Eisenhower in War and Peace

by Jean Edward Smith

  Eisenhower officially assumed his duties as supreme Allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), on Monday, April 2, 1951. He and Mamie found temporary lodging in his old quarters at the Trianon Palace Hotel in Versailles, then much more substantial accommodations at the Villa Saint-Pierre—a former residence of the emperor Napoléon III in the village of Marnes-la-Coquette, about ten miles west of Paris. The villa was one of four stately mansions arranged in a palatial parklike setting. General Alfred Gruenther (Ike’s chief of staff) and his wife, Grace, lived in the mansion closest to the Eisenhowers; Major General Howard Snyder, Ike’s doctor, and his wife lived in another; and the fourth was divided for Eisenhower’s longtime aide Colonel Robert Schulz, and his driver, Sergeant Leonard Dry, and their families.

  From the outset Eisenhower decided that his headquarters, SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), which was located at a specially constructed site in the nearby village of Rocquencourt, should be a policy-making body, not an operational command post. Initial staff planning had assumed some 600 officers would be required to operate efficiently, but Ike soon cut the number to 250. Most were American and British, which Eisenhower deplored. He became dependent on other countries for support and most were reluctant at first to assign their best officers to SHAPE. As Ike told Cyrus Sulzberger of The New York Times, assignment to NATO for most officers was a “crown of thorns,” not a “bed of roses.”5

  Eisenhower upon hearing the news that President Truman had relieved MacArthur in Korea, April 11, 1951. (illustration credit 18.1)

  There were some familiar faces. Brigadier Sir James Gault of the Scots Guards, his wartime aide, was there once again as an aide. And Field Marshal Montgomery, now Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, fresh from a stint as chief of the imperial general staff (CIGS), was his deputy—an arrangement that pleased both Ike and Monty. As General Gruenther recalled, the two worked together seamlessly and without friction. Montgomery shared Eisenhower’s commitment to NATO, and was highly respected by senior officers throughout the alliance. His proven military skill complemented Ike’s political ability perfectly.

  Except for his frequent visits to confer with leaders in the various NATO capitals, Eisenhower stayed close to home and office. American officers and their wives were a tight-knit group, sharing dinners, golf, and bridge parties, and they rarely ventured into Paris or the French countryside. They lived not so much in France as at an American base that happened to be located among the French.6 Eisenhower’s lunch and dinner companions were overwhelmingly American—diplomats, military people, members of the press, and visiting political figures from both parties. Members of the Gang flew over frequently for lengthy sessions of golf and bridge, and to discuss politics.

  In addition to his NATO duties, Eisenhower kept close watch on the GOP presidential campaign. Whenever asked, he firmly denied any interest in the nomination. That was consistent with his NATO responsibilities, and it was also good politics. “The seeker is never so popular as the sought,” he told Gang member Bill Robinson. “People want what they can’t get.”7

  General Lucius D. Clay, who was one of Ike’s longtime friends and would play a crucial role in the campaign, thought Eisenhower had mixed emotions about seeking the nomination.

  He wasn’t being coy, because he knew that the party wasn’t going to go out and give him the Republican nomination on a platter. Nobody ever gets it that way, and he knew that. Eisenhower was no fool. I think it was more like this: He knew that he had tremendous standing in America, but that if he entered into a political contest he could lose the nomination, in which case his standing would be greatly lowered. Or he could lose the election, in which case it would be lowered even more. Therefore, in a personal sense, what did he have to gain? On the other hand, he really and truly had the feeling that if there was a chance, you just didn’t have the right to say you wouldn’t do it. There was some ambition mixed with this, and there were some other things.a The fact remains, this was a very simple man in a lot of ways. But there is no question in my mind that he was tremendously influenced by the position which he held in public esteem. This sounds like an oversimplification, but I really think these were the things that played on his mind.8

  It was New York governor Thomas Dewey who initiated the effort to compel Eisenhower to announce his candidacy. Dewey had endorsed Ike before a national television audience on NBC’s Meet the Press in the autumn of 1950. And as Eisenhower continued to sit on the fence, Dewey fretted that Taft was on the verge of locking up the Republican nomination. Of the 604 delegates required, media reports already credited Taft with more than 400. Equally serious, the key posts at the convention—presiding officer and chairman of the rules, credentials, and platform committees—had gone to Taft supporters. If Ike did not get into the race, Dewey believed that Taft would win by default.9

  In late September 1951, Dewey invited General Clay to his apartment in the Roosevelt Hotel for dinner. The two had met previously, but were not socially connected. Dewey told Clay that as things now stood Taft was going to be the Republican nominee, and that he could not possibly be elected. The only person who could change that was Eisenhower. Dewey knew that Clay was personally close to Eisenhower, and asked whether he thought Ike would run.10

  Clay said he did not know. It would require a groundswell of popular demand, an effective campaign organization, and adequate financial support. Clay told Dewey that if he could put those together, “I think it would be the right thing for him to do, and I would be prepared to do everything I could to get him to run.” Dewey, who is sometimes described even by his most ardent supporters as “cold as a February iceberg,” had charmed Clay.11 On the spot he became an ardent Republican ready to do his utmost to get Ike to announce his candidacy for the GOP nomination.12

  The intimate relationship between Eisenhower and Clay dated to 1937, when both had served with MacArthur in Manila. Marjorie Clay and Mamie were the closest of friends and had lived in adjacent apartments at the Wardman Park in the closing year of the war. Clay had been Ike’s deputy for military government in Germany, and was now chairman and CEO of the Continental Can Company in New York. Later he would become the managing partner of Lehman Brothers.b Eisenhower not only admired Clay’s success in the business world but considered him a walking encyclopedia of American politics. Clay’s father had been a three-term United States senator from Georgia, and Lucius had grown up on a steady diet of Washington politics. During the New Deal, Clay had been the front man for the Corps of Engineers with Congress; levered the Corps into providing the infrastructure for Harry Hopkins and the WPA; headed all military procurement for the Army and air force during World War II; and was the deputy director of war mobilization under James Byrnes. In Germany, Ike had consulted frequently with Clay about his political plans, and while at Columbia had sought Clay’s advice before taking himself out of the New Hampshire primary in 1948.

  Clay wrote Eisenhower on September 24, 1951, to inform him of his meeting with Dewey—who was given the code name “Our Friend.” Ike replied on the twenty-seventh, noting that his “attitude toward possible future duty should be clear.” Which, of course, it was not. Eisenhower then suggested that he would like to talk to Clay personally. “You and I think so much alike on so many problems connected with public service … that I think it would do me good just to have a long talk with you one of these days.… My very warm regards to Our Friend and to any others of our common friends that you may encounter.”13

  General Lucius D. Clay. (illustration credit 18.2)

  Clay was encouraged. Eisenhower had not said no. Clay followed up with a second letter to Ike on September 29. President Truman, said Clay, “will not run if you run. He has made this statement to two separate and reliable persons. He will run if [Taft] does, and in my opinion would beat [Taft] to a frazzle. The result would be four more years of the very bad government we have today, and it could even mean the downfall in this country of the two-party system.” Clay urged Ike to announce his cand
idacy.14 c

  Eisenhower replied with a lengthy letter on October 5 in which he detailed why he could make no public statement because of his NATO responsibilities. “It has been asserted to me, time and again, that the character of the Washington leadership is more important to this job than the commander on the spot. This is probably true; yet the fact is that I am now on a job assigned to me as a duty. This makes it impossible for me to be in the position (no matter how remotely or indirectly) of seeking another post.” After that disclaimer, Eisenhower went on to discuss the status of the campaign, making it clear that he was very much interested. “You need not worry that I shall ever disregard Our Friend. I have implicit confidence in his sincerity and in his good faith.” Once again, Eisenhower told Clay that he would like to meet with him. “In your job, is there any obvious reason for you to make a European trip this fall or winter?”15

  Clay was unable to find an obvious reason for visiting Europe, but in early November the problems involved in getting NATO off the ground forced Eisenhower to come to Washington. On November 5, he met Clay for breakfast in his suite at the Statler. “At that time NATO was his primary concern,” Clay recalled, “and I was very worried that he might say he was not receptive to an invitation to run. We had not yet had time for the movement to really jell.”

  Despite Clay’s urging, Eisenhower continued to keep his own counsel. “The sum and substance of our talk,” said Clay, “was that I could say [when I returned to New York] that I had reason to believe that if the movement generated enough public support, that we might have a candidate. It wasn’t a green light, but it wasn’t a red light either. And in my own mind I thought he would run—although he hadn’t said that.”16

  Later that afternoon Eisenhower met with President Truman at the White House. Truman was also interested in Ike’s plans. After discussing the problems of NATO, the president told Eisenhower that the offer he had made in 1948 was still valid. Truman would bow out if Ike would accept the Democratic nomination in 1952. When Truman pressed the offer, Eisenhower stepped back. Although he and the president agreed on foreign policy, his differences with the Democrats on domestic issues were too great for him to consider accepting. The two nodded and changed the subject.17

  Back in New York, Clay informed Dewey of his conversation with Eisenhower and told him to move ahead. General Clay was like that. If he was not explicitly called off, he would do what he thought best. And Ike had not called him off. On November 10, five days after Clay’s meeting with Eisenhower, Dewey convened a second meeting in his apartment at the Roosevelt Hotel to set up the campaign. He and Clay were joined by Herbert Brownell, Jr., who had managed Dewey’s campaigns in 1940 and 1944; Russell Sprague, the GOP national committeeman from New York; Senator James Duff of Pennsylvania; Harry Darby of Kansas, who was heading a Citizens for Eisenhower movement; Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts; and Harold Talbott of Chrysler, who had been the principal fund-raiser for Dewey’s campaigns.

  Neither Clay nor Dewey thought it advisable that they be publicly identified as heading the Eisenhower campaign. Having lost twice, Dewey was persona non grata with the conservative wing of the Republican party, and as a former military man Clay recognized that it was best to keep a low profile. Herbert Brownell, perhaps the most logical choice, had been tarred with Dewey’s brush, and was also unacceptable. The upshot was that Clay and Dewey asked Senator Lodge to be the official campaign chairman. “I was there because they needed a front man,” said Lodge. “All of these men knew what to do. Herb Brownell was the planner and thinker. And it was Lucius who called the shots. In those early stages, Clay was the key figure. Except for Lucius, none of us had ever talked to Eisenhower. And Harold Talbott became our fund raiser.”18

  Much to Clay and Dewey’s distress, Eisenhower remained tight-lipped. In early December, Clay sent Ike a brief memorandum detailing the state of the campaign and the complications caused by his continuing silence. Clay also pointed out some organizational problems. Senator Duff, he said, was “full of ego and determined to be anointed.” Duff did not like Lodge, Lodge “could not stand Duff,” Dewey was doubtful about both Duff and Lodge, and no one trusted Harold Stassen, who was suggesting himself as a stalking horse for Eisenhower. Clay noted the dates of the upcoming state conventions, and the problems they were having attracting delegates because those delegates could not be sure that Ike was a candidate. In 1952, delegates to party conventions were primarily political professionals, and the pros did not want to be kept dangling, said Clay.19 d

  Eisenhower replied on December 19. He told Clay that while he “instinctively agreed” with the points Clay made, his position as the commander of Allied forces in Europe prevented him from taking any action that “would inspire partisan argument in America. To my mind this would be close to disloyalty.”

  Ike still refused to commit himself. He told Clay that “Our Friend” [Dewey] wanted him to make a positive statement defining his political status by January 15, 1952. “Even to contemplate such a thing makes me extremely uneasy, although I have in the past admitted to Our Friend that my family ties, my own meager voting record [Ike voted for Dewey in 1948], and my own convictions align me fairly closely with what I call the progressive branch of the Republican party.”20

  Eisenhower was walking a tightrope, and the campaign difficulties were mounting daily. Ike wanted greater evidence of a groundswell of public support, but Clay, Dewey, and Brownell needed Eisenhower’s public blessing to cause that groundswell to materialize. Four days before Christmas, Clay wrote again to Ike to explain the problem. In effect, Clay told Ike he could not work both sides of the street.

  “Your letter has just come across my desk and it disturbs me so much that I am putting everything else aside to answer immediately,” Eisenhower replied on December 27. Ike tried to reassure Clay of his interest in the campaign, but he still dodged an outright commitment.

  Only yesterday I was asked to name the personality in the United States who was best acquainted with me and my methods, and who had a wide acquaintanceship with people of substance at home. [The question had been put to Eisenhower by Gang member William Robinson, publisher of the New York Herald Tribune.] Without hesitation I gave your name. This came about in connection with the discussion as to who was best qualified to act as an intermediary between me and the “pros,” since direct communication between us could obviously be embarrassing.21

  To help Clay explain his reluctance to formally announce his candidacy, Eisenhower cited the applicable Army regulation that governed him:

  AR 600–10. 18. Election to, and performance of duties of, public office.

  a. Members of the Regular Army, while on active duty, may accept nomination for public office, provided such nomination is tendered without direct or indirect activity or solicitation on their part. [Eisenhower’s emphasis.]22

  The wish may have been father to the thought, but Clay felt reassured that Eisenhower would run. Ike confirmed as much in a letter two days later to Henry Cabot Lodge, in which he gave Clay the equivalent of carte blanche to act on his behalf. “My confidence in General Clay is such, his accuracy in interpretation is so great, and his personal loyalty to me is so complete, that nothing he could ever say about me could be contrary to his belief as to what I would want him to say.”23 Princeton political scientist Fred I. Greenstein has written at length about Eisenhower’s indirect but carefully calculated style of political leadership.e His use of Clay in his 1951–52 quest for the Republican presidential nomination is an early manifestation of that style.

  On December 28, Eisenhower received a handwritten letter from President Truman inquiring about his intent.

  The columnists, the slick magazines and all the political people who like to speculate are saying many things about what is to happen in 1952.

  As I told you in 1948 and at our luncheon in 1951 [November 5], do what you think is best for the country. My own position is in the balance. If I do what I want to do, I’ll go ba
ck to Missouri and maybe run for the Senate. If you decide to finish the European job (and I don’t know who else can) I must keep the isolationists out of the White House. I wish you would let me know what you intend to do. It will be between us and no one else.24

  Truman’s message was clear. If Eisenhower intended to run, he would happily go back to Missouri. But if he did not, then the president would feel compelled to seek reelection against Taft.

  Eisenhower replied to the president with a lengthy handwritten letter of his own. “I am deeply touched by the confidence in me you express,” wrote Ike, “even more by that implied in the writing of such a letter by the President of the United States.” Eisenhower said he, too, would like to live a semiretired life with his family. “But just as you have decided that circumstances may not permit you to do exactly as you please, so I’ve found that fervent desire may sometimes have to give way to conviction to duty.” Eisenhower said he would not seek the presidency, but left the door open to accepting a draft.25

  In 1952, the New Hampshire primary posed the first test for Eisenhower. Governor Sherman Adams was confident that Ike would carry the state, but to do so he had to be listed on the ballot. That required an affirmation from Eisenhower that he was a Republican, and this he still declined to give. Clay and Dewey were at their wits’ end. On January 4, as the filing deadline approached, Clay authorized Lodge to enter Eisenhower in the Republican primary. Lodge wrote the necessary letter to Governor Adams, stating that Eisenhower had voted Republican and was in sympathy with “enlightened Republican doctrine.”26 Two days later Lodge met the press in Washington and formally threw Ike’s hat into the ring. Eisenhower would accept the Republican nomination if it were offered, said Lodge, and reporters could check with him at his headquarters in France. “I know I will not be repudiated.”27