Lone Wolf Terrorism

by Jeffrey D. Simon

  However, when the author of the study cited above concludes that “lone wolf terrorism is predominantly, though clearly not exclusively, a US phenomenon” because there were 113 incidents in the United States during this period, accounting for 57 percent of all lone wolf attacks in the fifteen countries, one has to wonder if this is yet another example of how statistics can be misleading.17 As already noted, it is not the number of incidents that count in measuring terrorism's impact on a society. One or two incidents can have as much effect in terms of generating fear and reaction in a country as can multiple attacks. Countries other than the United States that experienced significant lone wolf attacks included Norway (the massacre by Anders Breivik in 2011, one year after the end period for the above-cited data study), the Netherlands (the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh), Britain (the Nailbomber attacks), Italy (the “Italian Unabomber” attacks), Austria (the bombing campaign initiated by Franz Fuchs), and Israel (the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the massacre of Muslims at a mosque in the West Bank town of Hebron), to name just a few. Rather than being restricted to any one country, lone wolf terrorism is clearly a global phenomenon.

  DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE CREATIVITY, INNOVATION, AND DANGER OF THE LONE WOLF AND THE IMPACT HE OR SHE CAN HAVE ON GOVERNMENTS AND SOCIETIES

  This journey into the world of lone wolf terrorism has revealed a remarkable degree of creativity, innovation, and danger exhibited by the individual terrorist. From Mario Buda, who in 1920 set off the first vehicle bomb in US history, to Anders Breivik, who in 2011 was responsible for one of the first dual terrorist attacks ever by a lone wolf—a horrific massacre of youths in Norway that had followed by just a couple hours his detonating a car bomb in Oslo—lone wolves have proven to be just as dangerous as, and sometimes even more so than, the most formidable terrorist groups in existence.

  In between the attacks by Buda and Breivik came as series of “firsts” in terrorism history, including the first use of anthrax letters to kill people and the first major midair plane bombing in the United States, all the work of lone wolves. As noted earlier, there are several reasons why lone wolves can be more creative and dangerous than many terrorist groups. First, since they are working alone, they do not have to answer to any higher-ups or colleagues. There is no leader of a group who may veto a lone wolf's ideas or other members who could ridicule or argue against a lone wolf's novel plans for an attack. Lone wolves are free to think up any type of terrorism scenario they want. Furthermore, since they only have to answer to themselves, lone wolves are usually not concerned about how many people they may kill or injure in an attack, unlike many terrorist groups, which have to consider potential backlashes from their supporters if they exceed a certain casualty total or commit a particularly gruesome attack. Terrorist groups also have to worry about a massive law-enforcement and government response following certain incidents, such as the use of a weapon of mass destruction or another type of high-casualty attack that could lead to the demise of the group through arrests and other measures, whereas this is not a concern for the lone wolf.

  Lone wolves have also demonstrated that they can have a profound effect on governments and societies. We saw how, in the Netherlands, the lone wolf assassination of politician Pim Fortuyn shocked a nation not used to terrorism, causing one government official to proclaim that with the killing, “the Netherlands had lost its innocence.”18 The same was true for Norway, where, as noted in chapter 2, in the aftermath of the Breivik massacre, Norwegian prime minister Jens Stoltenberg stated: “I think what we have seen is that there is going to be one Norway before and one Norway after [the attacks of] July 22.”19 In the United States, Timothy McVeigh changed the way many Americans viewed terrorism with just one major attack in Oklahoma City, making people realize that homegrown American terrorists were as serious a threat as Islamic and other foreign-based extremists. And Bruce Ivins single-handedly shut down government buildings and mail-processing centers, and spread fear throughout the United States about a “new” form of terrorism—bioterrorism—with a wave of anthrax letter attacks.

  The combination of danger, innovation, and impact that has characterized lone wolf terrorism in the past is destined to continue in the future. So, too, will the effort by governments and law enforcement to design ways to effectively combat this threat. While many lone wolf attacks, like those initiated by terrorist groups, will not be that significant in terms of the damage they cause or the reactions they elicit, others will undoubtedly have serious effects. What, then, can we expect to unfold regarding lone wolf terrorism in the coming years?

  Anticipating the future of terrorism is, of course, a speculative endeavor. There are no laws of nature or scientific principles that can guide one in stating with reasonable confidence that certain things will or will not unfold in the terrorist world. Yet trying to predict the future of terrorism is a very popular exercise, with scores of scholars, research institutes, government agencies, and the like all offering their prognoses on what the future may hold.1

  I attempted to do this in a book I wrote in the early 1990s on America's experience with terrorism.2 At that time, as noted in chapter 7, the optimism that the United States had turned a corner in the battle against terrorism, with the return of the hostages from Lebanon and the relative quiet in anti-US terrorist attacks around the world, was shattered with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City. Foreign terrorists had come to American shores and attacked one of the world's most famous business and financial structures in one of the country's most populated cities. The illusion of invulnerability to terrorism at home that many Americans had felt was now gone. But what lay ahead? As I looked toward the future then, I got some things right and some wrong. For example, I thought that a new type of terrorist threat would emerge, which I labeled “aerial terrorism,” predicting that terrorists would begin crashing planes into buildings and other populated targets. However, I thought that, to avoid radar detection, their weapons would be low-flying, single-engine planes packed with explosives. I didn't foresee hijacked jets with thousands of gallons of fuel being the weapons, as turned out to be the case on 9/11. I also predicted that people in the coming years would be linked together through computer terminals and other devices anywhere in the world, and that this could be taken advantage of by terrorists to bypass traditional media when issuing threats and gathering information. But I didn't foresee the enormous impact that the Internet, which was still in its early stages, would eventually have on everyday life, including the lives of terrorists.

  The task of predicting the future of terrorism is fraught with difficulties. The best one can hope for is to anticipate the broad outlines of where things seem headed so that law-enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as policymakers and the public, are not caught off guard when terrorists strike next. With respect to lone wolf terrorism, several trends and developments point to it becoming more diversified, innovative, and dangerous in the years ahead.

  THE EMERGING FIFTH WAVE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

  In chapter 1, I discussed how David C. Rapoport, in his classic study of the history of terrorism, observed that we have experienced four distinct waves of international terrorism since the late-nineteenth century: the Anarchist, Anti-Colonial, New Left, and Religious Waves.3 Each wave, he noted, lasted approximately forty years, with the current fourth wave, the Religious Wave, beginning in 1979. While it is too early to determine if the Religious Wave will fade from prominence like its predecessors did after its forty-year period ends, many signs point to Rapoport being correct.

  The end of US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan will somewhat erode the appeal of Islamic extremism to impressionable youths around the world. Without the image of American troops occupying or involved in wars in Muslim nations, a major part of the Islamic extremists’ current anti-US campaign will be stripped away. There will, of course, still be plenty of issues for Islamic extremists to exploit in the years ahead, including various policies and a
ctions that the United States and other Western nations may take on future developments around the world, as well as the extremists’ continual animosity to moderate Islamic regimes. But the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the US killing of high-level al Qaeda operatives throughout the world, including, of course, Osama bin Laden, has left a void in the leadership structure of al Qaeda. According to renowned terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins, “Al Qaeda may remain lethal, but become increasingly irrelevant, confined to circulating its screeds from the edge, a reservoir of inchoate anger, a conveyer of individual discontents, which is its most likely fate.”4 Other Islamic terrorist organizations and cells, including al Qaeda affiliates such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), based in Algeria, will undoubtedly continue to strike and carry on the struggle against all those they believe to be infidels. But it does appear that the glory days of the Religious Wave of terrorism, which was characterized by a seemingly endless flurry of incidents and threats made during the decade following the 9/11 attacks, may very well be in the past.

  The Religious Wave is likely to be succeeded by a fifth wave of terrorism, which I have labeled the Technological Wave. As I discussed in chapter 1, this wave may have already emerged, as is evident by the growing impact that technology, and particularly the Internet, is having on virtually every aspect of terrorist and counterterrorist activity. The Technological Wave is empowering all types of terrorists with information and confidence to launch attacks and publicize their cause. It is creating a more level playing field, where no single religious or ideological agenda will dominate the world of terrorism. While much of the attention and effort to combat terrorism in the post-9/11 decade was aimed at Islamic extremists, other movements have been gathering steam, and they will continue to play an important role in this fifth wave of terrorism. Rob Wainwright, the director of Europol, the European Union's law-enforcement agency, put it best when he wrote the following in 2012 about the future of terrorism in Europol's annual report on trends in terrorism:

  The identified drivers [of terrorism] are not static…and can evolve or vanish over time in response to political or socio-economic developments, merge with other ideologies or convictions, or be the building blocks of new and sometimes very specific and highly individual motivations. Unclear or vague motives can blur the distinction between a terrorist offence and other criminal acts.5

  Terrorists of all persuasions will take even more advantage of technology in the fifth wave than they have in the past, not just because it will be available to them, but also because of the need to keep up with other terrorists, as well as with the authorities, as they plan their attacks. Terrorism is a competitive business, with groups, cells, and lone wolves needing to outdo each other with more spectacular or different types of attacks in order to ensure they achieve the publicity and reaction they desire. More powerful and sophisticated weapons and explosives will give them the opportunity to do just that. For example, AQAP, after failing twice to blow up planes in midair (once with bombs hidden in the cartridges of printers and the other time with a bomb hidden in the underwear of a suicide bomber), decided in 2012 to try again to set off an explosive with a more sophisticated detonator. The plot was uncovered only because the “suicide terrorist” who was to wear the “underwear” bomb turned out to be working for Saudi intelligence, which then turned the bomb over to the United States for forensic analysis.6 Similarly, a technologically sophisticated plot by Chechen extremists to sabotage the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Russia was uncovered by Russian security personnel in 2012. The plot involved using portable surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, a mortar, and a flamethrower in massive terrorist attacks during the Games.7

  The next wave of terrorism will also see more groups use the al Qaeda model for exploiting the Internet for maximum benefit, including posting videos of terrorist attacks in order to attract recruits, encouraging forums and chat rooms to keep people engaged in the struggle, and calling for lone wolves to initiate their own operations. In fact, that trend may already be underway, as reflected in the remarks of a German government official regarding a surge in left-wing terrorism in that country. “The leftists are putting out propaganda on the Internet detailing where the weak spots are in police body armour in order to wound officers,” said Uwe Schünemann, the interior minister for the German state of Lower Saxony. “They are targeting police vehicles to set ablaze. They even have tips on how to attack police officers. We are in the preliminary stages of a new wave of leftist terror.”8 Right-wing extremists are also becoming more adept at using social media and the Internet to promote their cause. As one European terrorism expert noted: “More sophisticated propaganda structures—substantially empowered by the use of social media tools—means that such [right-wing] groups have nowadays the potential to spread their ideology among a specific target audience (younger generations) which would appear to be more receptive to their message.”9

  As other non-Islamic groups expand and improve their Internet presence, we can expect an even more diverse array of lone wolves in the years ahead. The lone wolf will have a plethora of issues and causes to choose from, ranging from environmental, ecological, and economic concerns to opposition to a wide range of various governments’ policies and actions. Ethnic-nationalist and separatist causes are additional motivations for potential lone wolf activity. Self-radicalization over the Internet will remain a possibility for a lone wolf interested in any type of issue. And as Europol's Wainwright observed, the motivations for terrorist activity are never static; they can change at any time, as old issues recede and new ones arise.

  Another likely development in the fifth wave of terrorism will be the global spread of individual skills and knowledge in making and using sophisticated IEDs. As noted in chapter 1, we can expect to find many former insurgents from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan taking their skills and weapons to other countries and regions. Some will join existing terrorist groups, others will form their own cells, and still others may embark on individual attacks. The knowledge and skills they have in bomb making will eventually spread to other terrorists, who may use those skills for any cause they adopt. A harbinger of this might be the April 2011 discovery in a field in Northern Ireland of a type of IED that had been commonly used in Iraq and Afghanistan. That was the first time such a device had been found in Northern Ireland.10

  The fifth wave will also likely see more women become lone wolf terrorists. Thus far, it has been a male-dominated activity, with the two most prominent female lone wolves being Colleen LaRose and Roshonara Choudhry. Both women were attracted to the jihadist cause, with Choudhry being influenced simply by downloading the sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki over the Internet. It may very well be the case that as the ability of al Qaeda recedes in terms of its face-to-face recruitment of female members (whom they then were able to turn into suicide bombers), these same women, who would have joined the extremist group or its affiliates, will instead act by themselves after heeding the online call to embark upon lone wolf attacks. And, as mentioned above, as other types of movements from all parts of the political spectrum increase their online presence and emulate the model set by Islamic extremists in attracting lone wolves via the Internet, there will likely be more lone wolf attacks by individuals, including women, who are sympathetic to all types of different causes.

  FUTURE INNOVATIONS IN LONE WOLF TACTICS

  I've discussed in this book how lone wolves have been among the most innovative of terrorists throughout history. From vehicle bombings to anthrax letters, they have many times been ahead of the curve in introducing new terrorist tactics. What, then, might be some of the future innovations in terrorist tactics that will originate with lone wolves? One that appears to be tailor-made for such individuals would be to commit the first major, successful cyberterrorism incident. After all, a lone wolf would not even have to leave his or her home to launch a computer-driven attack. I
t is somewhat surprising, then, given the technical computer knowledge that individuals possess around the world, that we have not yet seen a major lone wolf cyberterrorist attack. For that matter, considering that many terrorist groups and foreign governments are also quite knowledgeable regarding computer-software technology, it is surprising that a worst-case scenario cyberterrorist operation by anybody, such as the sabotaging of critical infrastructures through computer and information systems attacks, has not yet occurred. One explanation is that the technology that businesses and governments have put into protecting against such major attacks is still ahead of the capabilities of potential adversaries. Furthermore, since most terrorist groups rely upon the Internet for communications, recruitment, fundraising, targeting information, and such, they would be shooting themselves in the foot if they committed a major cyberterrorist attack that brought down the Internet or greatly disrupted their own use of interconnected computer systems. And a foreign government that launched a cyberterrorist attack against another state, targeting its critical infrastructures, would be susceptible to retaliatory measures from that state, if the attack could be traced back to them.11