The Freud Files

by Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen

  207. Freud and Ferenczi (1993), 281.

  208. Ellenberger (1970a), 810–14.

  209. Jung, letter to the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10 January 1912, CW 18, §§ 1034–8.

  210. ‘On psychoanalysis’, letter of Jung to the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 17 January 1912 (Jung, CW 18, § 1039–40).

  211. In English in the original.

  212. This official protestation appeared in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 27 January 1912, signed by Jung and Franz Riklin for the IPA and Alphonse Maeder and J. H. W. van Ophuijsen for the Zurich Psychoanalytical Society. On 28 January, Jung published a heated letter on the debate in the journal Wissen und Leben (Jung 1912a).

  213. ‘A word about psychanalysis’, letter of Forel to the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 25 January 1912.

  214. ‘Psychanalysis and psychoanalysis, or Science and Lay understanding’, letter of Forel to the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 1 February 1912.

  215. Freud and Binswanger (2003), 79.

  216. Cf. above, pp. 47–52.

  217. Hale (1971b), 146.

  218. Ibid., 153.

  219. Since the appearance of the French edition of this book (2006), Ernst Falzeder and John Burnham (2007) have published an article on the Breslau conference, which overlaps at certain points with our study here.

  220. Freud and Jung (1974), 545.

  221. Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse, 1913, vol. 1, 199.

  222. Hoche (1913), 1068.

  223. Burnham (1983), 74.

  224. Bleuler (1913), 665.

  225. Bleuler (1910).

  226. Hoche (1913), 1057.

  227. Ibid., 1059.

  228. Ibid., 1060.

  229. Stekel (1911), 36; Stekel’s emphasis.

  230. Freud and Jones (1993), 146.

  231. Ibid., 147–8.

  232. Ibid., 149.

  233. Jones (1955), 172.

  234. Hoche (1913), 1068.

  235. Kraepelin (1913b), 787.

  236. Weygandt (1913), 787.

  237. Kohnstamm (1913), 790–1.

  238. Stern (1913), 785.

  239. Stransky (1913), 786.

  240. Freud and Abraham (2002), 184.

  241. Ferenczi (1914), 62–3. Freud took up this reductive explanation in his autobiographical study of 1925: ‘[Bleuler] strove too eagerly after an appearance of impartiality; nor is it a matter of chance that it is to him that our science owes the valuable concept of ambivalence . . . He resigned from it as a result of misunderstandings with Jung and the Burghölzli was lost to analysis’ (Freud 1925a, 51). Three years later, Bleuler rejoindered: ‘A small correction is permitted. The reviewer did not leave the International Psychoanalytic Association “due to differences with Jung,” but he considered the impossible demands of the association that his assistants either joined it or should stay away from the meetings taking place in the Burghölzli as a sign, that he no longer wanted to belong; and he understood the latter easily, because he had warned at that time before its founding that this would lead to secessions, and he considered the striving towards orthodoxy to be incorrect in science. It was a matter of principles, not of persons. I do not know of any differences with Jung’ (Bleuler 1928, 1728).

  242. Freud and Jones (1993), 199.

  243. Ibid., 482–3.

  244. Ibid., 234.

  245. Freud and Ferenczi (1993), 519.

  246. Freud and Jones (1993), 242.

  247. Freud and Ferenczi (1993), 550.

  248. Freud and Abraham (2002), 251.

  249. Archives of the Psychological Club, Zurich.

  250. Freud (1914a), 50.

  251. Szasz (1989), 149–50; Szasz’s emphasis. One may compare what Freud wrote in his final letter to Fliess: ‘nor can ideas be patented . . . Once they have been let loose, they go their own way’ (Freud 1985, 466).

  252. Ellenberger (1970a), 638.

  253. Stekel (1925), 570.

  254. Stekel (1950), 138.

  255. Protocols of Aniela Jaffé’s interviews with Jung in preparation of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, 154; Jung Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. On Jung’s influence on Freud’s analysis of the ego and second theory of drives, see Borch-Jacobsen (1988).

  256. Freud and Ferenczi (1993), 133.

  257. Freud (1914a), 7. Freud was taking over control of the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, after Bleuler and Jung had resigned from the editorship.

  258. Freud (1914a), 11–12.

  259. Ibid., 13.

  260. Ibid., 21–3.

  261. Freud (1925a), 48.

  262. Freud (1914a), 15. One wonders how Freud could have known that he would have had great pleasure from Nietzsche without having read him.

  263. Freud (1925a), 59–60.

  264. Scherner (1861).

  265. Popper [Lynkeus] (1899).

  266. Freud (1914a), 19–20.

  267. Janet (1894), vol. 2, 68.

  268. James (1929), 234.

  269. Ellis (1898a), 279.

  270. Ellis (1898b), 608–9 and 614.

  271. Bleuler (1896), 525.

  272. Freud (1985), 448.

  273. On the correspondence between Freud and Ellis, see Sulloway (1992a), 464; and Makari (1998a), 654; on the correspondence with Löwenfeld, see Freud (1985), 413, n. 3.

  274. On Gattel, see Sulloway (1992a), 513–15; Schröter and Hermanns (1992); on Bárány, see Jones (1955), 189; Gicklhorn and Gicklhorn (1960), 187; on Swoboda, see Freud (1985), 461–4, 466–7.

  275. The myth of the universally hostile reception of Freud’s work was demolished by Bry and Rifkin (1962); Ellenberger (1970a), 448, 450, 455, 508, 772–3; Decker (1971); Cioffi (1973); Decker (1975; 1977); Sulloway (1992a), 449–67; Tichy and Zwetter-Otte (1999). See also Norman Kiell’s anthology of reviews of Freud (Kiell 1988).

  276. See Macmillan (1997), ch. 5, notably 129–30.

  277. Makari (1998a), 646–7.

  278. Micale (1990) and (2008).

  279. Hirschmüller (1989), 100.

  280. Donkin (1892), 620; cited in Cioffi (1973).

  281. King (1891), 518.

  282. Clarke (1896), 414.

  283. Binet and Simon (1910), 95.

  284. Alt (1908).

  285. Breuer and Freud (1895), 246; Breuer’s emphasis.

  286. Hirschmüller (1989), 316–17.

  287. Breuer (1895), 1718.

  288. Sulloway (1992a), 509.

  289. Ritvo (1990); Sulloway (1992a); Makari (1997).

  290. Bell (1902), cited by Freud himself (Freud 1910a, 42). Five years earlier, Freud had cited another passage from the same article to illustrate the absence of knowledge of infantile sexuality in scientific literature (Freud 1905a, 173, n. 2).

  291. Sand (1992); on the embeddedness of Freud’s work on dream in the history of the study of dreams, see the remarkable neglected study of Raymond de Saussure (1926), and Ellenberger (1970), 303–11; Kern (1975); and Shamdasani (2003a), section 2.

  292. Freud (1925a), 43. See also Freud (1916–17, 84): ‘But to concern oneself with dreams is not merely unpractical and uncalled-for, it is positively disgraceful. It brings with it the odium of being unscientific and rouses the suspicion of a personal inclination to mysticism.’

  293. See also the note Freud added in 1911 to The Interpretation of Dreams: ‘However much Scherner’s view of dream-symbolism may differ from the one developed in these pages, I must insist that he is to be regarded as the true discoverer of symbolism in dreams’ (1900, 359).

  294. Scherner (1861), 192; cited in Massey (1990), 571.

  295. One may compare this with the famous passage in Freud’s Introductory Lectures: ‘The ego is not master in its own house’ (1917a, 143).

  296. Hildebrandt (1881), 55; noted by Kern (1975), 85.

  297. See McGrath (1967). Freud cited Schopenhauer’s ‘Essay on visions’ three times in The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 1900, 36, 66, 90). On the significa
nce of the German philosophy of the unconscious in the nineteenth century, see Ellenberger (1970a), 208–10, 275–8, 542–3; Shamdasani (2003a), section 3; Liebscher and Nicholls (2010); on Freud’s philosophical Schopenhauerianism, see Henry (1993), chs. 5 and 6.

  298. Already in 1930 H. L. Hollingworth noted: ‘The modern psychoanalytic movement, and what is often referred to as the Freudian psychology, consists chiefly in an elaboration and application of Herbart’s doctrines, and their amplification with a wealth of clinical detail’ (Hollingworth, 1930, 48). See also Jones (1953), 281, 371–6; Andersson (1962); Hemecker (1987).

  299. McGrath (1967).

  300. Nietzsche (1895–1904).

  301. Freud (1985), 398.

  302. Jones (1957), 100.

  303. Merton (1976).

  304. Freund (1895).

  305. Freud (1893).

  306. Freud (1985), 152. On the question of intellectual priority, Ernst Kris noted in his edition of Freud (1954) that the article of C. S. Freund reproduced in part an article by Heinrich Sachs published in 1893 (Sachs 1893), at a time when Freud had not made public his ideas on the principle of psychic constancy. Freud, characteristically, never cites Sachs in the texts in which he refers to this principle.

  307. Freud (1985), 252.

  308. Nunberg and Federn (1967), 48; cited and commented on in Sulloway (1992a), 469–72.

  309. Actually, Névroses et idées fixes [Neuroses and Fixed Ideas] (Janet 1898).

  310. Freud (1985), 302.

  311. Ibid., 325.

  312. Ibid., 463.

  313. In the section of the first edition of the Three Essays devoted to bisexuality, Freud cited Gley (1884), Kiernan (1888), Lydston (1889), Chevalier (1893), Krafft-Ebing (1895), Hirschfeld (1899), Arduin (1900) and Herman (1903). Only in the second edition of 1910 did Freud add Fliess’ name: ‘Fliess (1906) subsequently claimed the idea of bisexuality (in the sense of duality of sex) as his own.’ However, it goes without saying that Freud was aware that the idea of bisexuality figured prominently in Fliess (1897). In 1924 he went further: ‘In lay circles the hypothesis of human bisexuality is regarded as being due to O. Weininger, the philosopher, who died at an early age, and who made the idea the basis of a somewhat unbalanced book [1903]. The particulars which I have enumerated above will be sufficient to show how little justification there is for the claim’ (Freud 1905a, 143, n. 1). The Weininger–Swoboda episode is discussed by Sulloway (1992a), 223–32.

  314. Freud (1985), 466–7.

  315. Swales (1995).

  316. Freud (1920b).

  2 THE INTERPREFACTION OF DREAMS

  1. Hoche (1910), 1009.

  2. Aschaffenburg (1911), 754.

  3. Hitschmann (1911).

  4. Forel (1919), 224, 232 and 235. See Dessoir (1889).

  5. Cited by Ellenberger (1970), 806.

  6. Prince (1911), 348–9.

  7. Haberman (1914–15), 278–9.

  8. Wohlgemuth (1923), 246.

  9. Breuer (1895), 1717.

  10. Freud (1985), 447.

  11. Moll (1913), 190.

  12. James (1920), vol. 2, 327–8.

  13. Binet and Simon (1910), 94–5.

  14. Kronfeld (1912), 194.

  15. Janet (1919), vol. 2, 262.

  16. Haberman (1914–15), 276.

  17. Forel (1919), 229 and 234.

  18. Kraepelin (1913a), 938.

  19. Undated, Adolf Meyer papers, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.

  20. Wohlgemuth (1923), 246.

  21. Hollingworth (1930), 149.

  22. Jastrow (1932), 37–8; Jastrow’s emphasis. Compare this with Wittgenstein’s commentary in 1942: ‘Freud is constantly claiming to be scientific. But what he gives is speculation – something prior even to the formation of an hypothesis’ (Wittgenstein 1966, 44; Wittgenstein’s emphasis).

  23. Clarke (1896), 414.

  24. Gaupp (1900), 234.

  25. Forel (1906a), 214.

  26. Putnam (1906), 40.

  27. Muthmann (1907), 51. Muthmann didn’t intend this as a critique of Freud, which is reflected in Freud’s relatively benevolent response: ‘He [Muthmann] still lacks perspective, he treats discoveries made in 1893 in the same way as the most recent developments’ (Freud and Jung 1974, 64).

  28. Hoche (1910), 1008.

  29. Moll (1913 [1909]), 278–9.

  30. Hart (1929), 73–4.

  31. Popper (1963), 37–8.

  32. See Collins (1985).

  33. Pickering (1995).

  34. Delbœuf (1993a), 259.

  35. Bernheim (1892 [1891]), 168–9.

  36. On this question of the artefact in experimental psychology and psychoanalysis, see Borch-Jacobsen (2009); Stengers (2002).

  37. On the ‘personal equation’ in psychology, see Boring (1929), ch. 8, and Shamdasani (2003a), section 1.

  38. Devereux (1967).

  39. See Kohler’s study (1994) on the laboratory fly Drosophila melanogaster, which continues in a literal manner the programme of an ‘ecology’ of experimental practices proposed by Clark and Fujimura (1992).

  40. Wohlgemuth (1923), 221.

  41. Freud (1925a), 41; our emphasis.

  42. Freud and Jung (1974), 6.

  43. Forel (1906b), 314.

  44. Prince (1911), 347.

  45. Cited in Adam (1923), 47.

  46. Hart (1929), 73.

  47. Woodworth (1917), 179–80.

  48. Jastrow (1932), 249–50.

  49. Freud (1925a), 42.

  50. On this subject, see the excellent remarks of Stengers (2002), ch. 4; as well as Borch-Jacobsen (2009), ch. 2.

  51. On this question of hypnosis in psychoanalysis, see Borch-Jacobsen (1987), reprinted in Borch-Jacobsen (1992).

  52. Frank (1961), 168.

  53. Freud (1925a), 42–3.

  54. Freud (1905b), 261; Freud’s emphasis.

  55. Freud (1914b), 148–9 and 155–6.

  56. Freud (1916–17), 452.

  57. Grünbaum (1985), ch. 2, B.

  58. This point is well demonstrated by Assoun (1981), ch. 3. See also Siegfried Bernfeld to Hans Ansbacher, 26 May 1952: ‘Freud belonged to the group of physicists and physiologists around Brücke, who prepared the way for the positivism of Mach and Avenarius. He certainly knew the Zeitschriift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. In the 1890s, Mach struck him . . . In one form or another positivism was unquestionably his “natural” mode of thinking’ (Siegfried Bernfeld Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; cited by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis in Bernfeld and Cassirer Bernfeld, 1981, 260). Freud mentions his reading of Mach’s The Analysis of Sensations in his letter to Fliess of 12 June 1900 (Freud 1985, 417).

  59. Freud (1915b), 117.

  60. Freud (1900), 598; (1926a), 194.

  61. Freud (1933), 95.

  62. Freud (1925a), 32.

  63. Freud (1917a), 142.

  64. Freud (1915b), 124.

  65. Mach (1976), 178; Mach’s emphasis.

  66. Freud (1937a), 225.

  67. Freud (1920a), 60.

  68. Mach (1976), 8–9.

  69. Freud (1915b), 116.

  70. Mach (1976), 9.

  71. Freud (1923), 253–4.

  72. Freud (1914c), 77.

  73. Jacques Derrida, in Derrida and Roudinesco (2004), 282–3: ‘Among the gestures that convinced me, seduced me in fact, is its indispensable audacity of thought, what I do not hesitate to call its courage: which here consists in writing, inscribing, signing “theoretical fictions” in the name of a knowledge without alibi (therefore the most “positive” knowledge). One thus recognizes two things at once: on the one hand, the irreducibile necessity of the strategem, of the transaction, the negotiation in knowledge, in the theorem, in the positing of truth, in its demonstration, in its “making known” or its “giving to understand,” and on the other hand, the debt of all theoretical (but also juridical, ethical and political) positing, to a performative power structured by
fiction, a figural invention . . . The “friend of psychoanalysis” in me is mistrustful not of positive knowledge but of positivism and of the substantialization of metaphysical or metapsychological agencies’ (Derrida’s emphases). On the supposed ‘athetic’ and non-positional structure of Freudian speculation, see Derrida’s ‘To speculate – on “Freud”’ in Derrida (1987). It seems that Derrida confounded the positivistic critique of metaphysics (evinced in Freud) with its Heideggerian deconstruction.