Eisenhower in War and Peace

by Jean Edward Smith

  That evening Eisenhower spoke to a Republican rally in Philadelphia’s Convention Hall—his final speech of the campaign.

  We cannot and will not condone armed aggression—no matter who the attacker, and no matter who the victim.

  We cannot—in the world, any more than in our own nation—subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us.

  Eisenhower did not mention Britain or France by name, and did not refer to the resolution pending in the General Assembly, but the thrust of his remarks was clear. “We believe humanity must cease preying upon itself. We believe that the power of modern weapons makes war not only perilous—but preposterous—and the only way to win World War III is to prevent it.”49

  Eisenhower did not have wine with dinner that evening on the train back from Philadelphia, but he drank two tall scotches before the meal and three after.50 The presidential party arrived back in Washington shortly after midnight. Four hours later Dulles reported from New York that the General Assembly had approved the U.S. cease-fire resolution 64–5, with only Australia and New Zealand joining Britain, France, and Israel voting against. Following passage of the resolution, Canada’s Lester Pearson proposed that a UN police force be organized and deployed between the combatants to ensure the effectiveness of the cease-fire.h

  “Life gets more difficult by the minute,” Ike wrote Alfred Gruenther. “I could really use a good bridge game.”51 To Swede Hazlett he wrote,

  The Middle East is a terrible mess. I think that France and Britain have made a terrible mistake. Of course, nothing in the region would be so difficult to solve except for the underlying cause of the unrest that exists there—that is the Arab-Israel quarrel. This quarrel seems to have no limit. Everybody in the Moslem and Jewish worlds are affected by it. It is so intense that the second any action is taken against one Arab state, all the other Arab and Moslem states seem to regard it as a Jewish plot and react violently.52

  By the weekend, Israeli troops had taken most of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip; the aerial bombardment of Egyptian targets continued, but British and French forces had yet to come ashore. In Washington, Dulles was rushed to Walter Reed for emergency surgery. What doctors initially assumed to be a kidney stone turned out to be a cancerous tumor in the colon. The operation to remove it was successful, but the secretary would be out of action for at least a month.

  The fighting in Egypt was upstaged early on Sunday, November 4, when Eisenhower learned that the Soviet Union had intervened with massive military force to snuff out Hungary’s brief experiment in democracy.i Premier Imre Nagy fled to the Yugoslav embassy, and a new Hungarian government led by János Kádár was installed by the Soviets. Hungarian “freedom fighters” resisted briefly, and asked for U.S. support. Over the years, John Foster Dulles, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America had repeatedly spoken of liberation, and to many this seemed the time to follow through. Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce cabled Eisenhower directly from Rome. “Ask not for whom the bell tolls in Hungary today,” she said. “It tolls for us if freedom’s holy light is extinguished in blood and iron over there.”53

  For Eisenhower it was not that simple. The president recognized the precariousness of the situation, the possible escalation of the crisis into nuclear war, and the fact that Hungary was surrounded by Soviet-bloc and neutral nations. It was, as he later phrased it, “as inaccessible as Tibet.”54 When the CIA sought approval to air-drop arms to the Hungarians, Eisenhower said no. “We have never asked for a people to rise up against a ruthless military force,” he told his press conference shortly afterward. “We simply insist upon the right of all people to be free to live under governments of their own choosing.”55 Eisenhower dispatched a sharp letter to Bulganin asking that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Hungary, but with the Middle East on fire, chose not to press the issue further.56

  On Monday, November 5, the British and French armada finally arrived off the Egyptian coast: some two hundred ships including five aircraft carriers, six battleships, a dozen cruisers, and an assortment of lighter craft. What followed was a textbook World War II amphibious landing. Paratroopers jumped before dawn; commandos went ashore at first light, and by noon most of Port Said, at the mouth of the Suez Canal, was in the hands of British and French forces. To minimize damage on shore, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Britain’s first sea lord, had restricted the preinvasion bombardment to guns of 4.5 inches or less. Mountbatten had argued strongly in Whitehall against the invasion, and better than the politicians of the Eden government, he knew the enormous destruction that would be caused by the fleet’s 15- and 16-inch guns. With the British and French ashore, the issue was now a military problem, and Eisenhower instinctively assumed command. “If we could have for the next two or three days a period of relative calm while your troops did nothing but land,” he told Eden, “we might much more swiftly develop a solution that would be acceptable to both sides and to the world.”57

  Ike’s solution unfolded quickly. At 10 a.m. the markets in New York opened and the pound came under unprecedented pressure. In 1956, currency exchange rates were fixed, and the British pound was pegged at $2.78. To maintain its value, the British government was forced to liquidate much of its gold and dollar reserves. That afternoon Deputy Prime Minister Rab Butler placed an urgent call to his friend George Humphrey and pleaded for a loan. Humphrey had anticipated the call and was ready with an offer: a $1.5 billion loan with the interest payments deferred. It was available, said Humphrey, as soon as the British ceased firing and withdrew their troops from Suez.58 Meanwhile in Britain motorists queued at petrol stations and tens of thousands of demonstrators crammed into Trafalgar Square to protest the Suez policy of the Eden government. The British press, without exception, blasted what The Manchester Guardian called “Eden’s war.”

  On Monday afternoon the stakes were raised when Soviet premier Nikolai Bulganin fired off messages to Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion announcing that Russia was prepared to use force to restore peace in the Middle East and suggesting the situation might escalate. The use of nuclear weapons was implicit.59 Bulganin also dispatched a letter to Eisenhower suggesting that the United States and Soviet Union join forces to restore peace and tranquility in the Middle East. “If this war is not stopped,” said Bulganin, “it is fraught with danger and can grow into a third world war.”60

  Eisenhower remained calm. He assumed Bulganin’s message was most likely an attempt to divert attention from the situation in Hungary, but the United States could take no chances. “Those boys are both furious and scared,” he told a meeting of senior officials in the Oval Office. “Just as with Hitler, that makes for the most dangerous possible state of mind. And we better be damn sure that every Intelligence point and every outpost of our armed forces is absolutely right on their toes.… If those fellows start something, we may have to hit them—and, if necessary, with everything in the bucket.”61 Eisenhower instructed Allen Dulles to send U-2 reconnaissance flights over Syria and Israel, but not over Russia. If the U-2s discovered Soviet planes at Syrian air bases, that would create a serious problem. But Ike thought the Russians were bluffing. “Look at the map,” he told those present.62

  Rather than answer Bulganin’s letter, Eisenhower chose to issue a White House press release, a more effective way, in his view, of making his point without threatening the Soviet leader directly. It was “unthinkable” that the United States join military forces with the Soviets in Egypt, said the White House. Moreover, “Neither the Soviet or any other military forces should now enter the Middle East area except under United Nations mandate.” If they did, the United States would “oppose any such effort.” The message was a clear warning to the Russians to stay out.

  Tuesday, November 6, 1956, was election day. At 9 a.m. Eisenhower and Mamie drove to Gettysburg to vote, and then returned to Washington by helicopter. They arrived about noon. Ike was informed that the U-2s had found no evidence of Russian pla
nes in Syria, nor were any moving into Egypt. But the best was yet to come. At 12:30 Washington time, Eden announced that Great Britain was ready to accept a cease-fire.

  American financial pressure had done the trick. On Tuesday morning the British government had requested the International Monetary Fund to make available the dollar funds the British had on deposit. The U.S. Treasury Department, as was its prerogative under IMF rules, blocked the transfer. At that point, Harold Macmillan, who was now chancellor of the exchequer, told an emergency meeting of the British cabinet that he could “not any more be responsible for Her Majesty’s exchequer” unless a cease-fire was ordered. Eden had no choice.j

  When he learned of the decision of the British cabinet, Eisenhower placed an immediate call to Eden.

  “Anthony,” said Ike, “I can’t tell you how pleased we are that you found it possible to accept the cease-fire.”

  “We are going to cease firing tonight,” Eden replied.

  “Without conditions?” asked the president.

  “We cease firing tonight at midnight unless attacked.”

  Eisenhower pressed Eden to withdraw quickly. Eden was evasive. Perhaps the British would remain as part of the peacekeeping force, or to help clear the canal. Eisenhower—who still held the trump hand—rejected the idea. “I would like to see none of the great nations in it,” he replied. “I am afraid the Red boy is going to demand the lion’s share. I would rather make it no troops from the big five”—a reference to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.63

  When Eden continued to evade a commitment, Eisenhower got tough. “If you don’t get out of Port Said tomorrow, I’ll cause a run on the pound and drive it down to zero,” said Ike.64 Eden capitulated. France followed suit. Israel did not agree to withdraw until the following day, and did not complete the movement until January 1957, after receiving American assurance of its right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. Eden stepped down as prime minister and was succeeded by Harold Macmillan. Guy Mollet survived for another seven months, and in Israel the war was viewed as a success. The state had demonstrated its military prowess, and henceforth would be a power to be reckoned with.

  In the closing days of the campaign, Governor Stevenson, Eleanor Roosevelt, and former president Truman excoriated Eisenhower for turning his back on Israel and America’s allies. Their criticism may have ensured that most of the Jewish vote remained in the Democratic column.65 But at a time of international crisis, the overwhelming majority of Americans preferred to keep Eisenhower in the White House. When the votes were tabulated on election night, Eisenhower swamped Stevenson 35 million to 26 million—the largest presidential majority since FDR routed Alf Landon in 1936. Ike carried forty-one states to Stevenson’s seven.k

  * * *

  a Eisenhower was keenly aware of the strategic importance of the Arab states, but he was also mindful of the moral claims of the Jewish people to their newly re-created homeland. In his diary, Ike observed: “The oil of the Arab world has grown increasingly important to all of Europe. The economy of European countries would collapse if those oil supplies were cut off. If the economy of Europe would collapse, the United States would be in a situation of which the difficulty could scarcely be exaggerated. On the other hand, Israel, a tiny country, surrounded by enemies, is nevertheless one we had recognized—and on top of this, that has a very strong position in the heart and emotions of the Western world because of the tragic suffering of the Jews throughout twenty-five hundred years of history.” DDE diary, March 13, 1956, 16 The Presidency, 2668–70.

  b Not only did Walter George of Georgia, who was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, come from the deep South, but of the twelve Democrats on the Appropriations Committee, ten were from cotton-growing states. Congressional Directory, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 207 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955).

  c On March 1, 1956, King Hussein abruptly dismissed Sir John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha) as commander of the famed Arab Legion in Jordan, a move the British (incorrectly) attributed to Nasser. “The world is not big enough to hold both me and Nasser,” Anthony Eden was quoted as saying. Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez 18 (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1967).

  d On May 10, 1956, less than a month before, Eisenhower underwent a complete physical at Walter Reed, and X-rays revealed “several constricted areas in the terminal ileum.” Dr. Snyder chose not to inform Eisenhower because he thought it would cause the president “unnecessary anxiety.” No remedial surgery was suggested. “DDE’s Ileitis Operation,” Snyder Papers, EL.

  e The Soviets followed through on their offer to build the Aswan Dam. The money was provided in 1958, and construction began in 1960. The dam was designed by the Soviet Hydroproject Institute in Moscow, and employed more than twenty-five thousand Egyptian engineers and workers. It was completed on July 21, 1970, and the reservoir, Lake Nasser, reached capacity in 1976. The Aswan Dam is 4,189 yards long, 1,072 yards wide at its base, and 365 feet tall. Lake Nasser, which was formed by the dam, is 342 miles long, 22 miles wide, and holds nearly 90 million acre-feet of water. Irrigation from the Aswan Dam increased Egypt’s arable land by 500 percent, and when opened, the dam produced half of Egypt’s electricity.

  f Maurice Couve de Murville, the veteran diplomat who was France’s ambassador in Washington, and who had served two years in Cairo, explicitly warned the State Department several days earlier that if the United States reneged on financing the Aswan Dam, Nasser would most likely seize the Suez Canal. His warning was ignored by Dulles. Herman Finer, Dulles over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy 47 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964).

  g The Suez Canal, conceived and constructed under the direction of Ferdinand de Lesseps, was opened to traffic on November 17, 1869. (Giuseppe Verdi wrote the opera Aida to commemorate the opening.) One hundred and one miles long and two hundred feet wide at its narrowest point, the canal was owned by the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, a private stock company. Of the company’s 32 directors, 16 were French, 9 British, 5 Egyptian, 1 Dutch, and 1 American. The British government held 44 percent of the stock, another 44 percent was held by assorted French institutions, and the balance was held by individuals of various nationalities. In 1955, 14,666 ships passed through the canal, of which roughly one-third were British. Most of those were oil tankers. Two-thirds of Britain’s crude oil imports passed through the canal. Lyon, Eisenhower 693.

  h In 1957, Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work organizing the peacekeeping UN Emergency Force.

  i Following publication of Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” to the Twentieth Party Congress detailing the horrors of the Stalin era, riots in Poland swept out the Soviet-dominated government and installed Wladyslaw Gomulka as premier. Gomulka announced that “there is more than one road to socialism,” and warned that the Polish people “would defend themselves with all means.” On October 22, 1956, the successful Polish action triggered widespread rioting in Hungary, demanding among other things that Imre Nagy, who had been deposed by the Russians in 1955, be returned to power. Nagy was installed as premier on October 23, and order was briefly restored. The leadership of the Soviet Union apparently was at a loss how to proceed. Initially they announced that Soviet troops would be withdrawn, but evidently had a change of heart. On November 4, two hundred thousand troops of the Red Army supported by four thousand tanks converged on Budapest.

  j In their post-Suez memoirs, numerous British officials indicated that they thought the U.S. government had engineered the run on the pound in New York. Harold Macmillan explicitly accused the New York Federal Reserve of selling pounds at a rate that was “far above what was necessary to protect the value of their holdings.” Macmillan, Riding the Storm 163–64; Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis 131–33 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Also see Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden 623 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960).

/>   k Stevenson carried six states in the Deep South, plus Missouri. His majority in Missouri was a minuscule 3,984 out of almost 2 million votes cast (50.1 percent to 49.9 percent). Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections 295.

  TWENTY-SIX

  Little Rock

  A most interesting subject for detailed study would be Eisenhower’s role in connection with the segregation storm in the South, his part in bringing about that storm, in subtly promoting its increased violence, and in steering it towards the ultimate objective of his Communist bosses who planned the whole thing far in advance.

  —ROBERT WELCH, FOUNDER, THE JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY

  Never in the postwar era was American prestige higher than in the aftermath of Suez. Small nations could scarcely believe the United States would support Egypt, a Third World country, in a fight against two of America’s oldest allies, or that it would come to the aid of a Muslim state resisting Israeli aggression. “Never has there been such a tremendous acclaim for the President’s policy,” Henry Cabot Lodge reported from the United Nations. “It has been absolutely spectacular.”1