by Rod Gragg
Although not as high as neighboring Big Round Top, its commanding view made Little Round Top a perfect site for artillery. Both armies coveted the boulder-cluttered 150-foot-high landmark, also known locally as Sugar Loaf Hill, but it was successfully occupied and held by the Federal army.
Library of Congress
While not solely responsible for saving Little Round Top for Meade’s army, Warren’s decisive action proved invaluable. Nine years after the battle, he chronicled his role in the events.
Just before the action began in earnest, on July 2d, I was with General Meade, near General Sickles, whose troops seemed very badly disposed on that part of the field. At my suggestion, General Meade sent me to the left to examine the condition of affairs, and I continued on till I reached Little Round Top. There were no troops on it, and it was used as a signal station. I saw that this was the key of the whole position, and that our troops in the woods in front of it could not see the ground in front of them, so that the enemy would come upon them before they would be aware of it.
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“The Discovery Was Intensely Thrilling to My Feelings, and Almost Appalling”
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The long line of woods on the west side of the Emmitsburg road (which road was along a ridge) furnished an excellent place for the enemy to form out of sight, so I requested the captain of a rifle battery just in front of Little Round Top to fire a shot into these woods. He did so, and as the shot went whistling through the air the sound of it reached the enemy’s troops and caused every one to look in the direction of it. This motion revealed to me the glistening of gun-barrels and bayonets of the enemy’s line of battle, already formed and far outflanking the position of any of our troops; so that the line of his advance from his right to Little Round Top was unopposed. I have been particular in telling this, as the discovery was intensely thrilling to my feelings, and almost appalling.
I immediately sent a hastily written dispatch to General Meade to send a division at least to me, and General Meade directed the Fifth Army Corps to take position there. The battle was already beginning to rage at the Peach Orchard, and before a single man reached Round Top the whole line of the enemy moved on us in splendid array, shouting in the most confident tones. While I was still all alone with the signal officer, the musket-balls began to fly around us, and he was about to fold up his flags and withdraw, but remained, at my request, and kept waving them in defiance.
In this nineteenth century artwork, General Warren stands atop Little Round Top and studies the distant Confederate lines with his field glasses. Warren realized the critical military value of the peak and took decisive action to save it for Federal forces.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War
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“He Planted a Gun on the Summit of the Hill”
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Seeing troops going out on the Peach Orchard road, I rode down the hill, and fortunately met my old brigade. General Weed, commanding it, had already passed the point, and I took the responsibility to detach Colonel O’Rorke, the head of whose regiment I struck, who, on hearing my few words of explanation about the position, moved at once to the hill-top. About this time First Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett of the Fifth Artillery, with his battery of rifled cannon, arrived. He comprehended the situation instantly and planted a gun on the summit of the hill. He spoke to the effect that though he could do little execution on the enemy with his guns, he could aid in giving confidence to the infantry, and that his battery was of no consequence whatever compared with holding the position. He stayed there till he was killed. I was wounded with a musket-ball while talking with Lieutenant Hazlett on the hill, but not seriously; and, seeing the position saved while the whole line to the right and front of us was yielding and melting away under the enemy’s fire and advance, I left the hill to rejoin General Meade near the center of the field, where a new crisis was at hand....
“Are You Not Too Much Extended, General?”
The Controversial “Sickles’s Salient” Puts the Federal Battle Line at Risk
Forty-three-year-old Major General Daniel Sickles was used to doing things his way. When General Meade told Sickles, an army corps commander, to put his Third Corps into line on Cemetery Ridge just north of Little Round Top, he obeyed—at first. Sickle’s corps had arrived on the battlefield the night before and on July 2 had deployed alongside General Hancock’s Second Corps troops. However, when Sickles studied his position that afternoon, he decided that his troops were in a poor position and were vulnerable to Confederate artillery fire, so he moved his corps forward of the Federal line—without orders. Accordingly, the 10,000 troops in his Third Corps advanced all the way to the Emmitsburg Road, causing a half-mile forward buckle or “salient” of the Federal line. Sickles’s unauthorized move left Little Round Top unprotected, exposed the Federal left flank, and compromised Meade’s battle plan. When he saw Sickles’s troops go forward, General Hancock was astonished. The redeployment would be disastrous, Hancock believed. “Wait a moment,” he told another officer. “You will see them tumbling back.”
Sickles was accustomed to controversy. A former New York politician and U.S. congressman, he was known for his outlandish behavior. His reputation had been tarred by charges of embezzlement, swindles, and adultery. As a member of the New York state legislature, he had earned an official censure for parading a notorious prostitute into the legislative chamber. On the eve of the Civil War, his scandalous behavior had attracted national attention when he shot and killed Philip Barton Key, the son of the composer of the National Anthem, for committing adultery with his wife. Defended by Washington attorney Edwin M. Stanton, who would later become his boss as U.S. Secretary of War, Sickles claimed to be momentarily deranged by his rage, and became the first American acquitted on grounds of temporary insanity. His political connections as a Northern Democrat earned him an officer’s commission, and he became cronies with General Hooker and his staff, rising to the rank of major general and becoming a corps commander by the time of Chancellorsville. There, his corps had been ravaged by Confederate artillery fire—and his unauthorized redeployment at Gettysburg might have been an attempt to avoid such a disaster again.
Major General Daniel Sickles commanded the Federal Third Corps at Gettysburg. Flamboyant and prone to controversial action, he advanced his portion of the Federal defensive line without orders, making it vulnerable to attack.
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General Meade was shocked to find Sickles’s troops so far out front of the Federal line. When Sickles tried to explain that he had made the unsanctioned move in search of higher ground, Meade reportedly replied, “General Sickles... if you keep on advancing you will find constantly higher ground all the way to the mountains.” Sickles offered to order his troops back to their original position in the line, but it was too late—the Confederate attack was upon him. Sickles’s troops fought fearlessly, and Sickles lost a leg in battle that day, but his decision to move his corps to what became known as “the Sickles’s Salient” would remain controversial. In 1864, he defended his actions in testimony before Congress’s powerful Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. At about the same time, the influential New York Herald newspaper published an anonymous article by a writer dubbing himself “Historicus,” which exonerated Sickles and disparaged General Meade. The article provoked a national controversy, and some of Meade’s officers publicly rebutted the article, which one dismissed as “pure invention.”
It was widely believed that “Historicus”—General Sickles’s anonymous defender in the Herald—was actually General Sickles, secretly making a clever public defense of his actions at Gettysburg. Below is an excerpt of the controversial newspaper article.
To the Editor of the Herald:
... General Meade broke up his quarters at Taneytown, as he states, at 11 p.m. on Wednesday, and reached Gettysburg at 1 a.m. Thursday, July 2. Early in the morning he set to work examining the position of the various army corps. It is har
dly true to say that he imitated the example of all prudent commanders on the eve of a battle, and made a complete survey of the ground he occupied.
It was on these occasions that the genius of the first Napoleon revealed itself; for at a glance he saw the advantages of his own position and the assailable point of the enemy. It seems that General Lee was somewhat more astute than Meade in this, for in his report he states what he deemed “the most favorable point” for his attack. “In front of General Longstreet” (opposite our left wing).... It is not to be supposed that General Meade refused to see this; but as he makes no mention of it in his report, I propose, for the sake of the future historian of the battle, to tell what I know about it.
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“General Meade Had Decided upon a Retreat”
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Near this important ground was posted the valiant Third Corps, and its commander, General Sickles, saw at once how necessary it was to occupy the elevated ground in his front toward the Emmitsburg road, and to extend his lines to the commanding eminence known as the Round Top, or Sugar Loaf hill. Unless this were done, the left and rear of our army would be in the greatest danger. Sickles concluded that no time was to be lost, as he observed the enemy massing large bodies of troops on their right (our left). Receiving no orders, and filled with anxiety, he reported in person to General Meade, and urged the advance he deemed so essential. “O,” said Meade, “generals are all apt to look for the attack to be made where they are.”
Whether this was a jest or a sneer Sickles did not stop to consider, but begged Meade to go over the ground with him instantly; but the commander-in-chief declined this on account of other duties. Yielding, however, to the prolonged solicitations of Sickles, General Meade desired General Hunt, chief of artillery, to accompany Sickles, and report the result of their reconnaissance. Hunt concurred with Sickles as to the line to be occupied—the advance line from the left of the Second Corps to the Round Top hill—but he declined to give any orders until he had reported to General Meade, remarking, however, that he (General Sickles) would doubtless receive orders immediately.
Two p.m. came, and yet no orders. Why was this? Other orders than those expected by General Sickles were, it appears, in preparation at headquarters. It has since been stated, upon unquestionable authority, that General Meade had decided upon a retreat, and that an order to withdraw from the position held by our army was penned by his chief of staff, General Butterfield, though happily its promulgation never took place. This order is probably on record in the Adjutant-General’s Office.
Meanwhile the enemy’s columns were moving rapidly around to our left and rear. These facts were again reported to headquarters, but brought no response. Buford’s cavalry had been massed on the left, covering that flank with outposts, and videttes [sic] were thrown forward on the Emmitsburg road. While awaiting the expected orders, Sickles made good use of his time in leveling all the fences and stone walls, so as to facilitate the movements of his troops and to favor the operations of the cavalry. What, then, was the surprise of Sickles to see of a sudden all the cavalry withdrawn, leaving his flank entirely exposed! He sent an earnest remonstrance to General Meade, whose reply was that he did not intend to withdraw the cavalry, and that a part of this division (Buford’s) should be sent back. It never returned. Under these circumstances, Sickles threw forward three regiments of light troops as skirmishers and for outpost duty.
The critical moment had now arrived. The enemy’s movements indicated their purpose to seize the Round Top hill; and this in their possession, General Longstreet would have had easy work in cutting up our left wing. To prevent this disaster, Sickles waited no longer for orders from General Meade, but directed General Hobart Ward’s brigade and Smith’s battery (Fourth New York) to secure that vital position, and at the same time advancing his line of battle about 300 yards, so as to hold the crest in his front, he extended his left to support Ward and cover the threatened rear of the army.
These dispositions were made in the very face of the enemy, who were advancing in columns of attack, and Sickles dreaded lest the conflict should open before his dispositions were completed. At this juncture he was summoned to report in person at headquarters, to attend a council of corps commanders. His preparations were of such moment and the attack so near, that General Sickles delayed attending the council, while giving all his attention to the carrying out of his orders.
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“The Enemy’s Columns Were Moving Rapidly around to Our Left”
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A second peremptory summons came from General Meade, and leaving his unfinished task to the active supervision of General Birney and General Humphreys, Sickles rode off to the rear to headquarters. Before he had reached there, the sound of cannon announced that the battle had begun. Hastening rapidly on, he was met by General Meade at the door of his quarters, who said, “General, I will not ask you to dismount; the enemy are engaging your front; the council is over.” It was an unfortunate moment, as it proved, for a council of war.
Sickles, putting spurs to his horse, flew back to his command, and, finding that Graham’s brigade was not advanced as far as he desired, he was pushing that brigade and a battery forward about 100 yards, when General Meade at length arrived on the field. The following colloquy ensued, which I gathered from several officers present: “Are you not too much extended, general?” said Meade. “Can you hold this front?” “Yes,” replied Sickles, “until more troops are brought up; the enemy are attacking in force, and I shall need support.” General Meade then let drop some remark showing that his mind was still wavering as to the extent of ground covered by the Third Corps. Sickles replied, “General, I have received no orders. I have made these dispositions to the best of my judgment. Of course, I shall be happy to modify them according to your views.”
General Sickles would lose a leg in the battle, donate it to a Washington, D.C., museum, and visit it regularly for years to come.
National Archives
“No,” said Meade, “I will send you the Fifth Corps, and you may send for support from the Second Corps.” “I shall need more artillery,” added Sickles. “Send to the Artillery Reserve for all you want,” replied Meade; “I will direct General Hunt to send you all you ask for.” The conference was then abruptly terminated by a heavy shower of shells, probably directed at the group, and General Meade rode off. Sickles received no further orders that day.
There is no doubt, I may venture to add, that Sickles’ line was too much extended for the number of troops under his command; but his great aim was to prevent the enemy getting between his flank and the Round Top alluded to. This was worth the risk, in his opinion, of momentarily weakening his lines. The contest now going on was of the most fierce and sanguinary description. The entire right wing of the enemy was concentrated on the devoted Third Corps. ... It was now pretty clear that General Meade had awakened to the fact which he treated with such indifference when pressed on him by Sickles in the morning—that our left was the assailable point, if not the key to our position....
It is to be hoped that the above narrative will be regarded as dispassionate, as it is meant to be impartial. Some slight errors may have crept in; but this may possibly stimulate others to come forward with a rectification. Had General Meade been more copious in his report and less reserved as to his own important acts, the necessity for this communication would not have existed.
HISTORICUS.4
“Fix Bayonets, My Brave Texans!”
Lee’s Second Day Attack Opens against the Federal Left Flank
As Longstreet’s two divisions—Hood’s and McLaws’s—prepared to attack the Federal left flank shortly before four o’clock, General Longstreet realized that the Federal line was much longer than Lee and he had thought it to be. He could see that it extended beyond the wheat field and the peach orchard all the way to Little Round Top and Big Round Top. General Hood realized the mistake as well, and feared that advancing up the Emmitsburg Road would expose
his troops to crushing enemy fire. Better to attack the extreme left flank of the enemy’s line, he believed—to go around the Round Tops and attack the Federal rear. He sent a dispatch to Longstreet, urging a change in orders. Longstreet refused: it was past time to attack, and he would not change General Lee’s orders. Hood protested further—until Longstreet finally rode over and told him face-to-face, “We must obey the orders of General Lee.” Hood finally went forward, but not according to plan. He gave up his plan to march around the two big hills and attack the Federal rear, but, despite orders, he refused to send his troops up the Emmitsburg Road to what he believed was certain destruction. Instead, he sent them straight for the Round Tops.
