The Fairey Battle: A Reassessment of its RAF Career
Page 18
The reality was quite the reverse. German generals testified to the delays caused by Allied daylight bombing, but they did not even notice that the nocturnal strategic air offensive against the Ruhr had started.1 The Fairey Battles may not have changed the course of the war, but their daylight attacks on German troops in 1940 inflicted more damage on the German war machine than the Wellingtons bombing the Ruhr by night.
The two planes were now at opposite ends of the Air Staff requirements spectrum. The Wellington had become a valuable asset. It was not ideal, but it was an extremely useful interim type that would meet RAF needs until the four-engined bombers arrived. The Fairey Battle was not filling any gap in Air Staff plans, and there was no intention of replacing it with a better single-engined tactical bomber. Events would prove such a plane was required. In the end, the RAF would choose the single-engined fighter-bomber to fill this role, but there was no reason why the two-seater could not succeed, as the success of the Il-2 Sturmovik on the Eastern Front demonstrated. Eventually, the RAF opted for the more versatile single-seater, just as it had in the First World War, but this was all in the future. In the desperate days of 1940, the Fairey Battle was all Britain had, but it was never given a chance to show what it could do if properly equipped.
The Wellington, with much justification, is credited with having a very distinguished combat career. In contrast, the Fairey Battle has been repeatedly derided as an embarrassing failure. In truth, neither was allowed to achieve as much as they could have achieved. With fighter protection, both planes could have been successful day bombers, and both could have played a crucial role in defeating the German offensive in France in May 1940. They should have both been ready to play a full part in helping the British Army defeat a German invasion. Fortunately for the Air Staff, that invasion never came. If it had, it would have exposed their flawed thinking and subsequent histories might have asked more searching questions about how both these bombers were used.
The real tragedy in the Fairey Battle story is that its brave crews had to endure the myth that their efforts had been pointless. Air Staff dogma required the Battle of France to be seen as nothing more than an unnecessary prelude before the proper war began. They believed that wars would be won by bombing the enemy’s people and resources, not by armies fighting on the battlefield, and that the RAF had always been wasting its time and the lives of its aircrews by getting involved in the Battle of France. The Battle crews who survived had not just risked their lives in a losing cause; their efforts had always been futile and pointless. Their comrades had sacrificed their lives for no good reason.
The truth is that their efforts were neither futile nor pointless. Indeed, the Battle aircrews could have changed the course of the campaign, with far-reaching consequences for the future course of the war. Muddled thinking had given the RAF a bomber that it did not want. Quite by accident, the RAF found itself equipped with a bomber that could be used tactically, and chance then put the squadrons equipped with this bomber in the path of the main German advance. While the Air Staff were convinced that the decisive struggle would take place over the Ruhr, it was actually taking place over the Ardennes—and it was the Battle crews who were fighting it. The German Army knew it was taking a risk by going through the Ardennes. If the Battles had been properly armed, protected, and escorted, their repeated attacks against the German forces winding their way towards the Meuse might have exposed just how great this risk was. Even in the appallingly underprepared state in which they were thrown into action, the Fairey Battle still managed to give the French a fleeting opportunity to restore the situation. A more prolonged effort by better-prepared squadrons would have given the Allies far more time to react to the German breakthrough, and sustained bombing from the first day of the offensive might have helped prevent it. While the crews of the heavies, bravely fighting the elements in their attempts to bomb the Ruhr, never had any chance of influencing the course of the war in 1940, the Fairey Battle crews at least risked their lives in a winnable cause—and the plane they flew was good enough to enable them to win it. It is sometimes suggested that a plane like the Battle could never operate effectively until air superiority had been won. This is not true and wars cannot be fought on this basis. Armies cannot wait for air superiority before they can benefit from air support. The Fairey Battle did not need air superiority. It just needed more armour, self-sealing tanks and fighter escorts.
The Fairey Battle may not have been the ideal army support plane, but it was a lot closer to what Britain needed than the misguided Air Staff policies and thinking that made sure it would fail. In more questioning times, the circumstances in which Battle aircrews were sent into combat might provoke more criticism, or even condemnation. The disastrous losses were avoidable. Hindsight was not required; all that was needed was the implementation of decisions made at the time. The story of the Fairey Battle sums up the failings in British air policy. The attitudes and policies that had robbed the Battle aircrews of any chance of carrying out their missions successfully also helped ensure defeat on the battlefield for the Allied cause.
The Fairey Battle could never have been the strategic bomber the Air Staff wanted it to be, but it could have been a successful army support bomber. The Air Staff insistence that this was not the way to use bombers was a major misjudgement, but the scale of the error has been concealed by a myth that has remained remarkably durable. As far as the Air Staff was concerned, the Battles did not fail in combat because they were not provided with self-sealing tanks or adequate armour, nor were they a failure because they were denied fighter escorts and the offensive weapons they needed to be effective. For the Air Staff the reason for the Battle’s failure was very simple. The Fairey Battle failed because the plane was obsolete. That was the version of history that the Air Staff wanted recorded—and that is the version that fills our history books.
Appendix I
Comparison of performance required by the specification and achieved by the first production model
P.27/32 Battle K.7558
Empty Weight 6,300 6,720
Speed at 15,000 feet Not less than 195 mph 252 mph
Service ceiling Not less than 22,000 feet 26,300
Range at 15,000 feet 720 1,050 miles
Range with extra tanks 1,500
Distance from 50 feet screen to rest 500 yards 690 yards
Landing run 200 yards 350 yards
Appendix II
Fairey Battle performance
K4303 K9281(Austin) K7758
Date December 1936 February 1938
Engine Merlin F 970 hp Merlin II 967 hp Merlin I 980 hp
Weight excluding bombs 8,019
Bomb load 1,000 lb
Fuel 1,632 lb
Oil 126
Total weight 10,777 10,900 10,898
Max speed 10,000 feet 234
Max speed 15,000 feet 257 mph 237 mph 252
Max speed 20,000 feet 252
Range 1,045 miles 1,050
Landing speed 53 mph 69 mph
Take off run 280 yards 435
Distance from rest to clear 50 feet barrier 445 yards 630 yards 725 yards
Distance to rest clearing 50 feet barrier 690 yards
Landing run with brakes After clearing 50 feet barrier 390 yards 350 yards
Service ceiling 24,600 26,500
Appendix III
Dive-bombing limitations of various RAF aircraft
Aircraft Max. Diving Speed (mph) Max. dive-bombing angle (degrees)
Fairey Battle 308 80
Hawker Hind 65-70
Vickers Wellesley 220 54
Bristol Blenheim 285 30
Armstrong Whitworth Whitley 220 30
Handley Page Harrow 220 30
Fairey Hendon 170 15
(Air 14/1812, 15 February 1938)
Appendix IV
Range of Fairey Battle at various speeds
Speed Main wing tanks (212 gal.) Main wing tanks plus aux. wing tank (33 gal.) Main wing tanks plus fus
elage tank (45 gal.) Main wing tanks plus aux. wing and fuselage tanks
Fairey built Battles
222 mph at 15,000 feet (Max. economic cruising power) 800 955 1,015 1,170
200 mph at 15,000 feet 910 1,080 1,150 1,323
157 mph (Most economical cruising speed) 1,030 1,220 1,350 1,540
176 mph at 1,000 feet (Max economic cruising power) 800 954 1,010 1,163
182 mph at 3,000 feet (Max economic cruising power) 790 943 998 1,150
Austin built Battles
197 mph at 15,000 feet (Max. economic cruising power) 712 850 900 1,037
150 mph (Most economical cruising speed) 917 1,093 1,157 1,333
157 mph at 1,000 feet (Max economic cruising power) 710 846 896 1,032
163 mph at 3,000 feet (Max economic cruising power) 710 846 896 1,032
(12 January 1939 AIR2/2620)
Appendix V
Depth of penetration (miles) of Battle at maximum cruising speed while over enemy territory (without auxiliary wing tank)
Location Approach and attack at 15,000 feet Approach at 15,000 feet, attack at 1,000 feet Approach and attack at 3,000 feet
From bases in France with fuselage tank 275 250 200
From bases in France without fuselage tank 185 170 135
From bases in Kent with fuselage tank 184 165 140
From bases in Kent without fuselage tank 95 85 75
(12th January 1939 AIR2/2620)
Appendix VI
The alternatives to the Battle 1939/40
Appendix VII
Battle production at the Austin and Fairey Stockton plants
The figures in brackets are the number included in the total that were built as trainers.
Endnotes
AIR, AVIA, T and DSIR refer to National Archives documents. Details of operations come mainly from the National Archives Operational Record Books for the squadrons. Where I have drawn from more than one, I have recorded it as ORB in the endnotes to avoid pointless repetition.
No. 12 Squadron AIR27/164
No. 88 Squadron AIR27/716
No. 103 Squadron AIR27/813
No. 105 Squadron AIR27/826
No. 142 Squadron AIR27/972
No. 150 Squadron AIR27/1008
No. 218 Squadron AIR27/1348
No. 226 Squadron AIR27/1406
No. 300 Squadron AIR27/1655
No. 301 Squadron AIR27/1660
No. 304 Squadron AIR27/1667
No. 305 Squadron AIR27/1672
Chapter 1
1. AIR5/1360 (20 March 1923).
2. Baughen, G., Blueprint for Victory (Stroud: Fonthill, 2014), Chapter 14.
3. AIR20/179 (29 July 1927).
4. CAB53/12 (15 April 1926 pp. 5-11).
5. AIR20/179 (1 July 1930).
6. AIR2/2745 (8 August 1932).
7. Ibid. (21 April 1932).
8. Ibid. (7 July 1932).
9. Ibid. (21 July 1932).
10. Gunston, B., Rolls-Royce Aero Engines (Sparkford: Patrick Stephens, 1989), p. 84.
11. FAA Museum, Talk to RAeS, Box 2011 (11 February 1931).
12. Ibid.
13. AIR2/2745 (21 July 1933).
14. Huntley, I., Aircraft Illustrated (Shepperton: Ian Allen, October 1974).
15. FAA Museum Fairey G.A. Drawings Register 1920-1938.
16. AVIA46/107 (Section 3).
17. Ibid. para. 3.
18. AIR2/2745 (24 October 1933).
19. Ibid. (23 August 1934).
20. Ibid. (12 June 1934).
21. Ibid. (8 March 1934).
22. Ibid. (19, 21 June 1934).
23. FAA Museum Fairey G.A. Drawings Register 1920-1938 (14 June 1934).
24. DSIR23/3921.
25. AIR2/2745 (17 October 1934).
26. Ibid. (18 October 1934).
27. Ibid. (8 April 1938).
28. AIR6/43 (4 May 1935).
29. Taylor, H., Fairey Aircraft since 1915 (London: Putnam, 1974), p. 18.
30. AIR6/24 (7 January 1936).
31. Ibid. (14 January 1936).
32. Ibid. (11 February 1936).
33. AIR6/25 (30 June 1936).
34. AIR6/24 (6 February 1936).
35. AIR8/196 (13 May 1935).
36. AIR6/24 (28 February1936).
37. Ibid. (25 February 1936).
38. AIR6/25 (28 April, 6 May 1936).
39. FAA Museum Fairey G.A. Drawings Register 1920-1938 (13, 24 October 1936).
40. AIR8/196 (13 May 1935).
41. AIR2/2620 (December 1936).
42. AIR6/25 (5 May 1936).
43. Morning Post (19 March 1936).
44. Ibid.
45. AIR2/2620 (20 April 1937).
46. FAA Museum Fairey G.A. Drawings Register 1920-1938 (18 March 1935).
47. AVIA46/107 (February-April 1936).
Chapter 2
1. Franks, N., Valiant Wings (Manchester: Crecy, 1994), p. 98.
2. AIR20/181 (4 March 1935)
3. AIR6/25 (24 November 1936).
4. Ibid. (19 January 1937).
5. Ibid.
6. AIR6/28 (10 February 1937).
7. Ibid. (7 March 1937).
8. AIR6/30 (13 July 1937).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. AIR6/31 (12 October 1937)
12. AIR6/28 (13 April 1937).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid. 136
15. AIR6/31 (21 September 1937).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. (28 September 1937).
18. Ibid. (5 October 1937).
19. Ibid. (9 November 1937).
20. Ibid. (9 November 1937).
21. AIR6/32 (16 November 1937).
22. AIR6/31 (9 November 1937).
23. Hendon Fairey File Box 136 (30 December 1937).
24. Ibid. (30 December 1937).
25. Ibid. (24 February 1938).
26. AIR19/5.
27. AIR41/39.
28. AIR6/34 (3 May 1938).
29. Ibid. (11, 26 July 1938).
30. AIR 41/39 (19 Sept 1938).
31. Ibid. (14 January 1939).
32. Ibid. (May 1939).
33. AIR14/131 (20 February 1939).
34. AIR2/2805 (20 February 1939).
35. AIR2/285 (February 1939), Air8/251 (January 1939).
36. AIR14/412 (30 October 1939), AIR 14/412 (11 December 1939).
37. AIR14/74 (23, 25 May, 7 June 1940).
38. AIR6/36 (6 December 1938).
39. AIR14/433 (12, 25 August 1939).
40. AIR14/181 (3 March 1940).
41. Ibid. (9 December 1937, 16 November 1938).
42. Baughen, G., Blueprint for Victory (Stroud: Fonthill, 2014), pp. 91, 163, 186.
43. Gooderson I., Air Power at the Battlefront (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 204.
44. AIR14/211.
45. Baughen, op. cit., pp. 169-170, 183.
46. AIR14/818 (17, 21 April 1939).
47. Ibid. (17, 22 April 1939).
48. WO106/5152 (9 May 1940).
49. AIR2/3037 (May 1938), AIR2/2613 (March 1937), AIR2/2677 (9 June 1937).
50. AIR14/818 (17, 21 April 1939).
51. AIR2/4130 (22 June 1939)
52. Ibid. (June 1939).
53. FAA Museum Fairey G.A. Drawings Register 1920-1938 (2 March 1937).
54. AIR2/2896 (September-October 1939).
55. AIR2/4130 (June 1939).
Chapter 3
1. AIR14/78 (1-3 September 1939).
2. AIR2/3130 (3 September 1939).
3. Ibid. (7 September 1939).
4. AIR2/3130 (9 September 1939)
5. Ibid. (11 September 1939).
6. AIR2/3130 (20 October 1940).
7. AVIA10/33 (13 November 1939).
8. AIR14/163 (22 September 1939).
9. AIR2/2620 (31 October 1940).
10. AIR2/3130 (5 September).
11. Ibid. (25 September 1939).
12. Ibid. (22 October 1939).
13.
Ibid. (22-27 October 1939).
14. Ibid. (3 September 1939).
15. Shores, C., Fledgling Eagles (London: Grub Street, 1991), p. 61.
16. AIR41/21, pp. 141-142.
17. AIR14/170 (18 Sept 1939).
18. Shores, op. cit., p. 61.
19. AIR2/2613 (23 November 1936), AIR9/97 (21 December 1938), CAB56/5 (21 February 1939).
20. AIR40/1400 (19 October 1939).
21. AIR9/97 (21 December 1938).
22. T161/923 (28 October 1938).
23. AIR 75/21 (Air Staff paper 5 July 1938).
24. AIR 8/287 (28 Sept 1939).
25. Shores, op. cit., p. 73.
26. AIR2/3193 (12 December 1939).
27. WO193/678 (27 September 1939).
28. AIR2/2896 (16 October 1939).
29. FAA Museum Fairey G.A. Drawings Register 1920-1938 (18 March 1935).
30. AIR14/251 (9 September 1939).
31. Hendon Fairey Files Box 136 (11 October 1939).
32. AIR2/2896 (10 October 1939).
33. AIR41/21 p.139, AIR2/3130 (23 September, 27 October 1939)
34. AIR41/21 p. 139.
35. AIR27/1008 (21 October 1939), AIR20/425 (1 November 1939).
36. AIR2/2620 (28 October 1939), AIR2/3456 (24 October 1939).
37. AIR14/74 (21 September 1939).
38. AIR2/2620 (8 November 1939), AIR20/12 (6 November 1939).
39. AVIA10/33 (19 December 1939).
40. Ibid. (13 November 1939).
41. Ibid. (20 December 1939).
42. Ibid. (23 December 1939).
43. AIR2/2620 (8 November 1939), AIR20/12 (6 November 1939), AIR2/3456 (12 November 1939).
44. AIR2/3456 (23 September 1943).
45. AIR20/425 (11 November 1939).