My Adventures as a German Secret Service Agent

by Horst Von Goltz

  There is a typical German Club in New York the Deutscher Verein in Central Park South. During the war it has been used as a sub-office of the German General Staff. It was here that von Papen used to store the dynamite that was needed in such enterprises as the Welland Canal plot. It was here that conspirators used to meet for conferences which no one, not even the other members of the Club, could tell were not as innocent as they seemed.

  These German societies and other agencies were used not merely to promote sympathy for the German cause, but also to influence public opinion in matters of purely American interest. On January 21, 1916, Henry Weismann, president of the Brooklyn branch of the German-American National Alliance, sent a report to headquarters in Chicago regarding the activities of his organisation in the recent elections. In the Twenty-third Congressional District of New York, Ellsworth J. Healey had been a candidate for Congress. Both he and another man, John J. Fitzgerald, candidate for Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, were regarded by German interests as "unneutral." They were defeated, and Weismann, in commenting upon the matter, wrote: "The election returns prove that Deutschtum is armed and able, when the word is given, to seat its men."

  Even in the campaign for preparedness Germany took a hand. Berlin was appealed to in some cases as to the attitude that American citizens of German descent should adopt towards this policy. Professor Appelmann, of the University of Vermont, wrote to Dr. Paul Rohrbach, one of the advisers of the Wilhelmstrasse, requesting his advice upon the subject. Dr. Rohrbach replied that American Deutschtum should not be in favour of preparedness, because "it is quite conceivable that in the event of an American- Japanese war Germany might adopt an attitude of very benevolent neutrality towards Japan and so make it easier for Japan to defeat the United States." And not long ago the Herold des Glaubens of St. Louis made this statement: "When we found that the agitation for preparedness was in the interest of the munition makers, and that its aim was a war with Germany, we certainly turned against it, and we have agitated against it for the last three months."

  But this anti-militaristic spirit was a rather sudden development on the part of the German societies. In 1911, when a new treaty of arbitration with Great Britain was under consideration, a group of roughs, led and organised by a Gefrman, violently broke up a meeting held under the auspices of the New York Peace Society to support that treaty. The man who broke that meeting up was Alphonse G. Koelble. It was this same Koelble who in 1915, when Germany's attack upon America was most bitter, organised a meeting of "The Friends of Peace," in order to protest against militarism! Strange, is it not, this inconsistency? Or was it that Mr. Koelble was acting under orders?

  Germany did these things not only for their political effect, but also because she knew that she could turn the evidence of her own meddling to account. It was for the same reason that Wolf von Igel, von Papen's secretary and successor, retained in his office a list of American citizens of German descent who "could be relied on." This list was found by agents of the Department of Justice when von Igel's office was raided. And the German agents were glad it was discovered. It gave to Americans an additional proof of the hold which Germany had obtained over a large group of German-Americans.

  It was as late as March, 1916, that the members of the Minnesota Chapter of the German-American National Alliance received a circular, advising them of the attitude towards Germany of the various candidates for delegate to the national conventions of the different parties, and indicating by a star the names of those men "about whom it has been ascertained that they are in agreement with the views and wishes of Deutschland, and that if elected they will act accordingly." I do not believe that the men who sent that circular expected it to be widely obeyed. But unquestionably they knew it would be made public.

  I think that if the German conspirators in America had confined their activities to this field they might ultimately have succeeded. They had managed to seduce a sufficient number of German-Americans to cause the entire German-American population to be regarded with suspicion. They had contrived to discredit the Pacifist and Labour movements by making public their own connection with individuals in these bodies. They had aroused the public to such a pitch of distrust that in the Presidential campaign of 1916 the support of the "German vote "was regarded with distaste by both candidates. And they had helped to create so tremendous a dissension in America that friendships of long standing were broken up, German merchants in many communities lost all but their German customers, and German-Americans were belaboured in print with such twaddle as the following:

  "The German-Americans predominate in the grog-shops, low dives, pawnshops and numerous artifices for money-making and corrupt practices in politics."

  The foregoing statement, which I quote from a book, "German Conspiracies in the United States," is not perhaps a fair sample of the attacks made upon German-Americans by the Press in general, but it is indicative of the heights to which feeling ran in the case of a few uninformed or hysterical persons. The point is that to a large portion of the populace the German-Americans had become enemies and objects of abuse.

  They, in turn, beset on all sides by a campaign of slander insidiously fostered by men to whom they had given their trust, did exactly what had been expected. They fell right into the arms of that movement which for fourteen years had been subsidised for that very purpose. They ceased to read American newspapers. They read German newspapers, many of which almost openly preached disloyalty to the United States. They became clannish and joined German societies which frequently contained German agents. They began to boycott American business houses and dealt only with those of German affiliation.

  Germany had gained her point. She alone could gain by the disunion of the country. It was to her advantage that the profits which had formerly gone to American business houses should be deflected to German corporations. And had she rested her efforts there 9 she might, as I say, have seen them produce results in the form of riots and armed dissension which would have effectually prevented the United States from entering the war.

  But Germany overreached herself. Emboldened by the apparent success of their schemes, her principal agents, von Papen, Boy-Ed and von Rintelen (who had begun his work in January, 1915) became careless, so far as secrecy was concerned, and so audacious in their plans that they betrayed themselves, perhaps intentionally, as a final demonstration of their power. The results are notorious. In so far as the disclosures of their activities tended further to implicate the German-Americans, they did harm. But by these very disclosures the eyes of many German-Americans were opened to the true nature of the influence to which they had been subjected, and through that fact the worst element of the German propaganda in America received its death-blow.

  To-day the United States is at war, and no intelligent man now questions the loyalty of the majority of the citizens of German blood. That in the past their sympathies have been with Germany is unquestioned and, from their standpoint, entirely proper. That in many cases they view the participation of the United States in the war with regret is probable. But that they will stand up and, if need be, fight as stanchly as any other group in the country, no man may doubt.

  That is the story of the darkest chapter in the history of German intrigue. Other things have f been done in this war at which a humane man may blush. Other crimes have been committed which not even the strongest partisan can condone. But at least it may be said that these things were done to enemies or to neutral people whom fortune had put in the way of injury. The betrayal of the German-Americans was a wanton crime against men whom every association and every tie of kinship or tradition should have served to protect.

  Germany has not yet abandoned that attack. There are still spies in the United States, you may be sure still intrigues are being fostered. And there are still men who, consciously or unconsciously, are striving to discredit the German-Americans by presenting them as unwilling to bear their share in the burden of the nation's war. Only a week before these lines
were written one man George Sylvester Viereck circulated a petition begging that Germans should not be sent to fight their countrymen, and an organisation of German Protestant churches in America repeated this plea. As a German whom fortune has placed outside the battle, and as one whose patriotism is extended towards blood rather than dynasty, I ask Mr. Viereck and these other gentlemen if they have not forgotten that many German-Americans have already shown their feelings by volunteering for service in this war and if they have not also forgotten that the two great wars of American history were fought between men of the same blood.

  Ties of blood have never prevented men from fighting for a cause which they believed to be just. They will not in this war! And when Mr. Viereck and his kind protest against the participation in the war of men of any descent whatever, they imply that the American cause is not just, and that it is not worthy of the support of the men they claim to represent.

  Is this their intention?

  CHAPTER XI

  MISCHIEF IN MEXICO

  More about the German intrigue against the United States German aims in Latin America Japan and Germany in Mexico What happened in Cuba?

  "AMERICAN intervention in Mexico would mean another Ireland, another Poland another sore spot in the world. Well, why not?"

  Those were almost the last words spoken to me when I left Germany in 1914 upon my illfated mission to England. I had in my pocket at the moment detailed memoranda of instructions which, if they could be carried out, would insure such disturbances in Mexico that the United States would be compelled to intervene. I had been given authority to spend almost unlimited sums of money for the purchase of arms, for the bribery of officials for anything, in fact, that would cause trouble in Mexico. And the words I have quoted were not spoken by an uninformed person with a taste for cynical comment; they were uttered by Major Kohnemann, of Abteilung III. B of the German General Staff. They form a lucid and concrete explanation of German activities in Mexico during the past eight years.

  Long before this war began German agents were at work in Mexico stirring up trouble in the hope of causing the United States to intervene. I have already told how, in 1910 and 1911, Germany had encouraged Japan and Mexico in negotiating a treaty that was to give Japan an important foothold in Mexico. I have told how, after this treaty was well on the way to completion, Germany saw to it that knowledge of the projected terms was brought to the attention of the United States thereby indirectly causing Diaz's abdication (see Chapter V.). That instance is not an isolated case of German meddling in Mexican affairs. Rather is it symptomatic of the traditional policy of Wilhelmstrasse in regard to America.

  It may be well to examine this policy more closely than I have done. Long ago Germany saw in South America a fertile field for exploitation, not only in a commercial way, in which it presented excellent opportunities to German manufacturers, but also as a possible opportunity for expansion which had been denied her elsewhere. All of the German colonies were in torrid climates, in which life for the white man was attended with tremendous hardships, and exploitation and colonisation were consequently impeded. Only in the Far East and in South America could she find territories either unprotected through their own weakness, or so thinly settled that they offered at once a temptation and an opportunity to the nation with imperialistic ambitions. In tire former quarters she was blocked by a concert of the Powers, many of them actuated by similar aims, but all working at such cross-purposes that aggression by any one of them was impossible. In Chapter II. I alluded to the result of such a situation in my discussion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. In South America there was only one formidable obstacle to German expansion the Monroe Doctrine.

  I am stating the case with far less than its real complexity. There were, it is true, many facts in the form of conflicting rivalries of the Powers as well as internal conditions in South America, that would have had a deterrent effect upon the German programme. Nevertheless, it is certain that the prime factor in keeping Germany out of South America was the traditional policy of the United States; and, so far as the German Government's attitude in the matter is concerned, it is the only phase of the problem worth considering.

  Germany had no intention of securing territory by a war of conquest. Her method was far * simpler and much less assailable. She promptly instituted a peaceful invasion of various parts of the continent; first, in the persons of merchants who captured trade but did not settle permanently in the country; second, by means of a vast army of immigrants, who, unlike those who a generation before had come to the United States, settled, but retained their German citizenship. With this unnaturalised element she hoped to form a nucleus in many of the important South American countries which, wielding a tremendous commercial power and possessing a political influence that was considerable, although indirect, would aid her in determining the course of South American politics, so that by a form of peaceful expansion she could eventually achieve her aims.

  Was this a dream? At any rate, it received the support of many of the ablest statesmen of Gemany, who duly set about the task of discrediting the Monroe Doctrine in the eyes of the very people it was designed to protect, so that the United States, if it ever came forcibly to defend the Doctrine, would find itself opposed not only by Germany, but by South America as well.

  Now, the easiest way to cast suspicion upon a policy is to discredit the sponsor of it. In the case of the United States and South America this was not at all difficult; for the Southern nations already possessed a well-defined fear and a dislike of their northern neighbour which were not by any means confined to the more ignorant portions of the population. Fear of American aggression has been somewhat of a bugaboo in many quarters. Recognising this, Germany, which has always adopted the policy of aggravating ready-made troubles for her own ends, steadily fomented that fear by means of a quiet but well-conducted propaganda, and also by seeking to force the United States into taking action that would justify that fear.

  As a means towards securing this latter end, Mexico presented itself as a heaven-sent opportunity. Even in the days when it was, to outward eyes, a well-ordered community, there had been men in the United States who had expressed themselves in favour of an expansion southwards which would result in the ultimate absorption of Mexico; and although such talk had never attracted much attention in the quarter from which it emanated, there were those who saw to it that proposals of this sort received an effective publicity south of the Isthmus. Given, then, a Mexico in which discontent had become so acute that it was being regarded with alarm by American and foreign investors, the possibility of intervention became more immediate and the opportunity of the trouble-maker increased proportionately.

  Germany's first step in this direction was the encouragement of a Japanese-Mexican alliance, the failure of which was a vital part of her programme. It was a risky undertaking, for if, by any chance, the alliance were successfully concluded, the United States might well hesitate to attack the combined forces of the two countries; and Mexico, fortified by Japan, would present a bulwark against the real or fancied danger of American expansion, that, for a time at least, would effectually allay the fears of South America. That risk Germany took and, in so far as she had planned to prevent the alliance, scored a success. That she failed in her principal aim was due to the anti-imperialist tendencies of the United States and the statesmanship of Señor Limantour rather than to any other cause.

  Then came the Madero Administration with its mystical programme of reform and an opposition headed by almost all of the able men in the Republic, both Mexican and foreign. Bitterly fought by the ring of Cientificos, who saw the easy spoils of the past slipping from their hands; distrusted by many honest men, who sincerely believed that Mexico was better ruled by an able despot than by an upright visionary; hampered by the aloofness of foreign business and Governments, waiting for a success which they alone could ensure, before they should approve and support; and constantly beset with uneasiness by the incomprehensible attitude
of the Taft Administration and of its Ambassador the fate of the Madero Government was easily foreseen.

  Before Madero had been in power for three months this opposition had taken form as a campaign of obstruction in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies supported by the Press, controlled almost exclusively by the Cientificos and by foreign capitalists; by the clergy, who had reason to suspect the Government of anti-clerical tendencies; and by isolated groups of opportunity-seekers who saw in the Administration an obstacle to their own political and economic aims. The Madero family were represented as incompetent and selfseeking; and in a short time the populace, which a month before had hailed the new Government as a saviour of the country, had been persuaded that its programme of economic reform had been merely a political pretence, and accordingly added its strength to the party of the Opposition.