showed that US standing as Asia’s leading power was basically sound.
American military deployments and cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific
region were robust. US economic importance in the region was growing, not
declining. Overall, it was clear that no other power or coalition of powers
was even remotely able or willing to undertake the costs, risks, and commit-
ments of the United States in sustaining regional stability and development
essential for the core interests of the vast majority of regional governments. 21
Thus, China’s rise—while increasingly important—posed less substantial
and significant challenge for US interests than many of the published com-
mentaries and specialists’ assessments might have led one to believe.
On this basis, the US administration increasingly emphasized positive
engagement and a growing number of dialogues with China, encouraging
China to act responsibly and building ever-growing webs of relationships and
interdependence. This pattern fit well with Chinese priorities regarding na-
tional development in a period of advantageous international conditions
while building interdependencies and relationships that constrained possible
negative US policies or behaviors.
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Domestic criticism of US policy toward China declined sharply with the
election of President Bush and Republican majorities in the Congress and the
American preoccupation with the war on terrorism. As explained below,
Bush’s initially tougher posture toward China was in line with views of the
vocal critics of Clinton administration engagement policies, and the president
benefited from strong Republican leadership and discipline that kept Con-
gress in line with the president’s foreign policies. American politicians and
interest groups seeking prominence and support in attacking Chinese policies
and practices were overwhelmed with the shift in the country’s foreign policy
emphasis after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Domestic criti-
cism of the president’s management of an increasingly close engagement
with China began to revive in 2005 as the war on terrorism wore on and the
conflict in Iraq reflected major setbacks for the Bush administration. Eco-
nomic and trade issues dominated the China policy debate. At the same time,
congressional, media, and interest groups revived criticism of China on a
variety of other issues involving, notably, human rights, international energy
competition, and foreign relations with perceived rogue regimes.
Democrats led by long-standing critics of China won majority control of
both houses of Congress in the November 2006 elections. Democratic Party
candidates for the 2008 presidential election generally were critical of the
Bush administration’s free-trade policies, which saw the US annual trade
deficit with China rise to more than $250 billion and coincided with the loss
of good-paying manufacturing jobs in the United States. They also tended to
take a tougher line than the US administration on human rights, Tibet, and
other issues in US-China relations. In the face of American criticism of
China and of US government moderation toward China, the Bush administra-
tion, some in Congress, and some US interest groups emphasized pursuit of
constructive engagement and senior-level dialogues as means to encourage
China to behave according to US-accepted norms as a “responsible stake-
holder” in the prevailing international order and thereby show that the posi-
tives in US-China relations outweighed the negatives. 22
Viewed from the perspective of international relations theories, the pat-
terns of US administration and Chinese government approaches to one an-
other during this period seem well explained through cost-benefit analyses
associated with realism. The differences in interests and values remained, as
did the very different identities of the two societies, but pragmatic leaders on both sides viewed carefully the power realities that they were attempting to
change to their advantage. They weighed costs and benefits of emphasizing
various differences and, on the whole, saw the benefit in pursuing paths of
convergence of mutual interest.
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127
PRIORITIES AND ISSUES IN US POLICY TOWARD CHINA
As seen in chapter 5, the US debates over policy toward China after the Cold
War generally had more to do with developments in the United States, espe-
cially changes in US perceptions of Chinese government policies and behavior, than with changes in those Chinese policies and behavior. From one
perspective, the Chinese authorities generally were following broadly similar
policies in the post-Mao (d. 1976) period designed to build national wealth
and power, maintain territorial integrity and achieve unification with Taiwan,
enhance the leadership of the authoritarian Communist Party, and improve
the economic livelihood and social opportunities for the Chinese people.
Their challenge to US-supported norms regarding such subjects as human
rights, weapons proliferation, environmental protection, the use of force to
settle territorial disputes, and other sensitive issues continued to wax and
wane over the years. They often posed serious problems for the United States
and US interests, but on balance they became less serious at the outset of the
twenty-first century than they were in the Mao period or even during much of
the rule of Deng Xiaoping. 23
However, the shock of the 1989 Tiananmen incident and the end of the
Cold War fundamentally changed the way the United States dealt with Chi-
na. A pattern prevailing into the twenty-first century saw the US administra-
tion generally continue to seek closer ties, including frequent high-level leadership meetings and various senior official dialogues, in order to develop
areas of common ground while managing differences. The US administration
and the Chinese government typically highlighted the many positive results
from US-China cooperation and dialogue. These included cooperation in
facilitating mutually advantageous trade and investment relations, coopera-
tion in managing such regional crises and threats as the Asian economic
crisis of 1997–98, the crises in 1994 and later (beginning again in 2002) over
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the 1998 crisis prompted by nucle-
ar weapons tests by India and Pakistan, the global war on terrorism beginning
in 2001, and the global economic crisis beginning in 2008. Under the rubric
of engagement or cooperation, the US administration officials and their Chi-
nese counterparts presided over an ever-increasing economic interdepen-
dence between the United States and China, supplemented by growing cul-
tural and political contacts and developing military contacts.
In contrast, a variety of US groups were in the lead among US critics who
applied pressure in the Congress, the media, and in other public discourse to
encourage a firmer US policy designed to press the Chinese government to
conform more to US-backed norms. As discussed in chapter 5, some of these
groups and advocates had var
ied motives that related less to China and its
government’s behavior and more to partisan or other ulterior benefits these
groups and advocates derived from taking a tough stand against Chinese
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Chapter 6
practices. The influence of the critics was sometimes evident in debates
within US administrations. It was reflected more clearly in the varying inten-
sity and scope of congressional debate and criticism of administration China
policy that generally emphasized positive engagement in the post–Cold War
period. On the whole, such criticism and the negative impact it had on devel-
oping US-China relations was seen to decline along with the overall influ-
ence of Congress in determining American foreign policy in the twenty-first
century. In particular, in the 107th Congress (2001–2), which coincided with
the start of the George W. Bush administration, there was a marked decline
in the scope and intensity of domestic American debate over China policy
compared to those seen in the 1990s. There were several reasons for the
decline. First, the early actions of the Bush government supported firmer
policies toward China that were backed by many in Congress regarding
Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, and security concerns. These actions helped
calm the strong congressional debate over China policy that prevailed in the
previous Congress. Second, partisan attacks on the US administration’s en-
gagement policy toward China also diminished as the Bush White House and
the Congress both were controlled by a Republican Party leadership intent on
showing unity and party discipline on China policy and other sensitive is-
sues. 24 Third, US preoccupation with the war on terrorism, including the USled military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, made it more difficult for US
interest groups and other activists to gain the public and private attention in Congress and elsewhere that they seemed to need in order to pressure for
changes in US policies toward China.
Congress and China Policy
To help grasp the scope and depth of the US domestic debate over China
policy during the first decade of the twenty-first century, it is instructive to review the issues that were raised in debates, notably in the US Congress.
Because of its receptivity to US domestic political movements and constitu-
ent pressures, Congress has remained a focal point for those US individuals
and groups critical of China’s policies and practices, who pressed for change
in US policy toward China. The record of the post–Cold War debate in
Congress over China policy is long and wide-ranging. It deals with clusters
of sensitive issues involving human rights and democratic political values,
security issues, economic questions, and sovereignty issues, especially re-
garding Taiwan and Tibet. Highlights of the issues considered in congres-
sional debate and actions at the outset of the twenty-first century are noted
below. They provide evidence of the broad range of American interests that
were trying to influence policy toward China and the directions these inter-
ests wanted China policy to follow. In general terms, the pattern shows these
groups often opposed improvements or other forward movement in US-Chi-
Pragmatism amid Differences during the G. W. Bush Administration
129
na relations until the Chinese government changed its policies and practices
more in accord with US-supported norms. The groups sometimes favored
sanctions or other pressures to force the Chinese government to change,
although US business interests and others with a strong economic stake in
China often were successful in seeking to sustain constructive trade relations
without such pressures.
After the intense US domestic debates over China policy in the 1990s, the
overall impact of the groups and the actions of Congress served in the first
decade of the twenty-first century more as a drag on forward movement in
US-China relations than an impetus for tougher US policy toward China.
There was little support for serious retrogression in key areas of US-China
relations. And, as in the case of the 1990s, there was almost no support for a
US policy that would lead to military confrontation or strategic containment
of China. 25
A high point of revived congressional pressure on the administration’s
China policy came with the inauguration of the Democratic Party–controlled
110th Congress in 2007; Democratic leadership continued with stronger ma-
jorities in control of the 111th Congress beginning in 2009, though the parti-
san incentive of the Democratic-led Congress to differ with the president,
now Democratic leader Barack Obama, declined. Overall, while some during
these years forecast major challenges to existing US China policy from do-
mestic US critics in the Congress and those working through the Congress,
the outcome was more in line with predictions of a much more mixed out-
look with pressures for a tougher US China policy offset by important
countervailing factors. 26
Congress dealt with each of the policy priorities and issues noted below in
a variety of ways, through press releases and statements reacting to US media
stories highlighting negative Chinese practices, legislation, hearings, so-
called dear colleague letters, formal letters to the administration, speeches in and out of Congress, and other means. 27
Human Rights Issues
China’s human rights abuses remained among the most visible and persistent
points of contention in US-China relations in the post–Cold War period.
China’s human rights record presented a mixed picture, with both setbacks
and minor improvements providing plenty of ammunition for US policy
debate in the Congress and elsewhere. Among the more positive develop-
ments in China’s human rights record, the Chinese government signed two
key human rights agreements: the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (October 27, 1997) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (March 12, 1998). The government also was allowing
local, competitive elections in rural areas in China, and it implemented legis-
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Chapter 6
lation to make political and judicial processes more transparent and to hold
law enforcement officials more accountable for their actions.
Crackdowns against Dissidents and the Falun Gong Group
In 1999,
American news accounts began to give wide coverage to reports that the
Chinese government was arresting prominent activists and giving out harsh
jail sentences for what most Americans considered to be routine and benign
civil acts. On July 22, 1999, the government outlawed Falun Gong, a spiritu-
al movement with an impressive nationwide organization in China, said to
combine Buddhist and Taoist meditation practices with a series of exercises.
The government arrested Falun Gong leaders, imposed harsh prison sen-
tences, closed Falun Gong facilities, and confiscated Falun Gong literature.
At that time, the Chinese government also cracked down on democracy
activists trying to register a new independent political party, the Chinese
Democracy Party. Promoters
of the new party were convicted on subversion
charges and given long prison sentences. 28
Tibet and Xinjiang
Chinese officials also harshly suppressed dissents
among ethnic minorities, particularly in Tibet and in the Xinjiang-Uighur
Autonomous Region, in China’s far west. In April 1999, Amnesty Interna-
tional issued a report accusing the Chinese government of gross violations of
human rights in Xinjiang, including widespread use of torture to extract
confessions, lengthy prison sentences, and numerous executions. Harsh Chi-
nese suppression continued as the global war on terrorism saw the Chinese
government brand dissidents in Xinjiang as terrorists with some links to al
Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations. Although US adminis-
tration officials warned, after September 11, 2001, that the global antiterror
campaign should not be used to persecute Uighurs or other minorities with
political grievances against Beijing, some believe that the US government
made a concession to the PRC on August 26, 2002, when it announced that it
was placing one small group, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, on the
US list of terrorist groups. 29
A significant episode of anti-China activism and rhetoric in Congress
accompanied public protests in the United States and harsh American and
other Western media criticism of China’s crackdown of dissent and violence
in Tibet in 2008. Congressional leaders called for a boycott of the summer
2008 Olympic Games, but President Bush announced firmly that he would
attend the games.
Chinese Prisons/Prison Labor
Prisons in China were widely criticized
for their conditions, treatment of prisoners, and requirements that prisoners
perform productive work. From the standpoint of US policy, one issue was
the extent to which products made by Chinese prisoners were exported to the
US market, a violation of US law. Meanwhile, periodic reports of Chinese
security forces taking organs from executed prisoners and selling them on the
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