Lone Wolf Terrorism

by Jeffrey D. Simon

  Perhaps one of the most obvious and yet overlooked reasons for why the Internet is the lifeblood for many potential lone wolf terrorists is the same reason it is the lifeblood for many scholars, professionals, and the curious public—namely, the addictive appeal of finding out virtually everything about anything at any time one chooses to do so. From using Google to research any topic, issue, or person to downloading books, articles, documents, and other materials, the world has opened up to anybody with access to a computer or smartphone. While for the most part this is a positive development, the downside is that a lot of material online is inflammatory and can inspire to take action those who may otherwise have never thought to do so. A blog or a webpage does not have to be controlled by extremists to have a catalyzing effect on volatile individuals.

  Furthermore, even legitimate sources of information accessed on the Internet can propel individuals into violent action, whereas years ago such people may not have even thought about current affairs or any other issue. No longer do people have to go to a library, buy a newspaper, visit a bookstore, or attend a lecture to learn about the world around them. The Internet provides them with sufficient information to formulate views on any topic or issue they choose. For some potential lone wolves, this may be all that is needed to fuel hidden passions that can lead them to violence.

  Another often-overlooked aspect of the technological and Internet age we are living in is that an individual can be “connected” to people, things, and ideas while at the same time being isolated, anonymous, and very alone. Individuals can hide behind screen names and yet share details about their lives with others while never having to meet face-to-face. People can walk down the street and be oblivious to all that is around them while they are tuned into their smartphone, iPod, or any other device providing them with music, conversation, or other information. We are living in a society where eye contact and interpersonal relations can be replaced by e-mails, texting, and tweets. All this plays into the hands of lone wolves, who can remain “alone,” if they choose to do so, while still connecting with the world around them.

  LEADERLESS TERRORISM

  The growth of lone wolf terrorism can also be viewed as part of a trend in terrorism that began in the 1990s and has been described as “leaderless resistance.” The main proponent of this form of terrorism was Louis Beam, a white supremacist who, in 1992, wrote an influential article, “Leaderless Resistance,” that was published in his own journal, the Seditionist. Beam called for the creation of small, autonomous, underground groups that would be driven by ideology and shared beliefs rather than the direction of leaders and members of organizations. In his article, Beam credited the origins of the concept of “leaderless resistance” to a retired US Air Force colonel, Ulius Amoss, who several decades earlier had proposed the strategy as a defense against a Communist takeover of the United States. For Beam, the strategy now was needed “to defeat state tyranny.” The advantage of leaderless resistance over other strategies was that only those participating in an attack or any other type of action would know of the plans, therefore reducing the chance of leaks or infiltration. As Beam wrote, “All individuals and groups operate independently of each other and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction…. Participants in a program of Leaderless Resistance through phantom cell or individual action must know exactly what they are doing, and exactly how to do it.”25

  It is not just white supremacists who have followed the strategy of leaderless resistance. So too have environmental extremist groups such as the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front, which are not actually groups but rather small autonomous cells with no central leadership. The same is true for antiabortion militant movements such as the Army of God. Many Islamic extremists have also followed a form of “leaderless resistance,” which terrorism scholar Marc Sageman aptly describes as “leaderless jihad.” These are Islamic militants who do not rely on direction or orders from al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization. As Sageman notes, these extremists “form fluid, informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. They have no physical headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant virtual environment of the Internet offers them a semblance of unity and purpose. Theirs is a scattered, decentralized social structure—a leaderless jihad.”26

  There have been numerous cases of leaderless jihadist attacks in recent years. This does not mean, however, that in all cases “face-to-face radicalization has been replaced by online radicalization.”27 Islamic militants can still form leaderless jihadist links with each other in “real life,” such as through meetings at mosques, coffee shops, schools, and so forth. But Sageman is correct in viewing the Islamic extremist threat as coming more from informal networks of small numbers of militants rather than from large-scale, hierarchal organizations. With so many different types of terrorists adopting a “leaderless” philosophy but not all fitting into a “resistance” category (hence Sageman's leaderless jihad phrase), it would seem that a better term to use would be leaderless terrorists. This would, of course, include the multitude of lone wolves with varied causes who operate either entirely alone or with minimal assistance from others.

  The idea that the world of terrorism is being populated by individuals not formally linked to an organization or central command is a difficult concept for many people to accept. The history of terrorism has been characterized by many well-known, organized groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and hundreds of others active in previous decades. There is also an assumption held by many that terrorist operations are complex endeavors that require detailed planning, resources, training, and leadership directed by large-scale organizations. That is not always the case, and as we have seen in recent years, the number of terrorist incidents and plots involving terrorists not affiliated with any group has increased. This adds to the challenges in combating terrorism. While centralized and even decentralized groups provide governments and others dedicated to fighting terrorism with a concrete object on which to focus their policies, the leaderless terrorists are more problematic. They are difficult to identify, track, and arrest. It is also difficult to proclaim a “war on terrorism” or any other catchy phrase when the threat emanates from leaderless terrorists.

  Government, law-enforcement, and intelligence agencies from around the world have taken notice of the leaderless terrorist and lone wolf threat. The Canadian government's Integrated Threat Assessment Centre warned in 2007 that “lone wolves motivated by Islamist extremism are a recent development. Islamist terrorist strategies are now advocating that Muslims take action at a grassroots level, without waiting for instructions.”28 An Australian government white paper stated that, in terms of al Qaeda and Islamic extremism, “‘lone-wolf’ attackers with no group affiliation but motivated by the same ideology can emerge at any time.”29 And it is not just the lone wolf seduced by jihadism that worries officials. The European Law Enforcement Agency (Europol) noted in 2010 that, in terms of right-wing terrorism in Britain, “individuals motivated by extreme right-wing views, acting alone, pose far more of a threat than the current [right-wing] networks or groups.”30 Meanwhile, a 2009 US Department of Homeland Security report stated that “lone wolves and small terrorist cells embracing rightwing extremist ideology are the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United States.”31

  THE DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA

  Any book on terrorism raises the question of how exactly does the author define terrorism. The problem with most definitions is that they are either too narrow and thereby exclude many significant cases of terrorist activity or are so broad as to be quite useless in understanding the terrorist phenomenon. There are also obvious biases and contradictions in many definitions, since they are usually based on ideological and political perceptions of the terrorist threat as well as the bureaucratic interests of various government agencies and departments around the world. The more disagreements
there are on defining terrorism, the more terrorists can benefit by the added confusion on the issue.

  The difficulty in defining terrorism has given rise to the famous slogan, “One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter.” Communities that support various groups in their violent acts do not necessarily see them as “terrorists.” Since the essence of terrorism is the effect that violent acts can have on various targets and audiences, it would make more sense to talk about terrorist-type tactics—which can be utilized by extremist groups, guerrillas, governments, and lone wolves—than to attempt to determine who exactly qualifies as a “terrorist.” The blowing up of planes, whether done by lone wolves or organized groups, is terrorism. The same is true for hijackings, assassinations, bombings, product contaminations, and other violent acts. Several decades of futile efforts to reach a consensus on defining terrorism should be a clear enough signal to move on to other aspects of the terrorist threat.32

  However, more than twenty-five years of being involved in terrorism research and analysis has convinced me that readers and others expect some type of definition to be offered. This volume's appendix provides a detailed discussion of the key elements needed for a practical definition of terrorism, in general, and lone wolf terrorism, in particular. For now, though, we can think of lone wolf terrorism as the use or threat of violence or nonviolent sabotage (including cyber attacks) by an individual acting alone, or with minimal support from one or two other people, to further a political, social, religious, financial, or other related goal, or, when not having such an objective, nevertheless has the same effect upon government and society in terms of creating fear and/or disrupting daily life and/or causing government and society to react with heightened security and/or other responses.

  We need, however, to go beyond the issue of definitions of terrorism in order to fully understand the motivations of lone wolf terrorists. Why exactly do lone wolves do the things they do? Is it for the same reasons that terrorist groups and cells perpetrate their violence, or are there some unique characteristics that propel the individual terrorist into action? Addressing this issue is an important part of understanding the lone wolf phenomenon.

  Trying to understand what makes terrorists tick has perplexed academics, policymakers, and the public for centuries. The once-popular notion that terrorists must be irrational because they kill innocent people has long been discarded as political, religious, territorial, and other objectives have been linked to various terrorist activities. For those terrorists with consciences, the French anarchist Émile Henry's proclamation in 1894 that “there are no innocent bourgeois”1 created the template that helps soothe the pangs of guilt that terrorsts of any ideological stripe might feel as a result of the deaths of children and other “innocents.” The only justification, however, that most terrorists have needed throughout history for their violence was a belief that the ends justified the means. If those ends were winning a homeland or an autonomous region, then even if innocent civilians were killed, that was the price that had to be paid for the “cause.” The same was true if the objective was the overthrow of a government, a global revolution, or any other cause.

  Lone wolves, however, usually do not even have to consider whether the ends justify the means. Since they are beholden to nobody but themselves, they alone can determine the course of action they will take. While some, like many terrorist groups, will make rational decisions based on the costs and benefits of various attacks, others will simply act without much thought being given to the consequences. But, like all terrorists, lone wolves have to decide whether the tactics and targets they choose will achieve their objectives. Understanding those tactics, targets, and objectives can help unlock some of the mysteries concerning who the lone wolves really are.

  LONE WOLF TACTICS, TARGETS, MOTIVATIONS, AND OBJECTIVES

  Throughout the history of terrorism, there have been a surprisingly small number of different tactics employed by terrorists, whether they are lone wolves or members of a terrorist organization. Just ten basic tactics have characterized terrorist behavior over time: bombings, hijackings, assassinations, kidnappings, armed assaults (machine-gun, rocket, or other violent attacks against people or buildings), barricade-hostage incidents (seizures of embassies or other government or business structures), product contamination, release of chemical or biological agents, cyberterrorism, and suicide attacks. The latter category often overlaps with several of the other types of tactics, such as bombings and armed assaults, in which the perpetrator willingly dies in the attack. And there can be, of course, combinations of tactics, such as the hijacking-suicide attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York City; Washington, DC; and Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

  While lone wolves can do many of the same things that terrorist groups do, such as hijack an airplane, assassinate a government leader, or shoot up a gathering of people, there are some operations that are better suited for larger groups or cells. For example, a kidnapping usually requires several people to abduct the targeted individual, transport him or her to a safe house, keep guard, and so forth. And lone wolves obviously cannot commit simultaneous attacks, unless they use timing devices and place bombs in several locations. They can, however, commit dual attacks where there is a short time period between incidents. This occurred in Norway in July 2011 when Anders Breivik set off a bomb in Oslo and then two hours later massacred youths at a political summer camp. Lone wolves, for the most part, have at their disposal the same array of tactics that other terrorists have.

  The targets of lone wolves are also not that significantly different from those of terrorist groups or cells. Lone wolves have attacked government, business, military, and civilian targets, and they have conducted both indiscriminate and selective killings. Among the indiscriminate murders by lone wolves were those of Timothy McVeigh, who was responsible for the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people, including several children. Among the more infamous selective attacks by lone wolves were those of Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, who sent package bombs to specific individuals over a seventeen-year period.

  It is when we look at motivations and objectives that we begin to see some of the discrepancies between terrorist groups and lone wolves. A terrorist organization is comprised of individuals who join the group for a variety of reasons, ranging from agreement with the group's overall objectives, such as the overthrow of a government or attaining a separate state or territory, to personal needs, such as the desire to belong to a group, rebellion against authority figures, revenge, and so forth. But once in the group, these individuals have to conform to the group's overall objectives. Otherwise, there could be dissension and potential compromise of a mission. As one observer noted, al Qaeda members “pledge their personal loyalty to [Osama] bin Laden, thus declaring their membership in the family of global jihad and willingness to sacrifice their lives for the goal as defined by the group's leader. This personal declaration of loyalty obligated organization members to carry out bin Laden's orders with strict obedience.”2 It can be assumed that Ayman al-Zawahri, who took over the leadership of al Qaeda in the aftermath of bin Laden's killing in May 2011, will try to become the new focal point for pledges of loyalty by members of the group, although al Qaeda has become a more decentralized organization in recent years.

  The lone wolf, however, doesn't have to make any pledges to a leader or make his or her desires align with that of a group. While lone wolves often perpetrate their violence for political, religious, ethnic-nationalist, and other “traditional” terrorist-group objectives, some of them also have a personal, psychological, criminal, or idiosyncratic motive for their violence. According to noted terrorism scholar Jessica Stern, “Lone wolves often come up with their own ideologies that combine personal vendettas with religious or political grievances.”3 Because lone wolves have their own agendas, they sometimes tend to be perceived as too dangerous and unstable for membership in a terrorist or similar type of group. Once rejected, t
he lone wolves can be motivated to take action by themselves. For example, McVeigh began plotting the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City after a Michigan militia group distanced itself from him because, according to the FBI, “it became apparent that his views were too radical.”4

  We have to be careful, however, in explaining lone wolf behavior as being driven by personal or psychological needs for which the lone wolf then simply attaches an ideology to justify his or her actions. That detracts from the dedication that many lone wolves have to the cause they adopt. Until we have data on the motivations of all members of every terrorist group, we cannot say with certainty that some members of a terrorist group do not have similar personal and psychological factors that are part of their motivations for violence.

  In fact, some leaders of terrorist groups have been portrayed as having similar personalities to those of lone wolf terrorists. In an article published shortly after the September 11, 2001, suicide attacks in the United States, a noted political scientist, Ehud Sprinzak, wrote about certain terrorists being “self-anointed individuals with larger-than-life callings.” Sprinzak labeled these individuals “megalomaniacal hyperterrorists” and included a lone wolf such as Timothy McVeigh in the category. But Sprinzak also put in this category Osama bin Laden (the leader of al Qaeda), Ramzi Yousef (the mastermind of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center), and Shoko Asahara (the leader of the Aum Shinrikyo cult and key figure in the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system). “Megalomaniacal hyperterrorists operate according to an altogether different logic,” Sprinzak wrote.5 “While often working with the support of large terror groups and organizations, they tend to be loners. They think big, seeking to go beyond ‘conventional’ terrorism and, unlike most terrorists, could be willing to use weapons of mass destruction. They perceive themselves in historical terms and dream of individually devastating the hated system.” Sprinzak also placed Yigal Amir, a young Israeli man who assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995, in the “megalomaniacal hyperterrorist” category, since, even though he was not involved in mass-casualty terrorism, “the impact of his act on the Israeli people could not have been more catastrophic.” Sprinzak notes that Amir, who was a right-wing loner, believed that “God wanted him to personally save the nation.”6