Complete Works of Edmund Burke

by Edmund Burke

  “Populus me sibilat; at mihi plaudo

  Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca.”

  And never did a man submit to infamy for anything but its true reward, money. Money he received; the infamy he received along with it: he was glad to take his wife with all her goods; he took her with her full portion, with every species of infamy that belonged to her; and your Lordships cannot resist the opinion that he would not have suffered himself to be disgraced with the Court of Directors, disgraced with his colleagues, disgraced with the world, disgraced upon an eternal record, unless he was absolutely guilty of the fact that was charged upon him.

  He frequently expresses that he reserves himself for a court of justice. Does he, my Lords? I am sorry that Mr. Hastings should show that he always mistakes his situation; he has totally mistaken it: he was a servant, bound to give a satisfactory account of his conduct to his masters, and, instead of that, he considers himself and the Court of Directors as litigant parties, — them as the accusers, and himself as the culprit. What would your Lordships, in private life, conceive of a steward who was accused of embezzling the rents, robbing and oppressing the tenants, and committing a thousand misdeeds in his stewardship, and who, upon your wishing to make inquiry into his conduct, and asking an explanation of it, should answer, “I will give no reply: you may intend to prosecute me and convict me as a cheat, and therefore I will not give you any satisfaction”: what would you think of that steward? You could have no doubt that such a steward was a person not fit to be a steward, nor fit to live.

  Mr. Hastings reserves himself for a court of justice: that single circumstance, my Lords, proves that he was guilty. It may appear very odd that his guilt should be inferred from his desire of trial in a court in which he could be acquitted or condemned. But I shall prove to you from that circumstance that Mr. Hastings, in desiring to be tried in a court of justice, convicts himself of presumptive guilt.

  When Mr. Hastings went to Bengal in the year 1772, he had a direction exactly similar to this which he has resisted in his own case: it was to inquire into grievances and abuses. In consequence of this direction, he proposes a plan for the regulation of the Company’s service, and one part of that plan was just what you would expect from him, — that is, the power of destroying every Company’s servant without the least possibility of his being heard in his own defence or taking any one step to justify himself, and of dismissing him at his own discretion: and the reason he gives for it is this. “I shall forbear to comment upon the above propositions: if just and proper, their utility will be self-apparent. One clause only in the last article may require some explanation, namely, the power proposed for the Governor of recalling any person from his station without assigning a reason for it. In the charge of oppression,” (now here you will find the reason why Mr. Hastings wishes to appeal to a court of justice, rather than to give satisfaction to his employers,) “though supported by the cries of the people and the most authentic representations, it is yet impossible in most cases to obtain legal proofs of it; and unless the discretionary power which I have recommended be somewhere lodged, the assurance of impunity from any formal inquiry will baffle every order of the board, as, on the other hand, the fear of the consequence will restrain every man within the bounds of his duty, if he knows himself liable to suffer by the effects of a single control.” You see Mr. Hastings himself is of opinion that the cries of oppression, though extorted from a whole people by the iron hand of severity, — that these cries of a whole people, attended even with authentic documents sufficient to satisfy the mind of any man, may be totally insufficient to convict the oppressor in a court; and yet to that court, whose competence he denies, to that very court, he appeals, in that he puts his trust, and upon that ground he refuses to perform the just promise he had given of any explanation to those who had employed him.

  Now I put this to your Lordships: if a man is of opinion that no public court can truly and properly bring him to any account for his conduct, that the forms observable in courts are totally adverse to it, that there is a general incompetency with regard to such a court, and yet shuns a tribunal capable and competent, and applies to that which he thinks is incapable and incompetent, does not that man plainly show that he has rejected what he thinks will prove his guilt, and that he has chosen what he thinks will be utterly insufficient to prove it? And if this be the case, as he asserts it to be, with an under servant, think what must be the case of the upper servant of all: for, if an inferior servant is not to be brought to justice, what must be the situation of a Governor-General? It is impossible not to see, that, as he had conceived that a court of justice had not sufficient means to bring his crimes to light and detection, nor sufficient to bring him to proper and adequate punishment, therefore he flew to a court of justice, not as a place to decide upon him, but as a sanctuary to secure his guilt. Most of your Lordships have travelled abroad, and have seen in the unreformed countries of Europe churches filled with persons who take sanctuary in them. You do not presume that a man is innocent because he is in a sanctuary: you know, that, so far from demonstrating his innocence, it demonstrates his guilt. And in this case, Mr. Hastings flies not to a court for trial, but as a sanctuary to secure him from it.

  Let us just review the whole of his conduct; let us hear how Mr. Hastings has proceeded with regard to this whole affair. The court of justice dropped; the prosecution in Bengal ended. With Sir Elijah Impey as chief-justice, who, as your Lordships have seen, had a most close and honorable connection with the Governor-General, (all the circumstances of which I need not detail to you, as it must be fresh in your Lordships’ memory,) he had not much to fear from the impartiality of the court. He might be sure the forms of law would not be strained to do him mischief; therefore there was no great terror in it. But whatever terror there might be in it was overblown, because his colleagues refused to carry him into it, and therefore that opportunity of defence is gone. In Europe he was afraid of making any defence, but the prosecution here was also soon over; and in the House of Commons he takes this ground of justification for not giving any explanation, that the Court of Directors had received perfect satisfaction of his innocence; and he named persons of great and eminent character in the profession, whose names certainly cannot be mentioned without highly imposing upon the prejudices and weighing down almost the reason of mankind. He quotes their opinions in his favor, and argues that the exculpation which they give, or are supposed to give him, should excuse him from any further explanation.

  My Lords, I believe I need not say to great men of the profession, many of the first ornaments of which I see before me, that they are very little influenced in the seat of judgment by the opinions which they have given in the chamber, and they are perfectly in the right: because while in the chamber they hear but one part of the cause; it is generally brought before them in a very partial manner, and they have not the lights which they possess when they sit deliberately down upon the tribunal to examine into it; and for this reason they discharge their minds from every prejudice that may have arisen from a foregone partial opinion, and come uninfluenced by it as to a new cause. This, we know, is the glory of the great lawyers who have presided and do preside in the tribunals of this country; but we know, at the same time, that those opinions (which they in their own mind reject, unless supported afterwards by clear and authentic testimony) do weigh upon the rest of mankind at least: for it is impossible to separate the opinion of a great and learned man from some consideration of the person who has delivered that opinion.

  Mr. Hastings, being conscious of this, and not fearing the tribunal abroad for the reason that I gave you, namely, his belief that it was not very adverse to him, and also knowing that the prosecution there was dropped, had but one thing left for his consideration, which was, how he should conflict with the tribunal at home: and as the prosecution must originate from the Court of Directors, and be authorized by some great law opinions, the great point with him was, some way or other, by his par
ty, I will not say by what means or circumstances, but by some party means, to secure a strong interest in the executive part of the India House. My Lords, was that interest used properly and fairly? I will not say that friendship and partiality imply injustice; they certainly do not; but they do not imply justice. The Court of Directors took up this affair with great warmth; they committed it to their solicitor, and the solicitor would naturally (as most solicitors do) draw up a case a little favorably for the persons that employed him; and if there was any leaning, which upon my word I do not approve in the management of any cause whatever, yet, if there was a leaning, it must be a leaning for the client.

  Now the counsel did not give a decided opinion against the prosecution, but upon the face of the case they expressed great doubts upon it; for, with such a strange, disorderly, imperfect, and confused case as was laid before them, they could not advise a prosecution; and in my opinion they went no further. And, indeed, upon that case that went before them, I, who am authorized by the Commons to prosecute, do admit that a great doubt might lie upon the most deciding mind, whether, under the circumstances there stated, a prosecution could be or ought to be pursued. I do not say which way my mind would have turned, upon that very imperfect state of the case; but I still allow so much to their very great ability, great minds, and sound judgment, that I am not sure, if it was res integra, I would not have rather hesitated myself (who am now here an accuser) what judgment to give.

  It does happen that there are very singular circumstances in this business, to which your Lordships will advert; and you will consider what weight they ought to have upon your Lordships’ minds. The person who is now the solicitor of the Company is a very respectable man in the profession, — Mr. Smith; he was at that time also the Company’s solicitor, and he has since appeared in this cause as Mr. Hastings’s solicitor. Now there is something particular in a man’s being the solicitor to a party who was prosecuting another, and continuing afterwards in his office, and becoming the solicitor to the party prosecuted. It would be nearly as strange as if our solicitor were to be the solicitor of Mr. Hastings in this prosecution and trial before your Lordships. It is true, that we cannot make out, nor do we attempt to prove, that Mr. Smith was at that time actually Mr. Hastings’s solicitor: all that we shall attempt to make out is, that the case he produced was just such a case as a solicitor anxious for the preservation of his client, and not anxious for the prosecution, would have made out.

  My Lords, I have next to remark, that the opinion which the counsel gave in this case, namely, a very doubtful opinion, accompanied with strong censure of the manner in which the case was stated, was drawn from them by a case in which I charge that there were misrepresentation, suppression, and falsification.

  Now, my Lords, in making this charge I am in a very awkward and unpleasant situation; but it is a situation in which, with all the disagreeable circumstances attending it, I must proceed. I am, in this business, obliged to name many men: I do not name them wantonly, but from the absolute necessity, as your Lordships will see, of the case. I do not mean to reflect upon this gentleman: I believe, at the time when he made this case, and especially the article which I state as a falsification, he must have trusted to some of the servants of the Company, who were but young in their service at that time. There was a very great error committed; but by whom, or how, your Lordships in the course of this inquiry will find. What I charge first is, that the case was improperly stated; secondly, that it was partially stated; and that afterwards a further report was made upon reference to the same officer in the committee. Now, my Lords, of the three charges which I have made, the two former, namely, the misrepresentation and suppression, were applicable to the case; but all the three, misrepresentation, suppression, and falsification, were applicable to the report.

  This I say in vindication of the opinions given, and for the satisfaction of the public, who may be imposed upon by them. I wish the word to be understood. When I say imposed, I always mean by it the weight and authority carried: a meaning which this word, perhaps, has not got yet thoroughly in the English language; but in a neighboring language imposing means, that it weighs upon men’s minds with a sovereign authority. To say that the opinions of learned men, though even thus obtained, may not have weight with this court, or with any court, is a kind of compliment I cannot pay to them at the expense of that common nature in which I and all human beings are involved.

  He states in the case the covenants and the salary of Mr. Hastings, and his emoluments, very fairly. I do not object to any part of that. He then proceeds to state very partially the business upon which the Committee of Circuit went, and without opening whose conduct we cannot fully bring before you this charge of bribery. He then states, “that, an inquiry having been made by the present Supreme Council of Bengal respecting the conduct of the members of the last administration, several charges have been made, stating moneys very improperly received by Mr. Hastings during the time of the late administration: amongst these is one of his having received 150,000 rupees of Munny Begum, the guardian of the Nabob, who is an infant.”

  In this statement of the case everything is put out of its true place. Mr. Hastings was not charged with receiving a lac and a half of rupees from Munny Begum, the guardian of the Nabob, — for she was not then his guardian; but he was charged with receiving a lac and a half of rupees for removing the Nabob’s own mother, who was his natural guardian, and substituting this step-mother, who was a prostitute, in her place; whereas here it supposes he found her a guardian, and that she had made him a present, which alters the whole nature of the case. The case, in the recital of the charge, sets out with what every one of your Lordships knows now not to be the truth of the fact, nor the thing that in itself implies the criminality: he ought to have stated that in the beginning of the business. The suppressions in the recital are amazing. He states an inquiry having been made by the Supreme Council of Bengal respecting the conduct of the members of the last administration. That inquiry was made in consequence of the charge, and not the charge brought forward, as they would have it believed, in consequence of the inquiry. There is no mention that that inquiry had been expressly ordered by the Court of Directors; but it is stated as though it was a voluntary inquiry. Now there is always something doubtful in voluntary inquiries with regard to the people concerned. He then supposes, upon this inquiry, that to be the charge which is not the charge at all. The crime, as I have stated, consisted of two distinct parts, but both inferring the same corruption: the first, two lac of rupees taken expressly for the nomination of this woman to this place; and the other, one lac and a half of rupees, in effect for the same purpose, but under the name and color of an entertainment. The drawer of the case, finding that in the one case, namely, the two lac of rupees, the evidence was more weak, but that no justification could be set up, — finding in the other, the lac and a half of rupees, the proof strong and not to be resisted, but that some justification was to be found for it, lays aside the charge of the two lac totally; and the evidence belonging to it, which was considered as rather weak, is applied to the other charge of a lac and a half, the proof of which upon its own evidence was irresistible.

  My speech I hope your Lordships consider as only pointing out to your attention these particulars. Your Lordships will see it exemplified throughout the whole, that, when there is evidence (for some evidence is brought) that does belong to the lac and a half, it is entirely passed by, the most material circumstances are weakened, the whole strength and force of them taken away. Every one knows how true it is of evidence, juncta juvant: but here everything is broken and smashed to pieces, and nothing but disorder appears through the whole. For your Lordships will observe that the proof that belongs to one thing is put as belonging to another, and the proof of the other brought in a weak and imperfect manner in the rear of the first, and with every kind of observation to rebut and weaken it; and when this evidence is produced, which appears inapplicable almost in all the parts, in many dou
btful, confused, and perplexed, and in some even contradictory, (which it will be when the evidence to one thing is brought to apply and bear upon another,) good hopes were entertained in consequence that that would happen which in part did happen, namely, that the counsel, distracted and confused, and finding no satisfaction in the case, could not advise a prosecution.

  But what is still more material and weighty, many particulars are suppressed in this case, and still more in the report; and turning from the case to the proceedings of the persons who are supposed to have the management of the inquiry, they bring forward, as an appendix to this case, Mr. Hastings’s own invectives and charge against these persons, at the very same time that they suppress and do not bring forward, either in the charge or upon the report, what the other party have said in their own justification. The consequence of this management was, that a body of evidence which would have made this case the clearest in the world, and which I hope we shall make to appear so to your Lordships, was rendered for the most part inapplicable, and the whole puzzled and confused: I say, for the most part, for some parts did apply, but miserably applied, to the case. From their own state of the case they would have it inferred that the fault was not in their way of representing it, but in the infirmity, confusion, and disorder of the proofs themselves; but this, I trust we shall satisfy you, is by no means the case. I rest, however, upon the proof of partiality in this business, of the imposition upon the counsel, whether designed or not, and of the bias given by adding an appendix with Mr. Hastings’s own remarks upon the case, without giving the reasons of the other parties for their conduct. Now, if there was nothing else than the fallacious recital, and afterwards the suppression, I believe any rational and sober man would see perfect, good, and sufficient ground for laying aside any authority that can be derived from the opinions of persons, though of the first character (and I am sure no man living does more homage to their learning, impartiality, and understanding than I do): first, because the statement of the case has thrown the whole into confusion; and secondly, as to the matter added as an appendix, which gives the representation of the delinquent and omits the representation of his prosecutors, it is observed very properly and very wisely by one of the great men before whom this evidence was laid, that “the evidence, as it is here stated, is still more defective, if the appendix is adopted by the Directors and meant to make a part of the case; for that throws discredit upon all the information so collected.” Certainly it does; for, if the delinquent party, who is to be prosecuted, be heard with his own representation of the case, and that of his prosecutors be suppressed, he is master both of the lawyers and of the mind of mankind.