Jihad Joe

by J. M. Berger

  That’s not to say that pre-9/11 recruits were oblivious to more advanced jihadist ideas—for instance, the ambition to create Islamic states or takfiri ideas about killing infidels (even when the infidels were Muslims). Some were preconditioned with these ideas, through exposure to ideologues such as Omar Abdel Rahman, but others were simply attracted to the miracles described by Abdullah Azzam or moved by mainstream media reporting about atrocities in Bosnia. Even those who had a more thorough grounding in abstract jihadist theology were absorbing those lessons through a relatively limited number of sources.

  Religious indoctrination at the camps was tightly controlled by al Qaeda and a handful of loosely related organizations working from more or less the same playbook, including Lashar-e-Tayyiba and the Islamic Group. Instruction was delivered within a controlled environment, where cultlike indoctrination techniques such as dislocation and isolation helped reinforce the message. This more structured environment created jihadists who were, generally speaking, more formidable and more consistent in their beliefs.

  In the post-9/11 era, two major changes worked together to dramatically alter the model. First, the invasion of Afghanistan virtually destroyed the existing network of al Qaeda training camps and drove non-Qaeda camps deep underground. It became much harder (though far from impossible) to travel to the fields of jihad and receive a decent education. The reconstituted camps in Pakistan operated under a cloak of extreme secrecy in a much more restrictive environment than before. In the United States, the environment for recruiters deteriorated in a corresponding manner, with mosques clamping down on the public airing of extremist rhetoric.

  At the same time, the use of the Internet launched a decade of sustained and often explosive growth, not only for jihadists but for everyone. Internet access became ubiquitous, costs came down, and software and websites became easier to use. The advent of Web 2.0 led to a proliferation of blogs and message boards, and e-mail became the preferred method of communication. All these tools spread within the jihadist community at much the same pace that they did in the general population.

  The chief effect of these two changes was to reverse the old paradigm. With the rise of the jihadist Web, religious indoctrination now tends to come first, and the decision to take part in combat comes second, if at all.

  Would-be jihadists are today able to immerse themselves in a dizzying array of radical Islamic literature. They can feast on hundreds or thousands of hours of video and audio lectures by established clerics, as well as enthusiastic amateurs.

  Among the amateurs, many lack a sophisticated Islamic outlook, but they excel at the Wikipedia approach to expertise. Anyone armed with Google can convince himself (and a certain number of others) that he is an expert in nearly any topic with a few weeks of concerted effort. Islamic jurisprudence may be especially vulnerable to this cut-and-paste mentality, due to its dense complexity and lack of a central religious authority to settle disputes.

  Eventually, aspiring jihadists convince themselves that they too are experts, capable of deciding religious questions that have life-and-death consequences. All this can happen before the jihobbyist steps one foot overseas, as it did with Samir Khan and Zach Chesser.

  Where the jihobbyists start to run into trouble is when they attempt to make the transition from talk to action. The clear passages to physical jihad are long gone, and those who wish to fight are left to their own devices.

  Some succeed, but many more fail. Bryant Vinas nearly got himself killed trying to reach al Qaeda. In late 2009 five young men from the Washington, D.C., area demonstrated that not everyone is as lucky or competent as Vinas. They got arrested about a week after getting off the plane.86

  Before 9/11 someone who selected himself for jihad usually did so because he was pretty damn tough. After 9/11 someone who selected himself was more likely to be a voracious reader.

  When you’re fighting a war, you need foot soldiers more than poets. Whether through lack of aptitude or lack of desire, many jihobbyists simply don’t make it to the front lines. Tarek Mehanna never found a connection, if he was even trying. Ahmed Abousamra managed to get to Iraq only to return after two weeks. Yousef Al Khattab apparently just dropped out. Zach Chesser couldn’t even make it onto a plane.

  12

  The Future of American Jihad

  The journey of the American jihadist spans continents and decades. Americans of every race and cultural background have made the decision to take up arms in the name of Islam and strike a blow for what they believed to be justice.

  Many who embarked on this journey took their first steps for the noblest of reasons—to lay their lives on the line in defense of people who seemed defenseless. But some chose to act for baser reasons—anger, hatred of the “other,” desire for power, or an urge toward violence.

  In the early days of the movement, it was possible to be a jihadist and still be a “good” American. Fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan was seen as admirable in many quarters, including the American right—the same political movement that today harshly criticizes mainstream Muslims who are slow to condemn Hamas. Both the right and the left united to support the Muslims of Bosnia (in principle, at least), and there was no effort to police volunteers who would help them with weapons or their lives.

  But there were flaws in the program. The Afghan jihad gave birth to al Qaeda, and the Bosnian jihad was deeply infiltrated by al Qaeda and other terrorist networks.

  In each country, jihadists primarily (if not exclusively) targeted soldiers of an opposing military force. Today’s jihadists rarely confine themselves to military targets. They also intentionally kill civilians, including increasing numbers of Muslims, and many stage attacks outside of war zones and call those acts of violence “jihad.” Because of this, the concept of military jihad has today been almost irrevocably welded to violent extremism and terrorism.

  Modern jihad presents a clear threat to the national interest of the United States and to the safety of its citizens at home and abroad, as well as to countless innocent civilians of other nations. These countries include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia, where Sunni extremists have targeted Shia Muslims, other Muslim sects they consider to be apostate, and any Muslim of any sect who dares take a stand against them.

  We cannot interdict the behavior of individuals or popular masses on a global scale, but we can and must deal with the problem when it strikes closest to home. American jihadists present a unique threat to their homeland. Understanding the problem is the first step toward finding solutions.

  The observations that follow pertain to the specific, peculiarly American path to jihad. On the global level, the question of radicalization and jihadism is more complex and interwoven with local political and cultural issues, but some of these points still apply.

  PORTRAIT OF AN AMERICAN JIHADIST

  Many jihadist ideologues are motivated by the desire to recreate some form of Islamic caliphate in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and elsewhere in the Eastern hemisphere, whether regionally or in individual countries. Others seek to expand that caliphate on a global scale, with the intent to absorb Western society into a world-spanning Islamic state ruled by a strict, often brutal, interpretation of the shariah (Islamic law).

  Although such motives have a place in public discourse concerning global policy, they are nearly irrelevant to the question of radicalization, especially the radicalization of Americans. Those who take up the jihadist path often end up embracing such global ambitions at a later stage, but very few Americans simply wake up one morning with a desire to impose shariah on the world.

  Radicalization starts most often quietly and usually with a specific grievance. Many elements lead American Muslims to take up the banner of jihad, and some of these will be examined in the following passages, but the first element is almost always the same.

  Whatever else lies in their hearts, virtually all American jihadists share an urgent feeling that Muslims are under attack. The most important reli
gious and political justifications for jihad are based on the idea of self-defense, striking back against aggressors and protecting the members of the global Muslim community, known in Arabic as the Ummah.

  Therein lies a sticky, painful problem. The narrative of Muslim victimization does not originate with al Qaeda. It is a pervasive theme that is deeply entrenched in mainstream Muslim thought, both in America and abroad.

  In preparing for this book, I read nearly two hundred issues of the monthly English-language magazine published by the Saudi-supported Muslim World League, arguably the single most influential Muslim organization in the world. Month after month, the magazine trumpets the alarm: Islam is under attack from enemies everywhere. Islam is misunderstood because of vicious lies by its enemies. Muslims are persecuted and discriminated against on the global stage and in individual countries.

  This isn’t only a Saudi predilection. It can be found, to a greater and lesser extent, around the world. In the United States, the most visible example is the Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Washington, D.C., nonprofit whose daily e-mail newsletter enumerates grievance after grievance, from workplace discrimination to alleged hate crimes, which can be anything from a nasty word to murder or arson. CAIR’s message is more carefully calibrated than that of the MWL, but it contributes to the echo chamber.

  Some of the specific complaints aired by both organizations are entirely valid. Muslims in the United States and around the world suffer their share of travails and persecution, sometimes more than their share in a given time and place.

  Muslim advocates absolutely deserve to have a voice, but they must also ask themselves whether they are—sometimes inadvertently—helping to perpetuate a counterproductive narrative about how the United States collectively treats Muslims.

  CAIR follows in the footsteps of the American Muslim Council, founded by Abdurrahman Alamoudi. AMC was, in its day, as prominent as CAIR is today, but it faded from the scene after Alamoudi’s arrest for trying to assassinate the Saudi crown prince Abdullah. During his time in the spotlight, Alamoudi gave voice to the same litany of grievances and the same sometimes-explicit argument that America, as it currently exists, is fundamentally inhospitable to Muslims.

  This dynamic is made more complicated by the fact that all three of the aforementioned organizations have meaningful ties to jihadist movements. The Muslim World League was Abdullah Azzam’s employer (see chapter 1), and its personnel have been linked to al Qaeda and a number of terrorist plots. Abdurrahman Alamoudi was funneling money from Osama bin Laden to Omar Abdel Rahman even as he advocated for American Muslims as head of AMC (chapter 4). And CAIR’s incorporators can be found in the personnel rolls of Hamas support groups in North America during the early 1990s.1

  While acknowledging the deep complexity of this issue and the clear need for advocacy by and on behalf of American Muslims, it is important to realize that the path to radicalization begins with a rock-solid belief that Muslims are a victim class. Potential radicals do not have to look far to find reinforcement for this view. I will not belabor the point, because I think Muslims must resolve the issue themselves, and excessive input by outsiders can heighten the problem rather than ease it (as will be discussed later in this chapter). But those who encourage American Muslims to see themselves as disenfranchised victims must accept some degree of responsibility for the result.

  Almost every jihadist profiled in this book started on his path with the idea that Muslims are being attacked by non-Muslims, whether in a specific circumstance or on a global level. The line that must be crossed to proceed to military jihad requires defining those attacks as a “war on Islam” (although not everyone who uses that language means to endorse jihad). War must be met by war, and by that logic, people move from angry talk to violent action.

  Jihadist recruiters cynically exploit aggression and atrocities committed against Muslims, as in Bosnia. Once drawn in, recruits often find the sphere of attacks on Muslims that justify an armed response quickly expands. The list of provocations starts with military violence but grows to include “economic oppression,” which is blamed for poverty in Muslim nations; the “immodest” display of women’s bodies on television, which is blamed for corrupting Muslims’ morals; and even simple insults or criticisms of Islam.

  Accepting that someone, or everyone, is engaged in a war with Islam is only a precondition to the radicalization process. To complete the transaction, American jihadists will usually need one or more of the following traits:

  Idealism/altruism: Many American jihadists act—in the beginning, at least—out of good intentions and the simple belief that their actions can bring about a positive change in the world. Ismail Royer is an example of someone who defends his actions with an intellectualized appeal to the better angels of our nature. Abdullah Rashid, in a simpler way, continually calls back to the basic idea of doing good. For both men, the complexity of the real world (and their real personalities) outpaced the simplicity of the stories they like to tell about themselves. Idealism burns brightly in the heart, and it is often impervious to reality.

  Violent tendencies or an obsession with violence: Military jihad and terrorism are inherently violent activities. Those who become jihadists must come to terms with that violence, and some fully embrace it. In certain cases, violent impulses are the primary driver that leads someone to jihad, even more than the defensive rationale. Tarek Mehanna watched and cheered videos of gory beheadings the way other Americans watch football. Isa Abdullah Ali, the veteran of Lebanon and Bosnia, is riveting when he describes himself as a professional soldier and killing machine. His adoption of jihad seems at times like an effort to ennoble a preexisting attraction to violence. Sometimes people seek out a convenient rationalization for their worst impulses, and sometimes that rationalization happens to be jihad.

  Ideology: As discussed in previous chapters, the role of ideology has changed significantly in the last thirty years. During the 1980s people were often recruited to jihad out of a sense of adventure or due to the personal charisma of leaders such as Abdullah Azzam, only becoming seriously indoctrinated with religious rationales after they arrived in Afghanistan or other fields of jihad. Today, the Internet offers a path to ideological radicalization before action. Recruits such as Tarek Mehanna and Zach Chesser absorbed the philosophy of politicized Islam and more advanced radical belief structures, like takfir, before ever taking action.

  Identity politics: On paper, Islam is color-blind. In practice, Muslims can be as racist as anyone else, and radical American movements like Al Fuqra— whose members are mostly black separatists—have a strong component of racial and identity politics. Islam itself can also be experienced as an exclusive political or social identity. Some American jihadists, such as Jose Padilla, have a history of gang identification prior to converting to Islam. The allure of joining a seemingly empowered social network should not be underestimated.

  Alienation: In Europe, social alienation is seen as a significant driver of radicalization among Muslims, but American Muslims tend to be more assimilated than their European counterparts. Nevertheless, some American Muslims— such as Daniel Maldonado—took steps toward radicalism because of a feeling that they could not practice Islam in the United States due to social pressures. Millions of American Muslims would disagree with Maldonado on this point, but it should be recognized as a potential risk factor.

  Fetishization of sex and women: The psychology of sex and gender is incredibly complicated, and I will not attempt a detailed deconstruction here. Yet it’s worth noting that sex often makes an appearance in these stories. Many American jihadists, such as Nidal Hasan and Omar Hammami, were described by friends as “desperate” to get married but only to extraordinarily chaste women. Some jihadist clerics even allow followers to have sex outside of marriage as part of their recruitment pitch.2 Jihadists can also show clear signs of sexual dysfunction, such as Anwar Awlaki’s penchant for hanging around schoolyards and patronizing teenage prostitutes.
The ubiquitous use of rape stories in jihadist propaganda also points toward a fetishized view of sex and women. It’s admirable to act to prevent rape and assist its victims, but the recurring tales of jihadists whose dreams are haunted by the screaming of Muslim women raise some questions worthy of deeper consideration.

  The mix of these qualities is fluid and has changed over time. For instance, the number of jihadist recruits who start from the broad platform of politicized Islam has increased, compared to those who react to specific situations of clearly defined aggression. The motivation of creating an Islamic state is more visible among Americans who want to fight in Somalia but have no ethnic ties to the conflict, to pick the most obvious example.

  The ready availability of sometimes shockingly brutal jihadist propaganda on the Internet also attracts a large cheering section of bottom-feeders: violence junkies, anti-Semites, and small men gripped by hate and self-loathing who lack the will to act themselves but are willing to provide a social context for those who would.

  EVALUATING THE THREAT

  In the 1980s and well into the 1990s, being a jihadist did not by definition alone make someone an enemy of the United States. But since September 11, the practice of military jihad has been criminalized and inextricably linked to terrorism.

  Even those who would take part in jihad overseas, forgoing American targets, are subject to prosecution or death by drone. The most active jihadists overseas are declared enemies of the United States, even when their concerns are primarily local. The participation of American citizens and long-term residents in any sort of jihadist activity is now treated as a security threat in itself, regardless of the nature of that activity.

  Several factors have contributed to that change, aside from the broad shift in American attitudes after September 11. U.S. diplomatic and intelligence efforts have deliberately linked jihadism to terrorism in the sphere of international relations, with a considerable amount of success.3