Victoria's Generals

by Steven J Corvi

  While travelling across France by rail, Gordon dispatched eight telegrams to Granville, two calling for a meeting of the eastern sheikhs at Berber to negotiate a withdrawal, two asking that the Khedive appoint him Governor General for the purpose of withdrawing Egyptian forces and restoring native rule, one calling for the restoration of the Darfur Sultanate and another calling on Egypt to recruit new Sudanese troops. While crossing the Mediterranean aboard the SS Tanjore, he sent another calling for the independence of a Sudan divided among local sultans who would collectively decide the country’s future. Zubeir, he wrote, needed to be kept out of the process, perhaps by exiling him to Cyprus.

  Gordon was met by Evelyn Wood at Port Said with a letter from Baring ordering him to proceed through Cairo and altering the terms of his mission from advising and reporting to one ‘arranging for the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison etc. as rapidly as is consistent with (1) the saving of life and so far as possible, property; (2) the establishment of some rough form of Government which will prevent, so far as possible, anarchy and confusion arising on the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops.’55 In Cairo, Gordon paid his respects (and attempted to salve old grievances) to the Khedive and then returned to Wood’s house, where he was staying, to meet with a committee made up of Wood, Baring, Graham, Nubar and Stewart to discuss the details of his mission. He was to proceed to Khartoum in a double role: as the Khedive’s Governor General and as Her Majesty’s High Commissioner; Gordon would have a credit of £100,000 made available to him; a gradual evacuation would be organised and carried out under his direction; he would be issued two firmans (Khedival proclamations), one publicly proclaiming him Governor General, and a second, to be kept confidential until the appropriate moment ordering evacuation and setting up a purely Sudanese government; he would be given resources to attempt to restore the Fur dynasty in Darfur; and he would meet with Zubeir the next day to seek his assistance.

  On 26 January Gordon attended a meeting, arranged by Baring, with officers with experience in the Sudan. He was accompanied by Wood’s ADC, Reginald Wingate, who was the only person present who could speak, read and write Arabic. Zubeir was present and he and Gordon fought about the death of Zubeir’s son. The meeting ended badly with Wingate assigned to search Suleiman’s courts-martial records for proof of Zubeir’s involvement.56 The meeting adjourned until the next day.

  At the reconvened meeting, the difficulties involving the evacuation of 12–15,000 civilians – Christians, Egyptian government officials and their families – as well as the garrisons arose. Baring stipulated that Gordon determine ‘the most opportune time and the best method for effecting the retreat. It is neither necessary nor desirable that you should receive detailed instructions … You will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Sudan … I also understand that you entirely agree on the desirability of adopting this policy.’ Asked by Baring if he agreed, Gordon responded ‘in the strongest terms’, and Baring inserted into the written instructions the clause, ‘and that you think it should on no account be changed’. Baring continued that the timing of the withdrawal was within Gordon’s discretion, that the country should be left to those who ruled it before the Egyptian conquest, and that, while Egyptian troops should not be made responsible for imposing or maintaining this rule, Gordon was to have ‘full discretionary powers to retain the troops for such reasonable period as you may think necessary in order that the abandonment of the country may be accomplished with the least possible risk to life and property’.57

  Zubeir then came into the meeting and Gordon apologised to him. Zubeir then shook his hand (as he had refused to do the day before) and pledged him his services. Gordon announced that he wanted Zubeir to accompany him to install him in power once he and the Egyptians departed. Gordon said that he had a mystical feeling about his trustworthiness. Since many of the Mahdi’s chiefs were Zubeir’s, he would have little trouble ‘end[ing] the Mahdi in a couple of months’.58 A furious argument over Zubeir ensued and Gordon refused to attend a farewell dinner. Baring reassured Gordon that, once he reached Khartoum, if he still wanted Zubeir, he would support his request. After their departure, Baring wrote privately to Granville approving his selection, but characterising Gordon as ‘half-cracked’ and concluding, ‘My only fear is that he is terribly flighty and changes his opinions very rapidly. I am glad that Stewart, who impressed me very favourably, is going with him, but I don’t think that Gordon much likes it himself. He said to me, “they sent him with me to be my wet nurse”.’59

  On 4 February, Valentine Baker’s force was slaughtered by Osman Digna at El Teb. When the Sinkat garrison heard the news, they spiked their guns and attempted to retreat to Suakin as well, but Digna’s men ambushed them a mile from Sinkat and massacred all of the men and most of their women and children. Only a small party of Royal Marines now held Suakin. By 8 February the India Office, Hartington, Wolseley and the Queen had all called for action - demanding that the government reverse its policy of evacuation, leaving everything east of the Nile under British-supervised Egyptian control, that a British force under Gerald Graham be sent to Suakin to defeat Osman Digna and another sent to Wadi Halfa to support Gordon’s efforts. Otherwise, Wolseley warned, sooner or later an expedition would have to be mounted to relieve Khartoum. Gladstone faced a five-day House of Commons debate and vote of confidence, which he survived while further confusing the government’s Sudan policy, and Graham was ordered to Suakin.

  Gordon and Stewart reached Abu Hamid on 7 February and received a positive welcome, especially when he announced tax reductions and a general amnesty. Emboldened, over the next two days, Gordon sent messages to Baring advising that the Egyptians should keep the Sudan and that the evacuation of Khartoum should be temporary. He still believed that Zubeir should lead the government there post-evacuation, and requested that Baring publish all of his cables to spur British public opinion. Three days later, Gordon sent a first message to the Mahdi at El Obeid, presenting him with Chinese silks and a Turkish tarbush – a hated symbol of the Turkiyya – offering him the Sultanate of Kordofan, and, contrary to Baring’s instructions, requesting a meeting with him. He also offered to ransom Slatin and his men and asked the Mahdi to restore the Khartoum–El Obeid telegraph line to facilitate communication between them. At Berber on 11 February, 1884 Gordon was welcomed with great pomp and ceremony. Before arriving there, Gordon learned that the Khedive had replaced Hussein Pasha Khalifa as the Murdir of Berber with a Circassian. Gordon cancelled the replacement and announced that henceforth the Sudan would be ruled only by Sudanese. That night, Stewart informed him of Baker’s defeat, of which the people of Berber had not yet heard. Reversing course again, the next morning Gordon announced the complete separation of the Sudan from Egypt (though still subordinate to Gordon’s authority as Her Majesty’s High Commissioner) and, to prove his sincerity, showed the secret firman, perhaps inadvertently – he couldn’t read Arabic – to Hussein Pasha and Mohamad Tahir, a jurist thought to be an ally of the Mahdi. Hussein Pasha and the Berber leaders rejoiced at the announcements and at a proclamation that preserved the status quo with respect to slavery in the Sudan. Even Gordon soon recognised the mistake. Through Baring, Granville telegraphed Gordon soliciting his views on the implications of Baker’s defeat and on whether Gordon himself should be recalled. Gordon answered no, calling on his superiors to do nothing precipitous that might interfere with a meeting of tribal chiefs that he was planning once he arrived at Khartoum, or that might drive them into the arms of the Mahdi.

  On 12 February Gladstone finally gave in to the pressure and ordered British forces to protect the Egyptian Red Sea coast. The next day, Graham’s brigade embarked for Suakin. By 5 March, the British had recaptured Tokar and fought and won the second battle of El Teb, forcing Digna’s tribesmen temporarily back into the hills. Its effect on Gordon’s mission would be to cast doubts on the latter’s promises that Britain’s objective was to return control of the Sudan to its native she
ikhs. At around the same time, two British officers fluent in Arabic, Captain (and Egyptian Army Major) Horatio Herbert Kitchener and Leslie Rundle, were sent south to scout the shortest route between the Red Sea and the Nile.

  Having survived a Mahdist ambush at the sixth cataract on board the steamer Ismailia (renamed Tewfikieha) escorted by the Abbas, Gordon arrived in Khartoum on 18 February. He received a warm reception from the city’s notables in a formal ceremony at the Governor’s Palace, and issued taxation remission and slavery continuation statements calculated to please the people. He then turned his attention to his mission, telegraphing Baring, again reversing his position on the Sudan’s future, calling on Britain to assume direct control of the country and appoint a local ruler to whom Britain would offer moral support and a subsidy for good behaviour. ‘As for the man H.M.G. (not the Khedive) should select one above all others, namely Zebeyr [sic].’60 Baring, in accordance with his promise to Gordon, supported Gordon’s recommendation to Granville, but suggested that Zubeir not be sent to Khartoum until Gordon completed his evacuation and left. Already feeling the outrage of anti-slavery supporters over Gordon’s maintenance of the practice, Granville replied on 23 February that the government doubted the wisdom of appointing anyone and that ‘public opinion here would not tolerate the appointment of Zebeyr’.61

  Khartoum, 1884–85

  Gordon sent the first party of Egyptian evacuees northward to safety on 26 February and by 11 March, when operations ceased, he had evacuated 2,140 Egyptians. At the same time, he sent a telegram to Granville stating his view that, to prevent chaos in the wake of the evacuation, the ‘Mahdi must be smashed up’.62 However cogent this advice, the prospect of offensive action against the Mahdi diminished the Cabinet’s confidence in Gordon. In the next few days, Gordon sent at least thirty telegrams to Baring, who took to reading them in batches in order to make sense of them, forwarding only the more lucid of them to Granville. On 29 February Baring wired Granville stating the options in stark terms: ‘simply evacuate with no thought of consequence; or evacuate the country leaving some semblance of order behind’.63 Gordon, he wrote, wanted to do the latter, but Zubeir was necessary to accomplish this, and Baring agreed with Gordon’s analysis and conclusions. Graham’s victory at El Teb convinced Gordon that the Suakin–Berber road would soon be open. On 13 March, however, Graham barely held off another attack at Tamai. Despite Wood’s and Baring’s advice, the Cabinet formally rejected sending Graham’s troops further westward to Berber and ordered their withdrawal to Suakin. From there, the force was ordered back to Egypt on 3 April, leaving just two battalions to guard Suakin.

  On 3 March Gordon wired Baring; ‘Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate the retention of the Sudan. I am quite adverse to it, but you must see that you could not recall me, nor could I possibly obey, until the Cairo employees get out from all the places. How could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled?’64 A day later, however, Stewart sent a more sober evaluation pointing out that the weather and terrain would probably prevent such forays even if they were authorised. He supported Gordon’s plea that Zubeir be sent. Baring made the plea to Granville but he flatly refused the request.

  On 10 March The Times published Frank Power’s account of an interview that Gordon had given (against Stewart’s advice) dwelling at length on the necessity of sending Zubeir to Khartoum. The publication of Gordon’s views ignited a firestorm of protest against empowering Zubeir ‘the slaver’. On 13 March the telegraph line to Khartoum was cut. In response, Kitchener and Rundle were ordered to Berber to facilitate ongoing communications and to keep the Suakin–Berber road open, but they never got there.

  The first Ansár forces, led by Sheikh al-‘Ubeid occupied positions on the Blue Nile across from the city on 14 March, beginning a 319-day siege. On 15 March Sheikh el-Obeid led all the tribes between Berber and Shendi into revolt, and by 20 March some 30,000 Ansár tribesmen loosely surrounded Khartoum. On 22 March the Mahdi’s response to Gordon’s 10 February message arrived in Khartoum carried by three armed Ansár envoys under a white flag. He suggested Gordon renounce his faith and surrender.65 Returning Gordon’s compliment, the Mahdi sent Gordon a patched jibba – ‘a filthy patched Dervish’s coat’66 Gordon called it – for Gordon to wear if he accepted the Mahdi’s offer. Gordon responded that ‘I cannot have any more communication with you’67 – the Mahdi would send at least eight more letters to him by 18 January 1885 – and turned his attention to preparation for the defence of the city and its 34,000 inhabitants. Food continued to flow into the city, now supplemented by land and river raids organised by Gordon and Stewart. The city itself was mostly not fortified, bounded on three sides by the confluence of the Blue and White Niles. To the existing 8ft deep ditch and rampart, which ranged from 5,900 to 6,700ft long depending on the height of the rivers that bounded it, Gordon added barbed and telegraph-wire entanglements, studded the ditch and ramparts with spearheads, laced the first 100yd of open ground with triple-spiked iron ‘crows feet’ and the next 500ft with broken glass, and laid a mass of land-mines made up of tin biscuit boxes full of powder, nails and bullets electronically detonatable. When he ran out of electric triggers, he added somewhat less reliable match or pressure-detonated mines. The ditch was anchored by Fort Mogren at the Blue Nile end and by Fort Buri on the White. The town’s two cross-river outposts, Omdurman across the White Nile and North Fort across the Blue Nile, connected to Gordon’s headquarters in the Governor General’s Palace by field telegraph, were also reinforced. With the summer high-water period approaching, Gordon felt confident of his defensive position.

  Gordon could muster some 8,665 defenders comprising 2,316 black Sudanese regulars – many former slaves and Gordon’s most reliable force – 1,421 Egyptian troops, 1,906 Bashi-Bazouk mercenaries from various tribes, 2,330 Shaigiya tribal irregulars and 692 volunteer townsmen. They would man the 15-mile parameter that enclosed both the town and grazing for the cavalry horses and the farm animals that helped to feed the city. He ensured their morale by paying them with money printed on his own presses and signed by him. Gordon also ordered the armouring and equipping of his small fleet of nine steamers with Krupp breech-loading artillery and Nordenfeld machine-guns.

  On 9 April Gordon received the now month-old warning from Baring that the British had no intention of sending a force to Berber. Angered and blaming Baring, he responded that this left him ‘free to act according to circumstances. I shall hold on here for as long as I can …’.68 On 16 April, he sent a series of messages to Berber for transmission to Cairo, appointing Zubeir, who had already refused to go unless a series of impossible conditions were met, Deputy Governor General of the Sudan with orders to proceed southward. Heavy rains had raised the level of the river giving Khartoum better protection. Sorties into the countryside also brought in large quantities of grain and livestock. The Khartoum arsenal was producing large quantities of ammunition, and, at Gordon’s request, Khartoum ulema denounced the Mahdi as a false prophet. Gordon also made frequent (and false) statements about rescue missions on the way.

  The British Cabinet met on 23 April to consider memoranda penned by Wolseley and supported by Hartington, demanding that the government determine its policy with respect to the Sudan: Wolseley wanted an army sent. After four hours of debate, during which Gladstone expressed his fear that Gordon’s rescue could be a cover for imperialist annexation, it was decided to ask Gordon about his intentions and what force it might take to bring him out. The inquiry would take three months to reach him. There were mass public meetings in Gordon’s support and on 12 May Gladstone’s government survived a vote of censure by just twenty-eight votes after Hartington assured the members that the government would spare no sacrifice to save Gordon.

  Ansár forces overran Berber on 18 May, capturing two steamers, £60,000 and Gordon’s medals, which had been sent there for safekeeping. With Berber now in the Mahdi’s hands, Kitchener and Rundle organised an intelligence and courier network f
rom Aswan. Indeed, on 20 July Gordon sent a message, via courier and telegram, through Kitchener in Dongola reporting that Khartoum and Sennar were still ‘en bonne defence’ and asking for information about relief forces. Some of Gordon’s messages were becoming garbled in transit and Kitchener had to interpret them before transmitting them to Cairo and London. On 2 September Kitchener reported that he thought Gordon was telling him that Khartoum could hold out until mid-November.

  Gordon finally received Gladstone’s questionnaire in July. He answered in a long letter dated 30/31 July, stating that he couldn’t leave Khartoum because:

  the Arabs have shut us up, and will not let us out…. I will conclude by saying that we will defend ourselves to the last, that I will not leave Khartoum, that I will try to persuade all Europeans to escape, and that I am still sanguine that, by some means not yet clear, God will give us the issue.69

  Gordon’s letter did not reach Baring until early October. Meanwhile, on 5 August, in response to a threat from Hartington to resign unless an effort was made to rescue Gordon, Gladstone asked the Commons to authorise a sum ‘not exceeding £300,000 to enable Her Majesty to undertake operations for the relief of General Gordon, should they become necessary’.70 Though the sum was considered inadequate by military experts, the Commons did so and then began its summer adjournment.