by Brian Vale
With all these arrangements concluded, on 23 December, Cochrane hoisted his flag on the O'Higgins and to the thunder of salutes, took command of the squadron. Preparations for putting to sea went on apace. For days there was an endless coming and going of boats as desperately short supplies, cordage, canvas and munitions were ferried from the arsenal to the warships. Recruiting had also gone well and by 1819, the squadron had been able to find 1400 of the 1610 officers and men it needed. The manning of privateers was banned; and more and more foreigners were signing on, attracted by the magnet of Cochrane's name and by the preferential rates of pay being offered. There was, however, a down side. Desertions of sailors from British and American ships caused angry protests, and on the Chilean vessels resentment began to grow among national seamen at the higher rates of pay given to the foreigners. There was also a reshuffle in the senior ranks of the squadron. William Wilkinson was left in command of the San Martin; but Robert Forster was given the flagship O'Higgins, Thomas Carter - formerly of the Argentine Intrepido - of the corvette Chacabuco and John Tooker Spry and James Ramsey - erstwhile First Lieutenant of the San Martin - of the brigs Galvarino and Araucano. William Prunier, a native of the Channel Islands, was sent to the brig Pueyrredon as a replacement for the unruly Raymond Morris.
The Chileans were delighted at Cochrane's arrival, but their feelings were not shared by everyone. Life had been difficult from the beginning for resident British merchants whose commercial operations covered both Chile and Peru. Fortunately the two sides in the conflict were anxious to ensure a continuation of a trade that they needed as much as the British, and had been willing to permit a series of temporary arrangements to prevent instant seizure of ships off Chile and Peru on the grounds they had stopped in the ports of the other. Now Lord Cochrane had arrived. Commodore Bowles was well aware of his enthusiasm for both action and financial gain, and feared that there would now be an unscrupulous onslaught on neutral commerce in the interests of prize money. Reporting to the Admiralty from Rio de Janeiro in December 1818, he wrote 'It is not difficult to foresee that the class of foreigners entrusted with the principal naval commands are likely to use their power and influence for the gratification of their private interests. ... Their Lordships will judge what sort of conduct may be expected from Lord Cochrane.'16 Later, he added gloomily,
I have little doubt, from the language used by Lord Cochrane that whenever a fair opportunity offers he will pay no more regard to neutral rights than to the orders of the government under which he serves. .
He has come to this country, as he himself expressed to Mr Worthington (one of the American commercial agents), to live. He has brought a prize agent with him and professes the determination to keep everything in his own hands and distribute the proceeds of all captures himself.17
Relations between the Chileans and the British nevertheless remained good. One reason was the scrupulous neutrality that officers of the Royal Navy were required to observe. Another was the fact that Captain William Shirreff of the frigate Andromache - which, with the sloop Blossom, had been sent by Commodore Bowles to the Pacific in April 1818 - sympathised with the patriot cause and was an admirer of Lord Cochrane. Chilean relations with the United States were not so good. Almost as soon as he arrived, Biddle of the Ontario had lost the popularity he had gained by challenging the Spanish blockade by a stiffnecked dispute about salutes. And as the year went on the situation got worse. In addition to trade protection, Biddle's major task in the Pacific was to sail north and take possession of the Colombia River in the name of the United States. On the outgoing and return voyages, he visited Peru in July and October. There, the Spanish Viceroy
Pezuela went out of his way to court the American captain. Anxious to obtain information on events in Chile, and to counteract what he saw as inevitable American sympathies for the patriot cause, he received Biddle with ostentatious affability, offering hospitality, openly praising his efforts and presenting him with a sword. Biddle, who - unlike the British - did not appreciate that cool formality was more appropriate to neutrality than visible cordiality, responded in kind, and was rewarded when the Viceroy agreed to modify the enforcement of the blockade in accordance with American views on the subject,18 to restore the Beaver and Canton to their owners, and to allow the watering and supply of American whalers in Peru.
Seen from Chile, all this good will looked distinctly suspicious, and when Ontario arrived back in Valparaiso in December 1818, she received a chilly reception. There were rumours that much of the huge quantity of bullion she had on board was not American property - which was legitimate - but Spanish - which was not - and that among her passengers were six Spanish military officers, one of whom was the Viceroy's own nephew. Tensions reached a climax when Biddle refused Cochrane's request to delay Ontario's departure until the Chilean squadron had sailed against Callao and abruptly left for the United States on 31 December. Publicly, the authorities tried to minimise the dispute by claiming in the Gazeta Ministerial de Chile that it was nothing more than a minor disagreement between Biddle and Cochrane over the protocol of salutes;19 but the cat was let out of the bag on 29 January 1819 when El Sol de Chile revealed that deserters claimed that the Ontario was carrying $800,000. For its part, the government sent a blistering complaint to Washington about Biddle's lack of neutrality, his transportation of enemy property and money, and his carrying of 'spies'.
Chapter 4
THE CALLAO CAMPAIGN
Foreigners may have been worried by Lord Cochrane's appearance in Chile, but the government and the public were delighted with their good fortune. The news of his appointment as commander-in-chief was made public in El Argos, El Duende and El Sol de Chile in October 1818 and, three months later, the Gazeta Ministerial de Chile confidently predicted that,
The nomination of Lord Cochrane as commander of the naval forces of Chile promises us the complete destruction of the Spanish Squadron in the Pacific; and, as soon as a respectable expedition appears before Callao which will stimulate the feelings of patriotism of Peruvians, the consequent explosion will break our subordination to the Tyrant.1
O'Higgins and his colleagues had high expectations of Lord Cochrane. But they did not see him as a saviour who had come to take charge of the war. In many ways he was an unknown quantity. His brilliance as an aggressive naval leader had been well established, but in no higher rank than a captain and in command of nothing bigger than a frigate. Cochrane's sympathy with radical causes was also well known - but so was his preference for independent action and his impatience with any superior authority. This was worrying. The struggle for freedom in South America was dominated by land campaigns, and command of the sea was a subordinate part of an overall strategy. Tactically, therefore, while the Chileans were happy to rely on Cochrane's legendary ingenuity, what he did at sea had to be controlled and coordinated with what took place on land. Private letters from O'Higgins to San Martin make this clear.2
Thus, when Cochrane took command, he was not - as some biographers seem to think - given carte blanche to take on the Spanish Navy as he saw fit. His orders, when they arrived on 9 January 1819, were both specific and detailed. They began 'the principal objective of this expedition is to blockade the port of Callao, to cut off the maritime forces of the Viceroy of Lima ... and by so doing enable them to be defeated in detail', and continued in 17 clauses to lay down exactly how this was to be done, with what forces, and for how long. They emphasised that the expedition was a preliminary foray intended to weaken the royalists through blockade (Article 1); to encourage patriot resistance (Article 6); to gather intelligence on military deployments (Article 7); to exchange existing prisoners of war and protest about their treatment (Article 9); and to seize all ships and property belonging to Spain (Article 12). And to ensure that nothing should put at risk the invasion planned for the following year, Cochrane was ordered to keep clear of shore batteries (Article 5), and to avoid action with superior forces (Article 13).3
Cochrane expresse
d satisfaction with these orders and concentrated on getting his ships ready for sea. It was no easy task. The Commandant General's Department was newly created and disorganised and the arsenal in Valparaiso was desperately short of naval stores, equipment and money. But with remorseless pressure from Cochrane and imperative orders from Zenteno it was done. It was planned that the Chilean squadron would sail in two Divisions - the first under Cochrane, comprising the heavier ships, which had received priority in the distribution of supplies, O'Higgins, San Martin, Lautaro and Chacabuco; and the second, consisting of the three brigs, Galvarino, Pueyrredon and Araucano, which would follow under Blanco Encalada as soon as it was equipped. On 14 January 1819, the first division was ready and the signal for departure was hoisted. It was a typical summer's afternoon, with a bright blue sky, a fresh breeze, and the waters of the Bay alive with the last minute bustle of pulling to sea. Cochrane was anxious to leave before dusk, and no sooner had the boats carrying Lady Cochrane and other visitors left the ship's side for the pull to the shore than the O'Higgins manned her capstan and began heaving the cable short. By the time the boats returned, the flagship had weighed anchor and was heading slowly seaward. But they contained one unexpected passenger. In the confusion on the dockside, Cochrane's five-year old son had somehow escaped from his mother, had been swept up in the excitement, deposited in the launch and returned to the flagship. It was now too late to send him back, so Thomas stayed on board as the squadron worked its way out of the Bay, turned into the cold blue rollers of the Pacific and headed north for Callao.
But there was a last minute problem. Lautaro had been unable to put to sea with her consorts before nightfall on 14 January. Now, the following morning, the resentment of the Chilean seamen in the frigate over pay boiled over: they refused duty, and the marines declined to force them to do so. Captain Worster was unable to control the outbreak and resigned, to be replaced by Martin Guise. Strong measures and the personal influence of Blanco Encalada finally restored discipline, and at noon Lautaro finally sailed to join Cochrane at sea.4
Cochrane's Division made good time in reaching the coasts of Peru. The voyage proceeded smoothly, the only disruption being that no sooner had Lautaro been reunited with the flotilla than Chacabuco disappeared. When the corvette eventually rejoined off Callao six weeks later, it was revealed that the delay had been caused by a mutiny that had broken out on board over pay grievances on 23 January. After four days, the officers led by Lieutenants Robinson and Morgell had managed to regain control and had taken Chacabuco into the port of Coquimbo on the Peruvian border where the ringleaders had been dealt with, and 16 of their confederates sent back in chains to Valparaiso for trial.
In the middle of February, Cochrane's ships began to enforce the blockade of Callao, seizing the occasional Spanish prize and searching neutral vessels approaching the port. On the 15th, the lookout ship Lautaro, investigating strange sails on the horizon found them to be the British merchant vessel Alexander escorted by two ships of the South America squadron, Andromache and Blossom which had been sent by Commodore Bowles to keep an eye on the blockade and protect British ships and property in Callao valued at a million dollars.5 Captain William Shirreff of Andromache was impressed by the courtesy shown by Captain Guise and was further relieved when he went aboard the O'Higgins to be assured by Lord Cochrane that he had 'not forgotten that he was an Englishman' (sic) and that he would ensure that British vessels were treated fairly.6 Shirreff was also given the outline of Cochrane's first intended sally against the heavily fortified port of Callao. The Vice Admiral had been generally content with his orders, but their cautious tone was not to his taste. Believing that the enemy should be hit hard and fast he therefore decided to stretch them to the limit. For his initial attack, he planned to take advantage of a local carnival on 23 February when the defenders would be distracted by drink and partying, to slip into Callao with O'Higgins and Lautaro flying American colours and posing as the American ships Macedonian - which had just replaced Ontario - and John Adams. Once inside Cochrane intended to board and carry off one of the Spanish frigates Venganza and Esmeralda which were anchored within the port. Captain Shirreff had anticipated such an assault and had issued precise instructions to British merchant ships that, if an attack did take place, they were to raise national colours and move to a position at least one mile out of gunshot.7
Callao, the port of Lima, was situated some five miles away from the capital and linked with a straight tree-lined road. Unlike the splendour of the capital with its baroque churches, convents, ornamental walks, triumphant arches, plazas and regular, intersecting streets, Callao was a scruffy low-lying town built at sea level against a backdrop of hills, which rose in successive ranges as far the distant peaks of the Andes. Its buildings and defences were scattered round the curve of a semicircular bay, the seaward arm of which was dominated by the Castles of the Real Felipe and the entrance blocked by a massive chained boom. It was this heavily protected position that Cochrane planned to penetrate. Leaving San Martin off the adjacent island of San Lorenzo, he prepared O'Higgins and Lautaro for action in accordance with his plan of attack. But on the chosen morning, 23 February, the approaches were suddenly blanketed by fog and the attempt had to be abandoned. It lasted for a week, dense and impenetrable. Then, during a clearer spell of hazy sunshine on 28 February, there was the sound of guns from the shore. It was only the firing of salutes to mark a visit by the Viceroy but the Chileans, mistakenly thinking that one of their ships was in trouble, headed for Callao only to find the fog rolling in once more. When it lifted, Cochrane's ships discovered themselves huddled together near the entrance with a Spanish gunboat caught in their midst. The gunboat was easily taken, but the Chileans were within range of Callao's formidable defences - 160 fixed guns on land plus a similar number on the broadsides of the Spanish armed ships that had been anchored in a semi-circle to protect the merchant vessels sheltering behind. Sighting the intruders, the Spanish batteries erupted in thunder and smoke, and with shot whistling about their ears the Chileans turned and laboriously worked their way out of the bay to safety. It had been a bad moment for Cochrane - made worse by the fact that, in his miniature midshipman's uniform, little Thomas had escaped from the after cabin in which he had been locked and had made his way to the quarterdeck where he was found splattered with the blood and brains of those killed by the Spanish cannonade.
Cochrane had now experienced at first hand the difficulties of operating off Callao. First there were fluky winds and the sudden frequent fogs, which could act as a cover to the odd blockade runner or enemy warship sneaking in or out. Then there were the batteries, which guarded the port - so massive that he must have begun to understand why his orders had urged caution and the avoidance of any engagement with them. His initial foray against Callao may have been frustrated, but with typical resilience Cochrane was already planning another attack. It came on 2 March, when the boats of the squadron led by Captain Forster and Major Miller seized San Lorenzo. Although the island was little more than a dreary outcrop of sand and rock without a scrap of vegetation, it was three miles from Callao and an ideal base from which to blockade the port. Cochrane also established a laboratory there to experiment with the explosives and primitive torpedoes with which he planned to harass the enemy. The first victim, however, was William Miller, who was dreadfully burned preparing charges for an explosion vessel. It took him six weeks to recover.
The liberation of 29 Chilean soldiers who had been kept on the island in chains for eight years reminded Cochrane of Article 9 of his orders. Two days later, he sent a letter in to Spanish Viceroy Joaquin de la Pezuela under flag of truce, proposing an exchange of prisoners and complaining about the ill treatment meted out to those who had already been captured after skirmishes ashore or from the patriot privateers Maipú and Ariel. Pezuela, accustomed to the stately courtesies of Spanish official correspondence, was annoyed by Cochrane's undiplomatic tone and reciprocated by expressing surprise at seeing a Briti
sh nobleman in the company of a bunch of rebels! But in doing so, Pezuela made a big mistake. Cochrane loved paper disputations, and for the next fortnight the two men indulged in an orgy of verbal point-scoring over the justice of the Chilean cause, the neutrality of Great Britain, and the right of a British nobleman to fight on behalf of aggrieved humanity wherever he chose.8 The correspondence ended with Cochrane pleased that he had won the argument. But alas, the real objective was overlooked. There was no exchange of prisoners.
