Foundations of the American Century
Page 16
The study of American subjects in the educational systems of other countries strengthens the basis for a better understanding of American life and institutions on the part of those elements of the population that shape public opinion and give direction to national policy—through educators, students, intellectuals, serious writers.
—J. Manuel Espinosa, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, State Department (1961)
The major American philanthropies were always international in their orientation and internationalist by conviction.75 Not only did this entail general sponsorship of worldwide educational and research programs, but it also featured a number of overt attempts to promote the study and appreciation of the United States abroad. Two ways that such appreciation was promoted are briefly explored below.
The relationship between Britain and the United States has often been described as “special,” especially given the two countries’ cooperation during World War II, but also because of shared cultural, linguistic, and political traditions. Indeed, promotion of American studies by the British Board of Education, Ministry of Information, and the Foreign Office began in earnest in 1941, when it was clear that American power would surpass Britain’s and that the latter would need better to understand the former. Prior to the war, the Carnegie Endowment had tried to promote interest in American affairs in the United Kingdom. That such interest in the United States was driven largely by changing political conditions is evidenced by the fact that the British state had also promoted greater study of France, when alliance with that country looked most likely to aid the war against Germany, and greater knowledge of the Soviet Union after July 1941, when the latter became a British ally.76 In addition to the wartime alliance, Britain played a key role in American Cold War global strategy: she had a vast, though declining, empire replete with military, naval, and air bases, which the United States lacked; was a willing ally in the struggle against communism/nationalism; and could deploy military forces with some rapidity. The cementing of this relationship—at the level of cultural and educational exchange—was established U.S. policy. The foundations were keen to strengthen Anglo-American relations, particularly in the period up to and following the Suez crisis of 1956, which starkly revealed the global power shifts away from European empires and toward the United States, and, in Britain’s case, after the Labor Party’s conference decision of 1960 unilaterally to dispense with Britain’s nuclear weapons, causing concomitant alarm among champions of the “special relationship.”77
The Rockefeller Foundation funded the initial conferences that evolved into the British Association for American Studies (BAAS). In developing BAAS, RF was acting in concert with state agencies, specifically the Fulbright Commission, the U.S. Information Agency, and the U.S. embassy in London. That is, the American studies projects in Britain—at Oxford and Cambridge, Nottingham, and Manchester, and elsewhere—were considered significant elements of American foreign cultural policy. Indeed, Fulbright’s Richard P. Taylor noted that the latter and the foundation were BAAS’s “twin godfather[s],” so vital had their contribution been to its formation and growth.78 According to Frank Thistlethwaite of St. John’s College, Cambridge, the initiative for the initial meetings had been Taylor’s.79
The origins of BAAS lie in a series of four Fulbright- and Rockefeller-funded “missionary conferences,” as they called them, from 1952 to 1955, which brought together—for up to five weeks—a number of academics, schoolteachers, and others interested in the United States.80 The conferences featured numerous prominent American speakers, including Barry Bingham, the publisher-editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, an ardent Anglophile, supporter of U.S. intervention into World War II, and a leading member of the Fight for Freedom, a hawkish prowar organization led by the Council on Foreign Relations.81 Bingham, who resided in halls during the conference, “became the chief man on the American side; astonishingly kind and cooperative; completely ungrand.” The most prominent academic at the same 1955 conference was the historian Richard Hofstadter. Other prominent American academics included C. Van Woodward (Johns Hopkins, Yale), William T. R. Fox (Yale), and Alfred Kazin.82
The aims of the Fulbright conferences were to “counteract the lack of information” in Britain regarding the United States and “to correct misinformation and misunderstanding,” bring together British and American scholars, promote the teaching of American subjects in British schools and universities, and create a network of independent scholars “spontaneously organizing themselves into a corpus capable of carrying on the work of these conferences, as a response to an indigenous demand rather than through super-imposition, e.g. the window-dressing of support from some American foundation” (emphasis added)! Unpacking that set of aims is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is clear that neither Fulbright nor Rockefeller were really interested in a completely independent or spontaneously established association—the supplying of “information” and the correcting of “misinformation” are loaded with unquestioned assumptions and meanings. As a “patriotic” organization that opposed the left inside and outside the United States, Rockefeller was not amenable, especially during the McCarthy era, to funding any association that might challenge the status and role in the world of the United States. The state-controlled Fulbright Commission was institutionally bound to anticommunism, broadly defined as it was in the 1950s. The original conferences, therefore, were part of a plan to promote pro-American and to combat anti-American thinking in the world.83 Indeed, the original recommendation for the Fulbright conferences came from the State Department,84 impressed as they were by the results of the Salzburg seminar.
The effects of the conferences were generally viewed positively by the Fulbright Commission. While many delegates just enjoyed the esprit de corps and the social aspects of the gatherings, others saw additional benefits. A headmaster from Wales noted that he had a vastly “increased understanding of the American people.” A history master, David Kintoul, from Fettes College, Edinburgh (former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s alma mater), was most impressed and was “eager to continue the studies well begun.” There were also a number of comments that would have warmed hearts in the State Department: an English teacher from Penzance felt the conference built a “proper bond for [Anglo-American] security in the future.” A teacher from Dorchester thought that “I cannot imagine any better way (short of shipping large numbers of us over to the States) of promoting Anglo-American relations.” Finally, a history teacher from West Lothian wrote that “the professors enabled me to acquire a more soundly-based and sympathetic understanding of the development of the United States and of its present position in world affairs.”85
Inspired by the success of the conferences, Thistlethwaite and a number of other prominent Americanists, such as H. C. Allen, Marcus Cunliffe, Dennis Welland, Max Beloff, William Brock, and Herbert Nicholas,86 considered ways of creating a permanent academic association to promote the study of the United States in British universities, hold an annual conference, produce an index of American research materials available in Britain, and launch their own academic journal. Its proposed program required further financial aid, which the founders hoped would be supplied by the Rockefeller Foundation.87 A memorandum to that effect by the Fulbright Commission’s Richard Taylor, produced in 1955, hoped that such ideas would “spark your [British Americanists’] imagination.” Taylor indicated in this memorandum that “assurances have been received from at least one American Foundation that it would be interested in assisting financially such an Association or Council. It is imperative, if advantage is to be taken of this concrete interest, that such an Association should be formed forthwith with the appropriate active incorporation, officers both honorary and at the working level.”88 Taylor was the executive secretary of the ad hoc committee of what became BAAS, an officer of the Fulbright Commission, a representative of the American state, and a close confidant of the Rockefeller Foundation. His “advice” and suggestions, therefore, carried great weight in the for
mative stages of BAAS and in extending American plans to promote the study and understanding of the United States in Britain.89 BAAS was duly formed on May 12, 1955.90
Further advice was offered by E. F. D’Arms of the Rockefeller Foundation, who had been involved in establishing the German Association for American Studies and the Salzburg Seminar, directly to Thistlethwaite, as to the future activities of the fledgling BAAS. D’Arms feared that a BAAS journal might prove difficult to launch, “given the difficulties which all journals face these days.” BAAS went on to form the Journal of American Studies in 1967. Additionally, D’Arms recommended that BAAS liaise with its American counterpart—the foundation-funded Association for American Studies—regarding setting up an information service for British scholars to find out about research opportunities and visits to the United States.91 D’Arms, in addition to proffering advice, was also extending and strengthening the foundations’ own American studies organizational network. Without Rockefeller’s financial support, it was recognized that “it is doubtful if the Conferences could ever have made the contribution [to bringing together British Americanists and initiating BAAS] at all.”92
In addition to Rockefeller and Fulbright funding, BAAS also received funding directly from the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) for its catalogue of UK-based American research material. USIA provided $20,000 for the purpose to hire researchers and pay for travel expenses, a secretary, and office materials.93 Given the ambitious plans of BAAS officers, however, further funds or gifts were required for possible new premises (the Commonwealth Fund offered some rooms rent free in Harkness House in London), new advisory services to British academics, and new publications—possibly a journal. Thistlethwaite noted that BAAS had already gained one hundred members, including seventy-four academics and twenty-four technical college teachers and school teachers. Thistlethwaite asked for more money from Rockefeller to hold different types of conferences—a week-long one for academics and researchers and another for a broader audience interested more generally in the United States—and for secretarial expenses. BAAS wanted, “in these formative stages [when] we are inhibited by lack of funds,” funding over several years to “put us on our feet.”94 At a later meeting between Thistlethwaite and D’Arms in New York, while the former was a visiting professor in the American civilization program at the University of Pennsylvania, Thistlethwaite suggested that BAAS become a “gatekeeper” for the numerous British academics wishing to apply for Rockefeller funding.95
In its formal bid for Rockefeller funds, BAAS outlined its mission to “transform the knowledge of scholars, educators and informed laymen in Britain about American history, literature and institutions.” One year into its life, BAAS had acquired 117 members. It had the advantage, it claimed, in spreading knowledge and understanding of the United States over the Fulbright Commission and the English-Speaking Union, as, unlike the former, “we are independent of the government,” and, as unlike the latter, BAAS is not a society for “propaganda,” the implication being that such factors made the others appear suspicious to British eyes. Believing that the way to spread knowledge was to begin at the top, an approach directly in line with Rockefeller thinking, BAAS would start by firmly establishing American studies as a legitimate and respectable academic discipline in the universities, causing ripple effects to be felt at the level of examinations at secondary schools, public schools, and sixth-form colleges. “Only by exerting this kind of influence will a new generation of British people grow up with a sensible understanding of American affairs,” BAAS argued. British Americanists also needed research funding for visits to the United States, particularly for the purposes of pursuing doctoral and other graduate training. “Without such a [Rockefeller] grant, we are in danger of being ineffective. And our collapse,” BAAS threatened, “coming at this particular moment, would set American Studies back a generation.” Underlying BAAS concerns, of course, was the Suez crisis, which caused a deep rift in Anglo-American relations in 1956. In all, BAAS asked for a total of $150,500 over a five-year period,96 to which Rockefeller agreed in 1957, much to the delight of Gaines and the Fulbright Commission.97
Overall, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Fulbright Commission contributed strongly to the formation of a vibrant and energetic BAAS, which promotes American studies as a university discipline; publishes an academic journal, among other publications, of high standing; and holds an annual conference. Its “pump-priming” sponsorship—especially the fellowship program—built the future of American studies by funding young scholars, some of whom became leaders in the field.98 Whether it achieved the aims originally attributed to the initiative is very difficult to tell; that it cemented Anglo-American relations at a particularly difficult time in the Cold War is clear from the reports of the conferences and from the BAAS Bulletin.99
During the 1960s, the Ford Foundation—through the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS)—built on the work of the Rockefeller Foundation and the U.S. Information Agency during the previous decade. The objectives of American studies’ promotion were noted to be “in constructing… [a world]… in which it will be possible to live at all,” according to an internal report for the Ford Foundation.100 In other words, American studies was seen squarely within the struggle against the Soviet Union’s apparent existential threat to American civilization. The latter had provided $331,000 for American studies in Britain from 1956 through 1969.101 Ford allotted $5.6 million for American studies in Europe and the Pacific region, of which $1.1 million was invested in Britain. Of the 201 scholars who received fellowships, Britain was awarded forty-nine, closely followed by Germany’s forty and Japan’s thirty-six.102 In particular, the University of Manchester played the role of “nursery” for British Americanists. Manchester supplied trained scholars who went on to head up departments at Sussex, East Anglia, and Hull. In the wake of these developments, American studies grew at the London School of Economics and the universities of St. Andrews, Glasgow, and Edinburgh. The U.S. embassy in London, which had also contributed to the formation of BAAS, invested $74,700 to found the Institute of U.S. Studies in London and funded eleven chairs and lectureships and almost forty book grants across the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Fulbright program financed almost six hundred scholars annually to cross the Atlantic.103 The overall effect was to “create a highly trained elite group of educators and researchers… [aware]… of the realities of American institutions and life which provides… a basis for intellectual discourse and understanding.”104 This was welcome news to the U.S. embassy in London: its cultural attaché (perhaps somewhat unrealistically) noted the existence of “a close parallel between knowledge of the United States on the part of the citizen and his overall approval of American foreign policy.” This was as welcome to the Ford Foundation, whose internal memoranda conceded the political character of their motivation in funding the program:105 “Despite the faint odor of cultural imperialism,” Ford’s Howard Swearer noted, “it was quite proper given the circumstances to promote American studies.”106
At the Pan-European level, the Rockefeller Foundation provided vital funding to the European Association for American Studies (EAAS), which was founded at the foundations-funded Salzburg Seminar in American Studies in 1954. The role of EAAS was to coordinate the promotion of American studies in Europe, especially since the formation of the German, British, and other associations.107 The immediate result of Rockefeller funding of EAAS was the conference decisions of 1957: for European scholars to focus research on “transatlantic influences and comparative studies of the two continents.” Further, EAAS, with specific research monies from Rockefeller, agreed to encourage scholars to research “The American Image in Europe,” subdivided into “the political image of America in different European countries… the impact of American educational theories in Europe… and the activities in Europe of American writers” after World War I. The Rockefeller Foundation noted that the proposed $20,000 grant would provide leverage against more “traditional”
scholars in Europe, who tended to suggest to younger scholars projects that were “unimaginative and traditional in character.”108
The effect of EAAS, according to Fulbright’s Robert Spiller, was to provide the smaller European countries—Switzerland, Benelux, and the Scandinavian nations—“an outlet for their interest in American Studies which they otherwise would not have,” which helped “the American cause [in Europe] as a whole.”109
The promotion of American studies in the United States and abroad was aimed at promoting the active support of American values at home and an understanding and respect for American culture abroad. It was an attempt to export the foundations’ domestic values to the world and led to the construction of a global network of American studies scholars, institutes, and associations. BAAS and EAAS were two such important aspects of the network, both encouraged and financially aided in their formative stages by collaboration between private American foundations and the American state. Although there were numerous student demonstrations in the 1960s at Ford/ACLS-funded institutions, two things are noteworthy: student interest in American subjects or study in the United States did not diminish, and no violent attacks were carried out on foundation-funded institutes, in sharp contrast to U.S. government facilities abroad. This underlines the advantages of promoting initiatives through apparently private, nonpolitical foundations, despite their ongoing collaboration with the American state.110 In combination, however, the foundations and the American state built enduring networks that, at their strongest, created a positive environment for transatlantic diplomacy and, at crisis points, helped weather storms that might have become far more violent had the networks not existed. But, through good times and bad, their networks endure, attracting scholars and resources, marginalizing other voices and agendas, and producing prestigious knowledge and symbolic capital. Marcus Cunliffe, a pioneer of American studies in Britain, agreed that British Americanists had said little new or original about the United States and mainly sought to “explain and justify… American experience… within the framework of ideas and assumptions set by Americans themselves.” Of course, Americanists had also rebutted “misconceptions which flourish on left and right,” which was healthy.111 The networks, originally a means to other goals, become an end in themselves, generating outcomes that are rarely, if ever, publicly stated. To be sure, networks cannot prevent a crisis—such as the Suez crisis of 1956—but they can assist the process of “normalization” in the postcrisis period.