Cochrane in the Pacific

by Brian Vale

  Ironically enough, many of San Martin's subordinates -including Lord Cochrane - were critical of San Martin's 'softly softy' tactics and also yearned to settle the fate of Peru on the battlefield. They argued that the best way to win Peruvian hearts and minds was a quick victory not a prolonged political debate. But the Captain General stood firm, knowing that the enemy's numbers were greater than his own and confident that his political strategy would work. And he was right - up to a point. The arrival of the liberating army on Peruvian soil had the effect San Martin had anticipated. In October 1820, the northern province of Guayaquil declared its independence. A month later, the Marquis of Torre Tagle brought the fortified town of Trujillo into the patriot camp. At the beginning of December, the desertion of the Royal Numancia Regiment to the patriot side was the first in a steady stream of defections. True, there was no widespread national uprising, but the royalist regime in Peru slowly began to unravel. Trade was at a standstill; starvation threatened as food supplies were cut by Cochrane's blockade; and, to cap it all, the coast was swept with an epidemic of fever. In fact it did more damage to San Martin's army than the Spanish and at the end of February 1821 Paroissien estimated that 900 men, including the Captain General who was spitting blood, were sick.3

  Right as he so frequently was in matters of military strategy, San Martin's hopes for a national rising in support of Peruvian independence were unrealistic. Like O'Higgins, his expectations had been formed in the liberation struggles of the semi-rural societies of Chile and the Argentine. Peru was different. Since its foundation, the development of the Viceroyalty had been conditioned by the huge wealth of its silver mines, which had allowed it to import all the trappings of church and state from aristocratic Europe. It was a country of sharp social contrasts between the wealthy merchants and titled officials of Lima and the impoverished Indians and Negro slaves who lived in the countryside. Geographical contrasts were just as great, with barely accessible forests and mountains dominating the interior, while the bulk of the population lived along a narrow coastal strip, the green areas of settlement and cultivation separated by waterless deserts or mountainous outcrops. The whole was dominated by Lima, the 'City of Kings' with its domes and spires, baroque churches and convents, public parks, triumphant arches and neat grid of streets and plazas. But neither the wealthy minority of merchants and aristocrats, nor the poor and impoverished majority, were fruitful breeding grounds for a revolution. The former had too much to lose, and the latter were more concerned with survival.

  After Andromache had sailed away carrying Kitty and his family, Lord Cochrane handed over the blockade of Callao to Robert Forster - now a commodore - and turned his attention to raiding the isolated settlements scattered along Peru's long coastline. To satisfy Cochrane's continual demand for military action, San Martin had eventually supplied him with a newly raised Peruvian regiment commanded by Colonel William Miller and given him a free hand. On 20 March 1821, he attacked Pisco, which had been reoccupied by the royalists after San Martin's withdrawal the previous October, seizing cattle, horses and much-needed supplies. On 21 April, Cochrane evacuated the town once more and, with his flag now flying in the San Martin, headed south. On 6 May, he bombarded and sacked Arica, seizing $110,000 in coin and silver. With orders to raise the Provinces of Arica and Arequipa,4 Miller and his men advanced into the interior in the direction of Tacna, swinging northwest to head off the three detachments of Spanish troops sent from Arequipa, Puno and La Paz before they could combine to confront him. He met and defeated the first in the valley of the Mirave, then forced-marched his troops 100 miles north to Moquega where he routed the other two detachments, pursuing them into the high mountains. Only the armistice of 23 May prevented further activity.

  Cochrane was pleased with these military adventures, which were just the kind of thing he had excelled at when invading enemy territory in France during the war.5 But occupied Peru was not France, and it was not enemy territory. Certainly, Cochrane took supplies and booty for the patriot forces and Miller's operations diverted Spaniard troops away from San Martin's army, but in the longer run his adventures damaged the country's economy and caused hardship to many Peruvian citizens. The orders Cochrane had been sent on 9 September 1819 had discussed the issue and explained that short-term incursions like these could be nothing more than a side show that put local patriots at risk once he had left. Indeed, Arica had to be evacuated as soon as the armistice was over and Spanish forces returned in strength. Behind him Cochrane left a ghost town, its population driven away, its shops and storehouses pillaged, and its houses looted with furniture smashed with shattered doors hanging from their hinges.6 It was not the way to win hearts and minds.

  Meanwhile, Cochrane's bag of prizes increased. As he made his way down the coast he seized seven more British merchantmen in Peruvian ports - Admiral Cockburn, Joséph, Robert Fuge, Mary, Rebecca (2), Robert and Lord Cathcart, though the last was not taken over by a Chilean prize crew and escaped on the first dark night.7 Captain Basil Hall, who was patrolling the coast in HMS Conway, sent details of these fresh detentions to Sir Thomas Hardy in Valparaiso. Hall had also discovered that Cochrane had changed his style and that, instead of detaining alleged blockade runners, he was freeing them on purchase of a trading 'licence' costing 18 per cent of the value of the cargo.8 Joséph, Robert Fuge and Admiral Cockburn paid Cochrane's licence fee and were released - the latter supplying, in place of cash, much needed cordage and rope for the Chilean Squadron. Sir Thomas Hardy, now in Chile, made an official protest to O'Higgins who was dismayed to hear what was going on and totally disowned Cochrane's activities.9 Hardy then sailed for Peru with Creole and the 74-gun Superb to sort out the problem personally.

  There was, however, little Hardy could do in relation to the merchantmen that had been seized by Cochrane's ships except to lodge an official protest.10 The British Government's policy of strict neutrality and the dubious nature of the practices being used by British merchants to disguise the true origins of their cargoes tied his hands. All he could do was to pass his concerns on to the Admiralty, complain about the anomaly of a situation where illegal 'acts of hostility ... are daily committed by His Majesty's natural born subjects serving in the Chilean squadron against others of His Majesty's trading subjects on this coast, without benefiting much the patriot cause,'11 and exchange letters with Lord Cochrane over the right and wrongs of his actions. Meanwhile, the USS Constellation had no hesitation in releasing the handful of American ships that had fallen into Cochrane's hands by force.

  Meanwhile, on land, the army of liberation waited for events to unfold, while San Martin lived aboard the schooner Sacramento. Basil Hall visited him at this time and was impressed with the Captain General's personality:

  At first sight there was little that was striking about his appearance; but when he stood up and began to speak, his superiority was evident. He received us on deck very simply, dressed in a loose coat and a large fur cap. He was seated at a table made from several board planks and placed over some empty barrels. He is a handsome man, tall, erect, well proportioned with a large aquiline nose, abundant black hair and long black whiskers. He is highly courteous and simple, unaffected in mannerisms, excessively cordial and unassuming and possessed of a kindly nature. ... In conversation on important topics, he disliked wasting time on details, he listened attentively and answered with clarity and brilliance of language, showing admirable resources of argumentation and a ready abundance of knowledge.12

  Hall was equally impressed by the logic behind San Martin's intention to liberate Peru rather than conquer it and by his patience in waiting for the collapse of Spanish power. His plans, wrote Hall, 'certainly appeared to many people to be very judicious at the time as they were uniformly followed by the success which he anticipated; and I am free to confess that . his measures at this juncture, seemed to me to be marked with sagacity, prudence and foresight.'13

  San Martin did not have long to wait. Spanish rule continued to crumble an
d, on 6 July 1821, Viceroy de la Serna and his men carried out their plan to abandon Lima and regroup in the mountains of Upper Peru - what is now Bolivia - to the southeast. When the troops marched out they left the capital apprehensive and deserted, many of the population having fled to take refuge in the Castles of Callao, which still held out, while the rest waited apprehensively with boarded up shops and windows for the orgy of pillage and looting they thought would follow. But nothing happened. San Martin surrounded the capital with his Army of Liberation but did not advance. His forbearance paid off. The local authorities regained their confidence, people returned to their homes and a police force was established to keep order. Captain Hall's offer of marines from Conway to help was politely declined.14 The Captain General had sworn that he would only enter Lima as a liberator and not as a conqueror, and six days later the invitation came. On 12 July, San Martin rode into the Peruvian capital to be embarrassed by public rejoicing and obsequious gratitude. A week later, Lord Cochrane visited the capital to join in the festivities where - according to his own account and those of his partisans - he was hailed as the real hero of the hour.

  When Cochrane returned to Callao from Arica on 8 July, he had gone immediately on the offensive. Whatever was happening in Lima, Callao still held out. His first act was to countermand an agreement that Commodore Forster had made in his absence that the British merchantmen Lord Lyndoch and Saint Patrick should be allowed to leave in ballast.15 His second, was to attack the port three days later, destroying the Sebastiana. Then came a setback. On 16 July, while anchored off Chorillos in heavy weather, the only serviceable anchor cable of the San Martin parted and the frigate was driven ashore and wrecked. Not even Captain Wilkinson's renowned seamanship, gained as a carpenter and then commander in the East India Company, could save her. She was loaded with corn - which the Captain General had hoped to offer as a gesture of reassurance to the hungry population of Lima - together with British prize goods and money. Of this, only $120,000 in silver was saved. This disaster was, however, followed by a success when, on 24 July, the boats of the squadron under Crosbie successfully penetrated the harbour and, in another spirited action, brought out the corvette Resolution and the armed ships San Fernando and Milagro. Unfortunately, the British merchantmen Lord Lyndoch and Saint Patrick, whose departure had been vetoed by Cochrane, were badly damaged in the crossfire, the master of the latter being burnt and mortally wounded.16

  On 28 July, the formal ceremony marking the Independence of Peru took place; and a few days later, San Martin was installed as Protector of the new republic. But the game was not quite over. On 2 September, it was reported that Spanish General José Canterac was advancing from the mountains at the head of a force of 10,000 men. San Martin was taken by surprise but seemed determined to do battle, deploying troops and militia in defence of Lima and summoning reinforcements from Cochrane's ships. Canterac's army marched into sight on 7 September and formed up facing the patriots. The standoff lasted for three days, with neither side making any aggressive move. Cochrane and the General Las Heras could be seen haranguing San Martin and urging him to attack. But the Protector was adamant and did nothing. The two forces were evenly balanced in numbers and San Martin, knowing full well that a single reverse would nullify all the gains he had made so far, was not prepared to gamble. Basil Hall understood his position, writing, 'the slightest military reverse at that moment must at once have turned the tide; the Spaniards would have taken Lima; and the independence of the country might have been indefinitely retarded.'17 Lord Cochrane on the other hand was filled with contempt at the Protector's caution.

  It was Canterac who finally lost his nerve, withdrew his men, and headed for his second objective, the Castles of Callao. As he marched off, San Martin was delighted, realising that the Spanish force was already short of supplies and was now cut off by land and sea. He predicted that in a fortnight, Canterac would be forced to either retreat or surrender. He was right. In fact, Canterac only lasted nine days before marching out of Callao and heading back the way he had come for the mountains, losing deserters and stragglers as he went. As the royalists approached Lima, participants on the patriot side prepared once more for a bloody and hard fought battle. Many like Paroissien wrote their wills and sent letters of farewell to their friends.18 But there was no confrontation. San Martin merely stood aside with his army and watched the Spaniards retreat. He was perfectly content for Lima to be saved and for Callao to fall without an unnecessary battle. Indeed, the Governor, General La Mar, surrendered the Castles two days later.

  Unfortunately for San Martin, his confidence in the wisdom of his 'wait and see' strategy was not shared by his subordinates. They were dismayed that the Spanish forces had been left undefeated to remain a threat in the mountains. Moreover, the morale of armies depends on victories not on strategic inaction. San Martin's commanders had already become disenchanted. They yearned for a fight and were aghast at his caution during Canterac's advance, then retreat from Callao. It is said that General Las Heras broke his sword across his knee and declared that he would serve no more after such a shameful day. Certainly, the whole affair dealt a blow to San Martin's military reputation from which it never recovered.

  Chapter 12

  THE ROW WITH SAN MARTIN

  For South Americans, 1821 was a momentous year. But for Lord Cochrane, its main feature was not the blockade of Callao, or the surrender of Lima, or even the creation of the Peruvian Republic. It was his blazing row with San Martin. In view of the very different personalities of the two men, a clash of wills was inevitable. Inevitable, that is, taking into account the insubordinate streak in Cochrane's character, his deeply suspicious nature and his inability to keep his opinions to himself. San Martin was a reflective and subtle Latin - a political realist who believed that only authoritarian government would frustrate his countrymen's instinct for anarchy, and a man of strategic vision who saw battles as merely one means to an end. Lord Cochrane, on the other hand, was an impulsive and opinionated Scottish aristocrat who saw the world in simplistic terms - a political romantic who believed in democracy and knew little of the South American temperament, and a man who saw battles and fighting as ends in themselves. Between the two men there was a total lack of understanding.

  The first disagreement was over military tactics. San Martin's strategy was to play for time, to politicise the country slowly and avoid action with Spanish forces while internal disputes destroyed their will to fight. He also knew full well that the military forces opposed to him were superior in both numbers and experience and was determined to avoid any risk. Cochrane could not comprehend this reasoning. As a result he watched with incredulity as San Martin avoided one opportunity for action after another, and concluded that the Captain General's behaviour was due either to cowardice or a desire to keep the army intact so that he could keep power after independence. Likewise, he seemed unable to appreciate the difference between liberating a country under occupation and invading an enemy state. His intensely suspicious personality made things worse. San Martin's reluctance to provide him with a military force to create mayhem on the coasts of Peru was put down to 'a violent jealousy which caused him to look at me as a rival'.1 And it did not take long for Cochrane to convince himself that San Martin was 'employing every effort to lessen my reputation amongst his officers, and endeavouring to the utmost to prevent the squadron from gathering fresh laurels, even sacrificing his own reputation to this insane jealousy'.2 The notion was absurd.

  The next argument was about how Peru was to be run after liberation. In spite of giving assurances that the Peruvians would be free to choose their own form of government, San Martin introduced an authoritarian regime designed to prevent the internal anarchy he feared. His excuse was that until the Spanish were defeated, a democratic system would be divisive and dangerous. Cochrane, who had assumed that the despotism of Spain would be immediately followed by some sort of democracy, was dismayed, and became more so when the politicians around San Ma
rtin led by Monteagudo began to feather their nests by persecuting the old Spaniards and acting like despots. Making one of the hasty and misguided assumptions that were a feature of his whole life, Cochrane convinced himself that the unambitious and apolitical San Martin had planned a tyranny from the beginning and had an insatiable thirst for power. As was his wont, on 7 August he subjected him to a lecture on the duties of a ruler, beginning by flattering him as 'the Napoleon of South America' and ending:

  no man had yet arisen, save yourself, capable of soaring aloft with eagle eye embracing the expanse of the political horizon. But if, like Icarus, you trust to waxen wings, your descent may crush the rising liberties of Peru and involve all South America in anarchy, civil war and political despotism. ... Flatterers are more dangerous that the most venomous serpents, and next to them are men of knowledge - if they have not the integrity or courage to oppose bad measures when formally discussed or even when casually spoken of.3

  But the final clash was not about military tactics or political theory. It was about money. And what brought matters to a head were the methods Cochrane was forced to use in order to keep his squadron at sea. The 1819 campaign against Peru had been uncomplicated in administrative terms. The squadron had operated away from Valparaiso for only short periods before returning for pay and supplies, and had regularly sent enemy prizes and captured property back to Chile for condemnation and sale. The campaign that began in August 1820 was different. This time the squadron remained off the Peruvian coast for 22 months. It was operating far from its base, and Peru was in too much turmoil for money and supplies to be easily available. Three supply ships arrived from Chile in December 1820 and another in February 1821, but after that Cochrane was forced to fend for himself, relying on what he could capture to provide the money, equipment and supplies he needed. The problem he faced in maintaining the squadron's materiel and morale was very real.