The Nuclear Jihadist

by Douglas Frantz

  PROLOGUE

  The encounter between Olli Heinonen and the CIA agent in Vienna came from multiple interviews with senior officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. Information about the “Dragonfire” incident in October 2001 came chiefly from Graham Allison’s excellent book Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Company, 2004), and Massimo Calabresi and Romesh Ratnesar, “Can We Stop the Next Attack?” Time, March 11, 2002. The impact of a nuclear detonation on an American city was compiled from interviews with Allison and his Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn, and Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, as well as various Web sites.

  The Dutch decision not to arrest A. Q. Khan in 1975, with the knowledge of the CIA, was described in detail in an interview by Ruud Lubbers, the former Dutch prime minister, who was involved in the incident. It was first mentioned in an article by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Unraveling Pakistan’s Nuclear Web,” New York Times, December 27, 2004.

  CHAPTER 1. THE SMILING MAN

  Details of Khan’s arrival at the Physics Dynamic Research Laboratory in 1972 and many other events during his time there came from several interviews with Frits Veerman and from a privately published manuscript by Veerman and Jacques Ros, “Atomic Espionage” (Amsterdam: Centerboek Weesp, 1988). Additional details about Khan’s early years in India and Pakistan came from the authorized biography of Khan by Zahid Malik, Dr. A. Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb (Islamabad: Hurmat Publications, 1992), and from various speeches and articles by Khan over the years.

  General information about the birth and history of Pakistan came from a trio of fine books: Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); and Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

  CHAPTER 2. AN ACCIDENTAL OPPORTUNITY

  President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program was described by Leonard Weiss, “Atoms for Peace,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November–December 2003; and Allan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999). Ronald I. Spiers recounted the proposal that led to the creation of the IAEA in an interview.

  Reports by the CIA and other American intelligence agencies about early proliferation threats were recounted by Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney in The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York: Times Books, 1981). Both authoritative and prophetic, the book describes the origins of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and the roles played by the French and other nations in supplying equipment to the fledgling program.

  Khan’s wife has spoken little in public about her husband’s work and their life. Much of the information here comes from the transcript of an interview she gave May 17, 1986, to Hurmat, a weekly newspaper in Islamabad. In addition, several friends and associates of the Khan family provided insights into their domestic life. Henk Slebos was interviewed outside a Dutch courtroom where he was awaiting trial on charges related to nuclear exports to Pakistan.

  Martin Brabers’s recollections of Khan’s student days and many details about conditions at Urenco are contained in a report commissioned by Greenpeace International and written by Joop Boer, Henk van der Keur, Karel Koster and Frank Slijper “A. Q. Khan, Urenco and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology: The symbiotic relation between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons,” (May 2004). Security regulations at Urenco were described in two reports by the Dutch government, one a study made public in 1979 and the other a classified version completed in 1982.

  CHAPTER 3. THE MUSLIM ALLIANCE

  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s rallying speech at Multan was described by Weissman and Krosney in The Islamic Bomb. Additional details were provided in an interview with Khaled Hasan, who attended the meeting as Bhutto’s press secretary and now lives outside Washington. Hasan also provided information about Bhutto’s campaign to raise money for the nuclear program from Colonel Moammar Gadhafi of Libya and other Muslim leaders; in addition, Weissman and Krosney described the arrival in Pakistan of couriers with suitcases of cash in The Islamic Bomb, as well as in a BBC-TV Panorama program broadcast June 16, 1980.

  The Indian nuclear detonations in May 1974 and the history of the country’s nuclear program were described in penetrating detail by George Perkovich in his book India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) and in The Islamic Bomb. Henry Kissinger’s response to the Indian nuclear explosion was portrayed by Dennis Kux in his book The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001).

  Robert Gallucci provided a rundown on what the United States knew about Pakistan in the wake of the Indian tests in interviews. His recollections were augmented by declassified reports from the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, many of which are available through the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/).

  CHAPTER 4. GOING HOME

  FDO officials refused to discuss anything related to Khan’s employment there, but details of his work at FDO and in the “brain box” at Almelo came from the later Dutch government reports, the Veerman interviews, and the Malik biography. Malik described Khan’s encounter with the two Pakistani scientists at FDO and his later attempts to join the Pakistani nuclear program. Khaled Hasan fleshed out details of Khan’s courtship of Bhutto in his interview. Ria Hollabrands talked about Khan’s domestic life in Zwanenburg in an interview outside her home there. Bhutto’s skepticism was relayed by Hasan and by another former aide to the Pakistani leader who asked not to be identified. The same sources described the arrangements that turned Khan into a spy.

  CHAPTER 5. THE PAKISTANI PIPELINE

  Siddique Butt’s role in the Pakistani pipeline was described in numerous sources, most extensively in The Islamic Bomb by Weissman and Krosney, the Greenpeace International report, and interviews with former American intelligence officials. The episode involving the ultra-thin foil, which led to the initial suspicions about Khan, is contained in confidential IAEA documents provided to us and amplified in interviews with IAEA officials. The failure of the Americans to grasp the threat posed by Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear-related technology originated in interviews with numerous former American diplomats and intelligence officials, most of whom were granted anonymity. The British technician’s discovery of the extra-specialized lathe at Rochling, the German company, is contained in confidential IAEA documents.

  Ruud Lubbers discussed the surveillance of Khan by Dutch security officials in an interview, which was augmented by an interview with a former BVD officer involved in the investigation, who spoke on condition of anonymity; and by a former senior CIA official, who also was granted anonymity. The outlines of the surveillance were also recounted by Broad and Sanger in “Unraveling Pakistan’s Nuclear Web.” Robert Einhorn called the decision to let Khan proceed a monumental error in an interview with us.

  CHAPTER 6. DOUBLE STANDARDS

  Information about Leonard Weiss came primarily from several interviews with him over the course of three years. Principle sources of information about Cheney, including his codename “Backseat,” were James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), and Joan Didion, “Cheney: The Fatal Touch,” New York Review of Books, October 5, 2006. Information about the Ford administration’s plans to sell nuclear technology to Iran was described in a series of declassified memos from administration archives; Dafna Linzer, “Past Arguments Don’t Square With Current Iran Policy,” Washington Post, March 27, 2005; “Iran’s upheaval derails a dynamic economy,” Business Week, November 27, 1978; and Henry Sokolski, “The Was
hington Post Bombs Nuclear History: Did Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz Try to Stoke Iran’s Nuclear Ambition in the ’70s?” Weekly Standard, March 30, 2005. Kissinger’s quote about proliferation not coming up in discussions about Iran is from Linzer’s article. Tony Benn’s complaints about the American attitude toward Iran were from an article he wrote, “Atomic Hypocrisy: Neither Bush nor Blair is in a position to take a high moral line on Iran’s nuclear programme,” Guardian, November 30, 2005.

  The description of Israel’s nuclear weapons program was based on Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), files from the National Security Archives, and author interviews with former Israeli nuclear officials. The exchange involving Kissinger and Reginald Bartholomew on the Symington amendment and Pakistan’s nuclear program, along with the warning from the shah about Bhutto’s nuclear intentions, came from a declassified Memorandum of Conversation, State Department, May 12, 1976.

  CHAPTER 7. THE ROAD TO KAHUTA

  Khan’s early days in Pakistan after his flight from Amsterdam and his rivalry with Munir Khan were described by Malik in his authorized biography and by Khan himself in an article he wrote in volume 21 of Defence Journal, a publication of the Pakistani military, titled “The Kahuta Story—Twenty Years of Excellence and National Services.” Additional information came from a lecture by Khan on September 9, 1990, to the Pakistani Institute of National Affairs in Lahore. Khan’s criticism of Munir Khan to Bhutto came from a former senior Pakistani government official and from Khan’s personal recollection of the conversation for his biographer, Malik. Khan’s description of beginning the enrichment program as a gigantic task was from his Defence Journal article. (After Khan’s confession in 2004, the Defence Journal article was removed from the publication’s Web site. In 2006 Defence Journal published a new history of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which diminished Khan’s role and promoted his late rival, Munir Khan.) Henny’s attitude toward life in Pakistan was from the Humrat interview.

  CHAPTER 8. OPERATION BUTTER FACTORY

  Veerman described his correspondence with Khan and provided copies of the letters quoted here. The Dutchman also recounted his dealings with the security police. The Brabers quotes came from the Greenpeace International report, but they are also contained in newspaper and magazine articles.

  Information about the contract with CORA came from Weissman and Krosney in The Islamic Bomb and Leonard Downie Jr., “US Prepared to Resume Nuclear Cooperation; Swiss, US Set to Resume Nuclear Energy Cooperation,” Washington Post, December 31, 1980. Slebos described his dealings with Khan in an interview, details also recounted in various newspaper articles, the Greenpeace report, and court files in the Netherlands.

  Sonja Haas described her father’s relationship with Khan in an interview. Officials with the Swiss government, the IAEA, and the CIA provided additional information about the Tinner-Khan ties. Friedrich Tinner’s quotation came from a senior IAEA official to whom it was addressed.

  Zia’s recollections of his journey from India to the newly formed country of Pakistan were from Steve Coll’s Pulitzer-Prize winning book, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004). Coll’s mastery of those years is unparalleled, and his book provided essential background material for us.

  Khan’s advertisements for workers at Kahuta and other recruitment efforts were from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s program, The Fifth Estate, “Secret Cargo,” December 9, 1980, and from private correspondence provided to us between Khan and Abdul Aziz Khan and other Pakistanis living abroad.

  CHAPTER 9. ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

  The description of the CIA station in Islamabad was provided by Milt Bearden in an interview with us. Information about CIA tactics came from Coll’s Ghost Wars and other publications. A former senior CIA official told us about the detention of an agency asset by the ISI and described the CIA’s knowledge of Khan dating to the middle 1970s. Other former American officials and Lubbers confirmed that Khan was “on the radar” at that time. In addition, declassified United States government memos and reports from the 1960s and 1970s demonstrate early concern about Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations; they are available from the National Security Archives.

  Weiss told us about his trip to Paris to meet with Bertrand Goldschmidt and his other involvement. Bob Gallucci’s quotations came from an interview with us and were corroborated by declassified documents, chiefly a January 22, 1975, memo, “Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation Issue,” and a formal complaint sent to Pakistan by the State Department on January 30, 1976. Cyrus Vance’s working group and its concerns are embodied in a detailed, 32-page white paper on Pakistan prepared by the State Department on April 25, 1978, later declassified and available through the National Security Archives. Gallucci’s comment about the option of assassinating Khan came from an interview. The former government official who said Khan should have been killed made the initial comment on the record, but he later requested anonymity because of his continuing dealings with the Pakistani government.

  CHAPTER 10. A NUCLEAR COWSHED

  The technical problems experienced by Kahuta were described by Khan in personal correspondence and in various declassified reports by the United States government. The CIA and other intelligence agencies ultimately discounted the chance of Khan’s success based on these initial reports of difficulties, which is one of the reasons the agency did not pay enough attention to him.

  The transaction involving the inverters from the British subsidiary of Emerson Electric and the comments of Frann Allaun, the British MP, were from Don Oberdorfer, Michael Gatier, and Maralee Schwarts, “Pakistan: The Quest for Atomic Bomb; Problem Discussed by West, Moscow, Peking,” Washington Post, August 27, 1979; David K. Willis, “On the Trial of the A-Bomb Makers: Antinuclear Battle Nears Climax,” Christian Science Monitor, December 1, 1981; Weissman and Krosney, The Islamic Bomb; and a BBC-TV Panorama program, June 16, 1980. Khan’s concerns were expressed in a letter to Abdul Aziz Khan that we obtained.

  Khan’s outburst about his alleged persecution by Americans and Jews is contained in a letter that he wrote to Aziz Khan on June 4, 1979. The quotation “Those of us who knew what was going on . . .” came from a former Pakistani diplomat who was interviewed multiple times and refused to allow his name to be used.

  The meeting with the IAEA director general was described in detail in a three-page, declassified telegram from the United States Embassy in Vienna to the State Department, dated July 9, 1979. Additional information came from the interview with Gallucci. The September 13 meeting was memorialized in a secret transcript prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and declassified in 2004. Gallucci described his covert trip to see Kahuta. The trip and Zia’s reaction were from an article by Simon Henderson, “We can do it ourselves: The father of Pakistan’s nuclear program speaks out,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1993.

  CHAPTER 11. SEE NO EVIL

  Zia’s fateful bicycle trip through the streets of Rawalpindi was described by Abbas in Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism and Coll in Ghost Wars; the latter also provided extensive details on the reaction of the people inside the United States Embassy to the rioters, material that was augmented with newspaper and magazine accounts of the episode.

  The assessment of Pakistan’s tilt toward religious extremism and the justification in the Koran for using nuclear weapons came from a declassified report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, “Islam and the Pakistani Officer Corps,” February 5, 1981, which was provided to us by Jeffrey T. Richelson, author of Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006).

  Zbigniew Brzezinski described his reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in a memo written for President Carter, “Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” December
26, 1979, released by the Cold War International History Project. Ronald Spiers’s recollections about the Carter administration’s policy toward Pakistan came from an interview. The inability of Weiss to persuade Glenn to oppose lifting the sanctions came from an interview with Weiss.

  President Reagan’s remarks about Pakistan’s nuclear program came from a packet of briefing papers and talking points prepared by the State Department on December 5, 1982, as well as notes from the actual meeting, all of which came from the archives of the Ronald W. Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California.

  Khan’s courtship of Pakistani journalists was described in interviews with several journalists, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of fear for their jobs and safety.

  The progress at Kahuta and the incident in which MI6 agents broke into Khan’s hotel room came from two confidential British documents from 1981 and 1983 and from interviews with a senior British counter-proliferation official and a former CIA official, both of whom declined to be identified because of the sensitive nature of the information. Zia’s reaction to Vernon Walters was from Simon Henderson, “Anxious U.S. Could Probe Zia over N-Plans,” Financial Times, December 8, 1982; and Kim Rogal, William J. Cook, and Jane Whitmore, “Worries about the Bomb,” Newsweek, December 20, 1982.

  The events leading up to the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor and its aftermath came from an interview with a senior Israeli intelligence official and from a book by former Mossad agent Victor Ostrovsky and Claire Hoy, By Way of Deception: The Making and Unmaking of a Mossad Officer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Major General David Ivry, “The Attack on the Osiraq Nuclear Reactor—Looking Back 21 Years Later,” Israel’s Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 7 June, 1981 (Jerusalem: Menachem Begin Heritage Center: 2003); Federation of American Scientists, “Israel’s Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,” June 7, 1981; and CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “The Iraqi Nuclear Program: Progress Despite Setbacks,” June 1983.