The Fairey Battle: A Reassessment of its RAF Career

by Greg Baughen

  Battle operations France May 1940.

  On 17 May, it was decided to reduce the Battle force to six front-line squadrons. Nos. 105 and 218 Squadrons were to be withdrawn with their aircraft, and aircrews transferred to the remaining squadrons. The decision was not immediately implemented; No. 218 Squadron crews flew a few more sorties for their squadron before being formally transferred. The six remaining squadrons also sent as much unnecessary equipment to the rear as possible, in an effort to make themselves more mobile.35

  There seemed to be enough Battles in store to keep these squadrons up to strength. No. 98 Squadron had arrived in March as a reserve and was able to provide replacement aircrews and planes. No. 142 Squadron only had three serviceable machines on the 19th, but was soon claiming a strength of twenty-five machines. Despite the heavy losses, the Battle squadrons were still a significant force. The only shortage appears to have been gunners. There was a suspicion in France, probably justified, that the gunner needs of the Bomber Command squadrons in the UK were getting priority. There were occasions when pilots had to fly on missions as gunners.36

  From the 18th, some of the Battle squadrons had planes on standby, but only No. 103 Squadron appears to have flown any sorties, with its Battles bombing targets in the St Quentin area. The low-level approach had now been abandoned. With no fighter escorts available, there was no advantage to flying in formation; the combined firepower of a Battle formation was not enough to beat off attack. At least operating singly, or at most in pairs, the pilots could fly as fast as the Battle could take them and try to use the plane’s manoeuvrability to shake off chasing fighters. With a speed deficit of over 100 mph, it was hardly an option that was guaranteed to succeed, but the crews believed it was better than flying straight and level in formation and taking on the Messerschmitts toe to toe. On the 18th, the Battles flew singly at around 8,000 feet and attacked their targets in shallow dives, with instantaneously fused bombs dropped at around 4,000 feet. It worked on the 18th, with all No. 103 Squadron’s Battles returning.37

  On the 19th, Nos. 12, 88, 103, 142, 150, 218, and 226 Squadrons were available for operations. This was the day de Gaulle launched his second counter-attack from the Laon region. D’Astier attempted to provide air support, but Barratt was no longer working alongside the French Air Force commander and does not seem to have been aware any French attack was taking place. Indeed, Barratt was very much in the dark about what was happening anywhere along the front. He knew that German forces were advancing beyond the Montcornet–Neufchâtel road, and his own reconnaissance confirmed that there were substantial German forces to the east of this line, north of Rethel. These were a potential threat to his bases further south, so Barrett ordered all except No. 226 Squadron to attack by day, with every available Battle, any target they came across on the roads and villages between Rethel and Montcornet. Somehow, No. 88 Squadron got the wrong orders and bombed targets around Hirson, and No. 142 Squadron ended up bombing targets much further west, near Laon. Arguably these were both more useful areas to be operating in, as the former was at the heart of the German drive west and the latter close to where de Gaulle was advancing. The Battles operating in the Rethel area were only attacking screening forces on the fringe of the main German advance. 38

  Six Battles from No. 150 squadron attacked columns of vehicles near Fraillicourt, south-east of Montcornet, and Chappes north of Rethel. Anti-aircraft fire was heavy; one plane failed to return while two others were damaged and were forced to land at the nearest friendly airfields. No. 218 Squadron appeared to find more targets, bombing tanks and trucks around Hauteville and Château-Porcien, a few miles north-west of Rethel. Shallow dive-bombing tactics were used, with planes descending from around 6–7,000 feet and dropping their bombs at 2–4,000 feet. No. 88 Squadron found no shortage of targets to bomb and strafe in the Hirson area and, along with No. 218, lost no planes, but all three Battles from No. 142 Squadron, attacking targets west of Laon, failed to return.39 No. 12 Squadron sent six Battles to attack targets north of Rethel, but only one small column was spotted. Two planes failed to return, one the victim of Bf 109s. Six Battles from No. 103 Squadron managed to bomb enemy forces west of Rethel without suffering any losses.40

  These attacks on their own could not achieve much. There were no natural bottlenecks and, with so many routes now open to the German Army, it would be difficult even for a much larger force to slow down the advance significantly. For these raids to have value, they had to be taking place in the vicinity of counter-attacks on the ground, where ground forces might be able to take advantage of any confusion caused. If the bombing had been even loosely coordinated with de Gaulle’s action further west, it might have been more useful.

  The loss of just six out of thirty-three Battles was hardly a triumph, but it was an improvement on the 50 per cent loss rate of the first five days of operations. In the circumstances, operating singly and dive-bombing from relatively low altitudes seemed the best way of using the Battle by day. However, an 18 per cent loss rate was still unsustainable and Barratt still believed operating by night was the only way of reducing losses to an acceptable level.

  On the night of 20th–21st, the eve of the British counter-attack southwards at Arras, the Battles resumed their nocturnal operations. Thirty-eight Battles attacked communications in the Givet, Dinant, Fumay, Monthermé, and Charleville-Mézières regions and just one Battle failed to return. The roads through the Ardennes and across the Meuse were still a potential bottleneck, but any delays caused here were not going to have any effect on the battle at Arras, some 100 miles away, which opened just a few hours later. Again, attacking targets closer to where the fighting was taking place had more chance of influencing events on the ground. In the end, mist over the Meuse prevented many pilots from even claiming to have hit something. On the day of the Arras counter attack, the Battles did not fly any daylight missions.

  On 22 May, it was to be the turn of the French to counter-attack. The target was Cambrai, and this time the British government insisted that the RAF make a greater effort to support the attack. On the night of 21st–22nd, forty-one Battles were ready to attack targets in the Ardennes but, after around a dozen had taken off, the Air Ministry ordered the operation to halt. Instead, the Battles were to operate the next day in the Amiens–Arras–Abbeville area, hunting down German tanks. Barratt was not at all keen on the idea of his Battles attempting to hit such small targets, as his bombers would have to fly very low to have any chance of success and would once again be vulnerable to ground fire.

  The area the Battles were sent to was too far west to be particularly relevant to the French counter-attack on Cambrai. It seems that the government instruction had been interpreted rather liberally. Lord Gort, the British land commander in France, was already planning to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk, and was more concerned about the threat to his right flank than any enemy forces that might block a French advance southwards. The Battles achieved little; the weather was poor and, after about a dozen had taken off, further missions were cancelled. The Battles spotted tanks in the Doullens, Amiens, and Bapaume areas, but only one was claimed. One Battle was lost, and another three were damaged.41

  The confusion about whether the trapped Allied armies should be striking south or retreating north was apparent in the orders handed to the Battle squadrons the next day. An early morning strike by No. 88 Squadron in the Douai–Arras region was cancelled. The squadron was then ordered to attack German forces north-west of Arras that were threatening to cut off the British retreat to Dunkirk. This mission was also cancelled and the squadron ended up flying no daylight missions that day.42

  In the evening, No. 12 Squadron dispatched four planes to bomb German tanks advancing along the Arras–Doullens road. The weather was poor and only two planes found the target, but all four returned. At about the same time, just south of Arras, four Battles from No. 150 Squadron dive-bombed a convoy of armoured fighting vehicles leaving the village of Ra
nsart, and more vehicles parked in a copse further south. Sqn Ldr Bradley, from No. 150 Squadron, had already dropped his bombs when he came across another German column. Undeterred, Bradley set about strafing the column, amidst heavy anti-aircraft fire. Again, it must have been frustrating to attack with such boldness, yet only have a single fixed machine gun to do it with. All the Battles from No.150 squadron encountered heavy ground fire, but all returned.43

  The Battles did not fly any day sorties on 24 May, but on the next day, flights from five squadrons attacked transport moving northwards along the Abbeville–Hesdin road. Out of probably around ten planes, only one failed to return, although the crew eventually made it back to friendly lines. As these planes were delivering their attacks, developments in the UK were setting up the next daylight Battle operation. The Germans’ lax procedures for operating their Enigma machines was making it relatively easy for the Bletchley Park cryptologists to read Luftwaffe signals. A message picked up at 1.30 p.m. on the 25th was decoded and turned out to be instructions for German Air Force commanders to attend a conference the following morning at 9.00 a.m. The venue was Roumont Château, near Libramont, the headquarters of Major-General von Richthofen’s VIII Corps, and the commanders were to arrive at nearby Ochamps airfield at 8.30 a.m. This information was in the hands of the Air Ministry in the early hours of the 26th. At 2.40 a.m. AASF HQ was informed, with more details following at 5.15 a.m. Soon after 7.30 a.m., Nos. 103, 142 and 150 Squadrons received instructions to disrupt the meeting.44

  At 9.00 a.m. on the 26th, six Battles from No. 103 Squadron, six from No. 142 and two from No. 150 set course for the château. The proximity of Ochamps airfield, and the presence of high-ranking officers, made it very likely that German fighters would be operating in the area. Nos. 1 and 73 Squadrons were given the task of protecting the attack but, once again, it appears to have been only an indirect escort. The Battles made their own way to the target in pairs, with Plt Off. Vernon leading the two planes from No. 150 squadron. He would soon find himself wishing the promised escort was closer to hand. Vernon lost touch with the second plane when a storm forced them to drop down to 5,000 feet. With some difficulty, Vernon found the château and dive-bombed it from 3,000 feet but he was immediately set upon by four Bf 110s—he tried to shake them off by diving to ground level but the Messerschmitts followed. Although under constant attack, Vernon still had the presence of mind to take aim at an enemy aircraft that happened to be landing at an airstrip he found himself flying over. The Battle kept going despite the pounding from the Messerschmitts, demonstrating the value of the armour that had been installed to protect the crew from fighter attack and how much punishment the basic airframe could take. However, the more vulnerable engine did eventually succumb and Vernon was forced to crash-land. His two crewmembers were captured but he eventually made his way back to friendly territory. A second plane also failed to return.45 Despite the poor weather, most of the Battles involved in the operation did manage to find the château, and inflicted some damage on the building. Those attending the conference were certainly aware that they were under attack, but there were no casualties.

  There were no more day operations until the 28th, by which time AASF squadrons were focusing their efforts on slowing down the build-up of German forces along the Somme and Aisne. The Germans had already established bridgeheads across the Somme, and it was from these that they were likely to launch the next phase of their offensive, once the Dunkirk pocket had been eliminated. On the morning of the 28th, six Battles of No. 226 Squadron tried to dive-bomb targets in the Laon area, but were largely defeated by low cloud. Three picked out targets between the clouds but the other three returned with their bombs. A little later, six more set off to attack roads leading to Amiens and Péronne. One had to return immediately when a Perspex panel blew out but the other five attacked transport and troops, using steep and shallow dive-bombing tactics. All the planes strafed any troops they came across, one pilot strafing enemy columns for five minutes until he had exhausted his ammunition. One of the Battles was damaged, but all returned. No. 103 Squadron was also flying day sorties on the roads leading to Abbeville; one of its planes was badly damaged by ground fire, but again all returned. These missions saw 40-lb anti-personal bombs used for the first time by day. (They were used by night a few days earlier.) These were much more suitable for attacking dispersed vehicles and troops and could be dropped safely from a lower altitude. Why it was so long before these were used is not clear, but it was another indication of how unprepared the Battle squadrons were for tactical air operations.

  AASF aircrews were beginning to use their Battles with more confidence. There were still no fighter escorts, and the fuel tanks and engines were still horribly vulnerable, but the crews were gaining combat experience. Since the disasters of the 14th, the Battle squadrons had flown around 100 day sorties and nine planes had failed to return. The losses were still heavy but they were not catastrophic.

  Meanwhile, most Battle sorties were being flown under cover of darkness, with the Meuse crossing points the main targets. On the night of 23–24 May, thirty-seven Battles set off for Monthermé and Fumay. The next night, forty-one Battles bombed railway sidings at Libramont, supply dumps at Florenville, and routes passing through Sedan, Fumay, Givet, and Dinant. Battles were now carrying three different types of bombs: 40-lb general purpose, 20-lb incendiaries, and the standard 250-lb bombs. 46

  In numerical terms, the Battles were making a useful contribution to the Allied tactical nocturnal offensive, with the AASF managing as many night sorties as the French Air Force. However, there had to be questions about how effective these missions were. Despite the nocturnal training exercises in the spring, even the most experienced pilots were far from proficient night flyers. The planes they were flying did not help; the Battle was simply not designed for night bombing, and the navigator cooped up in the internal cabin could do little to help his pilot find the target. Short-range bombing just beyond the front line might be possible, but anything that required deep penetration of enemy airspace was not so easy. From their airfields around Troyes, even the Meuse crossing points were 100 miles away and these were no longer the crucial targets they had once been. For several days after the breakthrough, the routes through the Ardennes were still the only way of supplying the advancing German Army. However, as the Allied armies fell back on Dunkirk, the number of routes available multiplied and there were no longer so many obvious bottlenecks.

  To make matters worse, Barratt was following his natural inclination to bomb ever further behind the front line. On the night of the 22nd, No. 103 Squadron bombed Trier, in Germany. Two nights later, the Battles of No. 88 Squadron set off for Frankfurt, nearly 100 miles inside Germany and a 250-mile haul for the luckless Battle crews. There were enough problems finding targets close to the front line without being expected to find targets deep inside Germany. Nor was it particularly useful; bombing Frankfurt was of very little relevance to any sector of the front, least of all the Allied troops holding the Dunkirk perimeter 300 miles away.

  Bombing was not particularly accurate, especially in the early operations, with crews relying on a combination of calculation, guesswork and hope. Even over short distances, most crews were happy just to get their plane somewhere near the target, drop their bombs and head for home. By far their biggest concern was finding their airfield and landing safely in the dark. Many of those claiming to have reached the target area were simply dropping their bombs on estimated time of arrival (ETA)—which meant when the crews guessed that they might be over the target area. This was a little more accurate when crews spotted a recognisable landmark fairly close to the target and then bombed on ETA from that point. Even so, it was scarcely likely to bring much success. Crews were told to stop using this method, but they were also told not to come back with any bombs, so bombs continued to be dropped on the flimsiest evidence of a target below. Some simply flew at 10,000 feet and bombed any sign of the enemy, such as a searchlight or t
he flash of an anti-aircraft gun but, from such high altitudes, the chances of hitting anything were remote. The more experienced night flyers might be able to fly low enough to actually identify a train or convoy and shallow dive-bombing gave them some chance of getting their bombs reasonably close. Some flew low enough to strafe the target as well, but it would take time for all aircrews to develop this degree of expertise and confidence. In the circumstances, it was hardly surprising that a plane making its way back to its airfield without its bombs was enough for the mission to be rated a success.

  Poor weather prevented any missions on the night of 26th–27th, but thirty-six Battles resumed the offensive the following night. A blaze was reported at Florenville, but this was the only indication any bombs were hitting their target. The continuing bad weather meant that only a handful of sorties could be flown over the next three nights. The weather and poor targeting, along with the inadequate training and unsuitable equipment, all combined to reduce the effectiveness of these nocturnal efforts. The overall inconvenience caused was probably not great but, with stretched supply lines, the German Army was likely to find any disruption unwelcome.

  It had been a traumatic three weeks for the Battle squadrons. For an inexperienced force, it was a very steep learning curve, but a more battle-hardened force was beginning to emerge. A terrible price had been paid for the experience gained; over 100 Battles had been lost and 119 pilots, observers, and gunners had been killed. But if the hard-learned lessons were taken on board, and an effective army air support force emerged, their sacrifice would not be in vain.