Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical

by Sciabarra, Chris

  66. Rand (January 1969), “The ‘inexplicable personal alchemy,’” in New Left, 117.

  67. Rand quoted in Current Biography 1982, 332.

  68. B. Branden (1986) writes that Rand “graduated from the university with the highest honors” (54). I could not substantiate this claim by reference to the Leningrad dossier on Alissa Rosenbaum.

  69. B. Branden 1986, 55; “Who is Ayn Rand?” in Branden and Branden 1962, 165. Also during this period, Alissa enrolled in a Leningrad school for young people who wished to pursue a career in the Russian film industry. She learned useful information on the craft of film that she would later apply to movie scripts. B. Branden 1986, 57.

  70. B. Branden 1986, 55–63. Childs (1982) observed that Rand was “in effect one of the first Russian Jewish dissidents” to come to America (33).

  71. In We the Living, Rand dramatizes how statism destroys the best in people. But she ends the novel on a positive note; although statism destroys the best people physically, it is unable to destroy them spiritually. As such, Kira dies smiling that “so much … had been possible” (446).

  72. B. Branden 1986T. Branden (28 June 1993C) also remarks that the committee never gave Rand the forum they had promised her. Rand was bitterly disappointed that she was denied this opportunity. In the immediate aftermath of her HUAC testimony, Rand, in her “Notes on the Thomas committee” (November 1993), in Schwartz 7.6, argued that Congress had the right to ask questions of fact with regard to Communist Party membership since the organization was committed to criminality. She also lamented that many of the “friendly witnesses” (including Adolphe Menjou and Morrie Ryskind) were blacklisted in the post-McCarthy era. Later, however, Rand argued that in a genuinely free society, “There would be no hearings.” B. Branden 1986, 200–203, Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 6.

  73. Rand (20 October 1947), “Ayn Rand’s HUAC Testimony,” in Binswanger 8.4.1–11; Willis, “Introduction,” in Heilman 1976, 1–3.

  CHAPTER 4. THE MATURATION OF AYN RAND

  1. Rand (4 May 1946), quoted in Peikoff 1991a, xiv.

  2. Rand (October–November 1963), “The goal of my writing,” in Romantic Manifesto, 162.

  3. Ibid., 163.

  4. Rand 1964b, 3. This interview was reprinted in Haley 1993.

  5. Rand (September 1971), “Brief summary,” in Objectivist 10:1091.

  6. Some of these stories (e.g., “Her Second Career”) do not relate directly to Rand’s experiences in Russia.

  7. Peikoff, “Editor’s preface,” in Early Ayn Rand, 5.

  8. Ibid., 108. One can find a similar disdain for both the state and the Church in Thus Spake Zarathustra, the first book of Nietzsche’s that Rand ever read. See Nietzsche [1883–85] 1905, 144.

  9. In later years, in Rand (17 February 1960), “Faith and force: The destroyers of the modern world,” in Philosophy, 85, she argued: “Communists, like all materialists, are neo-mystics.” I explore this identity more thoroughly in Parts 2 and 3.

  10. Rand (1931–32), “Red Pawn,” in Early Ayn Rand, 111.

  11. Rosenthal (15 November 1993C) remarks that Rand’s synopsis deals with a real-life Soviet prison at the Solovetsk monastery.

  12. Rand (1931–32), “Red Pawn,” in Early Ayn Rand, 130–31.

  13. Peikoff, “Editor’s preface,” in Early Ayn Rand, 172, writes that this story was cut from the novel, “presumably” because it was unnecessary to the establishment of Kira’s character.

  14. Rand (1931), “Kira’s viking,” in Early Ayn Rand, 179.

  15. Peikoff and Scott 1988T; Reedstrom 1993b.

  16. Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 11.

  17. We the Living, 446. During World War II, Italian film-makers produced a faithful (if unauthorized) film version of the book, starring Alida Valli as Kira, Rossano Brazzi as Leo, and Fosco Giachetti as Andrei. Directed by Goffredo Allessandrini, the film was initially shown in two parts to cheering Italian audiences. Though it depicted the grim reality of life under communism, the film may have been banned by Mussolini’s government for its implicit attack on all forms of totalitarianism, including fascism. The Nazis may have blocked the film’s entry into Germany because they believed that Andrei, the communist idealist, was too sympathetic a character. This is ironic, considering Rand’s virulent anticommunism! The film was lost to audiences for many years, until it was rediscovered, remastered, and rereleased in 1988 with English subtitles. The movie is distributed through Duncan Scott Productions. Reviews and different perspectives on the film are provided by Edelstein (1988), Ericson (1988), McGrady (1988), Peikoff and Scott (1988T), Chase (1988), Bradford (1988), Kamhi (December 1988), “Ayn Rand’s We the Living,” in Torres and Kamhi (1982–94), and Vermilye 1994, 27–28. I cite “Torres and Kamhi (1982–94)” for ease of reference. In fact, Aristos was edited by Torres from July 1982 to September 1991, and Torres and Kamhi from January 1992 to the present.

  18. Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 8.

  19. Rand (October 1958), “Foreword,” in We the Living, viii.

  20. Merrill 1991, 21–40. Merrill observes correctly that Rand’s revisions were not extensive. He points out some minor modifications of interest. In the first edition, Leo recites Kant at social gatherings; in the later edition, Leo quotes Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Oscar Wilde. Rand’s antipathy toward Kant was obviously not as pronounced in 1930–33 when she worked on the original manuscript. In the 1936 edition, Rand may have used Kant strictly as a Western philosophic symbol. Leo acknowledges Western sources to aggravate his Slavophile associates. Rand also writes that people “looked at Leo as they looked at the statue of Apollo.” Apparently, Rand rejected the Dionysian, and embraced the Apollonian, metaphor from an early point in her literary and intellectual development. We the Living, 127–28. Cox (1986) discusses Rand’s stylistic revisions.

  21. The following passages appear in the first (1936) edition of We the Living (92–95) and in a comparable scene in the second edition (79–80).

  22. Hicks 1992, 6. Echoing Rand’s own views, Oyerly (1990, 5) argues that Rand’s stark condemnation of the masses in the first edition of We the Living, was “poetic metaphor” entirely due to Rand’s early linguistic difficulties. Nathaniel Branden (1971b, 13), by contrast, argues that Rand made important philosophical changes in the second edition.

  23. Barbara Branden (28 June 1993C) states that in any event, such a “full philosophical explanation” would have been inappropriate in a novel. She suggests that the so-called Nietzschean elements of We the Living are really only features of Rand’s youthful, over-dramatized, literary style. In Branden’s view, these elements were never an authentic part of Rand’s perspective; “In fact, in the years I knew her, she often spoke of her deep respect for ‘the common man,’ saying that in many ways … the American common man had a greater intelligence [and] commitment to reason and individualism than was generally understood.”

  24. Rand (1934), Ideal, in Early Ayn Rand, 234. Ideal, like Rand’s 1939 play, Think Twice, was never performed. She wrote two other plays that were produced on Broadway. An adaptation of We the Living, called The Unconquered, did not have a successful run. Another play, written in 1932–33, originally titled Penthouse Legend, had a fairly successful Broadway presentation. It was published in 1968 as Night of January 16th. The play is a courtroom drama, and it featured a gimmick in which a jury is drawn from the audience. Rand considers the work an example of “Romantic symbolism.” She discusses the play’s history in Rand (June 1968), “Introduction,” in Rand [1933] 1968.

  25. Peikoff, “Editor’s preface,” iin Early Ayn Rand, 181–84.

  26. Rand (9 April 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings; Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.2.

  27. Ibid., 3. Barbara Branden (28 June 1993C) suggests that the mature Rand would never have published such an antireligious comment. This underscores the fact that Rand’s journals were indeed, “thinking on paper,” rather than carefully edited for public consumption. Rand believed that she
was primarily an advocate of reason, and that once reason won, faith and religion would cease to be issues.

  28. Rosenthal (15 November 1993C) observes too, that Chinese also lacks a word for “privacy.”

  29. Rand (1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.2.

  30. Ibid., 5. Torres and Kamhi note that there is a similarity between Rand’s concept of “sense of life” and Ortega y Gasset’s concept of “metaphysical sentiment” as presented in his work On Love: Aspects of a Single Theme. Torres and Kamhi (September 1991), “Ayn Rand’s philosophy of art: A critical introduction,” parts 3 and 4, in Torres and Kamhi 1982–94, 6 n. 12. The “sense of life” concept, which I explore in Chapter 7, has implications for Rand’s aesthetics. Though it is clear that Rand read Ortega y Gasset, there is currently no available journal evidence to suggest that she formed this concept as a direct result of his influence.

  31. Rand (15 May 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.5–6.

  32. Rand (4 December 1935), quoted in Branden and Branden 1962, 192.

  33. Some have assumed that Roark was modeled on Frank Lloyd Wright. For two accounts of the relationship between Rand and Wright, see B. Branden 1986, 140, 172, 189–91, 208–9, and Secrest 1992, 494–98, 510.

  34. Saint-Andre (5 August 1993C) notes that in many ways, Rand assigned to Roark the “positive” aspects of the Nietzschean superman (heroic strength of will and defiance of social convention), and to Wynand, the “negative” ones (cruelty and ruthlessness). A very similar technique was used by Gorky in his novel Klim Samgin (1925–1936). Gorky assigned “positive” Nietzschean aspects to his heroes and “negative” Nietzschean aspects to his villains. Rosenthal, “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 36. Wynand, of course, is not a villain in The Fountainhead, but he is the embodiment of all that Rand believed was wrong with the Nietzschean ethos.

  35. See Nietzsche [1886] 1966, 228 [par. 287]. Rand quotes a slightly different translation.

  36. Rand (25 December 1935), quoted in Peikoff (March 1992), “Afterword,” in Fountainhead, 697.

  37. Rand (9 February 1936), in ibid., 698–99.

  38. Rand (22 February 1937), in ibid., 700.

  39. Thanks to Cox (3 May 1993C) for emphasizing this particular aspect of Toohey’s character.

  40. Fountainhhead, 338. Rand was always “haunted” by this metaphor from Thus Spake Zarathustra. She lamented later that she felt as though she had become a philosophical “fly swatter” in her ongoing critique of contemporary thinkers. She thought Marx was a worthy adversary, but had grown tired of fighting intellectuals such as Freud or Rawls. Rand (November–December 1975), “A last survey, part one,” in Rand [1971–76] 1979, 4:382. Rand [1971–76] 1979 is hereafter cited as Ayn Rand Letter by volume and page number in text and notes.

  41. Rand (27 March 1937), in Fountainhead, 702.

  42. Rand (22 February 1937), in ibid., 701. Cox (3 May 1993C) reminds me that in the finished novel, Toohey is not quite portrayed as a “repulsive swine.” Rand achieves great literary irony by presenting him as a puny character with the “voice of a god.”

  43. Rand [1937] 1946, 108–10. Rand [1937] 1946 is hereafter cited as Anthem by page number in both text and notes.

  44. The Greek mythic imagery throughout Rand’s fiction could be the subject of a book in itself. In Atlas Shrugged, the Promethean metaphor figures prominently: “John Galt is Prometheus who changed his mind. After centuries of being torn by vultures in payment for having brought to men the fire of the gods, he broke his chains and he withdrew his fire—until the day when men withdraw their vultures” (517).

  45. The latter two screenplays were adaptations. See Cox 1987 for a fine overview of Rand’s writing for the cinema.

  46. Rand (1 January 1945), in Peikoff 1991a, x.

  47. Though Rand began outlining her novel in 1945, Atlas Shrugged is foreshadowed in a question Roark poses in The Fountainhead: “What would happen to the world without those who do, think, work, produce? (607). Raimondo claims that Rand’s novel, Atlas Shrugged, exhibits certain similarities to journalist Garet Garrett’s 1922 novel, The Driver. Raimondo (1993, 203) concludes that Rand “was influenced by Garrett.” I could not find any evidence to link Rand to Garrett, who was, as Raimondo correctly notes, an “exemplar of the Old Right.” A rebuttal to Raimondo is provided by Bradford (1994).

  48. Chambers 1957, 595–96. Even upon Rand’s death, William Buckley (1982a), editor of National Review, lamented that she had theologized her atheistic beliefs and had short-circuited her otherwise “eloquent and persuasive” antistatism. However, Berger (1986, 13) calls Rand’s philosophy “a vulgarized cross between Adam Smith and Friedrich Nietzsche.” Though there are many negative reviews of Rand’s works to choose from, it is possible to find an occasionally provocative characterization from an unlikely source. Feyerabend is said to have reported to McCawley (1990, 385 n. 21) that Rand “is much better than most academics.” In Feyerabend’s view, Rand defended her philosophy in “juicy tales full of sex, industrial espionage, murder, mystery, and at the climax introduces her beloved Aristotle (Atlas Shrugged—a story I read with considerable pleasure). And Aristotle, as far as I can see, by far exceeds all existing ‘thinkers’ in versatility and depth.… I prefer her to Derrida and Foucault any time.” Rand herself, was not as generous toward Feyerabend. See Rand (March 1970), “Kant versus Sullivan,” in Philosophy. For another positive review of Rand’s work, see Pruette 1943.

  49. Rand (20 January 1947), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Binswanger 5.2.2.

  50. Rand (31 July 1950), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.4–5.

  51. Rand (6 October 1949), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.1–2. Rand recognized (through her character Hank Rearden), “that by accepting the mystics’ theory of sex I was accepting the looters’ theory of economics” (Atlas Shrugged, 859). This observation had far-reaching implications that Rand developed later in her assessment of the conservative-liberal duality in U.S. politics.

  52. Rand (29 June 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Binswanger 4.6.8–9.

  53. Rand (28 August 1949), in Peikoff, “Editor’s preface,” in Early Ayn Rand, 260.

  54. Peikoff (1987bT) questions, period 1, explains that Rand could have named her philosophy “rationalism,” “existentialism,” “realism,” or “conceptualism,” but these labels were preempted by other traditions. Rand ultimately chose “Objectivism” because it emphasized the “objective” nature of her approach in every philosophic branch.

  55. Rand (8 June 1958), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.7.

  56. Hook 1961, 3. Despite Rand’s theatrical expository style, some of her critics have praised her ability to capture the essence of other systems of thought. See, for instance, Hollinger, “Ayn Rand’s epistemology in historical perspective,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984.

  57. The affair ended for a variety of reasons. It has been acknowledged by Barbara Branden (1986), Nathaniel Branden (1989), and Leonard Peikoff (1987aT).

  58. Peikoff (1964). Barbara Branden also took courses with Hook. Nathaniel Branden took courses with William Barrett. N. Branden 1989, 115–16.

  59. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 10; 1985T, Lecture 1.

  60. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 12. However, Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 15) warns that one cannot simply take any twelve topics in philosophy and thread them together seamlessly. Some issues are more closely related than others.

  61. Peikoff 1991b, 4. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 2) admits that he struggled with rationalism for fifteen years in his understanding of Objectivism.

  62. Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 5) admits to preferring synthesis over analysis.

  63. The most important aspect of Brande
nian revisionism is its attempt to transcend the cultic qualities of the early Objectivist movement. Branden accepts most of the responsibility for having generated a virtual cult around Ayn Rand. N. Branden 1989, 402; B. Branden 1990, 51.

  64. Branden claims that he has some differences with Rand that relate to her theories of sex and emotions. Branden (1983b, 225n) argues that he tends to emphasize generosity and mutual aid as essential to an ethic that “holds man’s/woman’s life as its standard” (emphasis added). Even if Branden’s formulation seems more “politically correct” than Rand’s, it is still within the broad Objectivist tradition. Ironically, in a 1978 lecture, Rand (1978T) claimed that Objectivism had made very little impact on the science of psychology. She stated that she could name exceptions, “but not in print.” This is the closest Rand has come to recognizing Branden’s post-1968 contributions. In any event, if Nathaniel Branden is the legitimate father of the self-esteem movement, Ayn Rand is its mother.

  CHAPTER 5. BEING

  1. Rand (June 1970), “The chickens’ homecoming,” in New Left, 108.

  2. Peikoff 1987T, Lecture 1; 1985T, Lecture 3.

  3. Peikoff 1991b, 122–23. One crucial question which must be considered is this: If Rand is wrong about a single aspect of her system, does this invalidate the totality? I do not consider this issue in the current study because it relates to the validity of Rand’s system-as-such. But it is worth examining.

  4. In this regard, Rand’s system resembles Marx’s system. On Marx’s approach, see Meikle 1985, 71.

  5. Rand rejected nearly every imaginable dichotomy: mind vs. body; idealism vs. materialism; rationalism vs. empiricism; internalism vs. externalism; intrinsicism vs. subjectivism; concepts vs. percepts; reason vs. emotion; the conscious vs. the subconscious; the articulate vs. the tacit; reason vs. art; fact vs. value; conventional egoism vs. traditional altruism; love vs. sex; anarchism vs. statism; atomistic individualism vs. organic collectivism. A number of other dichotomies are mentioned by Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 1): happiness vs. pleasure; pure vs. applied science; woman vs. man; art vs. business; politics vs. economics; morality vs. science; art vs. entertainment. In his course on logic, Peikoff (1974T, Lecture 3) explains that these dichotomies are all examples of the fallacy of the false alternative. This tendency toward the analysis of the “coincidence of opposites” in the modern world is not distinctive to Objectivism. It is also apparent in the systems of Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Emerson. See Kuntz 1981.