Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862

by Edward Cunningham

  Only a week later General Buell, commanding in eastern and central Kentucky, on the suggestion of an engineer officer on his staff, recommended to General McClellan the feasibility of an advance along the line of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers toward Nashville. McClellan, or “Little Mac,” as he was called, objected as President Abraham Lincoln did. The President’s objection was based more on political than on strategic grounds, for he was deeply interested in the possibility of a thrust in eastern Tennessee to relieve the supposedly suppressed and downtrodden Unionists living in that section. In a paper which McClellan and other Federal officers read with interest, Lincoln in late September or early October developed a plan of action calling for a movement into eastern Tennessee by the Union army. Apparently Lincoln’s initial military objective in this was to seize a point on the strategic Virginia-Tennessee Railroad “near the Mountain pass called Cumberland Gap.” It was not a bad idea for an amateur soldier, but the president failed to make any provisions in his plan for any operations on the Mississippi River or any other rivers in the area. At least Lincoln was thinking in terms of an offensive movement, though possibly in the wrong direction.6

  In the mountainous regions of the state, notably in the eastern third, there was strong evidence of pro-Unionist support, and the vote had been more than four to one against secession in June when Governor Isham Harris had put it up to the people to decide one way or the other. (Actually the vote made very little difference as Tennessee was already firmly committed to the Confederate cause, but it was a shrewd political move on the governor’s part to try and rally popular support.) Through the entire war this would be a scene of true civil strife, with brother against brother and noted bushwhackers and jayhawkers roaming about murdering and torturing with the greatest of enthusiasm.7

  Sporadically the East Tennessee Unionists engaged in guerrilla warfare and sabotage against the Confederate administration. Knoxville was the center for pro-Unionist activities, but the surrounding counties contained many citizens who bore no great love for the South, or at least President Jefferson Davis’ government. The most notable of these Rebels was Andrew Johnson, who would eventually become military governor of Tennessee and United States President, but there were many others such as William “Parson” Brownlow, a fire-eating fanatic, who would spread death and destruction upon his pro-Confederate enemies at the least provocation and sometimes without any.

  During the fall of the year hundreds of East Tennessee Unionists had begun drifting north, slipping through the thinly held Confederate lines into Unionist Kentucky. Some of them enlisted in ordinary Union army regiments, but others banned together, eventually forming an East Tennessee brigade headed by acting Brigadier General Samuel P. Carter, which set up base at Camp Calvert, near London, Kentucky.8 At the same time those Unionists who did not bother to leave the state to get into the war started a campaign of sabotage against the Confederate rail road system running through their segment of the state. Bridges were burned and Confederate transportation, both military and civilian, considerably disrupted.

  The New York Tribune on November 6 carried the story that the East Tennessee loyalists had fought a great battle at Morristown. This was vastly exaggerated, but there had been open resistance to the Confederates and many were arrested, notably “Parson” Brownlow.

  It was natural that for political reasons President Lincoln and many of his officials should be interested in seizing control of eastern Tennessee and restoring a civil administration favorable to the North. East Tennessee could then be cited as an example to show that the people of the South were basically in sympathy with the Union and that they had been merely led astray by their wicked and treasonable leaders. This would make good grist for the Northern propaganda mill. It is also extremely probable that Lincoln personally felt great sympathy for the East Tennesseans and simply wanted to relieve them of their sufferings, even though those sufferings might be considerably exaggerated. For humanitarian and for political reasons it was necessary, Lincoln thought, to intervene in this region.

  Located strategically, astride the Confederate railroad system and in position to outflank many important Confederate population and munitions centers, eastern Tennessee was destined to become a major battlefield. In this area the slaveholding and propertied classes tended to support the Confederate cause, while the common people, basically yeoman farmers or mountaineers, tended to be pro-Unionist in sympathy. In eastern Tennessee, as well as in some of the other mountainous regions of the South, the secessionist crisis tended to take on some of the characteristics of a class struggle.9

  At first many of the East Tennesseans, like their brothers in Kentucky, preferred to occupy a neutral position, but events soon showed that this was impossible. The strategic value of the region rendered it inevitable that military operations would take place in the area. The Richmond Inquirer called it the “Keystone of the Southern arch.” Not only did its passes afford avenues for invasion or counter-invasions, but it was also potentially a great stockpile of salt and bacon, essential to the Confederate armies in particular.

  President Lincoln was scarcely in the White House before United States Senator Andrew Johnson and his associate, Horace Maynard, requested assistance for the loyalists of the area.10 A Southern sympathizer wrote to Confederate President Jefferson Davis in November that the East Tennesseans “look for the establishment of Federal authority with as much confidence as the Jews look for the coming of the Messiah,” and that it was impossible to change their feelings, no matter what pressures might be adopted.11

  With Lincoln in sympathy with plans for the relief of East Tennessee, it was only natural that many of the Union military leaders should at least be impressed with the idea of cooperating in this movement, even though some of them might doubt the military feasibility of a straight thrust into East Tennessee. Brigadier General George Thomas, then a subordinate commander in the Eastern district of Kentucky, helped make arrangements to send supplies and munitions into the region in June.12

  Buell, who took command of the region in November, felt that an excursion into this region was premature. Johnson and Maynard telegraphed him that “our people are oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest; the government must come to their relief.”13 But Buell remained inactive.

  During this same time the Confederates were strengthening their hold on the region. In August, Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig carried an address by Brigadier General Felix K. Zollicoffer, commanding the area, in which he assured the people that Confederate authorities were here “only to insure peace to their homes, by repelling invasion and preventing the horrors of civil war. Treason to the state government cannot, will not, be tolerated.”14

  The famous East Tennessee bridge burning on November 8 triggered off the real crisis in that region. The execution of the attempt was carried out by the Reverend William Blount Carter after a consultation with President Lincoln, Secretary of State William Seward, and General McClellan. He planned to burn at the same time nine bridges between Stevenson, Alabama, and Bristol, Tennessee, thus crippling 265 miles of railway and impeding the transportation of troops and supplies to the battlefields of Northern Virginia. Five bridges were actually burned, and Carter escaped; however, five of his associates were hanged under the instructions of Judah P. Benjamin, then Confederate Secretary of War.15 Confederate authorities retaliated, ordering Unionist sympathizers to be imprisoned. The Knoxville Whig was finally suppressed and Brownlow committed to prison.16

  Whether for military or political reasons, General McClellan was at least partly in sympathy with Lincoln’s desire to aid the beleaguered loyalists, and on December 3 ordered General Buell to send troops to help protect the newly formed East Tennessee brigade from Confederate attack and, presumably, to pave the way eventually for some kind of Union advance. McClellan informed Buell that he could rely on his full support in the liberation of East Tennessee.17

  Advancing in this area would mean a difficult supply problem for t
he Union army, while a drive down either the Cumberland or Tennessee River, or one overland following the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, would be easier to supply. Buell continued to maintain his preference for action in central Tennessee, partly due to the influence of James Gerpy, president of the Louisville and Nashville line, and a most trusted advisor. Gerpy was strongly in favor of driving south, straight along the line of the railroad, with a subsidiary movement down the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers timed to coincide.

  Lincoln was not unaware of the difficulties inherent in advancing without the use of either the rivers or railroad as a logistics support, and in his message to Congress in December 1861, he urged upon that body the advisability of constructing a railroad at government expense from one of two railroad terminals in central Kentucky to either the Tennessee state line near Knoxville, the heart of loyalist territory, or to Cumberland Gap.18 The plan for Lincoln’s railroad, although never carried out, was eventually approved.

  When Thomas Scott arrived in Louisville, acting more or less as a personal agent of Secretary of War Simon Cameron and President Lincoln, Generals Buell and Anderson attempted to influence him in favor of an advance down the Cumberland-Tennessee toward Nashville. Scott was duly impressed, and he wrote to Edwin Stanton, the recently appointed Secretary of War, that the proposed railroad into East Tennessee was not “wanted at all to meet the enemy or to secure Tennessee.”19 Scott even went so far as to recommend that Stanton transfer forty or fifty thou sand men from the Army of the Potomac and add them to Buell’s force for an advance on Nashville, although this plan was never executed.

  One important reform carried out by the Union army at this time that would have a strong effect on the forthcoming campaign was the linking together of the American Telegraph Company and the Western Union Company lines with the headquarters of General McClellan. This placed “Little Mac” in direct communication with Halleck at St. Louis, Missouri, Commodore Foote at Cairo, Illinois, and Buell at Louisville, Kentucky.20 Even before the telegraph was complete, plans for a movement into Confederate territory were underfoot. In the middle of the month of December, at the Planter’s Hotel in St. Louis, Missouri, the subject of a push came up during a conversation between Generals Sherman, Halleck, and the latter’s chief of staff, Brigadier General George Cullum. Many people had urged an advance down the Mississippi River, but the main objection to this was the strong Confederate concentration at Columbus, Kentucky, about eighteen miles below Cairo.

  General Halleck had a map on his table and a large pencil in his hand. He asked the other officers in his presence, “Where is the Rebel line?” General Cullum took a pencil and drew a line running through Bowling Green, Forts Henry and Donelson, and Columbus. Halleck then said, “That is their line. Now where is the proper place to break it?” Generals Sherman and Cullum both replied, “Naturally the center.” Halleck drew a line perpendicular to the other near its middle, and it coincided nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River. “That’s the true line of operations,” Halleck said.21

  Just days later orders came through from General McClellan for the opening of a demonstration against Johnston’s forces in Kentucky. One object of the demonstration was to make a diversion in favor of General Buell, who was confronting Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner with a large Confederate force at Bowling Green. General Grant was supposed to move in order to pin down Confederate forces and to prevent the sending of reinforcements to Buckner. Grant instructed C. F. Smith to send a force up the west bank of the Tennessee to threaten Forts Heiman and Henry, while McClernand was detailed with six thousand men into western Kentucky, threatening Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River with another. General Grant personally accompanied McClernand’s force and gained much information concerning the countryside from the move. For more than a week Union soldiers tramped about in the mud and muck of the winter, the men suffering considerably from the weather. As a result of the expedition, Smith suggested in a report that an assault on Fort Heiman was practical. This confirmed Grant’s idea that the proper line of operations was along the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers.

  On January 6, before undertaking this demonstration against the Confederates, Grant asked for permission from Halleck for a conference in St. Louis, whereby he wished to lay out a plan of campaign before the latter. With the confirmation of his ideas by General C. F. Smith, Grant again requested to meet with General Halleck. Relations between the two men were not the most cordial, but Halleck consented. The meeting was not a success, according to Grant in his Memoirs.22 Halleck cut short the plan as being preposterous, being most unfavorable in his opinion.

  Grant’s account of this meeting does not support Halleck’s previously stated views on the subject, and it may be that the department commander simply did not understand what his subordinate was requesting, for Grant at times was a very poor speaker,23 or it may simply have been that Grant was not trusted to fulfill such an important operation, in view of the near disaster at Belmont.

  One view of this matter is that Halleck, although appreciating the need for an offensive in Kentucky and Tennessee, was reluctant to move until his right flank in Missouri was completely secured, feeling that he did not have enough troops to start two separate movements. Launching two attacks at one time would be a violation of the theories on warfare that Halleck held, since it would mean a divided effort instead of concentrating the resources of movement at a time.24 Once the Missouri campaign began, Halleck told McClellan, when his present plans were executed he would turn on Tennessee.25

  Buell, however, kept after Halleck to launch some kind of an advance as a diversion for an effort by him. The commander of the Army of the Ohio said that if Halleck would cut the Memphis and Nashville Railroad, he would assault and capture Bowling Green. President Lincoln, who naturally was interested in the eastern Tennessee Unionists, asked Halleck his opinion on the matter.26 General Halleck quickly replied that it would be sheer madness, since troops could not be with drawn from Missouri without risking the loss of the state, and also that there were not enough men available at Cairo, and that he knew the Confederates had no intentions of pulling troops from Columbus whether or not Buell ever advanced.27 Lincoln finally ended up by telling Halleck to contact Buell in regard to some kind of movement on January 1. “I am not ready to cooperate with him. Too much haste will ruin everything,” was Halleck’s peremptory reply.28

  Events in eastern Kentucky came to a head, with results that could have been foreseen by few, if any, of the participants. As early as October 22, fighting had broken out between the Confederates in eastern Kentucky and Tennessee by troops commanded by General Felix Kirk Zollicoffer and Federal forces commanded by General George “Pappy” Thomas. Zollicoffer’s men were repulsed after a sharp but brief action. Wrote one Federal soldier, “The loss among the Rebels is said to be awful.”29 The Confederates probably had four thousand men in action, but their casualties amounted to only a few dozen in reality. Attacking on the following day, Zollicoffer suffered additional casualties, and thereby decided to call it off, falling back to Cumberland Gap. General George Thomas would have preferred to take the offensive and pursue the retreating Confederate general, but General Sherman, who was in command in Kentucky at this time, felt that it would be wisest to remain on the defensive.30

  Eventually in December, the fiery Tennessee-born Confederate general began a slow forward movement against Thomas’ command. The Union commander passed the word along to Buell of the Southern advance, and it was agreed that Thomas could advance to the Cumberland, but should not cross the river “unless absolutely necessary.” Zollicoffer saved General Thomas any worry about this by making his camp on the northern bank of the river at a point about eighteen miles southwest of Colonel Albin Schoepf’s position at Somerset, Kentucky. Camping on the Union side of the river was not a particularly good idea, and Major General George B. Crittenden was detached from General Johnston’s army to proceed to the assistance of
Zollicoffer. By the time he reached the Confederate general’s army, however, it was too late to make any change. Thomas advanced on the position known as Logan’s Crossroads or Mill Springs, Kentucky, reaching it on January 18. Generals Crittenden and Zollicoffer prepared to launch a surprise attack, hoping to shatter the Virginia-born Thomas before he could unite with Schoepf. The two Confederate generals led six Tennessee regiments, the Fifteenth Mississippi, and the Fifteenth Alabama, along with an artillery company and a battalion of cavalry, probably around four thousand troops, out on a night march through one of the worst experiences of the war.31

  A blinding rain made the roads almost impassable while adding to the misery of the soldiers as they slogged along wearily, drenched to the skin and half-frozen from the low temperature.32 About 6:30 a.m. on January 19, troops from the First Kentucky Cavalry, U. S., signaled the main force that the Southerners were advancing. Firing soon broke out, but visibility was so poor from the daybreak mist and the smoke from the guns which so thickened the air that it was hard to distinguish friend from foe. General Zollicoffer, mistaking enemy for friend, rode out too far in front of his men, approaching Colonel Speed S. Fry, Fourth Kentucky Infantry. The general told Fry, “We must not fire on our own men,” and nodding his head to the left, remarked, “Those are our men.” Colonel Fry answered, “Of course not. I would not do so intentionally.” Fry began moving toward his regiment, and suddenly he saw another man ride up and join Zollicoffer. The new arrival opened fire with a revolver, hitting Fry’s horse. The Fourth Kentucky’s colonel at once opened with his own revolver at the man. A figure fell off a horse. Thus Zollicoffer died, a bullet through his breast, a victim of the poor visibility and his own recklessness.33