Complete Works of Edmund Burke

by Edmund Burke

  Mr. Middleton is dead, my Lords. This is not the Mr. Middleton whom your Lordships have heard and know well in this House, but a brother of that Mr. Middleton, who is since dead. Your Lordships find, when we refer to the records of the Company for the proof of this forgery, that there is no other than the unsupported assertion of Mr. Hastings himself that he was guilty of it. Now that was bad enough; but then hear the rest. Mr. Hastings has charged this unhappy man, whom we must not defend, with another forgery; he has charged him with a forgery of a letter from Yeteram ul Dowlah to Mr. Hastings. Now you would imagine that he would have given his own authority at least for that assertion, which he says was proved. He goes on and says, “I have not yet had the curiosity to inquire of the Nabob Yeteram ul Dowlah whether his letter was of the same stamp; but I cannot doubt it.”

  Now here he begins, in this very defence which is before your Lordships, to charge a forgery upon the credit of Munny Begum, without supporting it even by his own testimony, — and another forgery in the name of Yeteram ul Dowlah, which he said he had not even the curiosity to inquire into, and yet desires you, at the same time, to believe it to be proved. Good God! in what condition do men of the first character and situation in that country stand, when we have here delivered to us, as a record of the Company, Mr. Hastings’s own assertions, saying that these forgeries were proved, though you have for the first nothing but his own unsupported assertion, and for the second his declaration only that he had not the curiosity to inquire into it! I am not forbidden by the Commons to state how and on what slight grounds Warren Hastings charges the natives of the country with forgery; neither am I forbidden to bring forward the accusation which Mr. Hastings made against Nundcomar for a conspiracy, nor the event of it, nor any circumstance relative to it. I shall therefore proceed in the best manner I can. There was a period, among the revolutions of philosophy, when there was an opinion, that, if a man lost one limb or organ, the strength of that which was lost retired into what was left. My Lords, if we are straitened in this, then our vigor will be redoubled in the rest, and we shall use it with double force. If the top and point of the sword is broken off, we shall take the hilt in our hand, and fight with whatever remains of the weapon against bribery, corruption, and peculation; and we shall use double diligence under any restraint which the wisdom of the Commons may lay upon us, or your Lordships’ wisdom may oblige us to submit to.

  Having gone through this business, and shown in what manner I am restrained, where I am not to repel Mr. Hastings’s defence, and where I am left at large to do it, I shall submit to the strict injunction with the utmost possible humility, and enjoy the liberty which is left to me with vigor, with propriety, and with discretion, I trust.

  My Lords, when the circumstance happened which has given occasion to the long parenthesis by which my discourse has been interrupted, I remember I was beginning to open to your Lordships the second period of Mr. Hastings’s scheme and system of bribery. My Lords, his bribery is so extensive, and has had such a variety in it, that it must be distinguished not only with regard to its kind, but must be likewise distinguished according to the periods of bribery and the epochas of peculation committed by him. In the first of those periods we shall prove to your Lordships, I believe, without the aids that we hoped for, (your Lordships allowing, as I trust you will do, a good deal for our situation,) — we shall be able, I say, to prove that Mr. Hastings took, as a bribe for appointing Munny Begum, three lac and an half of rupees; we shall prove the taking at the same time the Rajeshaye bribes. Mr. Hastings at that time followed bribery in a natural manner: he took a bribe; he took it as large as he could; he concealed it as well as he could; and he got out of it by artifice or boldness, by use of trick or use of power, just as he was enabled: he acted like a wild, natural man, void of instruction, discipline, and art.

  The second period opened another system of bribery. About this time he began to think (from what communication your Lordships may guess) of other means by which, when he could no longer conceal any bribe that he had received, he not only might exempt himself from the charge and the punishment of guilt, but might convert it into a kind of merit, and, instead of a breaker of laws, a violator of his trust, a receiver of scandalous bribes, a peculator of the first magnitude, might make himself to be considered as a great, distinguishing, eminent financier, a collector of revenue in new and extraordinary ways, and that we should thus at once praise his diligence, industry, and ingenuity. The scheme he set on foot was this: he pretended that the Company could not exist upon principles of strict justice, (for so he expresses it,) and that their affairs, in many cases, could not be so well accommodated by a regular revenue as by privately taking money, which was to be applied to their service by the person who took it, at his discretion. This was the principle he laid down. It would hardly be believed, I imagine, unless strong proof appeared, that any man could be so daring as to hold up such a resource to a regular government, which had three million of known, avowed, a great part of it territorial, revenue. But it is necessary, it seems, to piece out the lion’s skin with a fox’s tail, — to tack on a little piece of bribery and a little piece of peculation, in order to help out the resources of a great and flourishing state; that they should have in the knavery of their servants, in the breach of their laws, and in the entire defiance of their covenants, a real resource applicable to their necessities, of which they were not to judge, but the persons who were to take the bribes; and that the bribes thus taken were, by a mental reservation, a private intention in the mind of the taker, unknown to the giver, to be some time or other, in some way or other, applied to the public service. The taking such bribes was to become a justifiable act, in consequence of that reservation in the mind of the person who took them; and he was not to be called to account for them in any other way than as he thought fit.

  My Lords, an act of Parliament passed in the year 1773, the whole drift of which, I may say, was to prevent bribery, peculation, and extortion in the Company’s servants; and the act was penned, I think, with as much strictness and rigor as ever act was penned. The 24th clause of Cha, 13 Geo. III., has the following enactment: “And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that, from and after the first day of August, 1774, no person holding or exercising any civil or military office under the crown, or the said United Company, in the East Indies, shall accept, receive, or take, directly or indirectly, by himself, or any other person or persons on his behalf, or for his use or benefit, of and from any of the Indian princes or powers, or their ministers or agents, or any of the natives of Asia, any present, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwise, upon any account, or on any pretence whatsoever, or any promise or engagement for any present, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward: and if any person, holding or exercising any such civil or military office, shall be guilty of any such offence, and shall be thereof legally convicted,” &c., &c. It then imposes the penalties: and your Lordships see that human wisdom cannot pen an act more strongly directed against taking bribes upon any pretence whatever.

  This act of Parliament was in affirmance of the covenant entered into by the servants of the Company, and of the explicit orders of the Company, which forbid any person whatever in trust, “directly or indirectly, to accept, take, or receive, or agree to accept, take, or receive, any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, donation, or compensation, in money, effects, jewels, or otherwise howsoever, from any of the Indian princes, sovereigns, subahs, or nabobs, or any of their ministers, servants, or agents, exceeding the value of four thousand rupees, &c., &c. And that he, the said Warren Hastings, shall and will convey, assign, and make over to the said United Company, for their sole and proper use and benefit, all and every such gifts, rewards, gratuities, allowances, donations, or compensations whatsoever, which, contrary to the true intent and meaning of these presents, shall come into the hands, possession, or power of the said Warren Hastings, or any other person or persons in trust for him or for his use.”

 
; The nature of the covenant, the act of Parliament, and the Company’s orders are clear. First, they have not forbidden their Governor-General, nor any of their Governors, to take and accept from the princes of the country, openly and publicly, for their use, any territories, lands, sums of money, or other donations, which may be offered in consequence of treaty or otherwise. It was necessary to distinguish this from every other species of acceptance, because many occasions occurred in which fines were paid to the Company in consequence of treaties; and it was necessary to authorize the receipt of the same in the Company’s treasury, as an open and known proceeding. It was never dreamed that this should justify the taking of bribes, privately and clandestinely, by the Governor, or any other servant of the Company, for the purpose of its future application to the Company’s use. It is declared that all such bribes and money received should be the property of the Company. And why? As a means of recovering them out of the corrupt hands that had taken them. And therefore this was not a license for bribery, but a prohibitory and penal clause, providing the means of coercion, and making the prohibition stronger. Now Mr. Hastings has found out that this very coercive clause, which was made in order to enable his superiors to get at him and punish him for bribery, is a license for him to receive bribes. He is not only a practitioner of bribery, but a professor, a doctor upon the subject. His opinion is, that he might take presents or bribes to himself; he considers the penal clause which the Company attached to their prohibition, and by which all such bribes are constructively declared to be theirs, in order to recover them out of his hands, as a license to receive bribes, to extort money; and he goes with the very prohibition in his hand, the very means by which he was to be restrained, to exercise an unlimited bribery, peculation, and extortion over the unhappy natives of the country.

  The moment he finds that the Company has got a scent of any one of his bribes, he comes forward and says, “To be sure, I took it as a bribe; I admit the party gave me it as a bribe: I concealed it for a time, because I thought it was for the interest of the Company to conceal it; but I had a secret intention, in my own mind, of applying it to their service: you shall have it; but you shall have it as I please, and when I please; and this bribe becomes sanctified the moment I think fit to apply it to your service.” Now can it be supposed that the India Company, or that the act of Parliament, meant, by declaring that the property taken by a corrupt servant, contrary to the true intent of his covenant, was theirs, to give a license to take such property, — and that one mode of obtaining a revenue was by the breach of the very covenants which were meant to prevent extortion, peculation, and corruption? What sort of body is the India Company, which, coming to the verge of bankruptcy by the robbery of half the world, is afterwards to subsist upon the alms of peculation and bribery, to have its strength recruited by the violation of the covenants imposed upon its own servants? It is an odd sort of body to be so fed and so supported. This new constitution of revenue that he has made is indeed a very singular contrivance. It is a revenue to be collected by any officer of the Company, (for they are all alike forbidden, and all alike permitted,) — to be collected by any person, from any person, at any time, in any proportion, by any means, and in any way he pleases; and to be accounted for, or not to be accounted for, at the pleasure of the collector, and, if applied to their use, to be applied at his discretion, and not at the discretion of his employers. I will venture to say that such a system of revenue never was before thought of. The next part is an exchequer, which he has formed, corresponding with it. You will find the board of exchequer made up of officers ostensibly in the Company’s service, of their public accountant and public treasurer, whom Mr. Hastings uses as an accountant and treasurer of bribes, accountable, not to the Company, but to himself, acting in no public manner, and never acting but upon his requisition, concealing all his frauds and artifices to prevent detection and discovery. In short, it is an exchequer in which, if I may be permitted to repeat the words I made use of on a former occasion, extortion is the assessor, in which fraud is the treasurer, confusion the accountant, oblivion the remembrancer. That these are not mere words, I will exemplify as I go through the detail: I will show you that every one of the things I have stated are truths, in fact, and that these men are bound by the condition of their recognized fidelity to Mr. Hastings to keep back his secrets, to change the accounts, to alter the items, to make him debtor or creditor at pleasure, and by that means to throw the whole system of the Company’s accounts into confusion.

  I have shown the impossibility of the Company’s having intended to authorize such a revenue, much less such a constitution of it as Mr. Hastings has drawn from the very prohibitions of bribery, and such an exchequer as he has formed upon the principles I have stated. You will not dishonor the legislature or the Company, be it what it may, by thinking that either of them could give any sanction to it. Indeed, you will not think that such a device could ever enter into the head of any rational man. You are, then, to judge whether it is not a device to cover guilt, to prevent detection by destroying the means of it; and at the same time your Lordships will judge whether the evidence we bring you to prove that revenue is a mere pretext be not stronger than the strange, absurd reasons which he has produced for forming this new plan of an exchequer of bribery.

  My Lords, I am now going to read to you a letter in which Mr. Hastings declares his opinion upon the operation of the act, which he now has found the means, as he thinks, of evading. My Lords, I will tell you, to save you a good deal of reading, that there was certain prize-money given by Sujah ul Dowlah to a body of the Company’s troops serving in the field, — that this prize-money was to be distributed among them; but upon application being made to Mr. Hastings for his opinion and sanction in the distribution, Mr. Hastings at first seemed inclined to give way to it, but afterwards, upon reading and considering the act of Parliament, before he allowed the soldiery to receive this public donation, he thus describes his opinion of the operation of the act.

  Extract of a Letter from Mr. Hastings to Colonel Champion, 31 August, 1774.

  “Upon a reference to the new act of Parliament, I was much disappointed and sorry to find that our intentions were entirely defeated by a clause in the act, (to be in force after the 1st of August, 1774,) which divests us of the power to grant, and expressly prohibits the army to receive, the Nabob’s intended donation. Agreeable to the positive sense of this clause, notwithstanding it is expressed individually, there is not a doubt but the army is included with all other persons in the prohibition from receiving presents or donations; a confirmation of which is, that in the clause of exceptions, wherein ‘counsellors-at-law, physicians, surgeons, and chaplains are permitted to receive the fees annexed to their profession,’ no mention whatever is made of any latitude given to the army, or any circumstances wherein it would be allowable for them to receive presents.... This unlucky discovery of an exclusion by act of Parliament, which admits of no abatement or evasion wherever its authority extends, renders a revisal of our proceedings necessary, and leaves no option to our decision. It is not like the ordinances of the Court of Directors, where a favorable construction may be put, and some room is left for the interposition of the authority vested in ourselves, — but positive and decisive, admitting neither of refinement nor misconstruction. I should be happy, if in this instance a method could be devised of setting the act aside, which I should most willingly embrace; but, in my opinion, an opposition would be to incur the penalty.”