to sanction Iraq; and US policy toward Cuba, Iran, the Middle East, and other
areas in the developing world. As noted in chapter 5, Clinton administration
concessions fueled the white-hot US domestic debate over the proper direc-
tion of the US China policy. 4
By contrast, the Bush administration lowered China’s priority for US
decision makers, placing the PRC well behind Japan and other Asian allies
and even Russia and India for foreign policy attention. 5 This kind of downgrading of China’s importance in US policy had last been carried out in the
Reagan administration under the supervision of Secretary of State George
Shultz. It appeared to be no accident that the key architects of the policy shift in 2001, notably Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, were among
key decision makers in the similar US shift in US China policy that began in
1983. Armitage and his key aides in the State Department and close asso-
ciates in the National Security Council Staff were in the lead in moving US
policy from the strong emphasis on compromising with China and doing
what was necessary in order to preserve good relations with China in the
latter years of the Clinton administration.
Following the crash between a Chinese jet fighter and a US reconnais-
sance plane over the South China Sea during the so-called EP-3 incident of
April 2001, discussed below, the Bush administration did not resort to high-
level envoys or other special arrangements that were used by the Clinton
administration to resolve difficult US-China issues. It insisted on working
through normal State Department and Defense Department channels that did
not raise China’s stature in US foreign policy. In an unusual step showing
that the administration was speaking firmly with one voice during the inci-
dent, US officials were instructed to avoid all but the most essential contacts with Chinese officials in Washington and elsewhere. 6
Pragmatism amid Differences during the G. W. Bush Administration
121
Bush administration interest in seeking negotiations with China in order
to create “deliverables” and other agreements remained low. Its reaction to
the EP-3 episode, markedly increased US support for Taiwan, and a new US
focus on China as a potential threat showed Beijing leaders that the Bush
government, while seeking to broaden areas of cooperation where possible,
was prepared to see US-China relations worsen if necessary.
Chinese leaders by mid-2001 seemed to recognize that if US-China rela-
tions were to avoid further deterioration, it was up to China to take steps to
improve ties. In a period of overall ascendant US influence in Asian and
world affairs, Beijing saw its interests best served by a stance that muted
differences and sought common ground. Chinese officials thus significantly
adjusted their approach to the United States. They became more solicitous
and less acrimonious in interaction with US officials. Chinese officials and
media toned down public Chinese rhetoric against the United States. They
gave some tentative signs of public PRC support for the US military presence
in East Asia. The US side also signaled an interest to calm the concerns of
friends and allies in Asia over the state of US-China relations and to pursue
areas of common ground in trade and other areas with the PRC. 7
US-China relations faced a crisis when on April 1, 2001, a Chinese jet
fighter crashed with a US reconnaissance plane, an EP-3, in international
waters off the China coast. The jet was destroyed and the pilot was killed.
The EP-3 was seriously damaged but managed to make an emergency land-
ing on China’s Hainan Island. The US crew was held for eleven days and the
US plane for much longer by Chinese authorities. Weeks of negotiations
produced compromises that allowed the crew and plane to return to the
United States, but neither side accepted responsibility for the incident. 8
Many specialists predicted continued deterioration of relations, but both
governments worked to resolve issues and establish a businesslike relation-
ship that emphasized positive aspects of the relationship and played down
differences. The terrorist attack on America in September 2001 diverted US
attention away from China as a potential strategic threat. Chinese officials
privately indicated that they sought a constructive relationship with the new
US government, and in the process they publicly showed remarkable defer-
ence in the face of the Bush government’s uniquely assertive stance on
Taiwan as well as its strong positions on regional and national ballistic mis-
sile defense, expansion of US-Japanese defense cooperation, NATO expan-
sion, and other sensitive security issues that had been focal points of Chinese criticism of the United States in the recent past. The Chinese leaders seemed
preoccupied at home, notably focusing on a very important and somewhat
irregular leadership transition and related issues of power sharing and devel-
opment policy. Against this background, Chinese leaders worked hard to
moderate previous harsh rhetoric and pressure tactics in order to consolidate
relations with the United States.
122
Chapter 6
The course of US-China relations became smoother than at any time since
the normalization of those relations. US preoccupation with the wars in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq and the broader war on global terrorism meant that US
strategic attention to China as a threat remained a secondary consideration
for American policy makers. Chinese leaders for their part continued to deal
with an incomplete leadership transition and the broad problem of trying to
sustain a one-party authoritarian political regime amid a vibrant economy
and rapid social change. In this context, the two powers, despite a wide range
of continuing differences ranging from Taiwan and Tibet to trade issues and
human rights, managed to see their interests best served by generally empha-
sizing the positive. In particular, they found new common ground in dealing
with the crisis caused by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program beginning
in 2002, and the Chinese appreciated Bush administration pressure on Tai-
wan’s leader Chen Shui-bian to avoid steps toward independence for Taiwan
that could lead to conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
It is easy to exaggerate the growing Sino-American convergence during
the Bush administration. The antiterrorism campaign after September 11,
2001, saw an upswing in US-China cooperation, though China was some-
what tentative and reserved in supporting the US war against Afghanistan.
President Bush’s visits to Shanghai in October 2001 and Beijing in February
2002 underlined differences as well as common ground. The US president
repeatedly affirmed his strong support for Taiwan and his firm position re-
garding human rights issues in China. His aides made clear China’s lower
priority in the administration’s view of US interests as the Bush administra-
tion continued to focus higher priority on relations with Japan and other
allies in Asia and the Pacific. In its first year, the Bush administration im-
posed sanctions on China over issues involving China’s reporte
d prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) more times than during the
eight years of the Clinton administration. The Defense Department’s Quad-
rennial Defense Review unmistakably saw China as a potential threat in
Asia. American ballistic missile defense programs, opposed by China, went
forward, and rising US influence in Southwest and Central Asia and pro-
longed military deployments there were at odds with China’s interest in
securing its western flank. 9 The Defense Department’s annual reports on the Chinese military pulled few punches in focusing on China’s military threat to
Taiwan and to US forces that might come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a
conflict with the PRC. The Bush administration’s September 2002 National
Security Strategy Report called for better relations with China but clearly
warned against any power seeking to challenge US interests with military
force. 10
It was notable that China’s increased restraint and moderation toward the
United States came even in the face of these new departures in US policy and
behavior under the Bush administration—namely, presidential pledges (in
Pragmatism amid Differences during the G. W. Bush Administration
123
particular) along with military and political support for Taiwan, strong mis-
sile defense programs, and strong support for alliance strengthening with
Japan and expanded military cooperation with India. In the recent past, such
US actions would have prompted strong Chinese public attacks and possibly
military countermeasures.
American leaders showed an increased willingness to meet Chinese lead-
ers’ symbolic needs for summitry, and the US president pleased his Chinese
counterpart by repeatedly endorsing a “constructive, cooperative, and can-
did” relationship with China. Amid continued Chinese moderation and con-
cessions in 2002 and reflecting greater US interest in consolidating relations
and avoiding tensions with China at a time of growing US preoccupation
with the war on terrorism, Iraq, and North Korea, the Bush administration
broadened cooperation with China and gave US relations with China a higher
priority as the year wore on. An October 2002 meeting between President
Bush and President Jiang Zemin at the US president’s ranch in Crawford,
Texas, highlighted this trend. Concessions and gestures, mainly from the
Chinese side dealing with proliferation, Iraq, the release of dissidents, US
agricultural imports, Tibet, and Taiwan, facilitated the positive Crawford
summit. 11 Meanwhile, senior US leaders began to refer to China and Jiang Zemin as a “friend.” 12 They adhered to public positions on Taiwan that were acceptable to Beijing. They sanctioned an anti-PRC terrorist group active in
China’s Xinjiang region. The Defense Department was slow to resume high-
level contacts with China, reflecting continued wariness in the face of Chi-
na’s ongoing military buildup focused on dealing with Taiwan and US forces
that may seek to protect Taiwan, but formal relations at various senior levels
were resumed by late 2002. 13
Looking back, it appears that patterns of Bush administration policy and
behavior toward China began to change significantly in 2003. American
officials sometimes continued to speak in terms of “shaping” Chinese poli-
cies and behavior through tough deterrence along with moderate engage-
ment. However, the thrust of US policy and behavior increasingly focused on
positive engagement. China also received increasingly high priority in US
policy in Asia and the world.
The determinants of the US approach now appeared to center on the Bush
administration’s growing preoccupations with the war in Iraq, its mixed
record in other areas in the war on terror and broader complications in the
Middle East, and wide-ranging international and growing domestic disap-
proval of Bush administration policies. The North Korean nuclear program
emerged as a major problem in 2003, and the US government came to rely
heavily on China to help manage the issue in ways that avoided major nega-
tive fallout for the interests of the US government. Although Asian policy did
not figure prominently in the 2004 presidential campaign, Senator John Ker-
ry, the Democratic candidate, used a televised presidential debate to chal-
124
Chapter 6
lenge President Bush’s handling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons develop-
ment. President Bush countered by emphasizing his reliance on China in
order to manage the issue in accord with US interests. 14
The Bush administration’s determination to avoid trouble with China at a
time of major foreign policy troubles elsewhere saw the president and senior
US leaders strongly pressure Taiwan’s government to stop initiating policies
seen as provocative by China and possible causes of confrontation and war in
US-China relations. 15 The strong rhetorical emphasis on democracy promo-tion in the Bush administration’s second term notably avoided serious pres-
sures against China’s authoritarian system.
The US government’s emphasis on positive engagement with China did
not hide the many continuing US-China differences or US efforts to plan for
contingencies in case a rising China turned aggressive or otherwise disrupted
US interests. The United States endeavored to use growing interdependence,
engagement, and dialogues with China to foster webs of relationships that
would tie down or constrain possible Chinese policies and actions deemed
negative to US interests. 16
On the whole, the Chinese government of President Hu Jintao welcomed
and supported the new directions in US China policy. The Chinese leaders
endeavored to build on the positives and play down the negatives in relations
with the United States. This approach fit well with the Chinese leadership’s
broader priorities of strengthening national development and Communist
Party legitimacy that were said to require China to use carefully the “strate-
gic opportunity” of prevailing international circumstances seen as generally
advantageous to Chinese interests. As in the case of US policy toward China,
Chinese engagement with the United States did not hide Chinese contingency
plans against suspected US encirclement, pressure, and containment and the
Chinese use of engagement and interdependence as a type of Gulliver strate-
gy, discussed below, to constrain and tie down possible US policies and
actions deemed negative to Chinese interests. 17
As China expanded military power along with economic and diplomatic
relations in Asian and world affairs at a time of US preoccupation with the
war in Iraq and other foreign policy problems, debate emerged inside and
outside the US government about the implications of China’s rise for US
interests. Within the Bush administration, there emerged three viewpoints or
schools of thought, though US officials frequently were eclectic, holding
views of the implications of China’s rise from various perspectives. 18
On one side were US officials who judged that China’s rise in Asia was
designed by the Chinese leadership to dominate Asia and in the process to
und
ermine US leadership in the region. 19 A more moderate view of China’s rise in Asia came from US officials who judged that China’s focus in the
region was to improve China’s position in Asia mainly in order to sustain
regional stability, promote China’s development, reassure neighbors and pre-
Pragmatism amid Differences during the G. W. Bush Administration
125
vent balancing against China, and isolate Taiwan. Officials of this school of
thought judged that China’s intentions were not focused on isolating and
weakening the United States in Asia. Nevertheless, the Chinese policies and
behavior, even though not targeted against the United States, contrasted with
perceived inattentive and maladroit US policies and practices. The result was
that China’s rise was having an indirect but substantial negative impact on
US leadership in Asia.
A third school of thought was identified with US Deputy Secretary of
State Robert Zoellick, who by 2005 publicly articulated a strong argument
for greater US cooperation with China over Asian and other issues as China
rose in regional and international prominence. 20 This viewpoint held that the United States had much to gain from working directly and cooperatively with
China in order to encourage the PRC to use its rising influence in “respon-
sible” ways in accord with broad US interests in Asian and world affairs.
This viewpoint seemed to take into account the fact that the Bush administra-
tion was already working closely with China in six-party talks to deal with
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and that US and Chinese col-
laboration or consultations continued on such sensitive topics as the war on
terror, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Burma, and even Taiwan as well
as bilateral economic, security, and other issues. Thus, this school of thought gave less emphasis than the other two on competition with China and more
emphasis on cooperation with China in order to preserve and enhance US
leadership and interests in Asia as China rose.
Bush administration policy came to embrace the third point of view.
Senior US leaders reviewed in greater depth the implications of China’s rise
and the strengths and weaknesses of the United States in Asia. The review
US-China Relations (3rd Ed) Page 22
