The Indian Ocean

by Michael Pearson

  Oman is particularly affected as tankers deballast as they enter the Straits of Hurmuz. After the spilt oil evaporates and is weathered it washes ashore in the form of disgusting tar balls. One half of all the world's merchant shipping passes through the Straits of Melaka, and here also oil spills are a constant possibility.84

  Globalisation also implies social and cultural worldwide integration, but this is not a one-way street, and nor is globalisation exactly the same as westernisation. Here are a few aspects of influences from outside, which show that any attempt to write a history of the ocean covering recent years is really invalid, for so important are outside influences that we really, just like Horden and Purcell in the case of the Mediterranean, can usually only write of history in the ocean, that is one that necessarily stresses extra-ocean influences. In the Gulf region internet usage is expanding rapidly. A recent survey found that 42 per cent of users had bought books from Amazon.com, while 38 per cent watched CNN news, only 8 per cent the local Gulf News.85 This changed during the second Gulf War. The creation of Israel in 1948 led many young Indian Jews to undertake aliyah. Frater was told that of the very old community in Cochin, there were only five families left, a total of thirty-one people. Of the remaining young men one was about to leave for Israel, and there had been no local weddings for seventeen years.86 Or consider that Reunion, still a French possession where the Catholic church is powerful, has one of the highest birth rates in the world: nearly 3½ per cent a year. The Jesuit network stretches globally. Young Jesuits from India are adopted by western congregations, often in Germany, and they in turn when they go back to India act as mentors for Catholic communities in East Africa.

  We have written extensively about Muslim conversion and rectification networks in previous periods. These efforts continue to today, so that Islam is the fastest growing religion in Africa. Here then is another aspect of globalisation, connections which spread around and beyond the ocean. This is hardly westernisation, and nor is the spread of Indian movies. Too often writers bewail the octopus spread of Hollywood and American TV soaps. It is true that for some years the American soap Baywatch was the most watched series in the world, but the spread of Hindi movies in all the Indian Ocean and beyond is equally important. These movies are certainly formulaic, but the formula is different from Hollywood. 'Marsala' films are influenced by Indian classical literature, especially the great epics of the Ramayana and Mahabharata. Every film, regardless of subject matter, has dance and music in conjunction with romance, adventure, violence and morality. What is important is that this recipe appeals not only to the Indian diaspora, but to many others in Africa, the Middle East and southeast Asia. This is understandable in arguably Indianised areas like Burma and Indonesia, but they also find a huge market in Kenya, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Singapore, the Gulf states, Thailand and Indonesia.87 Changes in Indian television have also provided a new market for Bollywood, and all the other areas of India which make movies. Up to the early 1990s the government-controlled Doordarshan mostly, as a matter of policy, promoted the Hindi language. Now that private players have been allowed in, there is much more content in other Indian languages, and also more foreign content. More channels need more product from the local film industry. Here also however westernisation has not been totally triumphant. Rupert Murdoch found that he had to indigenise his offerings via satellite in India much more than he had expected to.88

  So far we can write about the distribution of these movies, or for that matter of Islam or Christianity, but we know little about something even more important, that is their consumption. Certainly Hindi and other Indian movies mean different things to different audiences, in other words are consumed in different ways by different receptors, but this difficult matter has been little studied so far.

  In some aspects globalisation has acted to increase worldwide communications at the expense of more local circuits. As examples, it is now quicker to get to Paris from Mayotte than it is to get to Zanzibar, despite age-old connections between these two East African islands. Similarly, it is quicker to get goods from a French mail order firm than it is to get something from Mombasa, again undermining very ancient local connections. International connections via satellite, for those who can afford them, are often quicker and more reliable than internal telephone connections in many littoral countries around the Indian Ocean.89

  A further aspect of history in the Indian Ocean is to look at strategic matters, and the place of the ocean during the Cold War and later. We need also to consider the local reaction to this, which is halting moves towards greater integration within the region, that is then an attempt to respond by a focus of or within the ocean.

  The context is the end of the British lake period. British naval dominance was plain to see after 1815, and indeed could be dated from the end of the Seven Years War in 1763. This lake took very little effort to remain exclusive, as no other power challenged British dominance, except for a land-based threat from Russia. Britain concentrated her navy in the Atlantic and the Pacific, not the Indian Ocean, and within the ocean spent most money on the Indian Army. The Royal Navy's job was to combat piracy, as defined by the British, and to suppress the slave trade. It was only in the 1920s that British naval dominance worldwide began to be eroded.

  As independence got closer the influential author and diplomat K.M. Panikkar wrote a short book about India and the Indian Ocean. He complained bitterly that his fellow countrymen were landlubbers, yet 'In fact it may truly be said that India never lost her independence till she lost the command of the sea in the first decade of the sixteenth century.' From this time 'the future of India has been determined not on the land frontiers, but on the oceanic expanse which washes the three sides of India.' It was crucial that newly independent India have a strong navy, in alliance with a continuing British presence, for British 'interests in the Ocean are such that it will be nothing short of national suicide for her to withdraw from that area.'90

  Alas, Britain's decline as a Great Power meant a role in the distant and by now rather irrelevant Indian Ocean was beyond its capacity. In 1968 Harold Wilson announced that Britain was to withdraw from the Far East, the Arabian Sea and the Gulf by the end of 1971. They left the great naval base at Singapore in 1975, truly marking the end of an era. It is no coincidence that it was in 1971 that the Soviet Union first sent a substantial fleet into the ocean, though they had had a smaller presence for a few years previously. The ocean in fact now became a player, albeit a minor one, in the Cold War.

  Writing at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is already difficult to appreciate the intensity of feeling generated by the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States as it affected the Indian Ocean. Certainly at the time some academics and serving officers saw a very clear danger. Hanne, writing in the Military Review, subtitled the 'Professional Journal of the United States Army', was concerned that the United States had not moved in to fill the vacuum left by the British departure: 'many analysts have stated that the United States, with or without its allies, would have to move a visible naval force into that region to preclude its immediate de facto annexation by the Soviet Union into its "sphere of influence.''' Large areas of the Soviet Union would be within range of American submarines if they were based in the Indian Ocean, but instead, 'Attempting to convince the newly independent powers that security, self-determination and equitable prosperity come from the acceptance of a pro-Soviet foreign policy, the USSR is moving steadily along many fronts, publicly confident in the historic veracity of its ideology.'91 So also from the defence analyst Patrick Wall in his edited book The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West. He complained that the West 'is watching supinely while the world's greatest land power [that is, the Soviet Union] starts to dominate the sea as well.' Instead of doing something about this, 'Leftward-leaning Western Governments enthusiastically abuse, and try to boycott, South Africa and Rhodesia. At the same time, without seeing any inconsistency, they advocate an expansion of trade and c
lose cultural links with the Soviet Union and her satellites.' It was a matter for regret that 'Few, if any, African states can really be called pro-Western. The majority are unaligned but responsive to Soviet, and Chinese, penetration.... Lenin believed that the Western democracies would destroy themselves from within through becoming soft, greedy, and lacking in will power. He may yet prove to have been right.'92 Scary stuff, but perhaps appropriately I bought my copy of this book at a stall. The stamp inside said 'Discarded'.

  What happened was that the Soviet Union was concerned about what it perceived as an American build-up in the area, as seen in the total support given to the Shah of Iran from the early 1960s, and the formation of various military alliances, of which the most important for our area was CENTO. In August 1971 the Indian and Soviet governments signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which increased Soviet access in the region. The west was concerned not only about Soviet activities, but also about the fact that as domestic oil supplies declined in the United States the Indian Ocean, and especially the Straits of Hurmuz and Melaka, were the choke points through which travelled much of the vital oil. Japan, vital to American interests, received 85 per cent of all its oil from the Gulf via the Indian Ocean, and Europe about 50 per cent.

  Yet neither side invested very substantially in a naval presence in the ocean. Both were held back by communications difficulties, as the ocean was far from their major bases, let alone their home states.93 It was only on exceptional occasions that either side displayed any great interest. In 1971 the United States was worried about India's role in 'liberating' Bangladesh from the control of Pakistan. Henry Kissinger sent a task force of the Seventh Fleet, led by the USS Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal. However, it seems that this action, although seen as threatening by India, in fact was designed to warn China not to intervene. In 1979 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the Shah, an American client, lost Iran. Briefly the Indian Ocean area became again a central part of the Cold War. The unhappy result was that India was armed by the Soviets, Pakistan by the United States, and so their existing tense relations, and ability to attack each other, were exacerbated by the actions of the two major players in the Cold War.

  It is true that this relatively benign view owes something to hindsight. At the time it was understandable that analysts and policy makers took things more seriously. In the 1980s there was a major build-up of strategic weapons in the ocean, with both sides deploying nuclear submarines. Perhaps even more worrying, by the mid 1980s India had a nuclear capacity, even if this was not publicly announced, while Pakistan also had one potentially, which however they chose not to finalise in deference to United States wishes.94 This period of opaque nuclear capability was ended by the overt nuclear tests of May 1998.

  One consequence of the Cold War was that the United States built a major base on the island of Diego Garcia. This island was very well located, being more or less in the middle of the ocean, roughly latitude 7° S and longitude 72° E, 1,600 km south of India. It is an instructive story. It begins as early as 1961 with an agreement between Harold Macmillan and John F. Kennedy. As early as this the British wanted an increase in the American presence in the Indian Ocean, and the United States provided them with nuclear missiles as a quid pro quo. From the American angle, a well-located base in the ocean would help to secure the passage of vital oil tankers, and would bring most of the Soviet Union within range of Polaris missiles. It also meant American warships could operate more readily in the Indian Ocean, rather than have to come all the way from the existing major base, Subic Bay in the Philippines. The Seventh Fleet, for example, could reach Mumbai in three days steaming from Diego Garcia.

  The detail is rather sordid. In 1965 Mauritius was promised independence, but Harold Wilson, at American insistence, said the condition was that they give up part of their territory, the Chagos Archipelago. The soon-to-be independent state was also given £3 million in 'development assistance'. The British turned Chagos into the British Indian Ocean Territories. A year later, in 1966, one of the islands, Diego Garcia, with an area of about 11 square miles, was leased to the United States. The United States wanted an area where there was no population, and the British obliged by removing the 1,000 inhabitants of the island to Mauritius, where they were left to rot. When these people, the Ilois, complained to the Americans about their treatment they were told it was a matter for the British government, not the United States.95

  Diego Garcia has played a major role in United States actions in the Middle East, notably during the Gulf War of 1991, and the current (2001–02) 'war against terrorism'. They built a communications site on the island in 1971, and by the mid 1970s this was a major naval air base. The runway can handle any sort of plane, the port can accommodate an entire battle carrier group. In the late 1980s the island was populated by over 2,000 United States servicepeople, and 1,200 Filipinos to do food service and domestic work. At any one time about 800 personnel are ashore from ships in the harbour.96 Yet in essence United States interest in the Indian Ocean is strictly limited. They have no such hegemonic designs as were enforced by the Royal Navy for over a century. Rather, they want to be able to respond to any threat which affects their perceived interests, but no more. Just as Lord Curzon said that Britain took no interest in what the Arabs did inland, so also the Americans care little for any possible hostilities between various states around the ocean, provided oil supplies are not threatened. The crisis following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 provides further support for this analysis, for they obviously constituted a threat to American interests and so elicited a massive response.

  It should be remembered that the Indian Ocean differs in an important respect from the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, for in these two several major powers have interests and borders: no major power is located on the Indian Ocean littoral. No local navy has come close to achieving a major role, let alone dominance, in the ocean. The end of the Cold War has removed any significant Russian presence. Southeast Asian states have minor naval capacity, designed to patrol to stop refugees and to curtail piracy. Australia's navy similarly has almost no blue water capacity, and as I write is merely patrolling to stop any influx of refugees, a demeaning role indeed. Today the only major blue water navy from a littoral country is India's.

  When India and Pakistan became independent in 1947 British governments thought that India's role should be to provide, within a Commonwealth structure, assistance to the West to curtail China and the Soviet Union. India's navy was not really oriented towards Indian interests, but rather was to act as a minor ally in the effort to contain communism. It was not until 1958 that an Indian became Chief of Naval Staff, and some English officers continued to serve in the Indian navy until the early 1960s. The navy was neglected, the army was privileged. In 1962, on the eve of the war with China, the Indian Navy got 4.7 per cent of the defence budget, the army 77.5 per cent and the air force 17.8 per cent. After dependence on Britain ended, India simply moved to relying more or less totally on the Soviet Union: by the end of the 1980s seventy per cent of Indian military hardware came from the USSR.97 This did however enable a larger blue water role for the Indian Navy. The Indian press over the last few years has reported on quite major and far-reaching naval exercises. The aim is for the navy to 'wield appreciable influence on the waters extending from the periphery of the Persian Gulf in the west to the Strait of Malacca to the east.' The larger plan is for the Indian Navy 'to acquire a limited blue water capability as well as a restricted capacity to launch a seaward attack on land.'98 Indian Navy ships have even undertaken exercises past the Straits of Melaka in the South China Sea, in conjunction with the Vietnamese navy. India today has the seventh largest navy in the world. In early 2002 they were negotiating to buy a second aircraft carrier from Russia, and to lease two nuclear-powered submarines.99

  India was assuming what it considered to be its natural role in the ocean, that is as the dominant local power. It was claimed that this had
to do with India's size, and its location across major sea routes. Nehru claimed just before independence that 'Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically she [India] is so situated as to be the meeting point of Western and Northern and Eastern and South-East Asia.'100 On several visits to India I have had social dealings with young Indian Navy officers, a very suave and elite group of men with impeccable manners. When they found out I was from Australia they expressed polite interest, and talked about cricket. But I had a strong sense that they were thinking to themselves, 'We could take out you Australians without too much trouble,' as indeed they could. India's self-perception as the main player in the Indian Ocean even extended as far south as Antarctica, where India has assumed a vigorous role as various treaties allocate areas of interest.

  For a time this expanded role was looked on benevolently by the Americans, and cooperation between the two navies increased. India's ties with Russia were much less of a problem once the Cold War was over, and the country was seen by the Americans as being a democracy, and essentially status quo. Thus it could to an extent take over some of America's role in the Indian Ocean. Once India freed up its economy, in the early 1990s, it became something of a favourite with American investors. Similarly, there are strong ties, and much exchange of personnel, between computer specialists in California's Silicon Valley and the Indian equivalent in Bangalore. India was favoured over Pakistan in the 1990s.

  It is unclear to neighbouring states, and especially Pakistan, whether India wants its navy to play a defensive, or an offensive, role. Certainly India, especially under a more nationalistic and even chauvinistic BJP government, has made it clear that they expect as of right to be seen as the dominant local power in the Indian Ocean, but this does not necessarily mean any aggressive role. Indeed, despite the exercises and projection of Indian power all around the ocean, there are also major problems. The collapse of the Soviet Union and liberalisation of the economy had a directly restricting result for the Indian Navy. One influential commentator complained that the navy is still the poor relation. Ships are usually at sea only seven days in every month, and the number of frigates and destroyers has gone down between 1976 and 1996 from thirty-one to twenty-four.101 The focus of the Indian defence establishment has always been on Pakistan, with the conflict in Kashmir central, and this is a matter where navies have little role to play. Two recent events may have altered significantly the whole strategic situation. In May 1998 both India and Pakistan became overt nuclear states. The 'war against terror' after September 2001 has produced a whole new scenario, where at least for a time America is much more supportive of Pakistan. The re-entry of America in force into the region is obviously a significant event whose consequences are yet to be fully worked out.