Traitor King

by Andrew Lownie

  19 Hoare to Churchill, 28 June 1940, CHAR 20/9A–B/16 and CHAR 20/9A/15, Churchill College Archives, and FO800/326/199c, TNA.

  20 Hoare to Churchill, 28 June 1940, CHAR 20/9A–B/17, Churchill College Archives, and FO800/326/199D, TNA.

  21 Churchill to the Duke, 1 July 1940, CHAR 20/9A–B/22 and CHAR 20/31A/51–2, Churchill College Archives, and FO800/326/201A, TNA. The line ‘Already there is a great deal of doubt as to the circumstances in which Your Royal Highness left Paris,’ had been struck out.

  22 DGFP, 30 June 1940, AA–B15/B002536, No. 66, pp. 68–9.

  23 See KV2/1696, TNA, for more on peace initiatives.

  24 More details of the extensive dealings can be found in FO 371/24407 and FO 371/24408, TNA.

  25 Alexander Weddell to Elizabeth Weddell, 3 July 1940, Weddell, AW, Ms 1W 4126c FAZ, Virginia Museum of History and Culture.

  26 Alexander Weddell to Cordell Hull, 2 July 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States 1940, Vol. III, 1939/4357, p. 41.

  27 Eberhard von Stohrer to Joachim von Ribbentrop, 2 July 1940, DGFP, AA–B15/B002538, No. 86, Vol X, pp. 96–7.

  28 Eccles, p. 132.

  29 David Eccles to Gladwyn Jebb, 4 July 1940, FO 1093/23, TNA.

  30 Winston Churchill to Prime Ministers, 4 July 1940, CHAR 20/9A/34, Churchill College Archives. The eventual version was watered down. ‘The position of the Duke of Windsor on the Continent in recent months has been causing HM and HMG embarrassment as though his loyalties are unimpeachable there is always a backwash of Nazi intrigue which seeks to make trouble about him.’ This would be the future line, not least to Roosevelt in a telegram the same day, FO 371/24249, TNA.

  31 Hoare to Churchill, 5 July 1940, XIII/16/37, Templewood papers, Cambridge University Library.

  32 ‘Report from Informant in Close Touch with (former foreign minister) Neurath’s Entourage’, 7 July 1940, RA KEVIII Ab. Box 3, quoted Ziegler, p. 434, and FO 1093/23, TNA.

  33 Alan Lascelles to John Seal, 9 July 1940, CHAR 20/9B/120-122, Churchill College Archives.

  34 10 July 1940, ACAD 1/9, Churchill College Archives. C was the head of MI6.

  CHAPTER 10

  Operation Willi

  Later that day, 10 July, Peter Russell, an Oxford don – later Professor of Spanish Studies at Oxford – who had been working for British Intelligence since the mid-1930s, flew out to Lisbon. He had been on stand-by throughout June and an earlier flight on 30 June had been aborted as a result of mechanical trouble to the flying boat, which suggests the authorities anticipated problems with the Windsors. A fluent Spanish and Portuguese speaker, his role was to monitor the couple and was supposedly ‘under orders to shoot them if they threatened to fall into German hands during their nightly visits to the casino at Estoril.’1

  Russell stayed with the couple until 24 July. ‘There is . . . no doubt whatsoever in my mind that he had plenty of personal contact with them during this time,’ says his biographer Bruce Taylor. ‘He would talk about this quite freely while never giving up any very specific information as to time and place, nor taking any questions!’2

  The Windsors remained at Santo’s country house, near the Boca do Inferno (the Jaws of Hell), whilst arrangements were made for them to leave for the Bahamas. It was a very comfortable house, set in several acres of walled gardens with a large swimming pool, with a staff of a dozen, including a chef with an international reputation. Wallis played bridge, the Duke golf. There were occasional visits to the British embassy and they were entertained by various friends of the Santos.

  But the couple could not relax. Amidst concerns they might be kidnapped or speak indiscreetly to the press, they were virtual prisoners. There were patrols in the garden, they could only leave the compound with permission and an armed guard, and could walk only along the shore road where they could be observed. They were well aware that they were under surveillance from everyone and surrounded by informers. Bored, angry at the way his country had treated him, the Duke began to drink heavily and was vulnerable to any blandishment that might be offered.

  On 10 July, Baron Oswald von Hoyningen-Huene, the German ambassador to Portugal, reported to Ribbentrop:

  As Spaniards from the entourage of the Duke of Windsor have reported in strictest confidence during a visit to the Legation, the appointment of the Duke as Governor of the Bahamas is for the purpose of keeping him away from England since his return would greatly strengthen the position of English friends of peace whereupon his arrest at the instigation of his enemies could be counted on. The Duke intends to postpone his journey to the Bahamas for as long as possible, and at least until the beginning of August, in the hope of an early change in his favour. He is convinced that had he remained on the throne war could have been avoided and describes himself as a firm supporter of a peaceful compromise with Germany. The Duke believes with certainty that continued heavy bombing will make England ready for peace.3

  The German foreign minister was determined to lure the couple, perhaps through an invitation from a Spanish friend, from Portugal, where they were heavily guarded, back to Spain, where it would be easier to deal with them. As Ribbentrop told Stohrer in a top-secret telegram dated 11 July:

  At any rate, at a suitable occasion in Spain the Duke must be informed that Germany wants peace with the English people, that the Churchill clique stands in the way of it, and that it would be a good thing if the Duke would hold himself in readiness for further developments. Germany is determined to force England to peace by every means of power and upon this happening would be prepared to accommodate any desire expressed by the Duke, especially with a view to the assumption of the English throne by the Duke and Duchess.4

  Amongst the friends seen by the Windsors was Don Javier ‘Tiger’ Bermejillo, who had been a friend of Ernest Simpson whilst serving in the Spanish embassy in the early 1930s and a regular visitor to the Fort. Aristocratic, light-hearted and a romantic, he had been recalled because of a scandal in 1935 and the Duke had been instrumental in a refugee exchange that had saved his life during the Civil War.

  Bermejillo reported back to the Spanish authorities his conversations with the Windsors:

  He said the appointment was offensive but had several advantages. First, official recognition of Her (his wife Wallis). (Second) not having to take part directly in the conflict, to which he had never been party. (Third) to have more freedom to exert his influence in favour of peace.5

  The Germans now put their plan into action. Using as intermediaries Spanish friends of the Duke, he was invited to stay as a guest of the Spanish Government and offered the Palace of the Moorish Kings at Ronda.

  The Duke asked ‘the confidential emissary’, ‘Tiger’ Bermejillo, ‘if a maid of the Duchess to be permitted to travel to Paris in order to pack up various objects there and transport them by van to Lisbon, as they were required by him and the Duchess for the Bahamas.’6 The Germans were only too happy to agree ‘since if necessary the maid’s journey to Paris and above all the return journey to Lisbon can be held up as required in order to postpone further his departure.’7

  Wallis’s maid, Marguerite Moulichon, was given safe passage to Paris to collect various belongings, such as bed linen for the new posting.8 American diplomats also repatriated Wallis’s favourite Nile-green swimsuit, which she had left behind at La Croë, under what came to be called Operation Cleopatra Whim.

  Alec Cadogan was now briefed by one of his intelligence agents in Lisbon:

  of the exceptional care with which the Germans have fulfilled all of the Duke’s desires. Special camions were sent to and fro, and a detailed inventory list was made of all the furniture and personal property of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, which was shown to the Duchess for approval, to give her an opportunity to say if there was anything missing. Some of the more valuable belongings were transported in limousines and special instructions were given for everything to be in perfect order. The desire of the Germans to please the Duke and Duchess of Windsor was absolutely marked
and evident.9

  A new issue now arose. The Duke wanted to take his chauffeur and valet to the Bahamas, both of whom had been called up for war service. The War Office took the view that this would set an ‘unfortunate precedent’ and had already refused Lord Athlone in Canada a similar request, but the Duke was adamant. After taking advice from Monckton and Lord Lloyd, the Colonial Secretary, Churchill’s assistant private secretary John Peck wrote to Churchill ‘that HRH had to be treated as a petulant baby, and that there was a by no means remote possibility that he was prepared to face a break on this subject.’10 Shortly afterwards permission was given for piper Alastair Fletcher to accompany the couple to the Bahamas.11

  * * *

  It was arranged that the couple would leave for the Bahamas on 1 August but, instead of going via New York as was usual and where Wallis wanted to have medical treatment, the British Government insisted they should sail via Bermuda, arguing that the Duke’s views and presence in the US might bring ‘harmful publicity’ before the November presidential elections. They also used the technicality that the Duke was Commander-in-Chief of the Bahamas and his presence would flout American Neutrality Legislation.12

  The Duke was furious, writing to Churchill on 18 July: ‘Have been messed about quite long enough and detect in Colonial Office attitude very same hands at work as in my last job. Strongly urge you to support arrangements I have made as otherwise will have to reconsider my position.’13

  There were good reasons for concern on the part of the British government. On 19 July, Alec Cadogan had received a ‘Most Secret’ telegram from the Lisbon Embassy: ‘We have now learned from a reliable and well-placed source in Lisbon that Silva and his wife are in close touch with the German Embassy, and that Silva had a three-hour interview with the German Minister on the 15th July 1940.’14

  Herbert Pell, the American minister in Lisbon, sent a telegram to Cordell Hull on 20 July after dining with the Windsors: ‘Duke and Duchess of Windsor are indiscreet and outspoken against British government. Consider their presence in the United States might be disturbing and confusing. They say that they intend remaining in the United States whether Churchill liked it or not and desire apparently to make propaganda for peace.’15

  Sir Robert Vansittart, former permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, reported a similar conversation to Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, three days later:

  A very important and influential friend of mine has informed me that he recently sat next to the Duke of Windsor at dinner. My friend is very much perturbed at the prospect of the Duke’s activities. It is evident that he has formed a very low opinion of him. He said that he wished the Duke had been appointed to some post other than the Bahamas, for it was clear that the Duke and Duchess meant to spend a great deal of their time in the United States, where their presence and activities were certain to do our cause considerable harm.16

  This was set against a backdrop of continuing peace feelers from Germany to Britain. On 19 July, the German chargé d’affaires had approached Philip Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington through Malcolm Lovell, the executive secretary of the Quaker Service Council in New York. The approach was taken sufficiently seriously for Lothian to call Halifax that night and for Halifax to circulate it to the War Cabinet.17

  On the same day Hitler, in a speech to the Reichstag, ‘A Last Appeal to Reason’, had called for a negotiated peace to avert the ‘destruction of a great world empire’ and appealed ‘once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain . . . I can see no reason why this war need go on.’

  On 22 July, Eduard Hempel, the German minister in Eire, sent a telegram to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin:

  The impression in the Ministry of External Affairs here about the situation is as follows: A speedy conclusion of peace on reasonably tolerable terms on the basis of conditions brought about by the German success to date would be favored (sic) in general by Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon, and Hoare, whose dispatch to Spain was noteworthy from this point of view, also conservative circles (the Astors, Londonderry, etc.), high officialdom (Wilson), the city, the Times. Prospects for continuation of the war are generally regarded with pessimism . . .18

  Italy’s Gazzetta del Popolo had reported that day that the Duke wanted a government under Lloyd George and that Ribbentrop had received information from London that he had urged the King to appoint a pro-appeasement Cabinet. ‘There are now rumours,’ wrote George Orwell, ‘that Lloyd George is the potential Pétain of England.’19

  ‘Lord Lothian has offered his good offices,’ minuted Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary at the German Foreign Ministry, referring back to the approach of Malcolm Lovell, on 23 July. ‘If he is a normal British Ambassador, he must have had a high approval. We may proceed on the assumption that the Quaker is authorised to bring us together.’20

  And what of the Duke? According to the Portuguese Secret Service surveillance records, the Duke, who asked for his police protection to be removed at one point, was ‘an active player in the plot – using his car to ferry the conspirators around, allowing them to meet at his house, engaging in a constant shuttle between the German, Spanish and British embassies in Lisbon – and portrays a man in a state of agitated indecision.’21

  On 22 July, the Italian minister in Lisbon had radioed that the Duke had no intention of leaving Portugal until October.22 The next day the Duke rang Bermejillo saying he wanted to discuss an urgent matter with him. On 24 July, the Duke told the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, General Franco’s brother Nicolas, that he was ‘ready to return to Spain’.23 The following day, the Italian minister radioed to Rome that the Duke had applied for a Spanish visa and told a friend that the king had ‘demonstrated much feebleness’.24

  The same day, Max zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg had reported a conversation about a negotiated peace with the Aga Khan to Walther Hewel, Ribbentrop’s liaison official with Hitler, that: ‘He had seen Windsor as late as in April and the latter was thinking just as he was and was on close terms with Beaverbrook.’25

  On 25 July, the German Ambassador, Stohrer, reported to Ribbentrop that Don Miguel Primo de Rivera had returned from Lisbon, where he had had two discussions with the Duke, who claimed: ‘Politically he was more and more distant from the King and the present English government . . . The Duke was considering making a public statement and thereby disavowing present English policy and breaking with his brother.’26

  On 6 July, the Duke had a two-hour meeting with Nicolas Franco. ‘The influence upon the Duke and Duchess exerted by the confidential emissaries is already so effective that a firm intention by the Duke and Duchess to return to Spain can be assumed as in the highest degree probable,’ reported Stohrer to the Foreign Ministry.27 He quoted the Duke calling the war a crime and that he was shocked by Halifax’s speech on 22 July, rejecting Hitler’s peace offer. He concluded, ‘The Duke is said to be delaying departure.’28

  The Germans now put into operation a new plan, one of the strangest episodes of the Duke’s life – Operation Willi.

  * * *

  Walter Schellenberg was a clever and ambitious intelligence officer, fluent in French and English, who had read medicine and law at the universities of Marburg and Bonn, before joining the SS in 1933 and rising quickly within its ranks. Now the thirty-year-old Schellenberg was tasked by Ribbentrop to persuade the Duke to work for the Germans either through persuasion – he was authorised to offer 50 million Swiss francs – or by force.29

  On Friday 26 July, Schellenberg arrived in Lisbon. That afternoon the Duke saw an Abwehr agent, Ángel Alcázar de Velasco, who operated under the code name ‘Viktor’.30 He brought with him a letter from Don Miguel Primo de Rivera, claiming that unless the couple left for Spain, they would be murdered by British Intelligence, and that they should agree to be escorted to Guarda, a village 150 miles north-east of Estoril on the Spanish border.

  The Duke asked to have forty-eight hours to think about it. David Eccles ‘flew back to Lond
on with despatches furnished by Franco’s brother. These confirmed that the Duke was planning to return to Spain’.31 Eccles later reiterated, ‘They were trying to get him to agree and he would sort of play the hand for a peace conference in which the Germans would see that he got the throne.’32

  The British, who were reading Abwehr codes, now decided to act and the trusty Monckton was despatched to Lisbon. He arrived on 28 July, bringing with him a letter from Churchill:

  It will be necessary for the Governor of the Bahamas to express views about the war and the general situation which are not out of harmony with those of His Majesty’s Government . . . Many sharp and unfriendly ears will be pricked up to catch any suggestion that your Royal Highness takes a view about the war, or about the Germans, or about Hitlerism, which is different from that adopted by the British nation and Parliament.33

  On 29 July, the Italian minister in Lisbon, Renato Bova Scoppa, reported to Ciano that the emissary de Velasco had told a colleague, ‘The Prince thinks like us.’ The message was sent on to Berlin.34 It had said that it looked like the Duke was ready to fall in with the plan, but Monckton’s efforts had been effective. The next day, Schellenberg wrote in his log: Willi will nicht (‘Willi says no’).

  Later that day, Hoyningen-Huene sent a telegram to Ribbentrop stating that, though the Duke was still in favour of peace negotiations, he considered ‘the present moment as inopportune for him to manifest himself on the political scene’, adding ‘that his departure for the Bahamas need not imply a rupture, since he could return with 24 hours’ flying time via Florida.’35

  At noon on 30 July, the Duke gave a press conference at the British embassy to say he was off to the Bahamas. Ribbentrop now decided that there was only one option – to abduct the couple.

  The following day the Duke saw Don Nicolas Franco, who reminded him that: ‘The moment may come when England will feel the need to have you once more at her head, and therefore you should not be too far away.’36