Cochrane in the Pacific

by Brian Vale

  Keen to make his point and replenish his supplies, Cochrane reimposed the blockade with San Martin, Araucano and Pueyrredon while Captain Guise was ordered with Lautaro and Galvarino to attack the fort at Pisco and seize the shipping and supplies sheltering under its guns. Unfortunately, contrary winds delayed their arrival so that the attack took place in broad daylight on 7 November.

  Guise carried out his mission successfully, but Miller was wounded, taking three musket balls in the body, and another senior officer was killed - this time it was Colonel Charles, the commander of the marines. Charles was a Woolwich trained officer who had served with Sir Robert Wilson's irregulars in Portugal during the Napoleonic Wars and had later been seconded to the Russian army for the campaigns in Germany. As Maria Graham subsequently wrote, 'he was a brave and excellent officer but deserved a better fate than to be killed at the taking of so paltry a fortress.'30 She could have added 'against the Chilean Government's orders'. Charles was later to receive a hero's funeral in Valparaiso.

  Then there was another cause for frustration. Fortunately for Chile, the naval reinforcements sent from Spain had by this time shrunk to a fraction of their original size. Not only had the condition of the Alejandro I forced her to turn back, but the second two-decker, the San Telmo was hit by a severe storm rounding Cape Horn and was lost with all hands.31 Only the Prueba was now left to reach the Pacific and get as far as Peru. The Spanish frigate was actually sighted by the Chilean blockading squadron off Callao, but she turned and headed north pursued by Araucano before she could be identified. Later Lord Cochrane heard rumours that she had been seen to the north in Guayaquil. He immediately sailed in pursuit with O'Higgins, Lautaro, Galvarino and Pueyrredon. But on arrival they were disappointed. Leaving the flotilla outside, Cochrane entered the bay with the O'Higgins and after a brisk action seized two prizes, Begonia and Aguila, hiding behind the Island of Puna loaded with timber. Of the Prueba there was no sign. The Spanish frigate had in fact been lightened, taken up river and moored for repairs under the guns of the batteries. Cochrane had no choice but to abandon his quest and return to Callao.

  Chapter 5

  THE CAPTURE OF VALDIVIA

  Cochrane had not been satisfied with the campaign of 1819. The Chilean Government too was disappointed with the failure of the rocket attack on Callao. But, as O'Higgins pointed out in a letter to Lord Cochrane, no one blamed him.1 As far as the Chileans were concerned Cochrane had done all that had been asked of him. True, his attempts to destroy the shipping in Callao had failed, but he had effectively driven the Spanish Navy from the seas, imposed a crippling blockade on the Peruvian capital, and taken a useful bag of prizes. It was an impressive achievement for a navy that had existed for only a year. The government had already doubled his salary and prize money in recognition of his efforts. Now it featured his dispatches and achievements in the fortnightly Gazeta Ministerial de Chile.2 O'Higgins wrote repeated personal notes of support, and in a long letter dated 26 November 1819, Zenteno praised Cochrane's audacity and tactics, confirmed that he had the Supreme Director's total confidence, and demonstrated it by giving him a free tactical hand, concluding:

  while reiterating that the squadron should (i) not return unless faced with an emergency it cannot overcome, and (ii) that it should operate in such a way as to avoid compromises but take advantage of any chance to destroy all, or part, of the enemy's forces - the Government does not wish to restrict you with any rules. It leaves you free to operate in its interests according to circumstances.3

  Cochrane, however, was his own sternest critic. Although in public he was resentful of any outside criticism and incapable of admitting mistakes, in private he was deeply depressed by anything he saw as a failure. The events of his early life had given him a strong sense of insecurity. The death of his mother when he was no more than a child, and his father's preoccupations with inventions and money problems, had left him desperate for the approval of his superiors, and full of foreboding that it might not be forthcoming.

  Thus, he was genuinely dejected by what he regarded as his failure off Callao and - in spite of ample evidence to the contrary - was convinced that O'Higgins and his colleagues felt the same. Cochrane had hoped that the capture of the Prueba would compensate for his lax blockade of Callao - but in that too he had been frustrated. What he needed now was a victory to restore his reputation and defy his supposed detractors in Chile. Then he picked up a rumour that Prueba, or one of her consorts, had made landfall in the southern fortress of Valdivia.4 This gave him an idea. Forgetting that he had previously dismissed the base as an unimportant target, Cochrane came to the conclusion that the best way to frustrate his enemies was to seize Valdivia by coup de main!5 It was a plan of astonishing - but typical - audacity. It was also totally against his orders, which were to remain off Callao. The blockade had already been weakened when San Martin and Independencia had been forced to return to Valparaiso by an outbreak of typhus. Now, leaving only the heavily outgunned

  Galvarino and Pueyrredon to watch the port and intercept blockade runners, Cochrane sailed over the horizon in the O'Higgins to Valdivia - 2000 miles away from where he should have been! He told the Chilean Government nothing of his movements or plans. The flow of weekly dispatches simply ceased.

  Cochrane reached Valdivia at dusk on 17 January 1820. His first task was to assess the chances of a successful attack. There are two alternative versions of how he did this. Cochrane himself, in his Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chile, Peru and Brazil, claims that - sacrificing the element of surprise - he boldly entered the bay in O'Higgins flying Spanish colours, learnt what he needed to learn, and sailed out again taking prisoners with him.6 William Bennet Stevenson who was there, however, gives the more likely description. According to him, Cochrane left the O'Higgins standing off the entrance of the bay flying the red and gold of Spain to avoid alarming the defenders, and carried out a personal pre-dawn reconnaissance of the harbour in his gig.7 After he had returned, the intelligence he had gathered was supplemented by four Spanish soldiers and a pilot who had innocently boarded the Chilean warship while he was away deceived by her false colours. O'Higgins then made sail and disappeared over the horizon. Cochrane now had two objectives - the first to capture the Spanish brig Potrillo, which he learnt had evaded the blockade off Callao and was heading for Valdivia carrying money and supplies for the garrison; the second to head for the nearest Chilean base at Talcahuana in search of reinforcements for his attack.

  Potrillo sailed straight into Cochrane's arms without the need for a search and, though she attempted to escape, she was dismasted in a squall and captured. On board Cochrane seized $20,000 in silver and $40,000 worth of stores and munitions. With the prize in company, he then headed for Talcahuana, arriving on 22 January 1820. There he found himself in luck. In the harbour were two Chilean warships, the Intrepido, under the command of Thomas Carter, and the schooner Montezuma. Cochrane took both under his orders. Likewise, on hearing his plans for the capture of Valdivia, the Governor of Concepcion, General Ramon Freire, willingly supplied 250 infantrymen under Major Jorge Beauchef to supplement the flagship's marines and provide Cochrane with an adequate landing force. The final adjustments were quickly made. The troops were embarked, and Potrillo, with its cargo of money was sent off to Valparaiso under Henry Cobbett, the First Lieutenant of the O'Higgins. With all now prepared to Cochrane's satisfaction, the flotilla weighed anchor, and on 29 January, headed into the open sea.

  But almost immediately, there was a crisis. On the first night out, the ships became separated, and the progress of the O'Higgins was suddenly interrupted by a grinding shudder as she went aground on a reef off the remote island of Quiriquina. There was momentary panic as her false keel was torn off, her pumps failed, and she began to take in water from the damage to her underwater timbers. Cochrane immediately rallied his men, led them below, carried out repairs to the pumps and hull with his own hands, and saved the day. Fortunately, the wind was light so t
hat the Chileans were able to heave the O'Higgins off the reef using the kedge anchor until she floated again. That done, and with pumps going continuously to stem the inflow of water, the frigate headed once more for Valdivia. It took more than a minor accident and a damaged ship to deflect Cochrane from a mission!

  For a sailing ship to run aground at night in poorly charted waters was not an uncommon event. But Cochrane's inner circle soon realised that the incident did not reflect well on their patron. It was necessary therefore to manufacture a defence. The excuse that subsequently appeared in Stevenson's book, and that has been repeated by biographers ever since,8 is that Cochrane was exhausted with carrying out the duties of both commander-in-chief and captain, and went to bed giving orders to the officer of the watch, Lieutenant Nicholas Lawson, to call him if the wind rose. Lawson, however, was negligent and retired himself, leaving the deck to an inexperienced midshipman. He in turn failed to rouse Cochrane as ordered, and could not cope with the crisis when it arose. Thus, Cochrane's partisans were able to convince themselves that he was blameless for the accident. Alas, this carefully devised excuse does not hold water. The responsibility for allowing the flagship to become so seriously deficient in officers was Lord Cochrane's. It was he who decided that O'Higgins did not need a captain while he was on board. It was he who allowed the complement of lieutenants to fall to two by putting the rest aboard prizes. And of those who remained, Cochrane had arrested one - an American called Edward Brown - so that only Lawson had been left to carry out watch keeping duties. He, no doubt, was as exhausted as his Vice Admiral. The grounding of the O'Higgins showed Cochrane's powers of leadership, his strength of character, his technical skills and his seamanship at their best. It is a pity that his constant need for self-justification did not allow him to leave it at that.

  Valdivia was Spain's last remaining stronghold on the Pacific south of Callao. Located on the seaboard of the mountains and fjords of southern Chile, it was the first landfall for ships coming round Cape Horn from Europe and was an important base and a major depository of supplies, arms and munitions. The town, in a sheltered spot surrounded by apple trees and with an ample harbour, was located on the low, heavily wooded banks of a long river running into a flask shaped bay with a narrow fortified entrance 1200 yards wide running from west to east. Stevenson described it as 'the Gibraltar of South America', defended by 2000 men and more than 100 guns. This was, however, an exaggeration. Unlike Gibraltar, the troops and guns defending Valdivia were not located in a single fortress, but were scattered between five different forts and four smaller gun emplacements perched on the rocky heights that dominated the bay on every side. Thus, an enemy ship entering the harbour would first have to pass the guns of the Fort of Ingles on the right commanding the approaches; then those of San Carlos and Amargos, with Niebla on the opposite side; then, further down on the right, those of the Castle of Corral, which formed the centrepiece and dominated the interior of the bay.

  The defences of Valdivia appeared formidable, but Cochrane knew their weaknesses. Not only was the garrison scattered, but the guns were positioned so as to resist an attack by sea. To a man of Cochrane's tactical gifts, the answer was clear. It was to attack unexpectedly by land at night, and to roll up the forts and batteries one by one before a central defence could be organised. And this is exactly what he did. Late on the afternoon of 2 February, Cochrane's flotilla approached to within striking distance of Valdivia. Leaving the damaged O'Higgins out of sight of the shore, Cochrane embarked the landing parties on Intrepido and Montezuma and, in a heavy sea, they headed for a cove at the foot of the heights on which Fort Ingles was built. To gain time the Chilean ships flew the Spanish flag - and even communicated with the shore posing as friendly vessels fresh from Cape Horn. The bluff was eventually called, but by the time the fort opened fire it was too late. With Miller and the marines in the lead, the boats battled through a rising wind and crashing surf to reach the beach and drive off a picket of enemy skirmishers. Then, with the light fast fading, the rest of the troops landed and began to file up a steep goat track to the heights. When they reached the top it was night.

  With the defenders of Fort Ingles firing blindly into the darkness, Ensign Francisco Vidal of the marines managed to bridge the defensive ditch and the Chileans stormed it in a two pronged attack, driving the defenders out at bayonet point. Fleeing in panic the Spaniards collided with a column of reinforcements and threw them too into disorder. And when the fort of San Carlos opened its gates to admit the refugees, a horde of pursuing Chileans followed them in and promptly captured that as well. The attack surged on, with Fort Amargos falling with equal ease.9 The Castle of Corral was the objective of the Chilean infantry under Major Beauchef, and the regulars of the Cantabria Regiment, who formed the garrison, could have been expected to put up serious resistance. But by this time, so great was the confusion and demoralisation among the Spanish forces that when Beauchef attacked, the defenders rushed for the boats and escaped, leaving Colonel Fausto de Hoyos, his officers and a handful of men to surrender.10 By daybreak, the whole of the western side of the bay was in Chilean hands.

  Next day, taking advantage of the unexpected success of the previous night, Intrepido and Montezuma were ordered to carry the landing force from the castle across the bay to attack the Fort of Niebla and the batteries on the eastern side. But at that moment the menacing bulk of the O'Higgins appeared under a pyramid of sails from the seaward. Ignorant of the frigate's condition, alarmed at the thought of her heavy guns and assuming that she carried further Chilean reinforcements, the remaining Spaniards abandoned their defences and retreated up river to Valdivia while the O'Higgins entered the bay and was hastily beached before she could sink. By 6 February it was all over. Cochrane reached the town to be met by a flag of truce and to receive the surrender of the remaining Spanish forces.11 The mopping up operation, however, was not without its brutal side. The conflict in South America, as in so many essentially civil wars, had been marked by cruelty on both sides - indeed the south of Chile was at that moment being ravaged by a band of royalist irregulars commanded by a bloodthirsty warlord called Benavides. Valdivia was no exception. Captain Francisco Erezcano of the Intrepido's marines, who had acted so bravely in the attack on Fort Ingles, sullied his record by killing two unarmed Spanish officers; while Ensign Latapia, left in charge of the Castle of Corral, thought nothing of shooting prisoners to enforce his authority and would have killed more if Stevenson had not intervened.

  The taking of Valdivia was a major victory and a confirmation of Cochrane's extraordinary daring and military prowess. Its fall not only removed the last potential threat to Chilean independence but put a vast amount of military equipment in the government's hands. All told, Cochrane had seized 50 tons of gunpowder, 10,000 cannon shot, 170,000 musket balls, huge quantities of small arms, 128 pieces of artillery and a prize ship, the Dolores. His men also looted the town, the churches and the Governor's Palace, seizing tobacco worth $9000 and ornaments and plate to the value of $10,000; and on his own account, Cochrane took possession of $20,000 worth of crockery.12 The debit side of the capture only amounted to the O'Higgins' underwater damage and the loss of the Intrepido, which had grounded on a mud bank going upriver to Valdivia. Emboldened by his success, Cochrane decided to try his luck against Chiloe, a large archipelago 150 miles to the south which dominated the approaches to the fjords and mountains of southern Chile. But this time the Spanish garrison, under the redoubtable Colonel Quintanilla, was ready and waiting. The initial foray by 150 troops was beaten off by defenders of twice that number and Miller who, as usual, was in the vanguard of the attack against the strong point of Fort Aguay, was badly wounded by grape shot and had to hand over command to the Argentine marine Captain Erezcano. Faced with this rebuff, Cochrane called off the attack, justifiably content with what he had achieved so far. For the rest of the war, Chiloe was to remain as a minor irritant and a base for royalist privateers.

  Chapter 6


  'HEARTFELT GRATITUDE AT THAT SIGNAL ACHIEVEMENT'

  News that Lord Cochrane had left the blockade of Callao and disappeared over the horizon was received with concern in Chile. From the beginning some had feared that the Vice Admiral might ignore his orders and go off on some scheme of his own, and now their fears seemed justified. But, on 16 February, letters arrived from General Freire revealing not only that Cochrane was in Valdivia, but that he had achieved a stunning and unexpected victory. The Chilean authorities were relieved and delighted. Next day they published an Extraordinary Edition of the Gazeta Ministerial carrying the momentous news, and followed it two days later by another that triumphantly reprinted all of Cochrane's dispatches.1 A week later the government signified its pleasure by ordering that medals be struck for the victors2 and by issuing a public letter from Zenteno on 22 February, which began:

  If victories over an enemy can be estimated according to the resistance offered and the national advantages gained, then the conquest of Valdivia is, in both senses, inestimable - encountering as you did the natural and artificial strengths of that impregnable fortress ... the memory of that glorious day will occupy the first pages of Chilean history and the name of Your Excellency will be transmitted from generation to generation by the gratitude of our descendants.