Eisenhower in War and Peace

by Jean Edward Smith

  At his press conference the following day, Eisenhower was asked to comment on Dulles’s remarks. Not surprisingly, Ike declined. “I think no amplification of the statement is either necessary or wise,” said the president. “He was merely stating what, to my mind, is a fundamental truth and really doesn’t take much discussion; it is just a fundamental truth.”27

  Other administration figures were less reticent to chime in. Treasury Secretary George Humphrey said the United States had “no business getting into little wars. If a situation comes up where our interests justify intervention, let’s intervene decisively with all we have or get out.” Nixon said, “Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars, we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power … against the major source of aggression.”28

  But the New Look was not embraced by everyone within the administration. General Matthew Ridgway, although he initially signed on, soon became restive. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee in January 1955, Ridgway criticized the ongoing reduction in Army ground forces. The New Look, he told senators, was forcing the United States into an “all or nothing” posture and would expose the country to a series of future Koreas. “The foot soldier is still the dominant factor in war,” said Ridgway, “and weakening our ground forces would be a grievous blow to freedom.”29

  When Eisenhower met with the Senate Republican leadership the next day, he was asked by Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire how they should handle Ridgway’s testimony. “Ridgway is the Army’s chief of staff,” said Ike.

  When he is called up on the Hill and asked for his personal convictions, he has got to give them. But we must realize that as commander-in-chief, I have to make the final decisions. I have to consider—which the heads of the services do not—the very delicate balance between the national debt, taxes, and expenditures. Actually, the only thing we fear is an atomic attack delivered by air on our cities. God damn it, it would be perfect rot to talk about shipping troops abroad when fifteen of our cities were in ruins.

  That’s the trouble with Ridgway. He’s talking theory—I’m trying to talk sound sense. We have to have a sound base here at home. We have got to restore order and our productivity before we can do anything else. That’s why in our military thinking we have to put emphasis on two or three things first. One, we have to maintain a strong striking retaliatory Air Force and secondly, we have to build up our warning system so that we can receive as much advance notice as possible of any attack.

  Press secretary James Hagerty, who was at the meeting, said the senators listened with rapt attention. “You could hear a pin drop in the room. He [Eisenhower] pounded the table a few times for emphasis, and everyone in the room realized both the seriousness of the situation and the President’s arguments.”30

  When Ridgway’s term expired in the summer of 1955 he was not reappointed. Instead, Eisenhower turned to Maxwell Taylor, with equally disappointing results. Taylor, a gifted linguist who had commanded the 101st Airborne in World War II and later Eighth Army in Korea, was considered a serious military thinker and an officer of keen intellect. Before sending Taylor’s name to the Senate, Eisenhower extracted from him a firm commitment to support the New Look and the nuclear strategy upon which it was based. “Loyalty in spirit as well as in letter is necessary,” he told Taylor.31

  Like Ridgway, Taylor was soon off the reservation, arguing that the United States should abandon massive retaliation and the New Look in favor of what he called Flexible Response. Much to Eisenhower’s consternation, Taylor argued that a future war between the United States and the Soviet Union could be fought with conventional weapons. “That’s fatuous,” Eisenhower told Radford and Wilson. In Ike’s view, any war with Russia would be a nuclear war and in all probability that was why there was not going to be one. When Taylor persisted and suggested that the next war would be a limited one similar to Korea, Eisenhower rejected the idea. “Anything of Korean proportions would be one for the use of atomics,” said the president.32

  Taylor served as Army chief of staff for four years. After stepping down in 1959, he continued to press the doctrine of Flexible Response.33 Academic circles joined the debate. Henry Kissinger established his reputation as a foreign policy expert with the publication of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in 1957—an unrelenting critique of Eisenhower’s New Look strategy.34 In the partisan days of the late 1950s, the Democrats adopted the concept of Flexible Response. John Kennedy anchored his campaign for president on a pledge to jettison the doctrine of massive retaliation. When he was elected, Kennedy undertook an accelerated program to enhance America’s conventional war capabilities. Maxwell Taylor was recalled from retirement to advise the president (and was later appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs), and Army ground forces, particularly special forces, enjoyed a renewed emphasis.

  Critics of the Kennedy-Johnson administration and of the subsequent U.S. involvement in Vietnam often fault Kennedy’s revival of America’s limited war capability. By having the troops available to intervene incrementally, it was easier for the president to intervene incrementally. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it (in a different context), “What’s the point of having this superb military if we can’t use it?”35 That was the antithesis of Eisenhower’s position. For Ike, war was not a policy alternative. The purpose of military power was to avoid war, not fight one. Soldiers were not paper cutouts, and combat was not a board game.

  Eisenhower’s emphasis on the New Look and nuclear weapons preserved the peace during the Cold War. But it spawned a variety of side effects, some benign and beneficial, others downright pernicious. Among the pernicious was the arms race that led to the development of thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the spiral in defense spending that Ike had hoped to avoid. The possibility of mutual assured annihilation scarcely made for restful sleeping. On the other hand, Eisenhower’s emphasis on nuclear technology fostered significant scientific and educational advances. Research and development became an integral part of the federal budget. Under Ike, the government funded not only applied research, but generously supported pure research in a variety of scientific disciplines. And to do so, Eisenhower often had to beat down the opposition of Charles Wilson and George Humphrey. “Between the year I entered office and the year I left,” wrote Ike, “the federal appropriations for medical research at the National Institutes of Health multiplied nearly ten times, going from $59 million to $560 million [$4.1 billion currently].”36

  After the Soviets successfully launched the world’s first man-made satellite (Sputnik) in 1957, Eisenhower created the position of a full-time science adviser to the president, and appointed Dr. James Killian, the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to the post. Under Killian’s direction, the White House established the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), which provided Eisenhower a direct avenue for independent advice from the nation’s scientific community. Beginning in 1955, Eisenhower had pressed Congress to provide federal aid to the states for school construction—an unprecedented breakthrough in the relationship between the federal government and the states. The legislation lay dormant for two years on Capitol Hill, but in the aftermath of the Sputnik program, Congress enacted the National Defense Education Act of 1958, providing significant federal aid to education, particularly in the funding of graduate fellowships and improved public school instruction in science, mathematics, and foreign languages. The act followed closely Eisenhower’s recommendations in his message to Congress in late January 1957.37 Ike sold the measure to a reluctant Congress as an emergency measure in the face of Soviet scientific achievements, and the breakthrough in federal funding for education has changed the face of the American educational system.

  The Republicans lost control of both the House and the Senate in 1954. In the midterm elections, the Democrats picked up twenty-one House seats and one in the Senate. That gave the Democrats a comfo
rtable (232–203) majority in the House, and a narrow two-vote margin in the Senate with Wayne Morse of Oregon, still an independent, now voting with the Democrats.38 For Eisenhower, who would face Democratic congressional majorities for his remaining six years in office, it was a blessing in disguise. The Democrats supported Ike down the line in foreign affairs, had little interest in returning to the era of Calvin Coolidge domestically, and were not clamoring to investigate the executive branch.

  In the House, Sam Rayburn took up the reins once more as Speaker, and Lyndon Johnson became Senate majority leader. Rayburn, a bachelor from Bonham, Texas, was a man of few words. But he ruled the House with a discipline rarely seen since the days of “Czar” Joseph Cannon.d He had first been elected Speaker in 1940 following the death of William Bankhead, and was the undisputed leader of House Democrats. In the Senate, Lyndon Johnson, at forty-six, became the youngest majority leader in Senate history, and as Robert Caro explains, was soon the Master of the Senate.39 With Eisenhower in the White House, Sam Rayburn as Speaker, and Lyndon Johnson as majority leader, the country was in the hands of skilled professionals. Ike, LBJ, and “Mr. Sam” did not trust one another completely and they did not see eye to eye on every issue, but they understood one another and had no difficulty working together. Eisenhower continued to meet regularly with the Republican leadership. But his weekly sessions with Rayburn and Johnson, usually in the evening over drinks, were far more productive.40

  For Johnson and Rayburn, it was shrewd politics to cooperate with Ike. Eisenhower was wildly popular in the country, and his foreign policy was essentially a recognition of America’s new role in world affairs. By supporting a Republican president against the Old Guard of his own party, the Democrats hoped to share Ike’s popularity. “Eisenhower was so popular,” Johnson explained, “whoever was supporting him would be on the popular side.”41

  For Rayburn, it was personal as well. Eisenhower had been born in Denison, Texas, which was in Mr. Sam’s district. Rayburn had known Ike for years, and he liked him. “He was a wonderful baby,” the Speaker would say with a grin.42 Rayburn not only admired Eisenhower’s wartime leadership, but appreciated his truthfulness whenever he had testified before Congress. The Speaker admired truthfulness. He also respected Eisenhower’s judgment on national security. “I told President Eisenhower … that he should know more about what it took to defend this country than practically anyone and that if he would send up a budget for the amount he thought was necessary to put the country in a position to defend ourselves against attack, I would promise to deliver 95 percent of the Democratic votes in the House.”43 On domestic issues, Rayburn said the Democrats would not oppose just for the sake of opposing. “Any jackass can kick a barn down. But it takes a good carpenter to build one.”44

  Eisenhower, for his part, had often found the Republican leadership testy. Taft had been difficult, and William Knowland was but a slight improvement. In the House, Speaker (later minority leader) Joe Martin and party whip Charles Halleck were scarcely on speaking terms. The GOP majority in the Eighty-third Congress seemed less interested in grappling with the problems of the day than in repudiating the work of Truman and Roosevelt. In the Senate, conservative Republicans had introduced no less than 107 constitutional amendments designed to repeal the New Deal. Several sought to annul the decision at Appomattox by asserting the supremacy of the states over the federal government, while one would have abolished the separation of church and state by inserting the following words in the Constitution: “This nation devoutly recognizes the authority and law of Jesus Christ, Savior and Ruler of Nations through whom are bestowed the blessings of Almighty God.”45 Later in his presidency, Eisenhower found himself so frustrated with the Republican leadership in Congress that he told his secretary Ann Whitman, “I don’t know why anyone should be a member of the Republican Party.”46

  With Rayburn and Johnson in charge, Ike’s relations with the Hill were much easier. “Speaker Rayburn and I had long maintained friendly contact,” Eisenhower recalled. “For many years prior to my inauguration he had called me ‘Captain Ike.’ ”47 Eisenhower was also on friendly terms with Johnson, and kept a vigil on LBJ’s health. Whenever Johnson was in the hospital, Ike was sure to be at his bedside. “I don’t see any reason why these people shouldn’t be my friends,” Eisenhower once told an inquiring reporter. “They have been my friends in the past.”48

  Two of the most significant public works projects in American history—the interstate highway system and the St. Lawrence Seaway—are products of the Eisenhower years. The St. Lawrence Seaway, which opened the Great Lakes to ocean traffic, had been on the drawing board for many years, but it was Eisenhower who got behind it and marshaled the necessary votes to push it through Congress. From the time of Theodore Roosevelt, American presidents had advocated building the seaway, but had been thwarted by the powerful lobbying efforts mounted by American railroads, East and Gulf coast port authorities, coal mine operators in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, and the United Mine Workers, led by the truculent John L. Lewis, all of whom believed they would suffer if the seaway were built. Eisenhower, who believed the project was essential for national security, and who feared the Canadians would go ahead regardless of American participation, stepped out in front of the effort. “It was the only major issue on which my brother and I ever disagreed,” said Milton Eisenhower, then president of Penn State.49

  With Ike’s vigorous backing, the measure was passed by the Senate in January 1954, and by the House in May. The vote crossed party lines. In the Senate, a bipartisan coalition of twenty-five Democrats and twenty-five Republicans voted in favor. In the House, the vote was 230–158, with each party also divided. Without Eisenhower’s support, the measure would never have been reported out of committee. Ike signed the bill into law on May 13, 1954, and the St. Lawrence Seaway, linking the Gulf of St. Lawrence with Lake Superior, became a reality. “This marks the legislative culmination of an effort that has taken 30 years,” said the president.50 On June 26, 1959, the seaway was officially opened by Eisenhower and Queen Elizabeth II with a short cruise aboard the royal yacht Britannia. Since its completion, the seaway has averaged fifty million metric tons of shipping annually, and provides an easy means for the bulk shipping of American grains and minerals from the Midwest to ports abroad.e

  Eisenhower and Queen Elizabeth II at the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in Montreal, June 26, 1959. (illustration credit 23.3)

  Eisenhower is personally responsible for the interstate highway system—the largest public works project ever attempted. In the aftermath of the Korean War, defense spending slowed and the nation’s economy headed south. The danger signs were evident as early as February 1954. At a cabinet meeting on February 5, Eisenhower stressed the need to develop a public works program so that if needed it could be put into effect immediately. “If we don’t move rapidly, we could be in serious trouble,” said the president.51

  Eisenhower favored a highway program. In 1919, Ike had been one of six officers to lead the Army’s first transcontinental motor convoy across largely unpaved roads and makeshift bridges from Washington to San Francisco, and he understood from firsthand experience the need for a network of national highways. During the war, Eisenhower witnessed the effectiveness of the German autobahns.52

  By the summer of 1954 it was clear that an economic crisis was at hand. Unemployment rose, and a recession seemed just around the corner. Needing to act, and to act quickly, Eisenhower summoned his old friend Lucius Clay to Washington—the only time during his eight years in the White House that Ike turned to Clay. “We had lunch,” Clay recalled, “and he asked me if I would head a committee to recommend what should be done. He felt that a highway program was very important. That was the genesis of the President’s Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program.”

  Following his lunch with Eisenhower, Clay put together a five-man high-level committee stacked to recommend a national highway system: Stephen Bechtel of the Bechtel
Corporation; William Roberts, head of Allis-Chalmers; Samuel Sloan Colt, president of Bankers Trust; and Dave Beck, president of the Teamsters Union. All had a vested interest. “That’s why I picked them,” said Clay. “They knew what the highway system was all about.”

  It was evident we needed better highways. We needed them for safety, to accommodate more automobiles. We needed them for defense purposes, if that should ever be necessary. And we needed them for the economy. Not just as a public works measure, but for future growth. It was also evident that these new and better highways should be so connected to provide routes from somewhere to somewhere. Therefore, the interstate concept. This idea was already well developed within the old Bureau of Public Roads, and we built on that.53

  The Clay committee rendered its report to Eisenhower on January 12, 1955. It recommended an expenditure of $101 billion ($823 billion currently) over ten years, and forty-one thousand miles of divided highways linking all U.S. cities with a population of more than fifty thousand. Not only was it the largest public works project ever proposed, but when completed it would provide the United States with a highway net superior to that in any country, including Germany. Eisenhower, who had followed the work of the Clay committee closely, signed on immediately—with one exception. Clay had recommended the system be funded initially by a $25 billion federal bond issue at 3 percent interest. Ike said he preferred a toll road system. Clay demurred. Toll roads, he told Eisenhower, would work in the heavily populated sections of the East and West coasts, but were not feasible in the remainder of the country. “We have taken the position that a toll road is luxury transportation and is all right in sections of the country where the public have alternative roads to travel. [But] where the interstate highway system is the only road we do not think it should be tolled.”54 Eisenhower accepted Clay’s explanation, and on February 22, 1955, sent the National Highway Program to Congress. “Our unity as a nation is sustained by free communication of thought and by easy transportation of people and goods,” said the president. “The nation’s highway system is a gigantic enterprise. One in every seven Americans gains his livelihood and supports his family out of it. But, in large part, the network is inadequate for the nation’s growing needs.” Eisenhower asked for speedy approval of the measure.55