by Rod Gragg
Major General John Bell Hood had a reputation as a skilled commander and a fierce fighter. Some thought he was a Texan because he had made a name for himself commanding Lone Star troops in what was known as the Texas Brigade. He was actually a Kentucky doctor’s son, a West Pointer, who had served under General Lee in Texas when Lee acted as a lieutenant colonel in the prewar 2nd U.S. Cavalry. Hood went from service in Texas into Confederate service, experiencing a steady rise in rank from brigadier to major general as he distinguished himself in the Seven Days Battles, at Second Bull Run, and at Antietam. A sad-eyed, long-faced, thirty-two-year-old blond-bearded giant of a man, he would plunge into battle with no hesitation, and the fact that his men would willingly go with him was a tribute to his leadership. Eventually, he would lose the use of an arm and a leg, and would go into battle anyway—roped to his saddle. One of those grievous wounds befell him at Gettysburg.
A blond-bearded, towering giant of a man, Confederate Major General John Bell Hood was known as an aggressive combat commander. Eventually, he would lose the use of an arm and a leg, and would ride into battle tied to his saddle.
Rubenstein Rare Books and Manuscript Library, Duke University
When the time came to launch the attack on the afternoon of July 2, he sat on horseback in front of his division, which was lined up in the woods opposite the Round Tops. The troops remained quiet—veteran fighters from Alabama, Georgia, Arkansas, and Texas—as they awaited the order to attack. Hood was facing the soldiers of his former Texas brigade. He, too, was quiet, then he stood up in his stirrups—six-feet-two, towering above the men in gray and butternut—and shouted an order: “Fix bayonets, my brave Texans; forward and take those heights!” A Texas officer shouted back, “Follow the Lone Star Flag to the top of the mountain!” And then they were off. His troops surged forward, some moving through boulder-strewn Devil’s Den, pushing General Sickles’s Federal troops backward; some advancing through the woods in between the Round Tops; others climbing up and over Big Round Top to advance on Little Round Top. Almost immediately General Hood was wounded—hit by a fragment from an exploding artillery shell. His left arm was crippled and he was out of the fight, but his troops went forward without him.
In a postwar letter to General Longstreet in 1875, Hood would recall the second day at Gettysburg and his futile attempt to get Longstreet to change orders and redirect the assault around the Round Tops toward the Federal rear.
New Orleans, La.,
June 28th, 1875.
General James Longstreet:—
General, I have not responded earlier to your letter of April 5th, by reason of pressure of business, which rendered it difficult for me to give due attention to the subject in regard to which you have desired information....
I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, where the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were both engaged in company with Generals Lee and A. P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee—with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-belt buckled round the waist, and field glasses pending at his side—walked up and down in the shade of the large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet, at times, buried in deep thought. Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal Army.
General Lee was, seemingly, anxious you should attack that morning. He remarked to me, “The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him, he will whip us.” You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett’s Division—at that time still in the rear—in order to make the attack; and you said to me, subsequently, whilst we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: “The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.”
Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day, when in the afternoon—about 3 o’clock—it was decided to no longer await Pickett’s Division, but to proceed to our extreme right and attack up the Emmetsburg road. McLaws moved off, and I followed with my division. In a short time I was ordered to quicken the march of my troops, and to pass to the front of McLaws.
This movement was accomplished by throwing out an advanced force to tear down fences and clear the way. The instructions I received were to place my division across the Emmetsburg road, form line of battle, and attack. Before reaching this road, however, I had sent forward some of my picked Texas scouts to ascertain the position of the enemy’s extreme left flank. They soon reported to me that it rested upon Round Top Mountain; that the country was open, and that I could march through an open woodland pasture around Round Top, and assault the enemy in flank and rear; that their wagon trains were packed in rear of their line, and were badly exposed to our attack in that direction. As soon as I arrived upon the Emmetsburg road, I placed one or two batteries in position and opened fire. A reply from the enemy’s guns soon developed his lines. His left rested on or near Round Top, with line bending back and again forward, forming, as it were, a concave line, as approached by the Emmetsburg road. A considerable body of troops was posted in front of their main line, between the Emmetsburg road and Round Top Mountain. This force was in line of battle upon an eminence near a peach orchard.
* * *
“I Could Assault the Enemy in Flank and Rear”
* * *
I found that in making the attack according to orders, viz.: up the Emmetsburg road, I should have first to encounter and drive off this advanced line of battle; secondly, at the base and along the slope of the mountain, to confront immense boulders of stone, so massed together as to form narrow openings, which would break our ranks and cause the men to scatter whilst climbing up the rocky precipice. I found, moreover, that my division would be exposed to a heavy fire from the main line of the enemy in position on the crest of the high range, of which Round Top was the extreme left, and, by reason of the concavity of the enemy’s main line, that we would be subject to a destructive fire in flank and rear, as well as in front; and deemed it almost an impossibility to clamber along the boulders up this steep and rugged mountain, and, under this number of cross fires, put the enemy to flight. I knew that if the feat was accomplished, it must be at a most fearful sacrifice of as brave and gallant soldiers as ever engaged in battle.
At Gettysburg Hood and his troops launched Lee’s attack on the Federal left flank. Edwin Forbes, a field artist for Leslie’s Illustrated at Gettysburg, sketched it as it appeared from the summit of Little Round Top.
Library of Congress
The reconnoissance [sic] of my Texas scouts and the development of the Federal lines were effected in a very short space of time; in truth, shorter than I have taken to recall and jot down these facts, although the scenes and events of that day are as clear to my mind as if the great battle had been fought yesterday. I was in possession of these important facts so shortly after reaching the Emmetsburg road, that I considered it my duty to report to you, at once, my opinion that it was unwise to attack up the Emmetsburg road, as ordered, and to urge that you allow me to turn Round Top, and attack the enemy in flank and rear. Accordingly, I despatched a staff officer, bearing to you my request to be allowed to make the proposed movement on account of the above stated reasons. Your reply was quickly received, “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.” I sent another officer to say that I feared nothing could be accomplished by such an attack, and renewed my request to turn Round Top. Again your answer was, “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.” During this interim I had continued the use of the batteries upon the enemy, and had become more and more convinced that the Federal line extended to Round Top, and that I could
not reasonably hope to accomplish much by the attack as ordered. In fact, it seemed to me the enemy occupied a position by nature so strong—I may say impregnable—that, independently of their flank fire, they could easily repel our attack by merely throwing and rolling stones down the mountain side, as we approached.
* * *
“With This Wound Terminated My Participation in This Great Battle”
* * *
A third time I despatched one of my staff to explain fully in regard to the situation, and suggest that you had better come and look for yourself. I selected, in this instance, my adjutant-general, Colonel Harry Sellers, whom you know to be not only an officer of great courage, but also of marked ability. Colonel Sellers returned with the same message, “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.” Almost simultaneously, Colonel Fairfax, of your staff, rode up and repeated the above orders.
After this urgent protest against entering the battle at Gettysburg, according to instructions—which protest is the first and only one I ever made during my entire military career—I ordered my line to advance and make the assault.
As my troops were moving forward, you rode up in person; a brief conversation passed between us, during which I again expressed the fears above mentioned, and regret at not being allowed to attack in flank around Round Top. You answered to this effect, “We must obey the orders of General Lee.” I then rode forward with my line under a heavy fire. In about twenty minutes, after reaching the peach orchard, I was severely wounded in the arm, and borne from the field.
With this wound terminated my participation in this great battle. As I was borne off on a litter to the rear, I could but experience deep distress of mind and heart at the thought of the inevitable fate of my brave fellow-soldiers, who formed one of the grandest divisions of that world renowned army; and I shall ever believe that had I been permitted to turn Round Top Mountain, we would not only have gained that position, but have been able finally to rout the enemy.
I am, respectfully, yours,
J. B. Hood5
“Confusion Reigned Everywhere”
Longstreet’s Assault on the Federal Left Opens with a Shaky Start
At four o’clock on July 2, five regiments of Alabama troops led Hood’s division forward. Collectively, they comprised Law’s Brigade of Hood’s division—Longstreet’s First Corps—and they were commanded by Brigadier General Evander M. Law of South Carolina. A twenty-seven-year-old graduate of The Citadel Military College in South Carolina, he had practiced law and taught school before moving to Alabama and starting a military academy. When the war began, he converted his academy’s cadets into a company of Confederate troops, became their captain, rose to colonel and to commander of the 4th Alabama Infantry, and wound up as a brigadier general in Hood’s division—still leading Alabama troops. Despite his rangy build and a French-style goatee, Law had a boyish face—but there was nothing lacking in his fortitude. He had a horse shot from under him at Fredericksburg, and General Hood had personally commended him for bravery.
As Lee’s mighty en echelon attack began to unfold that afternoon, Law saw the same problem that alarmed Hood: he did not want to take his troops up the Emmitsburg Road and subject them to almost certain devastating flank fire. So he did not; instead, he ordered them to advance straight on through Devil’s Den and toward Little Round Top. Joining them were the troops of two more brigades—Arkansans, Texans, and Georgians under Brigadier Generals Jerome B. Robertson and Henry L. Benning.
Ahead of them, defending the left flank of Sickles’s line, was a brigade of Federal troops commanded by Brigadier General John Henry Hobart Ward— troops from New York, Maine, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. They ferociously resisted Law’s Confederates, fighting in the bizarre maze of giant boulders in Devil’s Den and pouring down fire from the base of Little Round Top. Ward ordered his men to hold their fire until the Confederates were only 200 yards away—until they could “plainly see the enemy.” It was “desperate tenacious fighting,” in the words of a Federal survivor. After more than an hour of combat, and in danger of being surrounded, the Federals defending Devil’s Den finally retreated back toward Cemetery Ridge and toward Little Round Top, leaving what some called “the Slaughter Pen” in the possession of Hood’s Confederates. It would become a post for Confederate sharpshooters intent on picking off Federal officers atop Little Round Top.
When twenty-seven-year-old Brigadier General Evander M. Law saw the assault route his troops were supposed to follow on July 2—exposed along the Emmitsburg Road—he changed it. Instead, they charged toward Little Round Top.
Photographic History of the Civil War
One of Hood’s Texans fighting his way through Devil’s Den at the base of Little Round Top was Private “Val” Giles, a twenty-one-year-old soldier in the 4th Texas Infantry. For the rest of his life he would remember the smoke, yells, blood, and confusion of that afternoon assault, and before his death in 1915, he recorded this memoir.
It was nearly five o’clock when we began the assault against the enemy that was strongly fortified behind logs and stones on the crest of a steep mountain. It was more than half a mile from our starting point to the edge of the timber at the base of the ridge, comparatively open ground all the way. We started off at quick time, the officers keeping the column in pretty good line until we passed through a blossoming peach orchard and reached the level ground beyond. We were now about 400 yards from the timber. The fire from the enemy, both artillery and musketry, was fearful.
In making that long charge, our brigade got jammed. Regiments lapped over each other, and when we reached the woods and climbed the mountains as far as we could go, we were a badly mixed crowd.
A young Confederate soldier from Hood’s division, killed by Federal fire, lies among the maze of boulders in Devil’s Den.
Library of Congress
Confusion reigned everywhere. Nearly all our field officers were gone. Hood, our Major General, had been shot from his horse. He lost an arm from the wound. Robertson, our Brigadier, had been carried from the field. Colonel Powell of the Fifth Texas was riddled with bullets. Colonel Van Manning of the Third Arkansas was disabled, and Colonel B. F. Carter of my Regiment lay dying at the foot of the mountain.
* * *
“Every Fellow Was His Own General”
* * *
The side of the mountain was heavily timbered and covered with great boulders that had tumbled from the cliffs above years before. These afforded great protection to the men.
Every tree, rock and stump that gave any protection from the rain of Minié balls that were poured down upon us from the crest above us, was soon appropriated. John Griffith and myself preempted a moss-covered old boulder about the size of a 500-pound cotton bale.
By this time order and discipline were gone. Every fellow was his own general. Private soldiers gave commands as loud as the officers. Nobody paid any attention to either. To add to this confusion, our artillery on the hill to our rear was cutting its fuse too short. Their shells were bursting behind us, in the treetops, over our heads, and all around us.
General Hobart Ward commanded a brigade of Northern troops who battled Hood’s Southerners in Devil’s Den and at the foot of the Round Tops. Don’t fire until you can “plainly see the enemy,” Hobart ordered.
Library of Congress
Nothing demoralizes troops quicker than to be fired into by their friends. I saw it occur twice during the war. The first time we ran, but at Gettysburg we couldn’t.
This mistake was soon corrected and the shells burst high on the mountain or went over it.
Major Rogers, then in command of the Fifth Texas Regiment, mounted an old log near my boulder and began a Fourth of July speech. He was a little ahead of time, for that was about six thirty on the evening of July 2d.
Of course nobody was paying any attention to the oration as he appealed to the men to “stand fast.” He and Captain Cousins of the Fourth Alabama were the only two men I saw st
anding. The balance of us had settled down behind rocks, logs, and trees. While the speech was going on, John Haggerty, one of Hood’s couriers, then acting for General Law, dashed up the side of the mountain, saluted the Major and said: “General Law presents his compliments, and says hold this place at all hazards.” The Major checked up, glared down at Haggerty from his’ perch, and shouted: “Compliments, hell! Who wants any compliments in such a damned place as this? Go back and ask General Law if he expects me to hold the world in check with the Fifth Texas Regiment!”
* * *
“The Balance of Us Settled Down behind Rocks, Logs, and Trees”
* * *
The Major evidently thought he had his own regiment with him, but in fact there were men from every regiment in the Texas Brigade all around him.
From behind my boulder I saw a ragged line of battle strung out along the side of Cemetery Ridge and in front of Little Round Top.... We ould hear the Yankee officer on the crest of the idge in front of us cursing the men by platoons, and the men telling him to go to a country not very far away from us just at that time. If that old Satanic dragon has ever been on earth since he offered our Saviour the world if He would serve him, he was certainly at Gettysburg that night....
