There was until recently a tendency to understand Roman politics in terms of fairly clearly defined factions based around certain wealthy families who monopolized high office over successive generations. These groups were believed to have advocated consistent policies, so that for instance a relative of Fabius Maximus could be expected to favour avoiding battle with the Carthaginians and attempting to wear them down gradually. We know very little about most Roman magistrates apart from their names, and this interpretation appeared to allow us to understand more about changes in Roman policy and strategy since the name alone now suggested an individual’s probable behaviour. Unfortunately, there is not a shred of evidence to support such a view and it has now been utterly discredited. Roman senators competed as individuals to gain office and the power, prestige and wealth which this brought. Families strove to win as much electoral success as possible for each new generation, not to further consistent policies in the Senate. Most of the 300 or so senators never held the consulship or praetorship, and the competition for these magistracies was always fierce, for there were inevitably far more candidates than there were posts. Equally importantly, the senatorial families formed a small social world and intermarried extensively. To interpret the elections for 216 as a victory for a Popular party, or, if a connection between Varro and Paullus is assumed, for the ‘Aemilian and Scipionic’ faction, is not supported by the evidence.4
Varro was clearly a shrewd politician, for otherwise as a novus homo it is unlikely that he would have reached the consulship, but it is difficult to say how capable he was as a soldier. Unlike Paullus, he had certainly never held a senior independent command, but then this was also true of most consuls in the third century BC. In the future Paullus’ family continued to be far more influential than Varro’s descendants and were able to shift the blame for Cannae onto the ‘new man’. This view was carried over into the literary record by Polybius and followed by all subsequent authors. Whether or not Varro was as incompetent a commander as these narratives suggest is impossible to say, but it is hard to see much evidence of Paullus’ greater experience and skill in the events of 216. Neither man was really prepared to control such a huge army, and both were utterly outclassed as a general by Hannibal, but this was also true of all other Roman commanders at this time. Wars in Illyria, or against Ligurian and Gallic tribes in Northern Italy who fielded armies of brave but ill-disciplined warriors, were poor preparation for facing an army as flexible and well led as Hannibal’s. It was only after long years of war, during which senators saw far more active service with the army than had ever been the case before, that Rome started to produce officers who added the skills of generalship to the physical courage and leadership normally expected of a Roman aristocrat.
THE LED
Polybius tells us that in 216 BC the Senate decided for the first time in Rome’s history to muster an army of eight legions, four for each consul. However, in his account of the Gallic invasion of 225 BC he also appears to say that the consuls were given four-legion armies, but this may be a misreading of the text from a statement that there were four legions in total, two for each consul. Another important difference was that in 225 the two consuls were not supposed to join forces and it was luck, rather than design, which brought both armies into contact with the Gauls at the battle of Telamon. In 216 BC both consuls with all eight legions were expected to fight together. Not only were there more legions than usual, but each unit was increased in size to 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. As usual, the number of Roman infantry was matched by the allies who also provided a higher proportion of cavalry. Polybius tells us that the army finally mustered 80,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, making it one of the largest forces ever put into the field by the Romans.5
Polybius’ testimony is clear, but Livy says that the different sources for the battle included a huge variation in the size of the Roman army. He mentions the Polybian figure of eight legions of 5,000 foot and 300 horse, but according to another tradition, the army of four legions commanded by the consuls of 217 outside Gerunium was only augmented by a levy of 10,000 new recruits. If the latter account is true, then the army at Cannae may have been no larger than around 50,000 men. Several modern scholars have favoured this version, arguing that, since numbers were frequently exaggerated in ancient accounts or distorted as the manuscript was copied over the centuries, it is always better to accept the lowest figure. In this case at least, such a view is surely mistaken. Polybius is our earliest and most reliable source and his account is utterly consistent in assuming that there were eight legions. It would be very rash to reject such positive testimony from this source. Livy’s narrative also assumed the higher estimate, when for instance he mentions that twenty-nine tribunes were killed in the battle and names six of the survivors. Since there were six tribunes per legion, this would indicate that at least six legions were present. Both sources also emphasize how great an effort the Romans made in this year in their determination to crush Hannibal. An army of 50,000 men would have given them no more than rough parity with the enemy and would not have been much bigger than the army soundly defeated at Trebia. The course of the campaign and battle certainly make far more sense if the full eight legions were present. It is possible that a reinforcement of about 10,000 men was needed to bring the army at Gerunium up to the strength, compensating for losses in the last campaign as well as the need to increase the size of each legion. In addition four complete legions plus allies were raised and sent from Rome to join the army. This reconstruction would accommodate both traditions, but must remain conjectural.6
The Roman legions in this period were not the long-lived institutions of the later professional army and appear to have been re-numbered each year. It is extremely rare for our sources to explain in detail when units were raised, disbanded, destroyed or incorporated into other units. The army at Gerunium consisted of the legions allocated to Servilius Geminus at the beginning of 217 and the units raised by the dictator, a total of four legions. Geminus’ army was based around some of the survivors of Trebia, most probably Scipio’s two legions, for Flaminius seems to have taken Sempronius Longus’ men. These units had been badly mauled, first in the fighting with the Boii and Insubres, and then at the hands of Hannibal, so it is virtually certain that they had received strong drafts of replacements. In the aftermath of Trasimene most if not all of Geminus’ cavalry had been killed or captured. Since then, all four legions had campaigned with Fabius Maximus and Minucius, winning some minor skirmishes, but also suffering some defeats. These were the best troops in the army. Many of their men were experienced, and, most importantly, that experience had been gained recently, alongside the same comrades and under the command of familiar officers. However, their service had not been dominated by successful fighting and it was only this, combined with good training and leadership, that was believed to raise an army to the peak of its efficiency.7
The four new legions were all recruited in late 217 or early 216. It took a good deal of time to organize each legion, dividing the recruits into their subunits of century and maniple, decury and turma, and appointing officers to command them. It took even longer for them to train and drill, gradually developing trust in each other and their leaders to create a confident and effective unit. In spite of the earlier defeats it is clear that the Romans had not become daunted by their foe, but rather grimly determined to achieve victory. Livy says that this mood was reflected when the tribunes of each legion led the men in taking a formal oath ‘Never to leave the ranks because of fear or to run away, but only to retrieve or grab a weapon, to kill an enemy or to rescue a comrade.’ In the past he claims that this oath, the sacramentum which in a similar form would survive in the Roman army for centuries, had been taken voluntarily by the soldiers in their own centuries.8
There were a very large number of senators and equestrians serving with the army, which in itself showed the mood of the times. The Roman aristocracy earned the right to rule the Republic in peace through its willing
ness to provide leadership and risk its lives on the State’s behalf in wartime. Between a quarter and a third of the Senate was present at Cannae, and most of the remaining senators had sons or other close relatives with the legions. Marcus Minucius Rufus, Fabius’ Magister Equitum and a former consul, was one of many distinguished men serving as a military tribune or on the staff of one of the consuls. The tribunes of this year were, in general, far more experienced and capable than was usual. Of the six named tribunes who survived the battle, four went on to hold the consulship. It is also instructive to look at the four praetors elected for the year. Three, Marcus Claudius Marcellus (consul 222, praetor 224), Lucius Postumius Albinus (consul 234, 229, probably praetor in 233), and Publius Furius Philus (consul 223), were former consuls and the other, Marcus Pomponius Matho, had already held the praetorship in the previous year. Marcellus and Albinus, both of whom were given field commands, in Sicily and Cisalpine Gaul respectively, were of the same generation as Fabius Maximus, men who had reached maturity during the First Punic War. The Romans were relying upon experience in the present crisis. It is another indication of Varro’s widespread popularity that he achieved the consulship in a year when the magistrates were such a distinguished group.9
The field army in 216 was four times larger than a normal consular army, and no one had experience of handling such a huge force. Tradition, created on those very rare occasions when both consuls had fought together, dictated that command should be held by each consul on alternate days, emphasizing just how improvised the system for controlling this army would be. It is doubtful whether the four legions massing at Rome had much time to spare for training together and certain that there was no opportunity to integrate this force with the existing four-legion field army when the two were united. The Roman army in the Cannae campaign was large, and its officers and soldiers brave and enthusiastic, but there had simply not been the time to weld them into a coherent force. The army was capable of only the very simplest of manoeuvres or tactics, far less flexible and supple than Hannibal’s veteran force. This difference was to have a fundamental influence on the forthcoming campaign.
The army sent against Hannibal was not the only one fielded by Rome in 216, although it was by far the largest. In all between fifteen and seventeen Roman legions were in service by the summer of 216, a total of perhaps 75,000–85,000 men, around a quarter of the number of citizens Polybius says were eligible for military service in 225. Supporting these were a similar number of allied soldiers.10
THE PLAN
The Romans mounted a massive military effort for 216, and it is worth considering their objectives. For Polybius the answer was clear: to seek battle with Hannibal’s army and destroy it. This was the decision of the Senate, supported by both consuls and in keeping with the general mood of the population as a whole for swift, decisive action. The historian claims that Paullus made a speech to the army, explaining the mistakes which had caused the defeats at Trebia and Trasimene and assuring them that these would not be repeated. Convention encouraged an historian to invent speeches which he considered appropriate for the character and situation, so it is unlikely that we have a quotation from anything which the consul actually said, but Polybius’ favourable attitude towards Paullus does not prevent Polybius from depicting him as eager for battle. In this version, the dispute between the consuls is not over whether or not to fight Hannibal, but when and where to do so.11
From the very beginning Livy’s narrative of the Cannae campaign is pervaded by a sense of approaching disaster, for which Varro is held almost solely responsible. He appears as a braggart, making speeches before he had even left Rome boasting of winning the war on the first day that he came in sight of Hannibal. Paullus is depicted as a friend of Fabius Maximus and an advocate of his delaying tactics. Both men were convinced of the futility of facing Hannibal’s veterans in an open battle, preferring instead to harass the enemy and deprive them of supplies until starvation forced their flight or surrender. Fabius is given a long speech, arguing for caution and telling Paullus that he will have to contend as much with his consular colleague as with Hannibal. Livy’s account of the campaign is, like so much of his work, intensely dramatic, as the wise Paullus manages to postpone, but cannot prevent the inevitable catastrophe brought on by Varro’s rashness. The description of Paullus’ death at Cannae, unwilling to survive a disaster for which he was not responsible even though its architect had already fled the field, is rich in pathos. This same tradition of consuls at loggerheads and of Paullus along with all ‘wiser’ senators supporting Fabius who continued to advocate caution was followed by all later sources.12
In 217, and later during his successive consulships in the remainder of the war, Fabius Maximus never fought a pitched battle with Hannibal. As dictator he had issued an order for villagers in the areas threatened by Hannibal to flee to the nearest walled town, taking with them livestock, moveable possessions and food. What could not be carried was to be hidden or destroyed. This ‘scorched earth’ tactic was intended to deprive the enemy of supplies, whilst the Roman army continually harassed and ambushed their foraging parties. In the end Hannibal’s army must starve, for as yet no significant community or people in Central or Southern Italy had defected to his cause, and he was much too far away from the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul to draw supplies from them. Livy claimed that this strategy would have worked if only the Romans had continued it into 216, and that even in the weeks before Cannae the Carthaginian army was beginning to lose heart. Its Spanish contingents, tired of the poor rations and long overdue pay, were supposed to be planning to desert. Another rumour claimed that Hannibal had drawn up a plan to abandon the army and flee with all his cavalry, hoping to cut his way to Cisalpine Gaul. Plutarch has Fabius Maximus claim that if Hannibal did not win a battle within the next twelve months then he would be forced to retire. Thus Cannae became all the more tragic, and Varro an even bigger blunderer, for if only the Romans had followed the same cautious strategy in 216, then victory was within their grasp. It was only this stunning defeat which prompted a wave of defections so that nearly all of Southern Italy abandoned Rome, providing Hannibal with a secure base, and the resources of men and material, which allowed him to wage war in Italy for more than a decade.13
Polybius did not share this view. In his, and indeed to a great extent in Livy’s, narrative, it is difficult to see much evidence for any real hardship being suffered by Hannibal’s men. Supplying an army of around 50,000 soldiers, at least 10,000 cavalry horses, plus an unknown number of servants, wives and camp followers was a never-ending problem for the Carthaginian commander. Our sources frequently mention the activities of foraging parties and explain many of Hannibal’s movements as dictated by the need to gather supplies. Fabius Maximus did very little to hinder these movements. The Carthaginians on several occasions took Roman strongholds, possessing themselves of the supplies massed at these points. Sufficient provisions were gathered at Gerunium to permit the Punic army to remain there for around six months from late autumn 217 to spring 216.14
Attacking an enemy army indirectly by depriving it of food was an approach sometimes adopted by later Roman armies, common enough to be known by the slang expression ‘kicking the enemy in the stomach’. In 217 Fabius Maximus’ main aim was to avoid further defeat whilst he rebuilt the army, and harassing the enemy was the only way to do this without risking fresh disasters. This was the right thing to do in the circumstances, but there is no reason to believe that this was still the right thing to do in 216, or even that Fabius himself believed this. The dictatorship had given Rome the chance to recover so that for the new campaign she was able to field a massive eight-legion army. Some of the troops were now experienced and well trained, and all were very confident. There was no reason to concentrate so many troops if an open battle was not planned, for half as many could have continued to shadow the enemy just as effectively. Supplying 80,000–90,000 men and their mounts created immense problems, making the army a very clumsy
force to manoeuvre close to the enemy without actually fighting. Allowing Hannibal to maraud at will through Italy was a constant affront to Roman pride, a demonstration of the Republic’s inability to protect itself and its allies. The appearance of power was often of more importance than its reality in the ancient world, and the continued perception of Rome’s weakness would eventually encourage attacks upon her or rebellions amongst her allies. If Hannibal’s army was seriously defeated in battle then it was too far away from its bases in Spain to survive. A single Roman victory would end the invasion and perhaps even the war. Seeking battle was the logical course of action for the Romans in 216, having amassed what they hoped would be overwhelming force. Perhaps Fabius Maximus still advocated caution–our sources certainly depict him as single-minded and unimaginative, although it was a tendency of ancient biographers to exaggerate aspects of a man’s character–but it is unlikely that this view was either widely supported or correct.15
THE CAMPAIGN
As with so many other aspects of the Second Punic War, there is some doubt over the precise chronology of the Cannae campaign. The battle itself occurred on 2 August, and, as far as we can tell, the months in 216 were broadly in line with the modern calendar. Polybius tells us that Hannibal remained in his winter quarters at Gerunium until the year’s crops had ripened sufficiently to be harvested and consumed by his soldiers. In this century that would place his move sometime in early June. If the third century BC and modern calendars were running reasonably closely, and assuming that the climate and hence the agricultural year were also essentially the same then as now, then this would mean that there were around seven to eight weeks of campaigning before the battle. Even a little variation in either of these factors could alter this by several weeks. Polybius tells us little about this period, his account only becoming detailed in the days immediately before the battle. Livy recounts a series of incidents, largely intended to demonstrate Varro’s inexperience and rashness, but these make very little sense and appear to be inventions.16
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