When Hannibal left Gerunium he headed south into the fertile region of Apulia. He was followed at some distance by the Roman army which had observed the Carthaginians throughout the winter months. This remained under the command of Servilius Geminus and Atilius Regulus, the consul and suffect (replacement) consul for 217. A series of messages went back to Rome, reporting Hannibal’s movements and asking for instructions. The two commanders explained that they could not remain too close to the enemy without being forced to fight a battle. The Senate’s reply instructed them to wait until the new consuls arrived with their legions. Thus the Carthaginian army was virtually unmolested as it moved along the coastal plain and captured the hilltop town of Cannae, about 100km (60 miles) from Gerunium. Cannae was not the largest settlement in the region–nearby Canusium being significantly larger–and had probably suffered in the campaign of the previous year for it was now abandoned, although it was still being used as a supply dump by the Romans. A rich store of produce from the surrounding area fell into Punic hands, providing Hannibal with a most valuable bounty which reduced his need to move and forage for some time. The town’s site also provided a good vantage point overlooking the flat plain to the north, the direction from which the Roman army would come.
We do not know how long it took the Carthaginians to move from Gerunium to Cannae, but once there Hannibal appears to have sat and waited for the Romans, perhaps for several weeks. There was no significant force to prevent him from moving wherever he liked in Southern Italy so the reason for this decision must be connected with his objective for the year’s campaign. The Punic invasion of Italy was still precariously placed. Hannibal had won victories and suffered no significant reverse, but had failed to make allies apart from the Gallic tribes of the Po valley, with whom he had long since lost contact. So far all his blandishments to Rome’s allies, and his kind treatment and release without ransom of allied soldiers taken prisoner, had not prompted the defection of any community. There was no reason to believe that a repeat of the previous year’s foray across the Apennines would produce greater results. His battlefield victories and depredations had not as yet had a serious impact on the Romans, whose spirit was undiminished and resources scarcely dented. It is hard to know just how much, or how little, information was available to ancient generals when they made their plans. In his account of the winter, Livy mentions the arrest and mutilation of an alleged Carthaginian spy in Rome itself, claiming that the man had been there throughout the war. It seems probable that Hannibal had some idea of the large army the Romans had raised for this year, but it is impossible to be certain. If the Romans had decided to confront him in battle, then he could not be seen to avoid this threat, since no community would defect to an invader who lacked confidence in his ultimate victory. Hannibal’s main objective was to meet and destroy the main Roman army or armies as he had in the last two years. Cannae, in open country well suited to his superior cavalry and where for the moment his men could live off the captured supplies and grain harvested from the fertile farmland nearby, offered an ideal spot to seek battle. The very willingness of the Punic army to wait there rather than camp in a strong position showed their confidence and acted as a challenge to Roman pride.17
Livy tells us that Paullus and Varro brought their forces to join the field army whilst it was still near Gerunium. On learning of this and of Varro’s impulsive temperament, Hannibal attempted to lure the Romans into a trap by very visibly abandoning his camp, but concealing his army in ambush nearby. The whole story makes very little sense and is certainly to be rejected in favour of Polybius’ version, which has the new consuls joining the army further south about a week before the battle. In one respect, however, Livy’s account is certainly to be preferred, for Polybius claims that both Geminus and Regulus remained as proconsuls with the army and fell in the battle. Since Regulus survived to hold the censorship in 214, it is best to accept Livy’s claim that he asked to be relieved because of age and returned to Rome before the battle.18
The new and old armies united, the two consuls led the combined force south. On the second day of their march they came within sight of Hannibal’s army about 8km (five miles) away. The tread of so many men and animals in the Roman column must have thrown up an immense cloud of dust from the dry Apulian soil which would have made their approach visible from even further away. At some point during the next days, one of Hannibal’s staff, a man named Gisgo, is supposed to have commented nervously on the size of the enemy host. Hannibal looked solemn and then quipped that even though there might be a lot of men over there, none were called Gisgo, dispelling the tension in laughter, though some of this may have been sycophantic. The route followed by the Romans is not altogether clear, but it may be that the new consuls had joined Servilius somewhere near Arpi. It is possible that they marched south along the coastal plain of Foggia for most of the way, and certain that the last stretch was across the open ground north of the River Aufidius. Cannae itself lay on a line of hills to the south of the river, but the ground to the north is very flat, with only the gentlest of gradients sloping down to the sea. The area then, as now, was highly cultivated and virtually treeless. Livy tells us that the Roman commanders took great care to reconnoitre the route they were following which suggests that some of the lessons of the last two campaigns had been learnt. Careful patrolling and the openness of the country ensured that any ambush was unlikely to succeed, so that Flaminius’ mistake would not be repeated.19
Yet now that they were close to the enemy, Paullus is said to have been deeply unhappy about the ground and it is at this point in Polybius’ narrative that the dispute between the consuls begins as they argued over where to fight the planned battle. Hannibal had more and better cavalry than the Romans, and Paullus believed that it was most unwise to fight him in open country so suited to mounted action. His preference was to move into more broken ground, probably in the hills to the west, and choose terrain where infantry rather than cavalry would be the decisive arm. Roman legions operated best on reasonably open ground, so it is likely that Paullus was most concerned with having some protection for the army’s flanks. Varro appears to have disagreed and Polybius put this down to his inexperience, but it should be pointed out that Paullus’ plan was not as simple as it seemed. In the first place the Roman army was exceptionally large and of very mixed experience, making it slow and clumsy. Such an army would have difficulty in outmanoeuvring Hannibal’s tightly controlled and cohesive forces and forcing him to fight on unfavourable ground. Feeding the Roman army was also a major problem, especially since the enemy now had possession of their most important supply dump in the area. Paullus’ plan would mean keeping the entire army concentrated for a long time until its commanders had created an opportunity, and it is highly questionable whether it would have been possible to supply it effectively.20
On the next day it was Varro’s turn to command and he led the army nearer to the enemy in spite of his colleague’s objections. Hannibal sent out cavalry and light infantry to harass the advancing Roman column. These caused some confusion, but when the Romans formed up some close order infantry, perhaps the extraordinarii–the picked allied troops who normally led the advance–and supported them with velites, the enemy were driven back. Sporadic fighting continued till nightfall, without either side winning a marked advantage or inflicting serious casualties, but the Romans’ progress was dramatically slowed by the need to form and maintain a fighting line, and it is unlikely that the column had made more than a few kilometres by the end of the day. Paullus was still supposedly reluctant to fight in this terrain, but on the next morning he assumed command and led a further advance to camp close to the enemy. According to Polybius, the consul felt that he was now too close to disengage the army. Some modern scholars have doubted this claim and gone on to suggest that there was no real division of opinion between the consuls, but that is to misunderstand the difficulty of withdrawing in the face of the enemy. This was always a highly dangerous operation, e
specially so for a large and unwieldy army like the Roman army in 216, and one faced in open country by superior cavalry. To retreat without a fight from an enemy, especially an outnumbered enemy, was also deeply dispiriting. At present the Romans were enthusiastic and eager to fight, but such spirit could prove very brittle. On balance, Polybius was probably right to say that the Romans were by this time committed and could not really pull away without battle.21
It is possible that Paullus had misgivings, but the decision had already been made for him and he proceeded to make the best of the situation. He camped with the main force, about two thirds of the army, on the north bank. Hannibal still appears to have been positioned on the high ground around Cannae on the other side of the river. The remaining third of the Roman army was sent across to the southern or right bank of the Aufidius about a mile (1.6km) from the main camp, but somewhat further from the enemy. The willingness to send some troops across the river to the same side as the enemy demonstrated the Romans’ determination and aggressive intentions. From this position they could more easily protect any foraging parties they sent to this side of the river, whilst threatening any of the enemy who attempted to do likewise. The dispositions of the Romans’ camps were in themselves offensive acts, as they attempted to control as much of the surrounding area as possible. In practical terms this might cause the enemy supply problems, but more immediately it was part of the attempt to build up their own soldiers’ confidence and diminish that of the enemy.
Apparently on the same day, Hannibal countered the Romans’ aggressive moves by giving his men an encouraging speech and, more importantly, advancing to camp on the same side of the river as the Roman main camp. The most likely location for this is the long, flat-topped ridge on which the modern town of San Ferdinando di Púglia now lies, for it is higher than the plain, giving it good defensive qualities, and close enough to the river to offer a convenient water supply. This was another statement of confidence, showing his willingness to close with and put pressure on the enemy, and his belief in victory. This careful, almost ritualized manoeuvring was typical of the formal battles of this period, each commander gradually building up the morale of his men giving them as many advantages as possible for the coming battle.22
The next day, 31 July by the modern calendar, the Carthaginian commander ordered his men to rest and prepare themselves for battle. Weapons and armour were cleaned, blades sharpened and as much effort as was practical on campaign taken to ‘dress up’ for a battle. On 1 August the Carthaginian army marched out and deployed in battle formation on the left bank of the river facing the Roman camp. It was once again Paullus’ day of command and he refused to risk a battle. Covering forces were placed in front of each of the Roman camps, but they did not move far from the ramparts and nothing was done to provoke a battle. Hannibal kept his army deployed for several hours, but was largely content with the moral impression created by the enemy’s refusal to fight, knowing that this would encourage his men. As was usual in these situations, he did not press the issue or attack the camps directly. The only move made was to dispatch the Numidian cavalry across the River Aufidius to threaten the smaller Roman camp. The light cavalrymen harassed the parties–probably mainly consisting of servants–out drawing water, panicking them and chasing them back into the camp itself. This was humiliating for the Romans, reminding them of the confidence the enemy had displayed earlier in the day by their offer to fight a battle in the open plain. It also challenged the very reason for the smaller camp’s existence, which was supposedly to guard Roman foragers and threaten those of the enemy. Polybius and our other sources tell us that Varro and many of the Romans felt shamed by their failure to counter the Numidian raid. Perceptively, the Greek historian also suggests that the soldiers were chafing at the delay, knowing that a battle was coming and wishing to get it over with.23
Polybius claims that messages were received in Rome announcing that the consuls were facing Hannibal near Cannae and that skirmishes between the outposts were occurring regularly. The city was tense, but given the distance involved, it is unlikely that the news reached Rome much before the battle occurred, for on 2 August Varro decided to fight.24
FOUR
The Battle of Cannae, 2 August 216 BC
SOON AFTER DAWN on 2 August the troops in the larger Roman camp formed columns in the main roads between the tent lines and in the open space (intervallum) behind the ramparts. Each maniple, legion and ala assumed a position in the column corresponding with its place in the battle-line. A camp normally had at least four gateways and each column marched out from a different gate. Varro led the army out of the camp and across the river. There was one ford between the two Roman camps, but there may have been other crossing places to the east which were also employed. On the right bank of the Aufidius, the army was joined by the troops from the smaller camp and together they deployed into battle order.
All our sources emphasize that the decision to deploy the army and offer battle was taken by Varro alone. This was right and proper, since it was his day to exercise command, but Livy goes so far as to claim that he issued the orders without consulting, or even informing, Paullus. In this version, Varro simply raised the red vexillum standard–the square flag which marked the commander’s position during a battle–outside his tent, the traditional symbol to tell the soldiers to prepare for battle. He then formed his own legions into columns and led them out. Paullus, seeing all this happen, felt obliged to follow with his own troops. None of this makes any sense. Varro held supreme command of the entire army for the day and it is absurd to suggest that he failed to issue orders to one important section of it or to inform his colleague. It should also be noted that the process of preparing the soldiers for battle and parading them preparatory to moving out was long and complex. Close supervision was required on the part of all the army’s officers, and especially the military tribunes of the legions and praefecti of the alae, to ensure that this was carried out as smoothly and quickly as possible, checking that the columns used for deployment were formed in the correct order and that when the army finally was able to move out it went by the proper route to the right place. The process must have taken hours for any army, and was made especially difficult by the size and mixed levels of experience and drill of the soldiers at Cannae. It is impossible to imagine that Paullus was unaware of all the activity in camp until Varro had begun to lead his forces out.1
Aemilius Paullus cannot have been ignorant of his colleague’s intention to offer battle on 2 August. The day before he had refused to meet Hannibal’s challenge, keeping most of his soldiers inside the camps. This does appear to give a clear indication that Paullus genuinely believed that it was unwise to fight. Polybius claims that he felt supply problems would force Hannibal to move his camp within two days if there was not a battle. If the Carthaginian army was to disengage and withdraw, then this would encourage the Romans and perhaps grant them an advantage in any future encounter. The smaller Roman camp had been expressly set up to place pressure on the enemy’s foragers. There was perhaps another reason why Paullus might have been less reluctant to fight a battle on the next day. As far as we can tell, on 1 August the Carthaginian army formed up between their own camp and the larger Roman camp. Livy tells us explicitly, and Polybius appears to imply, that the Numidians had to cross the Aufidius in order to attack the smaller Roman camp which seems to confirm that the main Punic army had been formed up on the left bank of the river. Both of these sources make it clear that Varro led the troops from the larger Roman camp across the river to the same side as the smaller camp and deployed the combined army into battle order in front of it. He was not then accepting battle under precisely the same conditions that his colleague had declined the previous day. The Romans had deliberately chosen different ground, despite this involving moving the larger part of their forces to the new position. Varro could not even be sure that Hannibal would accept a battle in this new location, but may have felt that simply offering to fight would h
elp to encourage his soldiers after the humiliation of declining battle and seeing one of their camps attacked. Perhaps Paullus still believed that it was unwise to fight, even in the alternative position. This is impossible to know, but it is worth remembering that the ability of the Numidians to dominate the eastern bank right up to the outposts immediately outside the smaller camp called into question the Romans’ ability to deny Hannibal’s army provisions.2
Whether or not Paullus agreed with his judgement, Varro had the right to make the decision and had not simply reversed his colleague’s choice. Fighting on ground of your own choice was one of the skills of the good commander portrayed by Hellenistic military theory, and this was something which both Sempronius Longus at Trebia and Flaminius at Trasimene had failed to do. Before moving on to consider in detail the choice of battlefield and how the terrain affected the subsequent battle, it is worth mentioning a theory which claims that in fact Paullus rather than Varro was in command on 2 August and committed the army to battle. This is an attractive idea, allowing us to claim that we have seen through the propaganda in our sources, but is based on highly tenuous assumptions. It is much better to follow the literary tradition and accept that Varro was in command, although he may have acted with the approval of his fellow consul.3
Cannae Page 6
