the operations division and told Eugene that Nagib had passed the polygraph test without a hitch. He commended Nagib's initiative to work hand in hand with Dr. Max Level and said that he believed this would further the Lab's stewardship project. Eugene asked him if the new information did not bother him at all and the Deputy Director invited him to come out to Los Alamos and interview Nagib himself if he still had concerns about him. Eugene asked if he could bring his Israeli colleague to the interview and the Deputy Director told him that only US citizens were allowed on site, and when Eugene suggested locating the meeting off-site the Deputy Director cut him short and said that he needed to promptly leave for his next appointment. Eugene got back to David and told him that he would personally go to Los Alamos to meet with Nagib, but didn't tell him about the conversation with the Deputy Director.

  May 30th, Los Alamos National Laboratory

  Nagib was deeply frustrated – here he had access to even the minor details of the most advanced warheads but could not download the information and certainly not remove it from the Lab. He couldn't get an electronic copy of the blueprints, he couldn't photocopy the schematics, he couldn't smuggle a camera to take photographs and most certainly couldn't get samples. Even worse, he w
as "invited" to meet a big shot from the NNSA who was scheduled to come to the Lab the following week. He discussed this with Alia after he got back home. She told him that she had overheard a conversation in the security office between the Deputy Director and her boss about the planned visit of the man from the NNSA regarding the reliability of key personnel with respect to national security issues. Now Alia and Nagib connected the dots and got a picture they did not like one bit. They considered their options: should they flee immediately or find some excuse for avoiding the meeting or continue to bluff their way, and decided to go with the latter option. That night they didn't much sleep, but unlike the sleepless night they enjoyed a few months earlier, this time it was the fear of being found out, or even arrested that drove the sleep away.