63. A. Werth, Russia at War (London, 1964), p. 9. See too Sapir, ‘Economics of War’, p. 214, who cites the view of Marshal M. Zakharov in the 1960s that the concept of deep operations using tanks and aircraft ‘fell into disrepute [and]… was even called sabotage’. On lack of military training, Moldenhauer, ‘Reorganisation der Roten Armee’, p. 145. On political education, Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers, p. 144.
Chapter 2
Epigraph: A. Knight, Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant (London, 1993), p. 109.
1. On the memorandum see A. Kube, Pour le mérite und Hakenkreuz: Hermann Göring im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1986), pp. 153–4; E. Fröhlich, ed., Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels (4 vols., New York, 1987), iii, pp. 26, 55, for the comments on the conflict of the future.
2. For the text of the memorandum see W. Treue, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan, 1936’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 3 (1955), pp. 184–210. The translation here is from J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Documents on Nazism (Exeter, 1980), ii, pp. 281–7.
3. Noakes and Pridham, Documents on Nazism, p. 282. On the German military build-up see R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1994), pp. 191–3, 294.
4. G. Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War 1933–1941 (London, 1995), p. 19; J. E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York, 1941), p. 60, letter from Davies to Cordell Hull, 6 February 1937.
5. J. Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security 1934–1938 (Ithaca, 1984), pp. 29, 32.
6. M. Heller and A. Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present (London, 1982), pp. 310–11; Roberts, Soviet Union and War, pp. 43–7.
7. Heller and Nekrich, Utopia, pp. 312–13; C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (London, 1990), pp. 126–7; W. G. Krivitsky, I Was Stalin's Agent (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 244–8.
8. Roberts, Soviet Union and War, pp. 50–51.
9. G. Jukes, ‘The Red Army and the Munich Crisis’, Journal of Contemporary History 26 (1991), pp. 196–8; Roberts, Soviet Union and War, p. 58.
10. Roberts, Soviet Union and War, p. 57.
11. I. Lukes, ‘Stalin and Beneš in the Final Days of September 1938’, Slavic Review 52 (1993), pp. 28–48.
12. Jukes, ‘Munich Crisis’, p. 199; Hochman, Collective Security, pp. 166–7; J. von Herwarth, Against Two Evils (London, 1981), pp. 122–3 for evidence from a German eyewitness.
13. Davies, Mission to Moscow, p. 194.
14. A. Vaksberg, Stalin Against the Jews (New York, 1994), pp. 83–8. Vaksberg argues that Stalin was planning a major trial of Soviet diplomats for 1940, but cancelled it because of the deteriorating international situation. Litvinov died in December 1951 in a car accident, organized, according to Beria's testimony at his own trial, by the security services.
15. Details on Molotov from B. Bromage, Molotov: The Story of an Era (London, 1956); on Beria see the excellent biography by A. Knight, Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant (Princeton, 1993), pp. 5, 14–16, 21–8.
16. J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1947), p. 606: Report to the 18th Congress of the CPSU, 10 March 1939.
17. Details on the rapprochement in J. Herman, ‘Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II: A Review of the Soviet Documents’, Journal of Contemporary History 15 (1980), pp. 583–4.
18. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 602.
19. P. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness A Soviet Spymaster (New York, 1994), p. 95; Herman, ‘Soviet Peace Efforts’. 594, 597.
20. A. Read and D. Fisher, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939–1941 (London, 1988), pp. 157–8.
21. Ibid., p. 158.
22. Ibid., p. 160; Stalin's reaction is recorded in L. Namier, Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration (London, 1950), p. 242.
23. Roberts, Soviet Union and War, pp. 73–5.
24. G. Roberts, ‘The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany‘, Soviet Studies 44 (1992), p. 61, citing a report from Astakhov of 12 May 1939.
25. Roberts, Soviet Union and War, p. 88.
26. M. Bloch, Ribbentrop (London, 1992), p. 247.
27. E. Radzinsky, Stalin (London, 1996), p. 428.
28. There are several versions of Hitler's response to the news. This version is cited in D. C. Watt, How War Came (London, 1989), p. 462.
29. Namier, Europe in Decay, p. 246.
30. J. L. Schecter, ed., Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston, 1990), pp. 46, 53.
31. Soviet statement to Poland, 17 September 1939, in G. Kennan, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1941 (New York, 1960), Document 32, p. 179.
32. J. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, 1988), pp. 172–4; other details from G. Malcher, Blank Pages: Soviet Genocide against the Polish People (Woking, UK, 1993), pp. 7–10; K. Sword,. Deportation and Exile: Poles in the Soviet Union 1939–1948 (London, 1996), pp. 1–12; Esperanto speakers from K. Sword, ed., The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces 1939–1941 (London, 1991), Appendix 3c: ‘NKVD Instructions Relating to “Anti-Soviet Elements”’, p. 307.
33. Sword, Deportation, pp. 13–26; Malcher, Blank Pages, pp. 8–9. The figure of two million refers to all Poles moved eastward, including prisoners of war. The four deportation actions took between an estimated 1,050,000 and 1,114,000.
34. Details in Malcher, Blank Pages, pp. 23–35 Figure for POWs from J. Erickson, ‘The Red Army's March into Poland, September 1939’, in Sword, Soviet Takeover, p. 22.
35. Bloch, Ribbentrop, p. 249.
36. Details from Heller and Nekrich, Utopia, p. 353; H. Schwendemann, Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion von 1939 bis 1941 (Berlin, 1993), pp. 373–5. See too W. Birkenfeld, ‘Stalin als Wirtschaftsplaner Hitlers’, Vierteljahreshefte für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 51 (1966).
37. Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 429; Molotov speech in R. Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (London, 1971), p. 442; 800 Communists from Heller and Nekrich, Utopia, p. 355.
38. Stalin quotation from V. A. Nevezhin, ‘The Pact with Germany and the Idea of an “Offensive War” (1939–1941)’, Journal of Slavic Military History 8 (1995), P. 811; ‘action last’ from R. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from above, 1928–1941 (New York, 1990), p. 49; 1934 speech in J. Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (Oxford, 1953), iii, Report of Stalin to the 17th Congress of the CPSU, 26 January 1934, p. 68. Molotov talk in Nevezhin, p. 821.
39. C. Roberts, ‘Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941, Europe–Asia Studies 8 (1995), pp. 1308, 1315; R. Tarleton, ‘What Really Happened to the Stalin Line? Part II’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 6 (1993), p. 30–1, 34–5; J. Sapir, ‘The Economics of War in the Soviet Union during World War II’, in I. Kershaw and M. Lewin, Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (London, 1997), pp. 215–17.
40. Tarleton, ‘Stalin Line’, pp. 37, 39; other details in Heller and Nekrich, Utopia, pp. 343–6.
41. W. Spahr, Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain (Novato, CA, 1993), pp. 27–30. For a less sanguine view of the battle see R. H. Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers, (Lawrence, Kans., 1996), pp. 169–70.
42. Tarleton, ‘Stalin Line’, p. 39; Schecter, Khrushchev, p. 64.
43. C. Van Dyke, ‘The Timoshenko Reforms March–July 1940’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 9 (1996), p. 87.
44. Ibid., pp. 89–90; Tarleton, ‘Stalin Line’, p. 39; Meretskov quotation in S. Bialer, ed., Stalin and his Generals (New York, 1969), p. 139: memoir of General M. I. Kazakov. On training see H. Moldenhauer, ‘Die Reorganisation der Roten Armee vor der “Grossen Sauberung” bis zum deutschen Angriff auf die UdSSR (1938–1941)’, Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 55 (1996), pp. 134–5, 146–7; Reese, Reluctant Soldiers, pp. 174–5.
45. Tarleton, ‘Stalin Line
’, p. 29.
46. Schecter, Khrushchev, p. 46.
47. Roberts, ‘Planning for War’, pp. 1311–12.
48. Details in Spahr, Zhukov, pp. 33–5 for Zhukov's role in the occupation of Romania; on Latvia see R. J. Rummell, Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917 (New Brunswick, 1990), p. 133; V. Vardys, ‘The Baltic States under Stalin: The First Experiences 1939–1941’, in Sword, Soviet Takeover, pp. 268–87.
49. F. Taylor, ed., The Goebbels Diaries 1939–41 (London, 1982), p. 24: entry for 10 August 1940.
50. M. Cooper, The German Army 1933–1945 (London, 1978), pp. 252–3; J. Toland, Adolf Hitler (New York, 1976), pp. 624–5.
51. Ibid., p. 626. There is now a wealth of German literature on planning for Barbarossa. The best introduction is B. Wegner, ed., From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941 (Oxford, 1997), especially Chapter 7. But see H. Boog et al., Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart, 1983).
52. On occupation plans see A. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945 (2nd ed., London, 1981); R-D. Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg and die deutsche Siedlungspolitik (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1991).
53. Roberts, Soviet Union and War, pp. 126–8; see too B. Pietrow-Ennker, ‘Die Sowjetunion und der Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1939–1941. Ergebnisse einer internationalen Konferenz in Moskau', Osteuropa 45 (1995), pp. 855–6. This is an extensive report on a conference of historians in Moscow to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war. The Russian historians present confirmed that Stalin and Molotov were genuinely seeking a second pact.
54. Roberts, Soviet Union and War, pp. 129–31; Bloch, Ribbentrop, pp. 313–16.
55. R. G. Reuth, Goebbels (London, 1993), p. 282.
56. J. Förster, ‘Hitler Turns East – German War Policy in 1940 and 1941’, in Wegner, From Peace to War, p. 127.
57. Bloch, Ribbentrop, p. 317.
58. Tarleton, ‘Stalin Line’, pp. 43, 48–9.
59. Ibid., pp. 45–6; Roberts, ‘Planning for War’, pp. 1308–9.
60. Roberts, ‘Planning for War’, pp. 1315–18.
61. Spahr, Zhukov, pp. 35–7; Bialer, Stalin and his Generals, pp. 140–41, memoir of General Kazakov.
62. Bialer, Stalin and his Generals, pp. 143–5 and 146–8, memoir of Marshal A. Yeremenko.
63. Spahr, Zhukov, pp. 42–4; Roberts, ‘Planning for War’, p. 1307; Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers, pp. 175–85.
64. For a discussion of the nature of the document see Spahr, Zhukov, pp. 47–9; Roberts, ‘Planning for War’, pp. 1315–18. For the argument about Soviet pre-emption see V. Suvorov, ‘Who was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?’ and comment on the Suvorov thesis of preemption in Pietrow-Ennker, ‘Sowjetunion’, pp. 856–67. Support for the idea of Soviet offensive planning in R. Raack, ‘Stalin's Plans for World War II’, Journal of Contemporary History 26 (1996), pp. 215–27; J. Hoffmann, Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945 (Munich, 1995), Chapters 1–2; E. Topitsch, Stalins Krieg (Munich, 1985).
65. Roberts, ‘Planning for War’, p. 1319; Tarleton, ‘Stalin Line’, p. 50.
66. Nevezhin, ‘Pact with Germany’, pp. 832–3.
67. Spahr, Zhukov, pp. 51, 59.
68. G. Gorodetsky, ‘The Hess Affair and Anglo-Soviet Relations on the Eve of Barbarossa’, English Historical Review 101 (1986), pp. 405–20; Pietrow-Ennker, ‘Sowjetunion’, reported the current Russian view that the Hess flight had a profound influence on Stalin's thinking. On intelligence warnings see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 209–13; D. Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II (Novato, CA, 1990), pp. 15–19.
69. F. W. Deakin and G. A. Storry, The Case of Richard Sorge (London, 1966), pp. 227–30; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 213.
70. Medvedev, Let History Judge, p. 450.
71. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 211; see also Knight, Beria, pp. 107–9.
72. Cited in R. McNeal, Stalin: Man and Ruler (London, 1992), p. 237.
73. Schecter, Khrushchev, p. 56.
74. McNeal, Stalin, p. 238.
75. Spahr, Zhukov, p. 49; G. K. Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections (2 vols., Moscow, 1985), i, pp. 217–29.
Chapter 3
1. D. Volkogonov, Stalin (London, 1991), p. 402; O. P. Chaney, Zhukov (2nd ed., Norman, Oklahoma 1996), p. 110.
2. A. Axell, Stalin's War through the Eyes of his Commanders (London, 1997), p. 162.
3. W. J. Spahr, Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain (Novato, CA, 1993), p. 49.
4. A. G. Chor'kov, ‘The Red Army during the Initial Phase of the Great Patriotic War’, in B. Wegner, ed., From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 417–18.
5. R. C. Nation, Black Earth, Red Star (Ithaca, 1992), p. 106; Dalton reference in M. Kitchen, British Policy Towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War (London, 1986), p. 56. See also S. Olsen, ed., Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters 1930–1964 (New York, 1980), p. 213, diary entry for June 24: ‘80 per cent of the [British] War Office experts think that Russia will be knocked out in ten days.’
6. C. Roberts, ‘Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941’, Europe–Asia Studies, 47 (1995), p. 1307; Chor'kov, ‘Red Army’, p. 416 for airfield figure.
7. R. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman, Oklahoma, 1991), pp. 88–9.
8. S. Bialer, ed., Stalin and his Generals (New York, 1969), pp. 208–9, memoir of Marshal N. Voronov; on the first week see S. J. Main, ‘Stalin in June 1941’, Europe–Asia Studies 48 (1996), pp. 837–9.
9. E. Radzinsky, Stalin (London, 1996), pp. 451–2.
10. Ibid., pp. 453–4.
11. S. A. Mikoyan, ‘Barbarossa and the Soviet Leadership’, in J. Erickson and D. Dilks, eds., Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 127–8 (a slightly different version of Anastas Mikoyan's memoir is in Volkogonov, Stalin, p. 411); Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 455 for the Voroshilov quotation.
12. J. Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (New York, 1945), pp. 9–15, radio broadcast, 3 July 1941. Pravda reference from Nation, Black Earth, p. 115.
13. Cited in A. Werth, Russia at War 1941–1945 (London, 1964), pp. 166–7.
14. J. L. Schecter and V. V. Luchkov, eds., Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (New York, 1990), p. 57; on the militia see J. Barber and M. Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945 (London, 1991), pp. 60, 73–6. An estimated two million volunteers enlisted in the militia during the war.
15. Chor'kov, ‘Red Army’, pp. 422–3; Barber and Harrison, Home Front, pp. 163–4.
16. On Order 270 see A. Sella, The Value of Human Life in Soviet Warfare (London, 1992), pp. 100–102. The Yakov story in Volkogonov, Stalin, p. 430; Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 461–2.
17. Spahr, Zhukov, pp. 59–60; the text of this portion of the tenth edition of Zhukov's memoirs is reproduced in O. P. Chaney, Zhukov (rev. ed., Norman, Oklahoma, 1996), pp. 122–3.
18. A. Knight, Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant (Princeton, 1993), pp. 113–14. The July 20 order was for all military units to be ‘purged of unreliable elements’.
19. G. C. Malcher, Blank Pages: Soviet Genocide against the Polish People (Woking, UK, 1993), pp. 13–14; O. Subtelny, ‘The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine, 1939–41: An Overview‘, in Y. Boshyk, Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath (Edmonton, 1986), pp. 11–13.
20. B. Krawchenko, ‘Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation, 1941 –4’ in Boshyk, Ukraine, pp. 16–17.
21. Ibid., pp. 19–23; I. Kamenetsky, Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine (1941–1944): A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism (Milwaukee, 1956), pp. 52–6.
22. Kamenetsky, Occupation of Ukraine, p. 45.
23. J. Förster, ‘The Relation between Operation Barbarossa as an Ideological War of Extermination and the Final Solution’, in D. Cesarani, ed., The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation (London, 1994), pp. 90–5; C. Streit, ‘Parti
sans, Resistance, Prisoners of War’, in J. L. Wieczynski, ed., Operation Barbarossa: The German Attack on the Soviet Union (Salt Lake City, 1992), pp. 262–70. Hitler quotation from Kamenetsky, Occupation of Ukraine, p. 35.
24. Chor'kov, ‘Red Army’, pp. 417–26; for an extensive discussion of the opening of the Soviet campaign see D. Glantz and J. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, Kansas, 1995), pp. 52–64.
25. M. Cooper, The German Army (London, 1978), p. 314.
26. Soviet Embassy, London, Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet–German War (London, 1942).
27. J. Lucas, War on the Eastern Front: The German Soldier in Russia 1941–1945 (London, 1979), pp. 61–2.
28. Ibid., pp. 31–3.
29. M. van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 150–3; R. L. di Nardo, Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army in World War II (London, 1991), pp. 37–40.
30. Von Hardesty, ‘Roles and Missions: Soviet Tactical Air Power in the Second Period of the Great Patriotic War‘, in C. Reddel, ed., Transformations in Russian and Soviet Military History (Washington, 1990), pp. 154–5.
31. Cited in Barber and Harrison, Home Front, p. 67.
32. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 76–7; J. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (London, 1975), pp. 207–10.
33. Werth, Russia at War, pp. 785–6.
34. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 78–9.
35. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 216–17.
36. Cooper, German Army, p. 312; on armaments see R. J. Overy, ‘Mobilization for Total War in Germany 1939–1941’, English Historical Review 103 (1988), pp. 631–2.
37. J. Toland, Adolf Hitler (London, 1976), p. 685.
38. Ibid., p. 684.
39. A. Fredborg, Behind the Steel Wall: Berlin 1941–3 (London, 1944), pp. 48–9; H. K. Smith, Last Train from Berlin (London, 1942), pp. 59–64.
40. Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 465–6.
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