by Brian Vale
On 22 March, Cochrane tried another destructive foray against Callao, this time using three prizes Victoria, Barbara and Lucero - the first two converted into fire ships, the last into an explosion vessel packed with gunpowder. With O'Higgins providing protection, the three ships advanced against the port covered by Forster in a bomb vessel and Lieutenant Wynter in a gunboat when the wind suddenly dropped to the lightest of breezes. Reluctantly, Cochrane called off the attack. Unfortunately, the explosion vessel under Lieutenant Nicolas Lawson of Lautaro had gone too far and was hit by fire from the shore batteries before she could get away. Cochrane was now convinced that further action against the Spanish base was impractical. At the beginning of April therefore, leaving Chacabuco on patrol off Callao, he withdrew with the rest of his ships to Huacho to fill his water casks. It was there that Blanco Encalada and the brigs found him on 4 April.
The Rear Admiral's arrival gave Cochrane the opportunity to broaden his attacks on Peru so, sending Blanco Encalada back to Callao to renew the blockade, Cochrane sailed north with O'Higgins, Galvarino and the recently captured schooner Montezuma to raid the settlements scattered along the long desert coast. Here, Cochrane was in his element. With the same skill he had shown when commanding the Imperieuse in the Mediterranean, he fell on the unsuspecting villages, distributing proclamations to inspire the patriots and seizing ships, property and money to dismay the royalists. At Patavilca on 5 April, he seized $67,000 together with quantities of sugar and rum. The following day at Huarmey, Cochrane sent the marines under Miller to ambush a mule train carrying $120,000 in gold and silver, then took a schooner called Macedonian that was obviously waiting to load the money. On 10 April at Gumbacho, he caught up with a French brig called Gazelle carrying $60,000, which he suspected belonged to the Philippines Company. Alas, the ownership of this booty was claimed by an American called Elphalet Smith, who was not only the owner of the Macedonian but of some of the money taken from the mule train. Smith, who was in the vicinity, furiously confronted Cochrane with a pistol but was disarmed and hustled away. But he had powerful friends in both the United States Congress and the Navy, and the seizures were to cause the Chilean Vice Admiral a great deal of trouble. Three days later, Cochrane captured and plundered the town of Paita, though - to the astonishment of the foreign sailors - he returned silver crosses, chalices and other religious objects that had been looted from a church and flogged the offenders.9 The rest of the booty was loaded onto the Spanish schooner Sacramento, which had been seized in the bay.
On 5 May, Cochrane returned to Callao. There was no sign of the blockading squadron, so, after waiting three days, Cochrane sailed back to Supe to pick up Galvarino and the prizes before sailing south for home. Behind him, the Spanish advanced to reoccupy the towns he had liberated, inflicting heavy punishments on those who had shown support for the patriot cause. In Huacho and Supe alone, 13 sympathisers were shot and 15 imprisoned. On 19 June Cochrane arrived back in the middle of the raw, cold northerly gales of the Valparaiso winter, joining Blanco Encalada and the rest of the squadron, which had been forced to raise the blockade of Callao at the beginning of May by shortage of supplies. The Chilean Government had done its best to avoid this, but unfortunately, the American ship Helen Mary, which had been sent north loaded with provisions, had been captured when, in Cochrane's absence, the powerful frigate Venganza had driven off Chacabuco and Pueyrredon and carried out a foray into the Pacific. With the blockade now lifted, the royalists in Callao appealed for naval reinforcements from Spain, attributing much of Cochrane's success to the support given to the patriot cause by the United States and Great Britain.10
Back in Valparaiso, Cochrane received a hero's welcome. Whatever its initial caution, the Chilean Government fully approved of the aggressive approach he had taken. From the beginning, news of his triumphs had been published in the Gazeta Ministerial de Chile - indeed whole editions were filled with his dispatches.11 The National Institute of Santiago issued a eulogy of his operations off Callao, and the public responded with enthusiasm. Nine months before, Chile had been entirely at the mercy of the Spanish Navy, which had blockaded its coasts and seized its ships at will. Now Cochrane had turned the tables and taken command of the seas, putting the Spanish on the defensive, driving their warships into harbour, and even attacking without hesitation their most powerful fortress in the Pacific. Judge John B. Prevost, who was now living in Santiago as American diplomatic agent to the region, caught the mood of the moment when he wrote to John Quincy Adams in July 1819, to say:
The changes brought about in one short twelve-month [period] are almost incredible. On my arrival all was dismay and consternation, the Flag of Chile was not known at its Ports, the Squadron of the Enemy was in sight and five thousand Spaniards were penetrating the Heart of the Country; At this period all is confidence, the patriot Flag waves triumphant on the ocean and upwards of forty large vessels at Valparaiso proclaim its success, while an equal number of troops are prepared for the invasion of Peru.12
Cochrane himself was more guarded in his assessment. In his view the purpose of the voyage - which had been to 'reconnoitre, with a view to future operations when the squadron should be rendered efficient, but more especially to ascertain the inclinations of the Peruvians in regard to their desire for emancipation' - had been achieved, and as a bonus, he had been able to 'restrict the Spanish naval force to the shelter of their forts, defeat their military forces wherever encountered, and capture a not inconsiderable amount of treasure'.13 Further success had, however, been frustrated by the Spanish 'passive system of defence' and the refusal of their naval forces to come out and fight.
Nevertheless, O'Higgins was satisfied and hurried down the coach road from Santiago to offer personal congratulations and to raise a loan so the squadron could be supplied and paid. Cochrane's offer to use his prize money for the purpose was politely declined. His proposals for the next stage of the campaign were also agreed. This time, there was to be an attack on the shipping in Callao in true Cochrane fashion using the latest military technology in the shape of Congreve rockets and explosion vessels. Goldsack's factory had begun to produce the necessary rockets and bombs, and the various devices were successfully tested before they left.
Cochrane's attitude was entirely positive at this time. His studies of Spanish were also making progress, helped by volumes of Chilean history books sent to him by a helpful Zenteno. In letters to his brother William, he reported that things were going well, and that he had expectations of large amounts of prize money. 'Suffice it to say', he wrote on 9 August, 'that I have every prospect of making the largest fortune which has been made in our days save that of the Duke of Wellington.'14 He even urged William to give up his life as a half-pay major in England and follow him to Chile, telling him that Captain Forster had married Jane Frith Cochrane in July, and that not only were there excellent brides to be found but any of his friends who had spare daughters were likely to find husbands as well!15 At a more mundane level, Cochrane asked William to contact Francis Place, the Charing Cross tailor who was one of Cochrane's radical friends, and to order a gross of admiral's brass buttons - without crowns - and a supply of blue cloth suitable for uniforms. Cochrane was also getting on well with the Supreme Director. Bernardo O'Higgins was half Irish himself and had been educated in England with the result that he understood Lord Cochrane and Cochrane understood him. It was to prove a profitable relationship.
On the social side, Cochrane's domestic life also seemed contented. Lady Cochrane was certainly enjoying herself, being the belle of many balls and gaining the admiration of John Downes, Captain of the USS Macedonian which had relieved the Ontario in early 1819. Downes had good contacts in Chile and was familiar with the country having been First Lieutenant of the USS Essex - and commander of the Essex Junior - when they had been captured by HMS Phoebe off Valparaiso in 1814. He had already done much to erase the poor impression left by Biddle, welcoming visitors aboard the American frigate and throwing a party
to celebrate Washington's Birthday on 22 February where he met Lady Cochrane. It was rumoured that he had been smitten by the dynamic Kitty, who was in the process of refurbishing her new house regardless of expense, and that he had sent the Macedonian's carpenters ashore to help with the work. The frigate's Clerk, a straight laced New Englander called Charles Jarvis Deblois, was highly critical, writing in his Journal that Downes spent far too much time with her, socialising, riding on horseback and going for long walks.16 Lady Cochrane was then 22 years old, a petite, vivacious brunette who loved parties, company and pretty clothes. Fortunately for her husband, she was also spirited and adventurous, and had determined to make the most of her new home by mastering the Spanish language. She was also enjoying the social life of Valparaiso and indulging in some adventurous travelling with her two children in the mountains and countryside around.
Alas, Cochrane's optimism was already being undermined by money problems. As usual, his expenses - with Kitty's assistance - were running ahead of his income. The costs of finding a house, of repairing it, of employing servants, and of providing the level of entertainment expected of an admiral on his flagship were well in excess of the $6000 he was being paid. Cochrane explained the problem to O'Higgins and described the Royal Navy's system of command pay or 'table money' for official entertainment, which effectively doubled the income of British flag officers. The Supreme Director saw the point. He and Zenteno sidestepped the question of table money, but got the Senate to agree that Cochrane's annual emoluments should be increased to $10,000, or £2000. It was made clear however that the extra $4000 was a personal gratuity payable only to Cochrane in recognition of his special circumstances and experience.17
But Cochrane was also worried about prize money. In Chile, the value of captured ships and property was shared among the captors as in Britain - the commander-in-chief receiving one-eighth; the captain of the ship concerned, two-eights; the sea officers, warrant officers and petty officers one-eighth respectively; and the rest of the ship's company the remaining two-eights. Unfortunately, in Chile only half of the value of prizes was distributed in this way, the rest being retained by the state. This was bad news for Cochrane, whose share of prizes not only went down to one-sixteenth of the value, but was reduced further since he had to pay one-third of the flag's share to Rear Admiral Blanco Encalada! Cochrane wrote again to O'Higgins, pointing out that prize money was 'the liberal reward for enterprise and exertion which has brought the Royal Navy to the pitch of Glory', and recommending that Chile adopted British practice.18 Once more, O'Higgins was sympathetic, and agreed that, in addition to his normal one-eighth share of prize values, Cochrane should receive one-eighth of the government's half as well - thus doubling his receipts and putting them on a par with what he would have received in the Royal Navy. Indeed, in their desire to win the confidence of the navy and reward its success, O'Higgins and Zenteno persuaded the Senate to agree that during the next cruise the state would forego its claim to half of the prizes taken, and would hand over the complete value of armed ships and equipment - though not of cargoes - to the captors.19
Pleased with both his reception and the government's generous response to his requests, Cochrane prepared the squadron for the next campaign. There were only minor adjustments to be made. With Martin Guise now in command of the frigate Lautaro, Robert Forster went to the corvette Independencia, which had now arrived from the United States; and a red-headed former Royal Navy Lieutenant, Thomas Sackville Crosbie, was given command of the Araucano in place of James Ramsey who was moved to Chacabuco. Forster's new appointment meant that the flagship lost its captain, but Cochrane declined to fill the vacancy and decided to do the job himself as well as acting as commander-in-chief. That done, on 12 September 1819, Lord Cochrane led the squadron out of the Bay to renew the attack on the royalists in Peru.
The orders Cochrane carried were as detailed as those he had received for the first cruise. The object of the expedition, he was reminded, was to secure the command of the Pacific that was so vital for the forthcoming invasion. But this time there was additional urgency, for news had arrived that a third Spanish reinforcement had left Cadiz in May. With its initial plan for maritime supremacy foiled by the capture of the Maria Isabel and half of its convoy, the Spanish Government had decided to send a substantial force to the Pacific. This time it comprised the 74-gun ships Alejandro I and San Telmo and the frigate Prueba, whose arrival would clearly mean a sharp swing of maritime power in favour of Spain. Cochrane therefore had two objectives - one to find and destroy the Spanish ships; the other to attack Callao and its shipping using rockets. The Chilean Government laid great store on achieving success and had ensured that the squadron lacked nothing in terms of supplies. Indeed, the squadron carried a battalion of marine infantry commanded by James Charles - now a colonel - to mastermind the rocket attacks. O'Higgins estimated that the cost of the expedition was no less than $400,000 or £80,000.20
Cochrane's orders contained a third element. The Chileans had approved of his aggressive approach during the first cruise but were unhappy at the assaults he had made against the coast of Peru. Cochrane, of course, simply saw it as enemy territory, which should be attacked by any means. O'Higgins and his colleagues did not agree. To them, Peru was a friendly country whose inhabitants were oppressed by an occupying army. In their view, seizures of their towns and assaults on their commerce made no real contribution to ultimate liberation and, as had been shown in the first voyage, only put local patriots at risk once the Chilean forces had withdrawn. All this was carefully explained in Cochrane's orders and led to the delicately expressed conclusion that 'you will expressly forbid the forces under your command under any pretext to undertake incursions or hostilities of any kind against the coasts of Peru.' Only parties filling water casks, gathering intelligence or contacting patriot elements were permitted to land, and then with only minimum numbers of men.21
Cochrane reached the Peruvian coast on 27 September. With the blockade reimposed and no sign of any enemy, he began to prepare the rocket and mortar rafts needed for the great assault on Callao. But first, he wrote to the Viceroy suggesting that he send an equal number of ships out of Callao so the fate of the port could be decided by some kind of duel between the two squadrons at sea. Puzzled by such a bizarre request, Pezuela refused.22 Rebuffed, on 1 October Cochrane prepared for the first attack. As night fell, the rafts were towed into position by the brigs Galvarino, Araucano and Pueyrredon and began to fire into the anchorage. Each was commanded by a marine officer -the mortars by Major William Miller; and the rockets by Colonel James Charles and Captain Henry Hind. They were answered by a hail of cannon fire, the shore batteries using red-hot shot. After a vigorous exchange, the Chileans withdrew. They had suffered only slight damage, principally when Captain Hind's rocket raft had blown up and a stray shot had killed Lieutenant Bealy of the Galvarino, but the performance of the mortars had been poor and the rockets had performed erratically.23
The days that followed saw more skirmishes, while Cochrane prepared for a second attack scheduled for 5 October. With the rest of the squadron left waiting outside, the three brigs once more towed their rafts into position and opened fire, while a fire ship commanded by Lieutenant Morgell was sent in to break the boom and flush out the vessels in the harbour. Alas, a lack of wind prevented him from gaining his objective before his ship was destroyed, while the rockets once more missed their targets, going wildly off course or plunging into the sea. The attempt was a failure. When writing the Narrative of Services in old age, Cochrane - then anxious to denigrate the Chilean authorities in any way - blamed them for the malfunction of the rockets in the two attacks because, for reasons of parsimony, they had used Spanish prisoners for the work who had 'embraced every opportunity of inserting handfuls of sand, sawdust and even manure at intervals in the tubes ... so that the charge would not ignite'.24 There is reason to doubt this. In the letters he wrote at the time, Cochrane made it clear that the failure had nothing to
do with the explosive charges, but was due to 'the poor and hasty work of welding the tubes and cylinders of the rockets ... and because some broke at the tail because the sticks had been made of knotty or imperfect wood'.25 In other words, the technology was in advance of its time. He was also anxious that the Chileans should not lose faith in the system, and explained that Britain had had exactly the same teething troubles when it had first used these weapons. Likewise Zenteno, replying to one of Cochrane's compendium letters of complaint on 14 May 1820, denied completely that prisoners-of-war had been used at all, writing that the rockets were 'constructed exclusively by the same artisans who had come to make them; and since only they were sufficiently skilled it was necessary to put the work in their hands notwithstanding the cost'.26 Unfortunately for Mr Goldsack, it was he who became the scapegoat.
Cochrane was now convinced that further attacks on Callao would be doomed to failure. The defences had been reinforced and all element of surprise had been lost. Cochrane now concentrated on the simple matter of blockade, but was anxious to find other ways of continuing the campaign. On 7 October, he wrote to Zenteno, discussing how the necessary pressure on the Spanish in Peru could be maintained while preventing incursions into Chile. One option he ruled out was an attack on Valdivia, the last royalist base in southern Chile. 'Although the taking of Valdivia would be useful,' he wrote, 'it is doubtful whether its surrender would achieve these objectives, since there are many smaller maritime locations which could be used by any naval force present in the area.'27
Turning his attention to Peru, the carefully expressed paragraphs in his orders that banned incursions on the coast were soon forgotten. The following day, he wrote urgently requesting that a special force of troops be put under his command to facilitate amphibious expeditions. 'A war of gentle means and half measures can gain no partisans,' he explained, and even if no reinforcements were available, the men he already had could keep the coast of Peru in constant uproar.28 O'Higgins's reply was cool. He reminded Cochrane that no force of fewer than 4000 men would make the slightest impact, and that nothing of military consequence should be risked while the Spanish reinforcements were still at sea. But there was good news. Intelligence from Gibraltar had reported that the poor condition of the Alejandro I - one of the worthless ships foisted on Ferdinand VII by the Tsar - had forced her to turn back before she even reached the coast of Brazil, so that the force now only consisted of the San Telmo and the Prueba.29
