Chosen Soldier

by Dick Couch

  We have a superb and highly professional military that has no peer when it comes to expeditionary and maneuver warfare. But today’s enemies don’t fight that way. They may posture in a conventional military manner, with parades and smart marching columns—as Saddam’s army did and Kim Jong Il’s army still does—but they cannot match us on the battlefield. In 1968, the North Vietnamese tried to mass their forces against ours during the Tet Offensive and at Khe Sanh. They took a terrible beating. Our media ceded these victories, but the enemy was crushed on the battlefield. So they stepped up their insurgency efforts, and five years later they sent us home. Saddam was a slow learner; it took a thrashing in the Gulf War and another trip to the woodshed a decade later for him to get it. But Saddam was a thug, and the people of Iraq were glad to see him go. So were others in the region, especially the Iranians. Like Tet and Khe Sanh, our invasion of Iraq was a tactical victory, and like post-1968 Vietnam, we face an entrenched insurgency with a very superior conventional force.

  I speak often and at length with special operators returning from rotations in Afghanistan and Iraq. I spoke with as many as I could while I was in Iraq. They’re proud of their service, and they feel they’re gradually making a difference in their areas—their little sectors of the war. They believe the insurgents are, for the most part, a ruthless and foreign-driven influence, and that most Afghans and Iraqis don’t want them in their country. They don’t want us there, either, but they generally understand why we’re there and the conditions under which we will leave. More than most in our deployed force structure, our special operators often deal with the locals on a daily basis, out in the villages and towns or helping to train the Iraqi and Afghan army and police units. On balance, they are not encouraged about our efforts to counter these insurgents. In traveling about Iraq, I was not encouraged by what I saw. Specifically, I was not encouraged by the nature of our presence, our management of the war, and the restrictions imposed on our forces.

  First, the nature of our presence. Our visible military presence in Iraq, frankly, borders on the obscene. We have taken Saddam’s army and air force bases and made them into gigantic logistic, personnel, and convenience centers. There are post exchanges, Subway sandwich shops, latte bars, gyms, swimming pools, miniature golf, and massive messing facilities. The contract chow halls are overwhelming. Along with a lot of overboiled and fried food, there are ethnic dishes—Chinese and Hispanic mostly—sandwich bars, salad bars, fresh fruit, and an impressive selection of pastries—not desserts, but pastries displayed in pastry cases. Two of the chow halls where, I must admit, I ate like a pig had Baskin-Robbins counters. The personal quarters for the soldiers, airmen, marines, and an occasional sailor ranged from barracks living to two-to-a-container billeting modules, all air-conditioned—Spartan, but very comfortable. The showers and toilet facilities are modern, communal, and often spotlessly maintained by contractors. Most Iraqis don’t live this well, and neither do soldiers in the Iraqi army. The bases I visited had extensive defensive perimeters that protected runways, aircraft, flight lines, motor pools, maintenance facilities, warehouses, command centers, and just about anything else you would see on a large military base in the United States. Except for the checkpoints, concertina wire, and the ten-foot-tall slabs of eighteen-inch-thick concrete used to create on-base minicompounds and contain indirect-fire attacks, these are U.S. bases. I found it troubling that these bases in Iraq have a permanent feel to them, much like the ones we have here at home.

  Don’t get me wrong, some very brave soldiers and marines go out on patrol, conduct operations, stand duty on checkpoints, and put themselves at risk to provide some measure of security and stability to Iraq. Convoy duty is often combat duty. It’s hot, dangerous, dirty work, and they do it courageously and professionally. But then they retire to these huge, fortified American installations with replicated American amenities and count the days until the end of their rotation. This is a generalization, but a lot of our forces live like this. Those whose duties don’t take them off base, and there are a lot of them, simply live out their rotations in this military twilight of a reconstituted America. Those scattered forces I saw in the outlying, smaller installations live a different life. So do those who do the heavy lifting of training the Afghans and Iraqis—like the Special Forces ODAs. They live much like the men they train.

  The management of this war goes back to fighting the current war with the Army you have. In spite of the recent powering-up of SOF budgets, we still have a conventional force in the field and battle management by the regular Army or Marine Corps ground-force commanders. They own the battle space in Iraq and Afghanistan. There’s an SOF command structure in these theaters, with joint special operations task forces and task units and forward operating bases and advanced operating bases—like the one I visited at Al Asad. But none of these “own” battle space; they provide only administrative, logistical, or intelligence support. If a detachment of Special Forces and their Iraqi army scouts or local tribesmen want to mount an operation against insurgent elements in the neighboring town or neighboring mountains, they have to get permission from the conventional commander responsible for that area or sector. Training of the Iraqi army or the Iraqi police is a conventional U.S. Army responsibility. They may ask for Special Forces help with this, and the smart military-training teams do, but they don’t have to. A lot of field-grade and senior SOF commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq are in the position of “selling” SOF capability to an Army (or Marine) battalion or regimental commander. I’d like to see battle space or territory given to SOF commanders and subordinate conventional forces assigned to support them. I realize that this runs against the current military culture, but I think it’s time to rethink our approach to fighting this enemy—even though less than one soldier in twenty in the active theaters is an SOF operator. We need a more robust SOF command-and-control structure. Maybe in the next war—or when the light goes on and we build and tailor a force to meet the threat and tactics of this insurgent enemy. Or the next one.

  Finally, there is the issue of restrictions in the use of force. The rules of engagement and the Rules of Land Warfare, as you have seen, are drilled into future Special Forces soldiers in the Q-Course and are a fact of life for all our deployed forces in the operational theaters. The SOF operators in the field live with these rules, and many a battle-space commander lives in fear that they will be violated—that there will be an incident that will get him relieved of command and end his military career. The bad guys know these force restrictions and how to get around them. IEDs and suicide bombers kill our soldiers and marines, and they kill even more Iraqi soldiers, policemen, and civilians. Yet placing an IED is a crime, not so much an act of war. If an insurgent is caught with a shovel in his hand digging alongside the road, he can put his hands up and not be shot. He will, in all probability, be processed, sent to an interrogation center, and released. He knows it, the average Iraqi knows it, and so does that Army specialist out patrolling those mean streets in his armored Humvee. They see some of these guys more than once. However, if the act of placing an IED were to earn a bomber an on-the-spot bullet, then there would be fewer of them out there—a lot fewer. Some of the detainees I observed appeared to have smirks on their faces. They were known insurgents, foot soldiers, and they knew they would be back on the streets in a few weeks. The issue of security and the ability of a government to protect its citizens is paramount. IEDs and suicide bombers visibly threaten this—and from what I saw, they threaten it effectively. Again, most of our combat casualties on the nightly news are from IEDs.

  I don’t have an answer for this one; it’s very dicey business. The special operators I speak with feel the level of insurgent violence could be dramatically reduced if they and the locals they train could take stronger action—specifically, against the bomb makers and the bomb placers. But the on-the-spot-bullet call is a difficult one. Any decision to shoot preemptively is a serious one—for those you make eligible for the bullet, ce
rtainly, and for those who have to make the on-the-ground decision to shoot preemptively. I say this with no regard for an insurgent who probably deserves this form of summary justice. I’m far more concerned about the American soldier, special operator or otherwise, who pulls the trigger. I care deeply for our soldiers and marines, and I want them to leave their field with honor; I want them mentally and morally intact when they return home. This, more than any other reason, is why we need to get this matter into the hands of the Iraqis and Afghans. Let them decide the fate of some Syrian or Saudi dirtbag insurgent who has come to their country to kill their citizens, or a member of their community or family.

  There is a final issue, and it has nothing to do with rules of engagement or conventional-force application versus special operations—it’s an in-house SOF issue. This is the emphasis within the special operations community regarding unilateral, direct-action operations as opposed to a commitment to train the locals. In a broad sense, both can be seen as counterinsurgency measures. The SOF proponents of direct action feel that if you find and kill enough senior-level insurgents, then the insurgent gears will grind to a halt and buy us the time to win local hearts and minds. They’re trying to cut the head off the snake, and they did with the targeting and elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Those who practice foreign internal defense advocate a by, with, and through approach—that the training of local soldiers and policemen should be a priority. The locals, once trained and fielded, are a whole lot better at the job than we are. Having done the former, albeit a long time ago, and seen the latter, I’m inclined to believe that training the locals to do the job is better—way better. It’s a matter of preventive medicine or surgery. And while developing the language and cross-cultural skills is more difficult and more time consuming than purely tactical, behind-the-gun skills, it’s what really sets the special operator apart from his conventional counterpart. What I’m saying here is that within special operations, we need more focus on foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency—these are the essential skills.

  This applies not just to Special Forces, but to our Rangers and SEALs as well. This in-house attention and concentration is important now, as we deal with this insurgency, and as we prepare for the next one. It’s the way our enemies will fight.

  There’s an old military adage that we usually fight the current war with the tactics of the last war. This is because wars supposedly change, and the military force that once proved effective is out of date—obsolete. We came into this war woefully unprepared to deal with an insurgent enemy; we simply lacked counterinsurgency capability in our force structure. In that regard, we learned little from Vietnam. I predict that the next war, or, better said, the next campaign in this one—the Regional War Against Islamic Extremists—will look a whole lot like this one. To be as unprepared as we were, especially with the decision to go into Iraq, was unfortunate. To be unprepared the next time, in the context of those we send into harm’s way, will be criminal.

  GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND MILITARY NOMENCLATURE

  1st SWTG

  1st Special Warfare Training Group

  18 Series military occupational specialties (MOS):

  18 Alpha (18A)

  Detachment commander

  180 Alpha (180A)

  Assistant detachment commander

  18 Bravo (18B)

  Weapons sergeant

  18 Charlie (18C)

  Engineering sergeant

  18 Delta (18D)

  Medical sergeant/combat medic

  18 Echo (18E)

  Communications sergeant

  18 Foxtrot (18F)

  Intelligence sergeant/18 Fox

  18 Zulu (18Z)

  Team sergeant/operations sergeant

  APFT

  Army Physical Fitness Test

  ATL

  Adaptive Thinking and Leadership

  BDU

  Battle dress utility (camouflage uniform)

  BNCOC

  Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course

  COIN

  Counterinsurgency

  DA

  Direct action

  DZ

  Drop zone

  EPW

  Enemy prisoner of war

  FID

  Foreign internal defense

  FOB

  Forward operating base

  Gs

  Guerrillas

  GPS

  Global Positioning System

  HALO

  High-altitude low-opening

  Humvee

  For HMMVW—high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

  IVW

  Involuntary withdrawal

  LBE

  Load-bearing equipment (vest)

  LMTV

  Light medium tactical vehicle (an Army 4 × 4 truck)

  LZ

  Landing zone

  MDMP

  Military decision-making process

  MOS

  Military occupational specialty

  NCO

  Noncommissioned officer

  NVGs

  Night-vision goggles

  Psyops

  Psychological operations

  ODA

  Operational Detachment Alpha

  ODB

  Operational Detachment Bravo

  OSUT

  One Station Unit Training

  Q-Course

  Special Forces Qualification Course

  QRF

  Quick-reaction force

  Radios

  Radios used by Special Forces:

  AN/PSC-5D

  Also PSC-5; primary satellite communication/SATCOM radio

  AN/PRC-137F

  Also PRC-137 or 137; primary high-frequency (HF) radio

  AN/PRC-148

  Also MBITR, or “embitter”; multiband inter-/intra-team radio, a handheld FM radio

  AN/PRC-119F

  Also PRC-119; FM base-station voice radio

  ALE

  automatic link establishment (text message format used with PRC-137)

  Rank

  Enlisted Army rank structure, junior to senior:

  Private first class (PFC)

  Specialist

  Sergeant, or buck sergeant

  Staff sergeant

  Sergeant first class

  Master sergeant—command senior master sergeant, often designated as first sergeant

  Sergeant major—command senior sergeant major, often designated as the command sergeant major, or CSM

  ROEs

  Rules of engagement

  SARE

  Situational Awareness Reaction Exercise

  SAW

  Squad assault weapon

  SF

  Special Forces (refers to Army Special Forces)

  SFAS

  Special Forces Assessment and Selection

  SFPC

  Special Forces Preparation Course

  SOF

  Special operations forces (refers to Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations)

  SR

  Special reconnaissance

  SWCS

  Special Warfare Center and School (John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School)

  TAC

  Teach, advise, and counsel

  UW

  Unconventional warfare

  VW

  Voluntary withdrawal

  ABOUT THE AUTHOR

  Dick Couch is a 1967 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He graduated from BUD/S Class 45 in 1969, and was the class Honorman. He was also first in his class at the Navy Underwater Swimmers School and the Army Military Free-Fall (HALO) School. As Whiskey Platoon Commander with SEAL Team One in Vietnam, he led one of the few successful POW rescue operations of that conflict. Following his release from active duty in the Navy, he served as a maritime and paramilitary case officer in the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1997, he retired from the Naval Reserve with the rank of captain. Dick and his wife, Julia, live in central Idaho.

  ALSO BY D
ICK COUCH

  Nonfiction

  The Warrior Elite

  The Finishing School

  Down Range

  The U.S. Armed Forces

  Nuclear, Chemical, and

  Biological Survival Manual