173. Huneeus, “Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime,” 472.
174. Ibid., 469. See also, Paul W. Drake, “International Factors in Democratization,” Estudio/Working Paper 1994/November 1994, presented at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid, November 4, 1993.
175. Puryear, Thinking Politics, 170–171. Emphasis added.
8. AMERICAN POWER AND THE MAJOR FOUNDATIONS IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA
1. Carl Boggs, Imperial Delusions: American Militarism and Endless War (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 32, 86.
2. P. G. Cerny, “Embedding Neoliberalism,” Journal of International Trade and Development 2, no. 1 (2008): 1–46.
3. Christopher Hitchens, “Defending Islamofascism,” Slate (October 22, 2007), http://www.slate.com/id/2176389. Hitchens equates Islamic fundamentalism with the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.
4. Thomas Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes (London: Penguin, 2003), 5.
5. With Warren Buffet’s donations to the Gates Foundation, the latter annually grants around $3 billion; Maureen Baehr, “New Philanthropy Has Arrived—So What?” in S. U. Raymond and M. B. Martin, eds., Mapping the New World of American Philanthropy (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 82.
6. “It is evident that terrorists draw much of their support and justification from those who are, or perceive themselves as, unjustly impoverished.” So wrote the president of the Rockefeller Foundation in 2002. The current global financial crisis has also depleted foundations’ income.
7. James M. Scott and Kelly J. Walters, “Supporting the Wave: Western Political Foundations and the Promotion of a Global Democratic Society,” Global Society 14, no. 2 (2000): 256.
8. R. F. Arnove and N. Pinede, “Revisiting the ‘Big Three’ Foundations” (unpublished paper in possession of author).
9. H. K. Anheier and S. Daly, “Philanthropic Foundations: A New Global Force?” in Global Civil Society 2004/5 (London: Sage, 2005), 169, argue that foundations hold “substantial investments in the global capital market [which is] considered responsible for many of the social and economic imbalances that global civil society seeks to address.”
10. “Breakout Session Globalization, INSP Plenary Meeting,” March 22, 2002.
11. James D. Wolfensohn, Development and Poverty Reduction (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2004).
12. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002).
13. Ibid.; Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).
14. David Hamburg, CC president (1983–1997), cited by Arnove and Pinede, “Revisiting the ‘Big Three’ Foundations,” 10; emphasis added.
15. Arnove and Pinede, “Revisiting the ‘Big Three’ Foundations,” 13.
16. Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank, and WTO (London: Zed, 2003), 14.
17. Arnove and Pinede, “Revisiting the ‘Big Three’ Foundations,” 19. That there are alternatives—based on fair trade, as opposed to free trade, etc.—see Peet, Unholy Trinity.
18. Arnove and Pinede, “Revisiting the ‘Big Three’ Foundations,” 29.
19. Rockefeller Global Inclusion Program, October 2003; www.Rockfound.org.
20. Ford Foundation Web site, www.Fordfound.org; grant awarded in 2003.
21. S. Sharma, “Microcredit: Globalisation Unlimited,” Hindu Business Line, March 5, 2002, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2002/01/05/stories/2002010500111200.htm. Grameen Bank interest rates were also far higher than commercial rates, at around 20 percent, another point of criticism.
22. Arnove and Pinede, “Revisiting the ‘Big Three’ Foundations,” 22.
23. The Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum received $100,000 to “build, study and promote mutually advantageous business links between large corporations and small or microenterprises worldwide”; http://www.Fordfound.org.
24. D. Rockefeller, “Why We Need the IMF,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 1998.
25. http://www.Fordfound.org; granted in 2003 to the Third World Network, Berhad, Malaysia.
26. See, for example, the report of the Foundations of Globalisation International Conference, University of Manchester, November 2003, http://www.les.man.ac.uk/government/events/foundations_finalreport.pdf.
27. Ford granted $350,000 to Yale University in 2003 to fund “the research practice and outreach activities of the Center for Cities and Globalization and to strengthen an interdisciplinary network on globalization.”
28. The Philanthropic Initiative, Inc., Global Social Investing (Boston: TPI, Inc., 2001), 4–5, 37–42.
29. All three grants in 2003; Ford Web site; TPI, Global Social Investing, 20.
30. Ford gave $153,000 to Internews Interactive, Inc., as part of its “Bridge Initiative on Globalization,” to assist the WSF to communicate with the World Economic Forum.
31. Suzanne Charle, “Another Way: Leaders of a Global Civil Society Chart an Alternative to Globalization,” Ford Foundation Report, Spring 2003.
32. Ibid. Michael Edwards, Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 14, argues “humanizing capitalism” is the WSF’s principal role.
33. Jose Gabriel Lopez, “Green Globalization,” Ford Foundation Report, Summer 2003.
34. CC Grants for Globalization Initiatives; CC Web site.
35. Grant to the LSE Foundation, 2003; Ford Web site.
36. http://www.ilps-news.com/central-info-bureau/events/mumbai-resistance-2004/why-mumbai-resistance-2004/.
37. MumbaiResistance Against Imperialist Globalization and War; http://www.mumbairesistance.org.
38. The Guardian, January 17, 2004; L. Jordan, “The Ford Foundation and the WSF,” January 15, 2004, at http://www.opendemocracy.net. The WSF did accept Ford-funded delegates. WSF is also run by a co-opted, rather than elected, organizing committee; see M. Morgan, “Overcoming the Imperial Subject: The WSF and Counter Hegemonic Strategies for a Post-Political Age,” paper presented at IR conference at METU, Ankara, June 18–20, 2008.
39. Firoze Manji, “World Social Forum: Just Another NGO Fair?” Pambuzka News 288 (January 26, 2007), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/39464.
40. Owen Worth and Karen Buckley, “The World Social Forum: Postmodern Prince or Court Jester?” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2009): 649–661. Worth and Buckley show that high proportions of WSF participants and leaders have postgraduate qualifications and daily Internet access, in contrast to the masses of the poor and excluded they claim to be representing (654).
41. R. Cox, “Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium,” Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 11–12.
42. M. Buckley and Robert Singh, eds., The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006); Center for Strategic and International Studies, Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2009), v.
43. A. L. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005), 37–38.
44. J. Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 113. They take the quotation from Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988): 653–673. Levy’s study was partly financed by the Carnegie Corporation.
45. This is acknowledged by Doyle in part 2 of his article, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1983); in Ford Foundation records, see letter, Doyle to Laurice H. Sarraf (grants administrator, International Affairs Programs, Ford Foundation), 20 July 1983; in PA795–677, reel 3751.
46. Grant number 07990618; reels 3038; 5376–78; Ford Foundation archives, New York.
47. Michael Doyle and Miles Kahler, “North and South in the International Economy: A Re-Examination,” in PA795–677; reel 3751.
48. In his Wa
ys of War and Peace, Doyle (1997) acknowledges the support of several organizations, including a Social Science Research Council/MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in International Peace and Security, and of the Belfer Center on Science and International Affairs at Harvard (on which more below). Doyle also noted that the MacArthur Foundation consciously set out to develop ideas that challenged Cold War realist thinking; Michael Doyle, private communication with the author; undated but ca. May 2009.
49. M. W. Doyle, “Liberalism and the Transition to a Post-Cold War System,” in A. Clesse, R. Cooper, and Y. Sakamoto, eds., The International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 98–101.
50. Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80 (1986): 1151–1169.
51. Larry Diamond, An American Foreign Policy for Democracy Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report (1991), http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=450004&subsecID=900020&contentID=2044. Emphasis added.
52. Ibid.
53. In one part of the speech, Clinton’s words were lifted directly from Diamond’s report: “Democracies don’t go to war with each other…. Democracies don’t sponsor terrorist acts against each other. They are more likely to be reliable trading partners, protect the global environment, and abide by international law”; speech, “A New Covenant for American Security,” Georgetown University, December 12, 1991; http://www.ndol.org.
54. Securitization is used here as defined by the Copenhagen School: “Once ‘securitized,’ an issue will evoke images of threat, enemies, and defense and allocate the state an important role in addressing it—thus the politics surrounding the issue will be transformed”; Deborah Avant, “NGOs, Corporations and Security Transformation in Africa,” International Relations 21, no. 2 (2007), 144.
55. C. Buger and T. Villumsen, “Beyond the Gap: Relevance, Fields of Practice, and the Securitizing Consequences of (Democratic Peace) Theory,” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (2007): 433.
56. Lake, quoted in ibid., 435; emphasis added.
57. W. G. Hyland, Clinton’s World (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 23.
58. Anthony Lake, “Remarks of Anthony Lake,” September 21, 1993, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html.
59. Strobe Talbott, “The New Geopolitics,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, November 14, 1994.
60. J. Kruzel, “More a Chasm Than a Gap,” Mershon International Studies Review 38 (1994): 180.
61. T. Smith, A Pact with the Devil (New York: Routledge, 2007).
62. Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives, December 1995, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/di.htm. Emphasis added.
63. E. D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20 (1995): 5–38.
64. Council for the Community of Democracies, CCD: The First Five Years 2001–2005, http://www.ccd21.org.
65. T. Carothers, “A League of Their Own,” Foreign Policy (July–August 2008).
66. See http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/58/quarterly_journal.html?page_id=146&parent_id=46.
67. S. E. Miller, “International Security at Twenty-five,” International Security 26 (2001): 5–39, n16.
68. See the “Acknowledgments” to M. E. Brown, S. M. Lynn-Jones, and S. E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996).
69. The original idea came from McGeorge Bundy, the Ford Foundation president and former national security adviser to presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who wanted to establish a number of university-based international security centers across America. Ford’s endowment to Harvard’s Center grew to $6 million in 1979; it was originally granted in 1974. See http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu.
70. Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
71. Carnegie Corporation (2007) Annual Report. Emphasis added.
72. Graham Allison, “Message from the Director,” http://belfer.ksg.harvard.edu/about/welcome.html.
73. Miller, “International Security at Twenty-five,” 5, 12, 13, 34; William Jefferson Clinton, “State of the Union Address, 1994,” http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/P/bc42/speeches/sud94wjc.htm.
74. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, Debating the Democratic Peace, xiv.
75. E. O. Goldman and L. Berman, “Engaging the World,” in The Clinton Legacy, ed. C. Campbell and B. A. Rockman (New York: Chatham House, 2000), 236, argue that Clinton dropped “democratic enlargement” and retained “engagement” because of “a set of academic arguments that democratization was often a conflict-prone process.”
76. Strobe Talbott, “Democracy and the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 47–64. In note 2, Talbott cites academics on democratic peace, including John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Christopher Layne.
77. Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” 34.
78. E. D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, From Voting to Violence (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 41.
79. John M. Owen IV, “Iraq and the Democratic Peace,” Foreign Affairs 84 (2005): 122–127.
80. Barack Obama, Pan American Day and Pan American Week Press Release, April 14, 2009; R. McMahon, “The Brave New World of Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Service Journal (January 2009): 31–39.
81. Owen, “Iraq and the Democratic Peace.” Other journals were also important in the development and discussion of democratic peace theory. World Politics published articles by Randall Schweller (1992), C. R. and M. Ember and Bruce Russett (1992), and John Oneal (1999). The Journal of Democracy defended and promoted the implementation of DPT. For example, Morton Halperin (director, PPS, at State, 1998–2001, and senior director for democracy at the NSC,1994–1996) co-wrote articles on how the major powers increasingly were “guaranteeing democracy” where it was actively undermined, while the political scientist James Lee Ray provided a robust theoretical and methodological defense of DPT. M. H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, “Toward a Global ‘Guarantee Clause,’” Journal of Democracy 4 (1993): 60–64; M. H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, “Guaranteeing Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 9 (1998): 134–147; J. L. Ray, “The Democratic Path to Peace,” Journal of Democracy 8 (1997): 49–64.
82. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). References to the democratic peace and Michael Doyle appear in the book (for example, 262–263) but not in the original article in The National Interest (1989), from which the book took its inspiration.
83. B. W. Jentleson, “In Pursuit of Praxis,” in Being Useful, ed. M. Nincic and J. Lepgold (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 129–149.
84. Condoleezza Rice, “The Promise of Democratic Peace,” December 11, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/09/AR2005120901711.html.
85. For a comprehensive analysis of anti-Americanism, see Brendon O’Connor, ed., Anti-Americanism, 4 vols. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2007).
86. GMF was originally founded by a West German government grant in 1972 in appreciation of U.S. Marshall Plan assistance; headquartered in Washington, D.C., it also maintains five offices in Europe—Belgrade, Berlin, Bratislava, Brussels, and Paris; GMF Annual Report, 2003; http://www.gmfus.org.
87. “Partnerships,” GMF Web site, at http://www.gmfus.org.
88. Ibid.
89. GMF Annual Report, 2003, 1–6.
90. Rubin held that post in President Clinton’s second administration (1995–1999); he was a partner at Goldman Sachs from the early 1970s and is a former trustee of the Carnegie Corporation.
91. GMF Annual Report, 2003, 7–10.
92. Ibid., 11.
93. Mark Leonard, ed., Re-Ordering the World (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002).
94. Inderjeet Parmar, “Catalysing Events, Think Tanks, and American Foreign Policy
Shifts: A Comparative Analysis of the Impacts of Pearl Harbor 1941 and 11 September 2001,” Government and Opposition (Winter 2005): 1–25.
95. Robert Cooper, “The Post-Modern State,” in Mark Leonard, ed., Re-Ordering the World (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 11–20. Since then, Cooper has published The Breaking of Nations (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003). For a critical analysis, see Inderjeet Parmar, “‘I’m Proud of the British Empire’: Why Tony Blair Backs George W. Bush,” Political Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2005): 218–231.
96. “Transatlantic Fellows Program: Past Fellows”; GMF Web site. Other past fellows have included the former president of Bulgaria, Peter Stoyanov; Todd Stern, a former Clinton White House Staff member; and numerous French, German, Italian, and other public figures.
97. Jeffrey Gedmin and Craig Kennedy, “Selling America, Short,” National Interest (Winter 2003).
98. Cheney is the wife of George W. Bush’s vice president, Richard Cheney; Bennett was President Ronald Reagan’s “drug tsar” and current head of Americans for Victory Over Terrorism (AVOT); Wilson is a conservative former Harvard academic; Mead is a senior fellow at the CFR.
99. Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, ed., Terrorists, Despots, and Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, August 2003).
100. Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Postwar American Hegemony (London: Routledge, 2002).
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