Chosen Soldier

by Dick Couch

  “Special Forces personnel routinely deal with the unfamiliar,” Major Ed Deagle tells me. Major Deagle is a trained psychologist who administered the three-and-a-half-day classroom portion of the ATL training. Deagle is a scholarly man, very approachable, and has none of the rough edges of the men he is training. He has an easy sense of humor, and he’s very perceptive.

  “Many of these officers bring with them a set of decision-making skills that’ve proven successful in traditional or more structured situations. The adaptive process is just that. We first want to develop their sensitivity to changes in their environment—changes that may affect their approach to a situation. Quite often, they do what they have always done in a new situation, even when their approach does not apply to the existing conditions. Second, we want them to change or modify their approach in a manner that will be successful—one that will move them to a resolution of the problem or desired outcome. And finally, we want this change in behavior or approach to be driven by some shift in the environment. When things change, so do they.”

  “At first, this concept was hard for me to get my arms around,” Matt Anderson says of his ATL training. “I understood what not to do, as I have my own way in which I approach problems or people. I guess we all do. For me, the ATL training forced me to step back a moment and see the problem—to take an additional moment to evaluate the situation and not rely on old techniques. I was one of those guys who would question the problem if my solution didn’t work or was marginally effective. You can’t do that; ATL teaches you to focus on how I can change to better handle the problem. The classroom drills helped a lot.”

  One of the scenarios is a negotiation. On one side of the negotiation is the student team leader, who has to arrange transportation for his team across a piece of arid and unfamiliar terrain in North Africa to their base camp location. He has limited funds to make these arrangements, feed his men, and support his mission. He also knows the locals to be crafty, sometimes unreliable, and out to make a quick buck. The trek to the base camp is long and dangerous. The team leader has to make a good bargain and a safe bargain. On the other side of this negotiation is an ATL student playing the part of a local merchant. The merchant has invested his family’s money in trucks and knows the Americans can be profitable customers. He also knows that he has the only trucks available, but the journey will be dangerous, and it would be catastrophic to lose the trucks. Yet he needs to make this deal to stay in business, and it has to be a good deal. Like his countrymen, the merchant enjoys the art of negotiating, and holds those who don’t negotiate in low esteem. The team leader and the merchant enter negotiations. Each has a best deal, an acceptable deal, and a bottom-line deal position. Each knows what, for him, is a bad deal. Under the precepts of adaptive thinking, both have to read the human terrain—the other person—as they work for the best possible outcome.

  “This kind of negotiation is very typical,” Ed Deagle says of this scenario. “Special Forces detachment leaders do this all the time. But the thinking behind the negotiation exercise has a much broader application. These ATL techniques will work for solving problems in a range of strategic, tactical, diplomatic, and leadership situations. They are particularly helpful in cross-cultural situations and when stress and emotion are factors in decision making. We try to give these future team leaders the tools to make better decisions. Some of them come to this quickly, and some are very hard to pry out of their old ways of problem solving in a structured environment. A few of them will see this as hocus-pocus and change very little. Others will readily adapt to it, and it will become a valuable asset in their leadership toolkit.”

  Following the classroom work, the 18 Alpha candidates begin a six-day field problem designed to challenge their decision-making ability in an unfamiliar environment and with ambiguous instructions. The students begin with a historical, political, military, cultural, religious, and geographical overview of the Pineland scenario. Pineland is a mythical nation around which much of the Phase IV training is built. They are briefed at a simulated forward operating base, where the commander tasks them with gathering certain physical and human intelligence. Their mission is to determine the feasibility of American support for a resistance movement in the country of Pineland. The resistance group they are to contact is known to oppose the Pineland government, which is unfriendly to the United States. They are infiltrated in two-man teams by helicopter to the outskirts of a metropolitan area—usually the outskirts of Richmond or Raleigh-Durham. Once on the ground, they must cache their equipment, change into civilian clothes, and “infiltrate” into the city. They are armed only with contact instructions for their first partisan linkup. This exercise has gone by a number of different names, but it’s currently called the Volkmann Exercise.

  “This is a full-on role-playing scenario,” Eric James says of the exercise, “and the students have to stay in role and play the game if they’re to learn from it. They have information about their first contact and where to meet them. Each member of the team will take the lead in three or more meetings where they’ll have incomplete information about the parameters of the meeting and about the individuals whom they must contact and extract information. Information is parceled out to the officer candidates depending on how well they handle the meeting and their elicitation skills.”

  Following the meetings, the teams exfil to a safe area and are returned to base, where they’re debriefed by a Special Forces officer playing the role of a joint special operations task force intelligence officer. During this debriefing, each student captain presents the information he collected and any corresponding conclusions. Then he’s evaluated on how he did or did not meet the commander’s objectives and intent.

  “This is a rude awaking for many of these guys,” Eric James says. “Very little in their military experience has prepared them for this. They are used to dealing with subordinate soldiers and superior officers with clear-cut lines of authority and communication. Now they must deal with a resistance fighter or sympathizer who has his own frame of reference. For the student, the turf is unfamiliar, their marching orders are vague, and they have varying degrees of control over their environment. It challenges the limits of their interpersonal skills. After each meeting, the resistance member role player fills out an in-depth critique of the meeting. What the student takes away from the meeting and how the role player perceived the exchange are often very different. It’s a huge learning experience, but only if the students stay in character. This is the first of many such meetings during this phase. They will conduct dozens of them during Phase IV and the Robin Sage exercise.”

  There are fifteen days devoted to strategic reconnaissance and direct action. Five days are devoted to mission planning in the classroom at Aaron Bank Hall, then the all-officer student ODAs travel to Fort A. P. Hill, an Army base in central Virginia, for field training. Each ODA is given a target package with the mission of conducting a strategic reconnaissance of the two targets in the package. The student officers know that they’ll probably be tasked with a follow-on direct-action strike immediately following their reconnaissance. In my student ODA, ODA 912, the assigned team leader is Captain Larry Shaw. Shaw is chosen to lead because he is a chemical warfare officer and the only American officer in 912 not to have been to Ranger School. Major James wants him to get as much time as possible in planning and leading small-unit operations. The foreign officers are excused from this particular class exercise for a special briefing in Washington. The other captains in 912 are assigned duties within the ODA, those of team sergeant, intelligence sergeant, communications sergeant, and the like. The planning process is not unlike that in Phase II, but far more detailed and analytical. This formatted approach to planning is called the military decision-making process, usually referred to as MDMP. It is both methodical and comprehensive, and—if used properly—allows for creativity in the planning process, but forces the planners to examine every aspect of the mission. MDMP is the common format of special operations a
nd joint-service operations. It allows SOF components such as Special Forces, Rangers, and SEALs to share planning doctrine with conventional forces.

  “This is the only time in Phase III you will plan as a student ODA and take that planning into the field,” Eric James tells 912. “The foreign-internal-defense and unconventional-planning exercises will be far more detailed and rigorous. So we let you cut your teeth on the reconnaissance and direct-action problem. It’ll give you a chance to work and plan as a team. It’s also a chance to get creative and apply your adaptive-learning training to a tactical problem. This is an opportunity to have some fun and take chances. In your planning, think about novel ways to execute your mission. Don’t get too clever, but forget the book. Think about ways to accomplish your mission with minimum exposure and least chance of compromise.”

  Nine-one-two attacks the problem, and begins to build alternate courses of action to accomplish its mission of observing its assigned targets. The team considers various courses of action and works up plans for infiltration, exfiltration, time on target, actions on target, and the host of logistical, contingency, and mission-essential tasks associated with the operation. There are medical, communications, and weather annexes to prepare. As a team, they’re all nimble with computers and the mission-planning software. Each of these captains has his personal version or versions of standard MDMP format—modified, tailored, and annotated from previous tours and planning previous operations. This planning software is carried on their personal laptops and on one or more thumb drives. A thumb drive is a small, removable computer storage drive a bit smaller than your thumb. When the drive is not plugged into the back of a computer, it’s often carried around the candidate’s neck on a lanyard.

  “A thumb drive on a lanyard is the staff officer’s ID badge,” Captain Miguel Santos says with a grin. His role on the team for this exercise is the intelligence sergeant. Santos is one of the better mission planners in the student ODA. “I’ve been planning missions and small-unit tactics since I was at West Point. Every time I do this, I learn something, and that leads to a shortcut or a way to do it better the next time.” He fingers the small cylinder around his neck. “Every lesson learned goes here, and it’s available when I need it.”

  Nine-one-two plans for two days and formally presents several operational courses of action to its forward operating base commander, who is played by Major Brooks. Brooks agrees with the single course of action it recommends, and the team begins the more detailed work that will turn the chosen course of action into an operable mission plan. This planning begins at Fort Bragg and continues when they arrive at Fort A. P. Hill.

  The facilities at A. P. Hill are excellent, and there are no distractions. As a young junior-grade lieutenant back in 1969, I trained at A. P. Hill with SEAL Team Two. The current facilities are Spartan and similar to those at the Special Forces training areas on Fort Bragg—dated wooden buildings with barracks space at one end and a planning bay at the other. The planning bays are cluttered with easels, whiteboards, tables, folding chairs, laptop computers, equipment boxes, MREs, field gear, and weapons storage lockers. For three days, 912 plans for its recon mission with the expectation of a follow-on direct-action tasking. The goal of much of this planning effort is the operational briefing for the forward operating base commander. This briefing is called a briefback. In this case, the commander is played by the Fort A. P. Hill base commander, who, by chance, happens to be a Special Forces officer.

  Captain Shaw’s plan is simple and straightforward. The eight-man ODA will insert some four miles from the target area. The men will then patrol to the area and establish a base camp to support their mission. Shaw and his communicator will man the base camp while two three-man reconnaissance and surveillance teams will move closer to the targets and establish patrol bases. The plan is for the two recon teams to lay up during the day and move about at night to survey the targets—a mobile radar site and a communications relay station. The briefback reflects the general political and military situation in the nation of Pineland. Shaw’s presentation is very smooth and professional, with various members of the team sharing the briefing duties. The real learning comes from the feedback from the commander’s comments.

  “Good job,” he says to Captain Shaw, but he’s really speaking to all of them. “You touched on all the mission critical issues and peripheral information. A couple of things. Since this is, for now, a reconnaissance mission, stress the importance of remaining undetected. Your guys have to know just how important this is, and remaining undetected has to drive your planning and your movement near the target.

  “As soon as you get on the ground and into the target area, get off a situation report to me as soon as you can. There’ll always be a very anxious forward operating base commander waiting to hear from you. He wants to know if you are all right, and he wants some ground truth. You are ground truth. Other commanders will likely key in on your information, right up to the area task force and regional commanders. You are now the best and most current information source.” He pauses to consult his notes. “You have a good plan, but keep it flexible as your recon teams will need to see things firsthand. If and when you are tasked with a direct-action follow-on mission, you’ll want to plan with their recent observations. You’ve probably already gamed a direct-action operation, but be open to the best and safest way to accomplish the mission. Right now, you may think the best option is to engage the target with a sniper weapon. Change the plan if your ground analysis shows this is not the best way to do this. Don’t underestimate the value of a simple standoff weapon like your M203 grenade launchers. They can be very effective against a soft target like a radar site.”

  The battalion commander leaves, and Eric James begins his critique. “I agree with the colonel; it was a good briefback.” Then he begins a long list of “do better” and “consider this” items.

  “When talking weather, terrain, enemy movements, and quick-reaction forces, talk about how these factors affect your mission. And always focus on the simplest way to accomplish your mission. On the positive side, Captain Shaw, I like the way you positioned yourself in base camp and in a position to support both of your reconnaissance teams. It’s a strong command-and-control position. Some commanders would like to see you in the primary recon team, but I think you have better overall control in the base camp. It means that you’re in for a few days of sitting on your butt in a hide site, but it’s best for the mission.

  “Again, you did a lot of things well, but as team leader you have to sell yourself, your plan, and your team to your commander. During the planning, intelligence drives the operational plan; during the briefing, your command of the intel will help you sell your operational plan. Be confident. Don’t look at your briefing slides; look at him. Speak in a clear, command voice—look him in the eye. Say things like ‘Your intent is’ and show him how your plan addresses his intentions. He may have other tactical options. Give him every reason to have confidence in your ability to carry out this mission.

  “There’s another reason you want your immediate commander and everyone else up the chain of command to have confidence in you,” James tells his captains. “A lot of commanders want to micromanage you in the field. The last thing you want is some guy back in a rear area calling you every few hours to ask you how it’s going. It’s in your interest to give the higher-ups every reason to trust you and to let you do your job. This is especially true for routine tactical missions or missions that are administrative in nature. A detachment commander recently back from Afghanistan told me he had an emergency request to send his medic to a forward position to tend to some friendlies who had been wounded by an IED. He sent his junior medical sergeant and his senior weapons sergeant to take care of it. The area commander, a conventional-force guy, ordered him to go—he wanted the detachment commander on the end of the radio so he could call every fifteen minutes and see what was going on. It was nothing his two sergeants couldn’t handle. The detachment commander h
ad his team sergeant in the field with a platoon of local militia and wanted to be near his ODA base camp. He finally had to tell his commander to let him do his job or to relieve him. You have to know your team and your stuff, and you have to be respectful, but you also have to stand your ground.”

  Nine-one-two conducts its rehearsals, sanitizes its briefing spaces, and boards its insertion helo—in this case an old six-by-six Army truck. The men are dropped off late afternoon for a four-mile night patrol to the target area. The temperature is in the mid-thirties, it’s raining, and their rucks top out at about ninety-five pounds. They’ll be in the field for five days with no resupply. Just before dawn the following day, the three elements of 912 go to ground in their hide sites. In most reconnaissance and surveillance missions, the recon teams move at night and hide out during the day. Choosing and preparing a good hide site is an art form. They’ll usually look for a small depression or a narrow ravine to start with. Then they move about the area to find fallen branches to bridge the depression. A woodland-pattern tarp is placed over the branches and covered with sticks, vegetation, and leaves. Most teams carry a can of spray adhesive so the leaves will cling to the tarp and look natural. You can walk within a few feet of a good hide site in the daytime and not see it. Before the elements go to ground for the day, they rig jungle antennas, using a slingshot to carry a weighted line over a tree branch to hoist the wire antenna into the air. When the sun is full up, 912’s two hidden recon teams are in communications with Shaw in the base camp on their handheld MBITR radios. In the base camp, Captain Shaw raises the forward operating base on his PRC-137. By midday, the cadre are out looking for the student teams to see how well they’re hidden.