The Fairey Battle: A Reassessment of its RAF Career

by Greg Baughen

  The Army, of course, did not just want their troops to know what dive-bombing was like; they wanted British soldiers to benefit from it. Experience in France had shown that:

  The rapid advance of the enemy armoured forces was due in no small measure to well-timed intervention by dive bomber formations directed immediately ahead of advancing columns wherever these were held up.25

  The War Office wanted the same and they continued to demand that the Air Ministry should provide it.

  A crisis meeting on 2 August allowed the War Office to air its grievances. Under pressure, the Air Ministry agreed to get close air support trials going as quickly as possible and the two Battle squadrons in Northern Ireland were given the task. There were very good reasons for choosing these two squadrons. No. 61 Group had been set up in Northern Ireland to support the Army if the Germans invaded the Republic of Ireland. The Group was a mixed force with an army-cooperation squadron, a long-range Coastal Command reconnaissance squadron, and the two Battle squadrons (Nos. 88 and 218) of No. 75 Wing. If Éire was invaded, the group would be immediately reinforced by two more Battle squadrons and two fighter squadrons. It was a force designed to cooperate directly with the Army and would respond to requests from the army commander in Northern Ireland. It was a tactical force, just like the BAFF, and the army units stationed in Northern Ireland were enthusiastic about the air support it could provide. Grp Capt. Carr, the commander of No. 61 Group, was very anxious to provide it.26 No. 61 Group was the new BAFF and the Battles of its No. 75 Wing would be continuing the tactical traditions of the AASF.

  The location of the Battle squadrons ensured there were no distractions. They were still technically under the control of Bomber Command, but they could not reach targets in mainland Europe so, unlike the squadrons in No. 1 Group, there could be no temptation to force them into a nocturnal strategic role. Initially, the squadrons were confined to coastal patrols, guarding against any uninvited German visitors landing on the coastline. However, the decision to use the squadrons to develop close air support tactics put the focus firmly back on their intended army support role. If there was any doubt about their role, it was clarified in instructions issued in September—the Battle squadrons were to provide ‘either close support or direct support of land operations according to the situation at the time and as directed by the General Officer Commander in Chief’.27 The trials the Air Ministry were organising would help them perform this role, and the procedures they would develop would include ‘radio techniques, machinery for command, target selection and methods of synchronising attacks on the ground and in the air’.28 This was real close support: the aircraft would be attacking targets on the battlefield that front line troops needed eliminated. Lt-Col. Woodall, who had been Barratt’s Army liaison officer in France, was put in charge of the trials.

  Given the danger the country faced, it might seem somewhat perverse to confine these exercises to squadrons based on the other side of the Irish Sea. The Germans might invade Éire, but they were far more likely to invade Britain. The tactics and systems the Battle squadrons were supposed to develop in Northern Ireland were obviously skills and techniques the Battle squadrons would have found very useful in an invasion of the UK. If squadrons in England had conducted these trials, embryonic command and control systems would be in place that could actually be used in an invasion. Instead of just having them pretending to be Stukas, Battles could have been attempting to respond to Army requests for support. This would have been a far more useful way of giving inexperienced troops some idea of what it was like to have aircraft intervening on the battlefield.

  This was not how the Air Staff saw it. This was not the beginning of a new phase in the Battle’s operational career. There were no efforts to make the Battles in Northern Ireland any more suitable for the role than the Battles in Britain. The techniques developed were not going to be used by Battle squadrons in No. 1 Group; for the Air Staff, it was just a rather academic exercise. The Battle was a suitable plane for the trials because it was a close approximation to the Bermudas and Vengeances on order from the United States, and trials with the Battle would be useful for developing the tactics these planes would use when they arrived. There was no immediate use for these tactics as they were for offensive, not defensive operations. They would only be needed at some distant future stage in the war when British forces were advancing.

  The Battle squadrons in Northern Ireland were just paving the way for future close-support planes that might one day equip the RAF and provide the Army with close support. There was therefore no hurry—indeed, as far as the Air Staff was concerned, this scenario was scarcely likely: by the time the British Army was ready to go onto the offensive, the long-range bomber would have already won the war. These trials were taking place simply to keep the War Office happy. The War Office might have suspected this but the generals were just delighted to get any sort of development going. The upshot was that the two Battle squadrons in Northern Ireland began developing sophisticated close air support tactics while the Battle squadrons in England were just practising their night flying skills.

  The commander of No. 75 Wing in Northern Ireland was a certain Group Captain Wann. When the exercises were complete he would help pen the Wann-Woodall report which many would claim revolutionised army and air force cooperation. In August 1940, however, he was showing little sympathy for the Army cause. He was not against using the Battles for low-level attack, which he felt had been abandoned too quickly in France. There was no reason why this approach could not be very effective, he argued, provided surprise could be achieved, and dive-bombers distracting the anti-aircraft defences might be one way of achieving this. However, like Playfair, he believed that his Battles should be used for interdiction in the rear and that they had been misused in France. The French Army, which had ‘an imperfect knowledge of the role of the bomber’, had chosen their targets and his Battles had ended up being used ‘to retrieve the mistakes of the French generals’.29 Bombers could not be used against fleeting targets, which had invariably moved on by the time the bombers arrived, and bomber pilots could not be held on standby like fighter pilots, waiting for such targets to be identified. These had ‘the thrill of the fight’ to look forward to, while bomber crews had only uncertainty about what they might be expected to attack.30 His Battle crews on standby in France had found the wait demoralising and much preferred ‘the steady job of night flying’.31 The one lesson he felt everyone should remember was that ‘Air Forces cannot take the place of Armies. To forget it would mean that one day the Air Force would be asked to fight the Army’s battles, such operations being called ‘close support’.32 His first assertion was correct, but it did not lead to his conclusion.

  Days after making these comments, Wann was told his Battle squadrons would have the task of developing the close support tactics he so clearly did not believe in. The exercises began on 5 September. On the 17th, the complete procedure for calling in air support was tried for the first time; it took 45 minutes from the request to the Battles taking off.33 It was unfortunate that these trials did not begin in July rather than September and with Battle squadrons in Britain rather than Northern Ireland. When they finally got going, a German invasion fleet was already gathering in the Channel ports.

  While the Battle squadrons in Northern Ireland were preparing to support the Army more effectively, the Air Staff was laying down the normal way Battle squadrons in England should be used when they were not required for an ‘emergency’. Daylight low-level missions, or indeed daylight missions of any sort, would not be a normal role for the Battle. On 17 July, the Group was told that the Battles’ general role was to target enemy airfields, shipping and barges, naval installations, and oil supplies, as well as mining inland waterways with the W-Mine. All of these missions would be done by night. Oil in storage depots was a particularly important target, as the Air Staff were convinced Bomber Command had already devastated the German oil industry, and the enemy was running short of oil. T
he loss of any stored oil ought to be a particularly heavy blow.

  The Battles were still supposed to play their part in opposing an invasion. They were to attack any vessels carrying troops, and bomb troops that were establishing or had established a bridgehead. They were also to be ready to spray the invading forces with mustard gas, if the government decided to take such drastic measures. However, Air Vice-Marshal Bottomley (Portal’s Senior Air Staff Officer) made it very clear in a covering letter that the primary role of the Battles would be targets on the continent. The Battles would not be able to penetrate far, but they would be able to provide a short-range supplement to the strategic air offensive.34 It was this mission that the Battle squadrons should prepare for.

  The Battle was clearly not suitable for this task, and Portal was particularly anxious to replace them as quickly as possible, but not with the dive-bombers on order from the United States, nor the Bostons and Maryland light-bombers that were already arriving. The Group needed bombers suitable for long-range bombing by night.35 In August, crews from Battle squadrons began visiting Wellington squadrons so that they could start familiarising themselves with the plane. Portal may not have been able to transfer the Battle crews to heavy bomber squadrons, but he was determined to make sure he achieved the same end by reequipping the Battle squadrons with heavy bombers. The days of No. 1 Group as a tactical force were numbered.

  While they waited for their Wellingtons to arrive, the Battle squadrons stood ready to fend off an invasion. From 9 July, six fully armed Battles were on standby at Binbrook or Newton every night, from an hour before dusk until they were released the following morning, ready to strike an approaching invasion fleet. Those not on standby were largely involved on long-distance cross-country night flying exercises. The first combat mission flown from Britain was on the night of 21–22 July; the target being an oil storage unit in Rotterdam. From their bases in Lincolnshire, it was a long trek, but it was all good practice for their future role. The planes followed the coast round to Orford Ness, and then headed across the North Sea. The Admiralty refused to turn on lighthouses to help guide the bombers, so even the trek along a blacked-out coast was a challenge. Three Battles from each of Nos. 103 and 150 Squadrons set off but only two dropped their bombs on the designated target. Two had to return with technical problems, and the remaining two bombed alternative targets.36 It was not the best of starts.

  No. 12 Squadron’s first night mission from the UK was a total failure. On the night of 23rd–24th three planes tried to take off, but two collided before they could get off the ground and the third gave up when its radio failed to work. The squadron had no more luck two nights later when Evere aerodrome near Brussels was the target: again, one of the Battles had problems with its radio, and the other two were forced to turn back by the weather.37 On the same night, three planes from No. 150 Squadron attempted to attack Hingene airfield, south-west of Brussels, but none found the target. On the night of 28th–29th, five planes from No. 142 Squadron made another attempt to bomb Evere airfield. One had to return early after the plane’s radio aerial became detached and two of the remaining four failed to return. The next night, three planes from No. 150 Squadron were supposed to bomb Waalhaven airfield, just south of Rotterdam, but deteriorating weather forced the mission to be cancelled after only one plane had taken off.38

  It was all too much for the crews. They were still not sufficiently trained in night flying and they were trying to fly aircraft that were not designed for night bombing. Breen accepted that finding dimly-lit targets after a long sea crossing was too much to expect of his crews and, with the moon on the wane, he decided to call off future missions.39 The squadrons needed bombers that were more suitable for long-range nocturnal bombing and crews that had acquired the skills to fly them. More night flying practice was the order of the day.

  In the meantime, the Battle squadrons would return to short-range daylight bombing—missions they were more capable of performing. It was not, however, a return to the army support operations they had flown in France. Instead, the Battle was to be used against naval targets. All those qualities that made it suitable for close air support in a land battle also made the Fairey plane a useful naval bomber. It was manoeuvrable enough to hit small targets so high-speed E-boats operating in the English Channel seemed a reasonable target. With an invasion likely, this might seem like a very useful way of using the Battle. In fact, in an actual invasion, E-boats would be last on the list of targets for attack—the slow cumbersome barges carrying tanks and troops would be the priority.

  The Battle’s new role led to some rather uncertain, and on occasion confusing, times for the squadrons. On 6 August, No. 1 Group ceased to be a part of Bomber Command, and the Group was transferred temporarily to Coastal Command for training.40 From the 13th, Battle squadrons were no longer required to have aircraft on standby to deal with an invasion. The day before, Nos. 12 and 142 Squadrons were assigned to No. 16 Group Coastal Command. On 16 August, after delays due to poor weather, No. 98 Squadron finally departed for Iceland. Nos. 103 and 150 squadrons were the only squadrons left in No. 1 Group and these began an intensive training programme which included tasks like dive-bombing targets pulled by speedboats. Ironically, there was now a sudden revival of interest in the operations the AASF had flown in France, and No. 1 Group was asked for more information on the dive-bombing tactics that they had used. Again, the request seems to have fallen on deaf ears.41 Its new naval role had not absolved the Group of any responsibility for supporting the Army. What was left of No. 1 Group was still supposed to support the Army’s Northern Command, and in the event of an invasion, half its squadrons would be transferred to Army control.42 As No. 1 Group only had two squadrons, it meant the Army would get just one Battle squadron from the arrangement.

  Meanwhile Nos. 12 and 142 Squadrons were involved in operations with No. 16 Group Coastal Command, operating from Detling and Eastchurch. The Battle of Britain was raging all around and these airfields were constantly targeted by the Luftwaffe, adding to the difficulties of the two squadrons. The squadrons were used for attacking French ports, mainly Boulogne. The first of these attacks was on the evening of 17 August, when six Battles from No. 12 Squadron were instructed to attack E-boats in Boulogne harbour. One failed to take off, but the others set off together half an hour before sunset. The idea was that the fading light would provide some protection, but it was counted as a daylight operation and the Battles were accompanied by Blenheim fighters, although as an escort these were of very dubious value. No enemy fighters were encountered and all the Battles made it back across the Channel, although one had been badly damaged by anti-aircraft fire and was forced to crash-land.

  The squadron repeated the attack the following evening, this time setting off 40 minutes later in two flights of three. The later take-off time was sufficient to classify it as a night operation and no escort was provided, but again all the planes returned. This was the last time the squadron attacked in formation; subsequent missions would be flown individually and completely under cover of darkness.

  No. 142 Squadron also began operations for No. 16 Group on the night of 17 August, dispatching six planes to bomb Boulogne harbour. They set off individually a little later than No. 12 Squadron, relying entirely on the gathering gloom for protection. Two turned back with technical problems, but the other four found the target and all returned safely. The squadron flew a similar late evening mission the following day, but most of the subsequent missions were flown entirely in the hours of darkness. There was the occasional attempt to fly by day using clouds for protection, the most determined effort being made on the evening of 23 August. At around 6.30 p.m., well before sunset, six Battles set off in pairs to bomb Boulogne; two made good use of clouds to evade the defences but two were chased back across the Channel by Messerschmitts, with one crash-landing near Ashford. The two that failed to make it back across the Channel were probably also victims of German fighters. It was clear that relying on cloud cov
er was no substitute for a fighter escort.43

  In all, the two squadrons flew around sixty sorties while they were with No. 16 Group. The crews were not happy with their move. They felt neither part of Coastal Command nor Bomber Command, ‘nobody’s baby’, as the Group operations book records.44 It was a reasonable summing up of the status of all Battle squadrons. No. 1 Group’s solution was to suggest the move to Coastal Command should be permanent. Nobody seemed to want the Battle squadrons.

  Dowding was one commander who wanted them, or at least the pilots. He still saw the Battle force as a waste of good pilots with valuable experience of flying single-engined planes, and made another appeal to have some of them transferred to Fighter Command. This time he got his way. Battle squadrons were asked for volunteers, and many pilots were delighted at the opportunity to play a part in the crucial battle that was taking place in the skies above the south-east. Nevertheless, it was another weakening of a tactical bomber force that might still have a very important role to play if the invasion came. There was perhaps an opportunity here to satisfy Dowding and the Army. Ironically, the War Office had suggested on more than one occasion that fighter-bombers could satisfy its close air support needs.45 Equipping the Battle squadrons with single-seaters would have given Dowding the extra fighters he wanted and the Army a much better ground attack plane. It was of course quite unthinkable that, in the RAF’s compartmentalised organisation, a Bomber Command group should be equipped with fighter-bombers.

  No. 1 Group’s separation from Bomber Command proved to be very temporary and, in early September, it returned to the fold. It is not clear if the imminent threat of invasion or the imminent availability of Wellingtons was the driving force behind this reunion. Nos. 12 and 142 Squadrons moved back to Binbrook, and the number of Polish Battle squadrons increased to four by the end of the August, with Nos. 304 and 305 Squadrons joining No. 1 Group. The Group might yet become a significant force in time for an invasion.