Chasing the Demon

by Dan Hampton

  But there were problems: The onset of the collapse of 1929 had surprising roots and, like an earthquake, there were tremors long before the eruption. T. H. Watkins, in The Great Depression, outlines much of this through Chapter 1, “The Prologue Years,” and Bill Bryson similarly works his entertaining accounts in One Summer: America, 1927, particularly pp. 357–429.

  Chapter 3: The Next Leap

  By the mid-1930s: Money, credit, buying power—these are the oils of all developed societies just as resources are the fuels. To continue the engine analogy, if one runs low, the forward momentum stops or the engine comes apart in pieces. Lack of resources would be the often overlooked crisis facing the Axis powers and was a catalyst for their initial conquests during the first two years of the world war. For the United States, a decade’s worth of overproduction and installment (credit) buying had grossly inflated American industry, so when combined with overpriced commodities and uncertainty in foreign markets, a reckoning was inevitable—but not necessarily cataclysmic. However, the failure of a commercial republic like the United States to prevent its banking collapse, and then to immediately correct it, is as astonishing as it is frightening. The cultural and societal damage shaped several generations, especially the men who chased the demon, and created the drastic consequences of the late 1930s that led to World War II. I suggest Watkins’s The Great Depression; Chapters 7, 8, and 9, for those intrigued by the subject. Also Richard Overy’s The Twilight Years contains highly informative insights into Britain’s condition during the same time, which is vital in understanding Whittle’s difficulties producing the world’s first jet engine.

  It began in the: Kyvig’s Daily Life in the United States, pp. 163–230, expands on the impact of the Great Depression in North American society, and the results of government solutions.

  It was into this world: Ken Chilstrom’s account was fascinating. Of course, he learned later in life how it all started but his firsthand, personal memories of this crucial time and its day-to-day effect on his life were illuminating. He remembered hearing of Lindy’s 1927 flight on the radio and, as I wrote in the text, absorbed a mental toughness from his parents that saw him through the war and made him the man he became.

  Shortly after his inauguration: See Okrent, Last Call, pp. 329–354, and pp. 373–376, for more detailed accounts. Coca-Cola, which had become vastly profitable as a manufacturer of “soft drinks” actually considered producing “Coca-Cola Beer.” Also, the $258,911,332 collected in newly instituted alcohol taxes represented about 9% of federal revenue in 1934—an astonishing slice of the pie and enabled the president to give Americans a 20% tax cut that jolted the economy into a substantial recovery.

  Through it all the nation: Richard Overy’s War and Economy in the Third Reich, specifically Section IV, Chapter 9, “Guns or Butter,” and Alan S. Milward’s War, Economy and Society 1939–1945, Chapter 8. Both are fascinating reading for those who enjoy the background behind the fighting. For a truly detailed, exhaustively researched explanation of the economics of Nazi Germany I suggest The Wages of Destruction, by Adam Tooze. Hitler’s Eagles by Chris McNab remains an invaluable resource on Luftwaffe organization, training, and key personnel.

  Interestingly, the young British: John Golley’s Genesis of the Jet is a bible for all things related to Frank Whittle. See page 23 for a description of Whittle’s startling 1928 thesis “Future Developments in Aircraft Design.”

  The solution, which astonished: Ibid., pp 32–36.

  Dr. Alan Arnold Griffith: Ibid., p. 36, pp. 82–85. It is a relief, yet also discouraging, to read about Whittle’s confrontations with bureaucracy and professional jealousy that often seem to be a wholly American issue.

  At the same time the Germans: John Killen’s The Luftwaffe, particularly Chapter 21, is an excellent source of detailed, hard-to-find information. See Anderson’s The Airplane, pp. 286–289, for a summary of Germany’s first jet aircraft.

  This outstanding achievement: Lords of the Sky, pp. 175–180, describes the opening tactical moves of the Second World War.

  Chapter 4: The Crucible

  One hour past midnight: For a very well-written account of the German invasion of the Soviet Union from the German point of view, see The German War, pp. 157–199 by Nicholas Stargardt. James Holland’s incomparable pair, The Rise of Germany, pp. 565–561 and The Allies Strike Back, pp. 23–41, offer insightful perspectives from the Allied side.

  A training slot opened: Former test pilot Al Blackburn has a good deal of background information on George Schwartz Welch that he collected from firsthand experience, mutual acquaintances, and Welch family members. See Blackburn’s Aces Wild, pp. 91–104. There are also several websites that, surprisingly, have solid information on Welch. The first is www.fampeople.com, and the second is a two part series from www.planesandpilotsofww2. Both are worth perusing for those wishing more information on one of the most intriguing figures of aviation history.

  During a single mission on October 26: Claims that Chuck Yeager was the first ace-in-a-day in 1944 are patently untrue. German, Japanese, and Soviet pilots aside, Lieutenant Vejtasa (USN) and Lieutenant Jefferson DeBlanc (USMC) were the first Americans to gain this status in World War II. A Marine with VMF-12, DeBlanc shot down five Japanese over the Solomon Islands on January 31, 1943.

  January also saw: The German Sixth Army was the largest of the Wehrmacht, and as I wrote in the text the psychological cost was on par with the physical loss of 265,000 trained soldiers. Germany’s decline had begun with the invasion of Russia, but the disaster of Stalingrad made it visual to the world.

  Operation Torch, the Allied invasion: Just as Stalingrad and Guadalcanal destroyed the myths of Axis invincibility, so Operation Torch allowed a preview of what the Allies were capable of achieving. The first large-scale joint operation of the war, the invasion of North Africa was a victory in many ways. British and American planners became familiar with each other, vital logistical details were worked out and put into practice, and complex, seaborne invasions became reality. American troops in the Mediterranean Theater also gained practical combat experience that would be invaluable throughout the balance of the war.

  An Allied offensive: America had been at war for less than a year and although the fighting in the Pacific was, and would remain, a bitter, vicious struggle the European/Mediterranean theater was the focus for Allied planners. The actual land area of the entire South Pacific is approximately 213,000 square miles, roughly the size of France; Japan could be contained and driven slowly back to their Home Islands, so the Pacific war would spread no further. Axis occupied Europe was at least one million square miles, and interconnected geographically so there was no telling what the Germans might attempt—the Battle of the Bulge proved that point. As long as air power guaranteed Allied freedom of ground movement in Europe while retarding Axis efforts then, like Japan, the enemy could be beaten down and crushed.

  “I was in the middle somewhere”: Interview with Ken Chilstrom, December 2018.

  The Apache was born: This particular program had more significance than most casual readers of history realize. It was, in effect, a test bed for the P-51 version of the same aircraft. Engines, weapons, and aerodynamics were all refined through combat lessons, learned and incorporated into subsequent variants of the Mustang. See the Allison-Engined P-51 Mustang, pp. 4–36, for a general overview.

  Though there were many significant: Anderson’s The Airplane, pp. 236–238, has an excellent technical description of the concept while pp. 265–268 discuss the design of the P-51 itself.

  Ken Chilstrom and his personal: Interview with Ken Chilstrom, December 2018. Ken was able to discuss the A-36 at length; engine settings, gun sights, and many details, including dispelling the myths about the Apache’s dive brakes being wired shut. He told me this was never the case in any aircraft he flew.

  It was Patton himself: Interview with Ken Chilstrom, December 2018. As I wrote, Ken still laughs over this incident. A firsthand account re
garding such a prominent figure is extremely interesting and humanizes an otherwise grim situation. Ken’s recollection of Bob Hope does exactly the same and permits the reader to see beyond the hype into a personal look at the man.

  The Germans were now: This battle is a superb view of Germany’s overall tactical mindset in microcosm. Their military was built for blitzkrieg—the lightning war—and they conducted their operations accordingly. This worked early on where tactical, localized, victories defeated their opponents but is not a large-scale, strategic method of conquest. The German industrial-military complex was never designed for long-term, multitheater operations, nor was any of this altered after it became necessary in 1941.

  Waffen SS commandos: It is important to correct historical misconceptions whenever possible and Otto Skorzeny, by virtue of his charisma and eye for publicity, has always erroneously been given credit for this feat. Major Otto-Harald Mors, a Fallschirmjäger battalion commander, planned and commanded the raid. Georg Freiherr von Berlepsch was the first to actually free the Italian dictator. See Marco Patricelli’s Liberate il Duce! and a work written by Mussolini’s son Romano, My Father, il Duce.

  Short of a negotiated peace: The historical context included in this chapter should make the reader aware of the German situation, and thus understand the importance of the various advanced programs. Military and political realists were keenly aware after the failure of Barbarossa, and Japan’s attack on the United States that, short of technology that would level the playing field, military victory was impossible. Very soon thereafter, the more pragmatic Germans in leadership knew even the jets and rockets could not be manufactured in sufficient numbers to turn the tide—not without an atomic bomb. The Pacific theater is an interesting inversion of this situation as the Americans realized that even with overwhelming numerical superiority, virtually unlimited resources, and a truly amazing industrial capacity there was no way Japan would surrender. No way, that is, against something that could not be defended against, and so devastating that Japan faced extinction. This was precisely what led to the decision to use atomic weapons.

  Chapter 5: Wonder

  Busemann, born in: See Anderson, The Airplane, pp. 322–323. It is somewhat surprising how much was known, or at least postulated, about supersonic flight during the 1920s and 1930s. Men like Busemann and the NACA’s Robert Jones had taken this to the limits of thought, yet wind tunnels, engines, and aircraft design had not achieved par with aerodynamics to the point where systematic flight test could validate or invalidate transonic or supersonic theories. A tremendous catalyst, extensive funding, and the correct sort of pilots were needed and this occurred in 1939 with the onset of the Second World War.

  Termed the transonic region: See A History of Aerodynamics, p. 371.

  This was confirmed during: After World War II Hugh Dryden became the director of aeronautical research for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics then the director of the NACA until 1958. Dryden served as deputy director of NASA after it replaced the NACA, and the Dryden Flight Research Center at Edwards AFB was so named in his honor.

  It is interesting to speculate: See McNab, Hitler’s Eagles, pp. 199–200, as well as Forsyth, X Planes: Luftwaffe Emergency Fighters, pp. 4–23, for amplifying information. Even with early advances in jets or rockets the Reich faced a critical resource problem. Still, with a pragmatic military strategy that included securing North Africa and the Suez Canal but not invading Russia the war could well have been over before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.

  It was apparent to these men: See Hallion’s Test Pilots, pp. 186–188 and p. 194.

  It was certainly not new: Ken Chilstrom interview, November 2017. The ability to speak to a man with firsthand knowledge removes all the guesswork or interpretation from certain historical events. As Ken related to me, and quite contrary to my previous belief, U.S. pilots like himself were not unduly concerned about German jets. They were dangerous and nearly always scored, but there too few of them to make a significant difference. Also, combat pilots will work out countertactics very fast and so it was done in Europe. Allied fighters discovered quickly that the jet could not turn well and was exceedingly vulnerable during takeoff and landing due to the long engine spool-up times.

  Heinkel had the obvious lead: See Witkowski’s The Truth About the Wunderwaffe, pp. 45–78, Hitler’s Eagles by Chris McNab, pp. 195–204, and Forsyth’s X Planes, pp. 24–61.

  By the fall there were: The math, correlated from the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, is most revealing and indisputably bears out my statements that German advanced technology did not seriously impede Allied efforts due to the timing and numbers; nor would it, short of an atomic weapon. Also, best on all sides as they were, the Germans completed only about 10 percent of the stipulated 3,000 hours of flight testing on the Me 262 and this resulted in all sorts of problems arising in operational units that were ill equipped to solve them. Turbine blades were unreliable and gave only a few hours of service before fracturing due to the inferior metals used in construction. There were also controllability issues with elevator and aileron “jitter” at high speeds approaching the transonic region.

  Chapter 6: The Brave

  At least 10,000 missions: See the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, December 1945.

  Conceived by Dr. Fritz Gosslau: See Killen’s The Luftwaffe: A History, pp. 241–261.

  Unquestionably the pinnacle: Lords of the Sky, pp. 355–359, and Chorlton’s Allison-Engined P-51 Mustang.

  Lockheed test pilot Ralph Virden: For an excellent discussion of compressibility, see Peter Caygill’s Sound Barrier, pp. 29–43.

  Without ball bearings: See Charles Higham, Trading with the Enemy, pp. 116–130.

  In light of all this: See Forsyth’s X Planes, pp. 13–20.

  The forest option was: The Luftwaffe: A History, pp. 231–247, by John Killen and Steven Zaloga’s Defense of the Third Reich 1941–45, pp. 48–58.

  The average German lived on: See a pair of excellent books on the subject; Richard Overy’s War and Economy in the Third Reich and The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze.

  His luck changed: Yeager and Janos, Yeager, pp. 32–34.

  “I’d rather dogfight than eat steak!”: Hoover with Shaw, Forever Flying, p. 56.

  But the Germans flying in Operation Bodenplatte: See Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe’s Last Hope, pp. 227–276, by Manrho and Putz.

  Major George Preddy: Preddy held the European Theater of Operations (ETO) record for kills in one day after shooting down six Bf 109s on August 6, 1944—more than two months before Chuck Yeager made his outrageous claim in Yeager, p. 72, that he was “the first ace in a day.” For World War II, the Germans had six pilots who were double or triple aces in a day, including Emil Lang’s astonishing tally of eighteen Soviet fighters on November 3, 1943. Other WWII aces in a day came from Japan, South Africa, Australia, Poland, and Britain, to name just a few. Before Preddy’s 1944 feat, America produced five such men, all naval aviators fighting in the Pacific.

  Ken Chilstrom had survived: Interview with Ken Chilstrom, December 2017.

  The result was a little-known: See Robert F. Door’s extremely interesting article “Project Extraversion: P-80 Shooting Stars in World War II.” Defense Media Network, April 15, 2013.

  Chapter 7: World War to Cold War

  “Everyone knew the jet”: Interview with Ken Chilstrom, December 2017.

  One such operation was Lusty: See Wolfgang Samuel’s American Raiders and Watson’s Whizzers for more information.

  “It was all stopwatches”: Interview with Ken Chilstrom, November 2017. Also refer to Test Flying at Old Wright Field, Chilstrom and Leary, for firsthand accounts of many pivotal test programs.

  Messerschmitt’s P.1101 arose: See Forsyth’s X Planes, pp. 51–59.

  American Bob Jones of the NACA: Expanding the Envelope, by Michael H. Gorn, is a superb source of information on flight testing and the NACA. See p. 56.

  “Man . . . I didn’
t know the 38”: Hoover with Shaw, Forever Flying, p. 93.

  American boys sporting crew cuts: As I’ve said before, to understand the people in any story one must understand the context, what factors, particularly the time in which they lived, shaped them, and I utilized several excellent sources for the 1940s section of this book. The 40s: The Story of a Decade from The New Yorker; Robert Sickel’s The 1940s, and America in the 1940s by Lindop and Goldstein are great places to start.

  At one point in 1946: It is encouraging to both see evidence that we, and our government, can learn from past mistakes. The various veteran programs were wildly successful, beyond all expectations, in preventing a repeat of both the economic and societal issues that defined the 1920s. As the numbers bear out, an educated, trained “new” middle class arose from the cauldron of war that fueled America’s ascendancy to global leadership and shaped the world we live in today.

  To this end George C. Marshall: The Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine were the pillars upon which the lines of the Cold War were drawn, and our modern world was formed. The relative success or failure of each can be endlessly debated, but what is fact is that the United States and the Soviet Union did not face each other in World War III.

  Never forgetting that the atomic bombs: This is an excellent case study in the dynamics of military capability dictating politics, or of political reality driving military development.

  Chapter 8: The Final Stage

  “Yes . . . I said it is”: Gorn, Expanding the Envelope, p. 151.

  A major issue was: Hallion’s Test Pilots, pp. 185–191, describes this event quite well.

  This problem would eventually be: Anderson, History of Aerodynamics, p. 412.

  Bell delivered its first: Miller, The X-Planes, p. 24.

  Nineteen forty-six, then, dawned: Interview with Ken Chilstrom, December 2017.