Colonial America

by Richard Middleton, Anne Lombard

  The conference then turned to the question of a common war fund. This issue provoked a wide-ranging discussion of a plan of colonial union drawn up by Benjamin Franklin. His scheme was that there should be a president general appointed by the Crown and a grand council elected by the colonial assemblies. Representation would depend on each colony's respective population. The grand council, or congress, was to have legislative power, though the president would be able to veto any measure. The new body was to be responsible for defense, relations with native peoples, and lands “not now within the bounds of particular colonies.” It would be financed by quitrents on all new grants.

  The scheme proved too ambitious to be acceptable either to the Crown or to the provincial assemblies, both of which apprehended a loss of authority; in addition it reminded many New Englanders of the hated Dominion of New England. Nevertheless, it was a remarkable initiative, which was to surface again in 1775.

  While the conference was in session, the first hostilities broke out. In 1753 the governor of Virginia, Robert Dinwiddie, had sent a young militia officer, George Washington, to warn the French to stop encroaching on the Ohio. Washington delivered his message and met with various local Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo representatives, seeking to renew their historical alliances with the British. A few Mingoes professed their willingness to help but most of the Indians ignored his entreaties, understanding that British expansion into the valley would hardly benefit their people. Early in 1754, Dinwiddie sent a group to construct a fort on the forks of the Ohio. These men were subsequently surprised by a much larger French and Indian force which proceeded to occupy the site themselves. Dinwiddie then sent Washington, now a militia colonel, back with a contingent to expel them. But although Washington routed a small vanguard of the French, he was subsequently surrounded at a makeshift encampment called Fort Necessity, where he was compelled to surrender and admit his guilt for starting hostilities.

  Document 28

  The Albany plan of union, 1754, reprinted in W. Keith Kavenagh, Foundations of Colonial America: A Documentary History (New York, 1973), Vol. 2, 1374–5

  This ambitious scheme proposed to link the colonies together in a defensive union. Question to consider: How would this plan have changed the way in which the colonies were governed, if it had been enacted?

  The Plan of Union (as finally adopted). It is proposed that humble application be made for an act of Parliament of Great Britain by virtue of which one general government may be formed in America, including all the said colonies, within and under which government each colony may retain its present constitution, except in the particulars wherein a change may be directed by the said act as hereafter follows.

  President-General and Grand Council. That the said general government be administered by a President-General, to be appointed and supported by the Crown, and a Grand Council, to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several colonies met in their respective assemblies.

  Election of Members. The [several] House of Representatives … shall choose members for the Grand Council in the following proportion, that is to say, Massachusetts Bay, 7; New Hampshire, 2; Connecticut 5; Rhode Island 2; New York 4; New Jersey 3; Pennsylvania 6; Maryland 4; Virginia 7; North Carolina 4; South Carolina 4. Total 48.

  Place of First Meeting. The City of Philadelphia

  New Election. There shall be a new election of the members of the Grand Council every three years …

  Meetings of the Grand Council. The Grand Council shall meet once in every year, and oftener if occasion require, at such time and place as they adjourn to at the last preceding meeting or as they shall be called to meet at by the President-General on any emergency …

  Assent of the President-General and his Duty. The assent of the President-General be requisite to all acts of the Grand Council and that it be his office and duty to cause them to be carried into execution.

  Power of the President-General and Grand Council: Treaties of Peace and War. That the President-General, with the advice of the Grand Council, hold or direct all Indian treaties in which the general interest of the colonies may be concerned; and make peace or declare war with Indian nations.

  Indian Trade. That they make such laws as they judge necessary for regulating all Indian trade.

  Indian Purchases. That they make all purchases, from Indians for the Crown, of lands not now within the bounds of particular colonies or that shall not be within their bounds when some of them are reduced to more convenient dimensions.

  New Settlements. That they make new settlements on such purchases by granting lands in the King's name, reserving a quitrent to the Crown.

  Laws to Govern them. That they make laws for regulating and governing such new settlements till the Crown shall think fit to form them into particular governments.

  Raise Soldiers and equip vessels. That they raise and pay soldiers and build forts for the defense of any of the colonies, and equip vessels of force to guard the coasts …

  Power to make laws, lay duties. That for these purposes they have power to make laws and lay and levy such general duties, imposts, or taxes as to them shall appear most equal and just.

  Quorum. That a quorum of the Grand Council, empowered to act with the President-General, do consist of twenty-five members; among whom there shall be one or more from a majority of the colonies.

  Laws to be Transmitted. That the laws made by them for the purposes aforesaid, shall not be repugnant, but as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of England, and shall be transmitted to the King in council for approbation.

  Officers, how appointed. That all military commission officers, whether for land or sea service, to act under this general constitution, shall be nominated by the President-General, but the approbation of the Grand Council is to be obtained before they receive their commissions. And all civil officers are to be nominated by the Grand Council and to receive the President-General's approbation before they officiate.

  Each Colony may defend itself on an Emergency. That the particular as well as civil establishments in each colony remain in their present state, the general constitution notwithstanding; and that on sudden emergencies any colony may defend itself and lay the accounts of expense thence arising before the President-General and General Council …

  Although this episode was intrinsically no more important than many previous skirmishes, on this occasion both crowns felt their prestige was at stake. When news of Washington's setback reached London, Newcastle's ministry determined to launch a four-pronged offensive to secure the frontier. First, a force of two regular regiments from Britain under the command of General Braddock was to do what Washington had failed to do on the Ohio. At the same time the middle and New England colonies were to be harnessed in a double offensive. One by Governor Shirley and the New England troops was to go against Niagara. The other under William Johnson, newly appointed commissioner for Indian affairs in Albany, was to advance north with his Mohawk allies and New York volunteers against Ticonderoga and Crown Point, two French forts on New York's northern border. Finally, a mixed force of regulars and provincials was to attack the French post of Beauséjour. Located at the neck of the peninsula joining Nova Scotia to the mainland, this post was seen as the key to French influence in the area.

  Map 25 The British offensive to secure the backcountry, 1755.

  Braddock arrived in Virginia in February 1755 and conferred with the neighboring governors, but his appearance elicited few offers of assistance. One problem was that the British plans for four simultaneous military expeditions were too ambitious for the highly independent, locally oriented colonial governments to support. Pennsylvania's assembly was especially slow to appropriate funds; its members included pacifists who opposed war in general and were especially reluctant to contribute to an expedition which was being launched from Virginia and likely to benefit that colony. Eventually it voted £20,000 of paper currency but did not include a suspending clause as required in the proprietary instructions.
Maryland had no western territory and therefore no interest in the conflict. The Carolinas claimed that they were too poor and had too many other enemies to worry about the struggle for the Ohio. The net result was that Braddock had difficulty acquiring both supplies and transport and was saved only when Franklin, in his capacity as postmaster general, managed to hire some wagons and horses.

  Another problem was British ignorance about the terrain on which they would be fighting, especially in the West. Planners of Braddock's expedition had failed to realize that the route from Virginia to Fort Duquesne was a narrow track through dense forest that could not carry wagons full of supplies and cannons without being widened. Nor did they comprehend that a substantial number of Indian allies would be critical to the success of their plans, both for purposes of scouting the territory and to provide military assistance. Although William Johnson and George Croghan had managed through skillful diplomacy to organize a contingent of Iroquois and Delaware warriors to accompany the British soldiers to their destination, the Indians were so offended by Braddock's haughty manners that most of them went home. In the end only eight warriors from the western Iroquois remained with Braddock's forces.

  The expedition was a disaster. After crossing the mountains, Braddock's 2,200-man force proceeded at an agonizingly slow pace westwards through the woods. Indian scouts provided the French at Fort Duquesne with ample warning that the British were coming and thus gave the French time to march out and stop their foes. A few miles from the fort, the British came face to face with a mixed force of French regulars, Canadian militias, and over 600 Kickapoo, Miami, Mascouten, Ottawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and Wyandot warriors who had marched out to find them. The Indians fired at them as they were accustomed to do, from behind trees and any other cover they were able to find. The British troops responded in turn as they had been trained to, bravely forming themselves into companies to fire massed volleys towards their enemies. The problem was they could not see their targets since the Indians and their French allies had taken cover. According to Adam Stephens, one of the attendant Virginians, the “Indians crept up hunting us as they would do a herd of Buffaloes … The British troops were thunderstruck to feel the effects of a heavy fire and see no enemy.” Stephens concluded that “you might as well send a cow in pursuit of a hare as an English soldier loaded in his way.” Eventually after three hours of heavy fighting General Braddock was killed and the regulars fled from the field. The British suffered enormous casualties, with two-thirds of their men either killed or wounded, and the incident began a fierce debate over whether British troops should be used in America at all.2

  Further north the colonial forces under Shirley and Johnson were having even more trouble. Although Shirley managed to raise a substantial force of New Englanders, fierce rivalry existed between him and Johnson, reflecting the conflicting interests of New England and New York. Therefore, although Johnson was supposed to recruit some warriors from the Six Nations for Shirley's attack on Niagara, he made little attempt to do so. Both men experienced difficulty supplying their forces. And in the end their expeditions at Lake George and Oswego failed to advance at all. They found the logistics of moving whole armies through a wilderness beyond their means. Johnson's failure was fortuitously disguised by his repulse of a French force under Baron Dieskau, who ill-advisedly attacked his fortifications on Lake George after a long march and without cannon. For this Johnson received a baronetcy.

  The only other success was achieved by Colonel Robert Monckton, who commanded an expedition which captured Fort Beauséjour and thus secured Nova Scotia against further attack by land. The Acadians were then offered one last chance to take the oath of loyalty. When they refused thousands of Acadians were rounded up and deported to the mainland, losing most of their property in the process, for their settlements were destroyed to prevent them being reoccupied. Few arrangements were made for their reception, and many died on the journey. The episode received much publicity in New France, and may well have served to inspire the rest of the French Canadian population to dedicate themselves even more fervently to the war, so as to avoid being conquered and suffering a similar fate.3

  One immediate result of Braddock's defeat was to produce a series of French and Indian raids on backcountry communities in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland. From the point of view of the Shawnees and the Delawares, of course, European settlers in the Pennsylvania backcountry were trespassers and invaders who had stolen their land, violating longstanding promises to protect them and to be their friends. The French victory at Fort Duquesne had finally convinced many of the Shawnees and the Delawares that they had nothing more to fear or to gain from the British. At French urging, they attacked backcountry British settlements at will, killing and capturing some 700 Pennsylvanian settlers and pushing back the line of settlement in some places by 50 miles. Backcountry settlers in Virginia and Maryland, too, fled in the wake of Indian assaults. New York did not escape either, for the Iroquois were not willing to control the area as the British had always assumed they would. Only in the Carolinas, where the Cherokees were still allied with the British, did the backcountry remain quiet.

  Indian allies were vital to the French war effort, for although the military of New France was extremely effective, it was also very small. Every male in the settler population was part of a militia company and received military training, and military service was held in high esteem, especially for members of seigneurial families. Nevertheless the French were chronically short of men since the settler population in New France was tiny. Therefore French military campaigns typically employed substantial numbers of Indian braves who fought alongside French troops. In August 1756, Delawares and Shawnees from the Ohio Valley joined other traditional allies of the French to help a force of French regulars and Canadian militiamen to a successful siege against the poorly defended Fort Oswego.

  Although the Indians had been vital to French success in the battle, their presence became a source of tension between the Canadians and their French commanding officer, the marquis de Montcalm. After the siege at Oswego, the Indians insisted on their customary right to take captives, scalps, and plunder. General Montcalm, who had no experience with North American warfare, was appalled; he believed that the Indians' behavior showed them to be savage and ungovernable. What Montcalm had failed to understand was that the taking of captives and war trophies were vital to Indian warfare, since they provided the proofs of individual courage for which the warriors fought. The Indians, for their part, were pleased with the outcome of the battle, and their enthusiasm for the French cause grew.

  Figure 36 French map of North America, 1756, showing Fort Necessity “détruit” (destroyed), near lower left corner. Photograph by Stephen Davison. Note the detailed information about the locations of Indian as well as European settlements.

  Unlike the French, who had effectively mobilized both the Indians and the settler populations to fight for French interests, British colonial governments struggled to raise men who could fight effectively for their empire. Although many colonies still required men to muster a few times a year for militia training days, these exercises had by the eighteenth century become social gatherings that featured more drinking than military drills. Militias were poorly funded in addition to being badly trained. An observer of the Virginia militia in 1739 had noted the “Diversity of Weapons and Dresses, the Unsizeableness of the Men, and the Want of the least Grain of Discipline in their Officers or them.” The situation had not improved in 1755. For its part, Pennsylvania had not had a regular militia at all, due to the pacifist commitments of the Quakers in its colonial government. Now, in the wake of raids in the backcountry, the anti-Quaker proprietary faction mobilized public support for military action against the Indians. When beleaguered refugees from the backcountry threatened to take over Philadelphia, the governor declared war in April 1756 and began offering bounties for Indian scalps. The Quakers in the assembly were so horrified by such belligerence that a number of them si
mply abandoned public service and left the assembly. Yet even under its newly militaristic provincial government the Pennsylvania militia did a poor job defending the backcountry settlements, lacking training, discipline, and equipment. Making things worse, the governor's scalp bounties encouraged vigilante groups to attack neutral Indians instead of hostile ones, creating even greater instability in the backcountry.4

  The alternative to using the militia was to call for volunteers. However, the system of raising volunteer units in the British colonies had many defects. One problem was young men's reluctance to volunteer. During the early years of colonial settlement, most colonies had imposed an obligation of military service on all free adult white men. However, by the mid eighteenth century military service had ceased to be part of many young men's experience. By now colonial governments had come to rely to a large extent on impressment to fill their limited demands for soldiers rather than calling up all available men. The effect of this policy was generally to limit military service to poor men, since those who could afford it paid for substitutes to serve in their stead. Unlike the young male settler population in New France, young men in most of the British colonies did not think of regular, sustained military service as either a glorious opportunity or a noble duty. Nor was it desirable economically. Military service paid poorly, and most young men from farming families could earn higher wages in civilian occupations, enabling them to save money for the farms they one day hoped to own. For the southern colonies, slave rebellions were an additional concern. Southern governments were reluctant to send too many white men to fight enemies far away, since they needed their white militia members to intimidate the enslaved population at home. A third problem was a lack of military experience, since volunteer units were raised for only one campaign at a time. As the lieutenant governor of New York, Cadwallader Colden, subsequently commented, “Being only levied in the spring and disbanded in the fall they must often disappoint their general's expectations.” Poor performance was to be expected “from men educated for the plough or trades in time of peace who never before saw an Enemy.”5