Complete Works of Edmund Burke

by Edmund Burke

  These examples are the school of mankind, and they will learn at no other. This war, therefore, is not a war for Louis the Eighteenth, or for the property, virtue, fidelity of France; but for George the Third, Francis the Second, and for all the property, honour, virtue and religion of England, of Germany, and all nations.

  But, say some, you force opinion. You can never extirpate opinion without extirpating a whole nation. Nay, by pursuing it, you only increase its partizans. Opinions are things out of human jurisdiction. I have formerly heard this from the mouths of great men, with more surprize than satisfaction. They alledged as a proof of their doctrine, the wars of Charles the Fifth, and some of his successors, against the Reformation.

  It is so common, though so unreasonable, it is hardly worth remarking, that no persons pursue more fiercely with criminal process, and with every kind of coercion, the publication of opinions contrary to their own, than those do, who claim in this respect the most unbounded latitude to themselves. If it were not for this inconsistency, then war against opinions might be justified as all others, more or less, according to the reason of the case: for the case judged on by moral prudence, and not by any universal abstract principle of right, is to guide government in this delicate point.

  As to the mere matter of extirpation of all kinds of opinions, whether right or wrong, without the extirpation of a people, it is a thing so very common, that would be clouded and obscured rather than illustrated by examples. Every revolution in the predominant opinion made by the force of domestic legal government, by the force of any usurpation, by the force of any conquest, is a proof to the contrary; — and there is no nation which has not experienced those changes. Instances enough may be furnished of people who have enthusiastically, and with force, propagated those opinions, which some time before they resisted with their blood. Rarely have ever great changes in opinion taken place without the application of force, more or less: Like every thing else in human life and human affairs, it is not universally true, that a persecution of opinions lessens or increases the number of their votaries. In finding where it may or may not have gathered these effects, the sagacity of Government shines or is disgraced, as well as in the time, the manner, the choice of the opinions on which it ought to use or forbear the sword of domestick or of foreign justice. But it is a false maxim, that opinions ought to be indifferent to us, either as men or as a State. Opinion is the rudder of human action; and as the opinion is wise or foolish, vicious or moral, the cause of action is noxious or salutary. It has even been the great primary object of speculative and doctrinal philosophy to regulate opinion. It is the great object of political philosophy to promote that which is sound; and to extirpate what is mischievous, and which directly tends to render men bad citizens in the community, and mischievous neighbours out of it. Opinions are of infinite consequence. They make the manners — in fact, they make the laws: they make the Lagislator. They are, therefore, of all things, those to which provident Government ought to look most to in their beginnings. After a time they may look to them in vain. When, therefore, I am told that a war is a war of opinions, I am told that it is the most important of all wars.

  Here I must not be told that this would lead to eternal war and persecution. It would certainly, if we argued like metaphysicians run mad, who do not correct prudence, the queen of virtues, to be any virtue at all, — and would either throw the bridle on the neck of headlong Nature, or tie it up for ever to the post. No sophistry — no chicane here. Government is not to refine men out of innocent and moral liberty by forced inferences, drawn by a torturing logic; or to suffer them to go down hill the highway that leads directly to every crime and every vice.

  Without entering much into the comparison of the two cases, (that of this war and that of Charles the Fifth against the reformation) which holds very ill, I shall only beg leave to remark, that theological opinions as such, whether sound or erroneous, do not go directly to the well being of social, of civil, or of politick society. But as long as opinion is the very ground and pillar of Government, and the main spring of human action, there are opinions which directly affect these very things. An opinion, that it is a man’s duty to take from me my goods, and to kill me if I resist him. An opinion that he has a right, at his will, to pull down the Government by which I am protected in that life and property, and to place it in the hands of the enemies of both. These it is very extraordinary to hear compared to the theological dogmas concerning grace and justification — and the nature and essence of the sacrament and other pious opinions on the one side or on the other — which left human society altogether, or nearly, as it was. They did not preach vices or crimes. The parties disputed on the best means of promoting virtue, religion and morals. Whether any collateral points relative to these questions or other circumstances of a more political nature mingled with them, might or might not justify a war, is a matter of historical criticism, with which, at this day, we are little concerned. But in the case before us, I must declare, that the doctrine and discipline of this sect is one of the most alarming circumstances relating to it, and the attempt to compare them with the opinions of school theologicians, is a thing in itself highly alarming. I know that when men possess the best principles, the passions lead them to act in opposition to them. But when the moral principles are formed systematically to play into the hand of the passions; when that which is to correct vice and to restrain violence, is by an infernal doctrine, daringly avowed, carefully propagated, enthusiastically held, and practically followed, I shall think myself treated like a child, when I hear this compared to a controversy in the schools. When I see a great country, with all its resources, possessed by this sect, and turned to its purposes, I must be worse than a child to conceive it a thing indifferent to me. When this great country is so near me, and otherwise so situated, that except through its territory, I can hardly have a communication with any other, the state of moral and political opinion, and moral and political discipline in that country, becomes of still greater importance to me. When robbers, assassins, and rebels, are not only debauched, but endoctrinated regularly, by a course of inverted education, into murder, insurrection, and the violation of all property, I hold, that this, instead of excusing, or palliating their offences, inspires a peculiar venom into every evil act they do; and that all such universities of crimes, and all such professors of robbery, are in a perpetual state of hostility with mankind.

  Let me now say a word upon another topic, and on the case put to illustrate it, that is, on the indifference with which we ought to regard the plan of Government, and the scheme of morals that prevail in a State, in any question of peace and war with it. In support of this doctrine, they cite the case of Algiers as a strong one — with an hint, that is the stronger case. I should take no notice of this sort of inducement, if I had found it only where first it was. I do not want respect for those from whom I first heard it — but having no controversy at present with them, I only think it not amiss to rest on it a little, as I find it adopted with much more of the same kind, by several of those on whom such reasoning before made no apparent impression. I was however mistaken; they were not rejected, but only stored and laid by for an occasion — condo et compono quae mox depromere possim. If it had no force to prevent us from submitting to this necessary war, it furnishes no better ground for our making an unnecessary and ruinous peace To this Algerian parallel, however, I have to say, that arguments of analogy in law are of great weight. Of course, in a discussion of the justice of the war I attend to them, provided they are analogies of principle, and not of mere practice. But when they are only arguments of analogy ad hominem, they only serve to confute and silence an adversary, who has acted in such a manner, and on such principles; but to a person who doubts the propriety of the action and the motive which is made the ground of the analogy, it can neither shame or perplex him. This analogical argument would lead us a good way. The fact is, we ourselves, with a little corn, others more directly, pay a tribute to the Republick of Algi
ers. Is it meant to reconcile us to the payment of a tribute to the French Republick? That this, with other things more ruinous, will be demanded hereafter, I little doubt; but for the present, this will not be avowed — though our minds are to be gradually prepared for it.

  In truth the arguments from this case is worth little even to those who approve the buying an Algerine forbearance of piracy. There are many things which men do not approve, that they must do to avoid a greater evil. To argue from thence, that they are to act in the same manner in all cases, is turning necessity into a law. Upon what is matter of prudence, the argument concludes the contrary way. Because we have done one humiliating act, we ought, with infmite caution, to admit more acts of the same nature, lest humiliation should become our habitual state. Matters of prudence are under the dominion of circumstances, and not of logical analogies. It is so absurd to take it otherwise. In the mouths of the weak and ignorant, it makes me laugh; in the mouths of men of learning and talents, it makes me sick. I, for one do more than doubt the policy of this kind of convention with Algiers.

  On those who think as I do, the argument can make no sort of impression. I know something of the Constitution and composition of this very extraordinary Republick. It has a Constitution, I admit, similar to the present tumultuous military tyranny of France, by which an handful of obscure russians, domineer over a fertile country, and a brave people. For the composition, too, I admit, the Algerine community resembles that of France; being the very scum, scandal, disgrace, and pest of the Turkish Asia. The grand Seignior, to disburthen the country, suffers the Dey to recruit, in his donions, the corps of Janissaries, or Asaphs which form the Directory, or Council of Elders of the African Republick, one and indvisible. But notwithstanding this resemblance, which I allow, I never shall so far injure the Janisarian Republick of Algiers, as to put it in comparison for every sort of crime, turpitude, and oppression with the Jacobin Republick of Paris. There is no question with me to which of the two I should choose to be a neighbour or a subject. But situated as I am, I am in no danger of becoming to Algiers either the one or the other. It is not so in my relation to the atheistical fanaticks of France. Have the Gentlemen who borrowed this happy parallel, no idea of the different conduct to be held with regard to the very same evil at an immense distance, and when it is at your door? when its power is enormous, as when it is comparatively as feeble as its distance is remote? and when there is a barrier of language and usages, which prevents your being corrupted through certain old correspondences and habitudes, which cannot for a long time be so wholly taken away, as not to make many of your people susceptible of contagion from horrible novelties that are introduced into every thing else? I can contemplate, without horror, a royal or a national tyger on the borders of Pegu. I can look at him, with an easy curiosity, as prisoner within bars in the menagerie of the Tower. But if, by Habeas Corpus, or otherwise, he was to come into the Lobby of the House of Commons, whilst your door was open, any of you would be more stout than wise, who would not gladly make his escape out of the back windows. This Ambassador from Bengal, would disperse you sooner than a dissolution by Royal Prerogative. I certainly should dread more from a wild cat in my bedchamber, than from all the lions that roar in the deserts behind Algiers. But in this parallel it is the cat that is at a distance, and the lions and tygers that are in our anti-chambers and our lobbies. Algiers is not near; Algiers is not powerful; Algiers is not our neighbour; Algiers is not infectious. Algiers, whatever it may be, is not an old creation; and we have good data to calculate all the mischief to be expected from it. When I find Algiers transferred to Calais, I will tell you what I think of that point. In the mean time, the case quoted from the Algerine reports, will not apply as authority. We shall put it out of court; and so far as that goes, let the council for the Jacobin peace take nothing by their motion.

  When we voted as we did, we were providing for dangers that were direct, home, pressing, and not remote, contingent, uncertain, and formed upon loose analogies. The whole tenor of conduct of France, not one or two doubtful or detached acts or expressions. To us it appeared, that the whole body of its discipline, comprehending the form of the State, and the scheme of opinion and manners, were adopted both as means and ends; as means, to establish universal empire; and as ends to fix the same system in every place to which their empire or their influence could extend. It was against this system that you and I voted for war. It is with this system that I shall for ever deprecate a relation of peace and amity.

  Various persons may concur in the same measure on various grounds. They may be various, without being contrary to, or exclusive of, each other. I thought the insolent unprovoked aggression of the Regicide upon our Ally of Holland a good ground of war; I think his manifest attempt to overturn the balance of Europe a good ground of war; as a good ground of war I consider his declaration of war on his Majesty and his kingdom. But though I have taken all these to my aid, I consider them as nothing more than as a sort of evidence to indicate the treasonable mind within. It was not for their former declaration of war, nor for any specific act of hostility that I primarily wished to resist them, or to persevere in my resistance. It was because the faction in France had assumed a form, had adopted a body of principles and maxims, and had regularly and systematically acted on them, by which she virtually had put herself in a posture which was in itself a declaration of war against mankind.

  It is fit that the people should know when the question is concerning peace and amity, the true nature, habits, dispositions, and views of the party with whom they are to cultivate friendship. It is of less importance to you, what is the character of your enemy, than what are the habits and dispositions of your friend. The relation of enemy to enemy is simple. Enemies aim by force at each other’s destruction. They are always, therefore, in a state of defiance and distrust; but the character of a friend is a serious matter. With a friend, the very nature of the relation must take off the guard. The people of England have felt their enemies, it is fit that they should know their friends.

  Before our opinions are quoted against ourselves, it is proper that, from our serious deliberation they may be worth quoting. It is without reason we praise the wisdom of our constitution, in putting under the discretion of the Crown, the aweful trust of war and peace, if the Ministers of the Crown virtually return it again into our hands. It was placed there as a sacred deposit, to secure us against popular rashness in plunging into wars, and against the effects of popular dismay, disgust, or lussitude in getting out of them as imprudently as we might first engage in them. To have no other measure in judging of those great objects than our momentary opinions and desires, is to throw us back upon that very democracy which, in this part, our constitution was formed to avoid.

  It is no excuse at all for a minister, who at our desire, takes a measure contrary to our safety, that it is our own act. He who does not stay the hand of a suicide is guilty of murder. To be instructed, is not to be degraded or enslaved. Information is an advantage to us, and we have a right to demand it. He that is bound to act in the dark cannot be said to act freely. When it appears evident to our governors, that our desires and our interests are at variance, they ought not to gratify the former at the expence of the latter. Statesmen are placed on an eminence, that they may have a larger horizon than we can possibly command. They have a whole before them, which we can contemplate only in the parts, and without the relations. Ministers are not only our natural rulers, but our natural guides. Reason clearly and manfully delivered, has in itself a mighty force: but reason in the mouth of legal authority, is, I may fairly say, irresistible.

  I admit that reason of state will not, in many circumstances permit the disclosure of the true ground of a public proceeding. In that case silence is manly and it is wise. It is fair to call for trust when the principle of reason itself suspends its public use. I take the distinction to be this. The ground of a particular measure, making a part of a plan, it is rarely proper to divulge. All the broader grounds
of policy on which the general plan is to be adopted, ought as rarely to be concealed. They who have not the whole cause before them, call them politicians, call them people, call them what you will, are no judges. The difficulties of the case as well as its fair side, ought to be presented. This ought to be done: and it is all that can be done. When we have our true situation distinctly presented to us, if we resolve with a blind and headlong violence, to resist the admonitions of our friends, and to cast ourselves into the hands of our potent and irreconcileable foes, then, and not till then, the ministers stand acquitted before God and man, for whatever may come.

  Lamenting as I do, that the matter has not had so full and free a discussion as it requires, I mean to omit none of the points which seem to me necessary for consideration, previous to an arrangement which is for ever to decide the form and the fate of Europe, In the course, therefore, of what I shall have the honour to address to you, I propose the following questions to your serious thoughts. 1. Whether the present system, which stands for a Government in France, be such as in peace and war affects the neighbouring States in a manner different from the internal Government that formerly prevailed in that country? 2. Whether that system, supposing it’s views hostile to other nations, possesses any means of being hurtful to them peculiar to itself? 3. Whether there has been lately such a change in France, as to alter the nature of it’s system or it’s effect upon other Powers? 4. Whether any public declarations or engagements exist, on the part of the allied Powers, which stand in the way of a treaty of peace, which supposes the right and confirms the power of the Regicide faction in France? 5. What the state of the other Powers of Europe will be with respect to each other, and their colonies, on the conclusion of a Regicide Peace? 6. Whether we are driven to the absolute necessity of making that kind of peace?