The Storm Before the Storm

by Michael Duncan

  CHAPTER 11

  THE SPIKED BOOTS

  Prosperity tries the souls of even the wise; how then should men of depraved character make a moderate use of victory?

  SALLUST1

  BACK IN ROME, SULLA PRESIDED OVER THE CONSULAR ELECTIONS for 87 BC and used them as an opportunity to further demonstrate he was not the tyrant his enemies made him out to be. Having already ordered his troops to vacate the city, Sulla now publicly refused to interfere with the election. Even as men hostile to him stood for the consulship.2

  Chief among these candidates was Lucius Cornelius Cinna. Cinna burst onto the historical stage here in the consular election for 87, and for the next four years would hold a dominant position in Roman politics. But about this man who is so critical to Roman history, we know almost nothing. Here is what we do know: He came from the same patrician Cornelii family as Sulla, but the “Cinna” branch left almost no trace. His father was probably the consul for 127, but we cannot be sure. Cinna himself was probably elected praetor for 90 or 89, and served as a legate during the Social War. But that is all we know. The rest of Cinna’s life—his family, his rise up the cursus honorum, his campaigns, success, failures—has been lost to history.3

  We can, however, speculate with some confidence that Cinna was born no later than 130, probably a few years earlier. This meant he was hitting his twenties just as the Cimbri were appearing in Gaul and Jugurtha was running loose in Numidia. Fulfilling his ten years of military service during this period, Cinna likely either served in Numidia or on the recurring campaigns against the Cimbri. But though these campaigns are well documented by Roman historians, and featured major figures like Marius and Sulla, Cinna is never mentioned. His name never appears, even in passing. Given his later political leanings, though, it seems likely he served in the north under Marius and alongside the Italians whose cause he would later champion.4

  But though Cinna was likely sympathetic to Marius, he was not among those twelve principal Marian leaders named by Sulla. It is highly unlikely Cinna took part in the fighting surrounding Sulla’s first march on Rome. He might not have even been in Rome at the time, but rather out with one of Rome’s various armies stomping out the last smoldering flames of the Social War. If Cinna did not return to Rome until after Sulla captured the city, he would be untainted by the entire affair and able to effectively tap those united by a common abhorrence of Sulla’s march on Rome. It is possible he ran on a platform of bringing Sulla to trial for his conduct.5

  But even with Cinna making noise about political prosecution, Sulla refused to take the bait. Disqualifying Cinna would prove that Sulla was exactly what his enemies said he was. There were multiple candidates in the race, but Sulla refused to help or hinder any of them. The other strongest candidate was Gnaeus Octavius. An old optimate conservative, Octavius was no friend of Marius and supported Sulla’s reforms in theory—but the way Sulla had gone about it burned him to the edges of his toga. Octavius could not be counted on to stand in the way if Cinna decided to prosecute Sulla.6

  When election day came, the Assembly elected Cinna and Octavius consuls. Sulla put a fine face on the election and said it was the ultimate proof that his enemies lied when they called him a tyrant. Would a tyrant let a man like Cinna be consul? The answer is no. Whatever Sulla’s crimes, raw tyrannical power was never his object. Sulla was fundamentally a conservative republican; the power he would acquire during his career was always at the service of conservative republican morality. At least in his own mind.

  But though he accepted the election of Cinna, Sulla was not without tricks. As the man who would administer the oath of office to the new consuls, Sulla forced them to swear an oath that they would not disturb his political reforms. In front of a large crowd, the incoming consuls swore the oath, and cast a stone on the ground to accept the punishment of exile if they broke their word.7

  As he vacated the consulship, Sulla could rest easy knowing that as long as he held his military command he would be shielded from political prosecution. To offer the same protection for his friend and colleague Pompeius, Sulla arranged for Pompeius to take over Rome’s army at Asculum. Pompey Strabo had been at his post for three years, and now that the siege was over, it was time for a change in command. At Sulla’s insistence, the Senate directed Pompeius to take over Strabo’s army. This would not only protect Pompeius personally, but it would give Sulla a reliable army stationed just over the Apennines if Rome should make trouble while Sulla was in the east. But neither Pompey Strabo nor his men appreciated the abrupt change in command. Within days of his arrival in camp, Pompeius was unceremoniously murdered. The assailants were never caught, but Strabo himself was naturally suspected of masterminding the assassination.8

  The murder of Pompeius shocked Sulla, and Rome suddenly felt less safe. Sulla kept himself under a tight bodyguard as he wrapped up a few last pieces of business in Rome. Within a few days, he departed for the safety of his legions at Capua.9

  IT DID NOT take long for Cinna to break his oath after assuming the consulship in January 87. At the first opportunity, Cinna dispatched a tribune to indict Sulla for the illegal murder of Roman citizens. Sulla could plead senatus consultum ultimum all he wanted, but unlike Opimius in 121, and Marius in 100, the Senate never issued the Final Decree to Sulla in 88. But since a tribune’s authority only extended to the city limits of Rome, Sulla ignored the charges and instead continued mobilizing his legions to head east. He left one legion behind to maintain the siege of Nola and moved the other five down to the southeastern port of Brundisium (modern-day Brindisi). From there they would depart for Greece.10

  Unable to prevent Sulla from leaving Italy, Cinna shredded the rest of the sacred oath he had sworn. Making a bid for widespread Italian support, he announced that he was going forward with Sulpicius’s program to disperse the Italians evenly through the thirty-one rural tribes. His colleague Octavius was appalled at the broken oath and rallied both conservative opinion and armed gangs.11

  With political debates now inevitably decided in the streets, both sides rallied large groups of menacing partisans. Cinna called in throngs of Italians while Octavius mustered the plebs urbana, who were acutely aware they would be buried forever if the Italians were distributed evenly throughout the tribes. Inside Rome, the plebs urbana outnumbered the Italians, so when the two sides clashed, Cinna was forced to flee the city. Octavius then induced the Assembly to strip Cinna not just of his consulship, but his citizenship. To replace Cinna, the Assembly elevated a nonentity named Merula. His selection was not an accident—Merula was a member of an obscure priesthood that forbid participation in almost any public business. Octavius would wield sole power in Rome.12

  But despite being outnumbered in Rome, Cinna had the numerical advantage everywhere else. The Italians were now aware the fight for political equality had moved from civitas to suffragium. They all now held Roman citizenship thanks to the Lex Julia, but knew they would have to keep fighting for the right to participate equally in elections. With Cinna promising full and equal suffrage, the communities that had lately been fighting for “Italia” readily agreed to fight for Cinna. After leaving Rome, Cinna ran a circuit south through Tibur, Praeneste, and Nola that saw him raise more than ten legions.13

  Cinna also had links to a large network of disaffected nobles he could call on to join him. Gnaeus Papirius Carbo—last seen in 89 passing a citizenship bill on behalf of the Italians—rallied forces of his own and joined Cinna. Also joining was Quintus Sertorius, a young officer who had shown loyal service to Marius while running supply networks out of Cisalpine Gaul during the Social War. Sertorius bore an implacable hatred of Sulla that would make him the last Marian general carrying on the Civil War, even after the rest were dead or defeated.14

  As he raised Italian legions, Cinna also induced the defection of the single legion left behind by Sulla to maintain the siege of Nola. Addressing the legion, Cinna dramatically laid his symbols of office down on the ground and said, �
��From you, citizens, I received this authority. The people voted it to me; the Senate has taken it away from me without your consent. Although I am the sufferer by this wrong I grieve amid my own troubles equally for your sakes… Where will after this be your power in the Assemblies, in the elections, in the choice of consuls, if you fail to confirm what you bestow, and whenever you give your decision fail to secure it.” Cinna then fell to the ground and lay there until the men picked him up, returned the symbols of office, and swore an oath to follow him. * 15

  While Cinna forged this huge army, his consular colleague Octavius could call on few forces beyond the plebs urbana. The armies of Pompey Strabo remained near Asculum, but Strabo’s loyalties were unclear. Strabo was his own man and would not likely subordinate himself to Cinna, but he was also furious at Sulla for the attempt to strip him of his army. Cinna skillfully exploited Strabo’s anger and vanity, and proposed an alliance sealed by a shared consulship in 86. If Cinna and Strabo joined forces they would be stronger than any other faction in Italy—and more than a match even for Sulla when their shared enemy returned from the east.16

  The only other army Octavius could call on were the legions of Metellus Pius. But Pius was pinned down trying to subdue the last of the Samnites and could not break away. In desperation, the Senate ordered Pius to cut a deal with the Samnites to end the war so he could come back to Rome. Aware they were in a strong bargaining position, the Samnites demanded “citizenship be given not alone to themselves but also to those who had deserted to their side”; they also “refused to give up any of the booty which they had, and demanded back all the captives and deserters from their own ranks.” But Pius refused to let the rebels retire on such generous terms. Cinna jumped at Pius’s hesitation. He sent a hard-line Marian partisan named Gaius Flavius Fimbria to present his own terms to the Samnites: Cinna would accept their demands if they joined his fight against Octavius. The Samnites agreed. Rome trembled.17

  AFTER THE SLAUGHTER of the Italians, Mithridates ruled Asia unchallenged in 87. Most of Asia had already accepted the king’s generous terms, but a few stubborn cities like Rhodes held out. With his opening gambit such a success, Mithridates let his ambitions grow. He now planned to cast himself as the liberator of Greece, expel the Romans, and reign over an empire that stretched from the Black Sea to the Adriatic.18

  While the king himself stayed behind in Asia to integrate the new domains, he sent out a two-pronged invasion of Greece in early 87. On land, an army of mercenary Thracians descended on Macedonia. By sea, the main Pontic army sailed under the command of General Archelaus. Archelaus had been one of Mithridates’s longest-serving generals, and even tangled directly with Sulla in Cappadocia over the installation of the puppet king Ariobarzanes in 95. Archelaus sailed his massive fleet across the Aegean Sea to Athens. There, with the help of a friendly political faction, he secured an Athenian declaration of allegiance to Mithridates. The Athenians knew their declaration meant war with Rome, but with Archelaus’s fleet already bobbing in their harbor, Rome’s vengeance was a distant threat.19

  When Athens went over to Mithridates, most of Greece followed its lead. With the entire region throwing off Roman authority, only the few lonely legions under the command of a praetor named Sura remained to hold the line. Guarding the Macedonian frontier, Sura fended off the Thracian invasion, but unless he was reinforced, Rome would lose Greece as quickly as they had lost Asia. Luckily for the beleaguered praetor, help was on the way.20

  Leaving his domestic troubles behind, Sulla sailed across the Adriatic in the spring of 87. As he marched his five legions east, every city he passed declared their undying loyalty to Rome—because of course they did, what would you do? But unexpectedly, Archelaus did not march his own army out to halt Sulla’s advance. This allowed Sulla to march all the way to the walls of Athens. Upon arrival, he demanded the city surrender. When the Athenians refused, Sulla ordered siege lines built around the city. But there was a problem—Archelaus controlled the seas. As long as the Pontic navy occupied the harbor of Piraeus, the Romans could never break the siege. To deal with this problem, Sulla dispatched one of his most loyal officers, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, * to make a circuit of the various eastern kingdoms and demand they provide ships for Rome. While he waited for Lucullus to return, Sulla camped in front of Athens. While outside Athens, he received reports about the situation back in Italy. He did not like what he heard, but the most unsettling bit of news was that Gaius Marius had returned.21

  MARIUS MADE PREPARATIONS to leave his temporary safe haven on the island of Cercina as soon as he heard Cinna was raising an army of Italians, many of whom would have been Marian veterans. Within a few weeks he cobbled together a small army of loyalists drawn from the inhabitants of Africa, including an infamous band of three hundred Illyrian bodyguards. Dubbed the “Spiked Boots,” these cold-blooded mercenaries would show little sympathy for spluttering Romans begging for their lives.22

  When he sailed back to Italy, Marius swung north of Rome and landed in Etruria. The Third Founder of Rome was beloved here among the northern Italians. Marius had delivered them from the Cimbri, and then generously expanded the rights and privileges of those who served under him. These Etruscan communities were outraged that the great Marius had been chased out of Rome like a common criminal. When Marius landed, “his flight and exile had added a certain awe to his high reputation,” and he raised new recruits everywhere he went. Marius soon commanded a personal legion six thousand strong. This force was not as large as the vast army controlled by Cinna, but it was enough to get Marius an audience. Far from the power hungry lunatic he is occasionally portrayed as being, Marius met Cinna and scrupulously placed himself under Cinna’s command. Cinna was, after all, still consul. Cinna appreciated the gesture and invited Marius into his war council.23

  This senior war council—now including Cinna, Carbo, Sertorius, and Marius—devised a strategy to surround and blockade Rome. Marius would capture the critical port of Ostia. Cinna would take Arminium and Placenta. Carbo’s legions would stake out the upper Tiber River. When they were all in place Rome would be strangled. But even as he watched these enemy forces fan out, back inside Rome, Octavius refused to surrender.24

  Octavius’s stubborn resilience was soon rewarded. After considering all his options, Pompey Strabo decided to fight Cinna rather than join him. With Metellus Pius trapped in Samnium, and Sulla in Greece, Strabo knew the walls of Rome were being defended by an irregular militia of plebs urbana who would never stand against tens of thousands of veteran soldiers. Especially not after those Italians had cut off Rome’s access to food and water. So Strabo decided there was an opportunity to play savior. If he swooped in to deliver Rome from the threat he would not only make himself a hero to the Senate and People of Rome, he would be left as the most powerful general in Italy.25

  Having completed their envelopment of the surrounding countryside, Cinna’s forces finally launched a direct assault on Rome in late 87. But reinforced by Strabo, the city withstood the attack. It appeared that Strabo really would be the hero of the hour—but then fate dealt one of its most famous blows. Over the winter of 87–86, plague swept through legionary camps, and more than ten thousand died, among them Pompey Strabo. He was disliked by all, so much so that a sensationalized story circulated that fate struck him dead with lightning. The sudden death of Strabo changed the entire political and military dynamic of the conflict. When Cinna and Marius returned to Rome next time, there would be no one standing in their way.26

  AFTER THE SHOCKING death of Strabo, the Senate despaired at its chances of surviving the siege. To keep the war going, Octavius slipped out of the city and joined with his strongest supporters, Metellus Pius and Marcus Crassus Dives. * Operating in the Alban Hills near Rome, Octavius tried to raise levies from the Latin communities that had stayed loyal through the Social War. But he could not raise troops fast enough, and with Cinna’s army preparing to march on Rome again, the Senate ordered Metellus Pius to go nego
tiate a peace. Cinna’s first demand was that Pius treat him as consul. He said, “I left Rome as consul, and I will not return there as a private man.” After a few rounds of negotiations, the Senate agreed to Cinna’s terms. The recently elevated priest-consul Merula formally resigned. In exchange, Cinna said he would not purposefully kill anyone when he reentered the city. But no one could miss Marius standing behind Cinna glowering ominously. As soon as these negotiations were complete, Metellus Pius prudently withdrew himself to Africa.27

  Settlement in hand, the Senate ordered the gates of Rome opened. The restored consul Cinna entered the city at the head of an army. But for the moment, Marius did not follow. The old man refused to enter until his status as an enemy of the state was formally repealed. So as soon as he entered the city, Cinna arranged for the Assembly to lift the ban on the twelve Marian exiles and restore their civil dignity. He then induced the Assembly to turn the tables on the man who had engineered the expulsion of the Marians. Under Cinna’s close watch the Assembly declared Sulla an enemy of the state.28

  With his dignity restored, Marius entered Rome. For a few hours everything was calm. Then the killing began. Though Cinna had pledged not to go on a punitive murder spree, Marius had made no such promise, and the soldiers were eager to be let off the leash. Whether they were Italian veterans of the Social War or foreign mercenaries, the chance to sack Rome was an opportunity they did not want to miss. So for five days, the people of Rome cowered under a bloody terror in which “neither reverence for the gods, nor the indignation of men, nor the fear of odium for their acts existed any longer among them… They killed remorselessly and severed the necks of men already dead, and they paraded these horrors before the public eye, either to inspire fear and terror, or for a godless spectacle.” But the killings were not indiscriminate. The marauding troops concentrated on the wealthier quarters of the city and ignored the lower-class plebs. This discriminating eye helped form a perverse bond between the soldiers and the poor Romans; indeed, after dreading contact for so long it might have surprised both sides to learn they had a common enemy in the rich nobles on the Palatine Hill.29