The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  In early 1812, however, Prince Peter Bagration reflected the opinion of more hard-line officers when he called for an aggressive stance towards the French. He proposed establishing a demarcation line on the River Oder, and its violation, ‘even by a single French Battalion’, would be considered a casus belli. Bagration suggested using ‘any means possible’ to ensure Austria’s support – or at least its neutrality – while an agreement with Britain would provide necessary funding. Depending on Napoleon’s actions, Bagration called for an invasion of Poland and the Germanic lands to raise a national movement against the French and ‘to remove the theatre of war from the boundaries of the Empire.’10

  Ludwig Wolzogen, a Prussian officer who joined the Russian Army in 1807, contemplated a more defensive strategy and proposed deploying two armies along the western frontiers. If the French attacked, one of them would withdraw to a special line of well-supplied fortresses, organized along the Dvina, Dnieper and other rivers, where it would make a stand. The second army would operate against the enemy’s lines of communication. Wolzogen’s ideas can be compared to an insightful, albeit largely overlooked, memo by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Chuikevich of the Secret Chancellery of the Ministry of War. Addressed to Barclay de Tolly, Chuikevich’s memo argued that Napoleon would seek a decisive battle to eliminate the enemy armies, therefore the Russians should avoid one as much as possible. Referring to the Spanish example, he contended that ‘it is necessary to conduct a war that [Napoleon] is not accustomed to’ and to start a guerrilla war utilizing lying detachments to harass French communications and supply lines. Chuikevich anticipated that the Russians would have to abandon vast territories to Napoleon but then, having gathered sufficient forces, they would be able to give battle to the exhausted, overextended and significantly reduced enemy forces: ‘The loss of several provinces should not frighten us since the integrity of the Empire resides with the integrity of the Army.’11

  Chuikevich’s memo, submitted in early April 1812, certainly indicates that the ‘Scythian plan’ was considered and discussed in its various aspects by the Russian high command on the eve of war. In the month preceding the start of the war, Barclay de Tolly and Bagration were already discussing evacuating large supply depots and laying waste to the countryside to create obstacles for the enemy to overcome. The Minister of War’s instructions specified: ‘We should prevent the enemy from using any of our supplies during the offensive, cut his lines of communication and always employ a “scorched earth’’ policy during our retreat.’12 Such a ‘Scythian plan’, however, was limited in nature and contemplated retreating only as far as the western Dvina. Barclay de Tolly himself was ready to surrender the recently acquired Polish–Lithuanian provinces and retreat towards ‘our ancient frontiers’. Lieutenant General Kankrin agreed that: ‘at the start of the war, no one anticipated retreating beyond [the] Dvina, and certainly not as far as Smolensk; as a result very few supply magazines were established beyond that river.’

  At first glance the proposed defensive and offensive plans seemingly contradicted each other, but as S. Shvedov argued:

  the intentions of the Russian command to invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and Prussia did not contradict the concurrent groundwork for a lengthy retreat [into Russia]. The purpose of the pre-emptive offensive was to move the ‘scorched earth’ zone, where the Russians wanted to engage Napoleon, as far west as possible. If achieved, the entire burden of the war would be removed from the shoulders of the Russian nation and placed on its neighbours.13

  Among the mentioned plans, Wolzogen’s ideas had particular effect, since they caught the attention of Lieutenant General Karl Ludwig August von Pfuel, a former Prussian officer who now advised the Russian Emperor. Recognizing that the western frontier of Russia was divided by the bogs of Polesye into two parts – northern and southern – Pfuel suggested that Napoleon could only approach from one of two directions: north of Polesye or south of it. He proposed to concentrate two armies and deploy one in the north and the other in the south. Should Napoleon approach from the north, the first army would retreat to the ‘Drissa camp’ on the western Dvina river and hold him there. The second army would then act on the enemy’s flanks and rear. But if Napoleon approached from the south, the second army would retreat to Zhitomyr and Kiev and the first army would attack the his rear, as well as his lines of communication.

  This plan was flawed for several reasons. For a start, it did not take into consideration the possibility of a French attack along both approaches. Meanwhile, the limited strength of Bagration’s army made an attack on the flank and rear of the enemy unrealistic, since Napoleon only had to oppose it with an equivalent force to halt its advance. Furthermore, the Russian armies would be divided into several components, each isolated from the others by long distances and difficult terrain. And finally, the location of the camp at Drissa was poorly selected, and its construction was not completed before the war began. Carl von Clausewitz, who served in Barclay de Tolly’s army, studied this fortification shortly before the 1st Western Army retreated, declaring that: ‘if the Russians had not voluntarily abandoned this position, they would have been attacked […] driven into the semi-circle of trenches and forced to capitulate.’14

  Nevertheless, Alexander, trusting Pfuel, approved the plan. Accordingly, the 1st Western Army was deployed north of Polesye, in the area of Vilna, and the 2nd Western Army was posted south of it. Further complicating matters was the fact that Alexander was reluctant to renounce previous strategic arrangements, even though the situation in Europe had changed and offensive war became impossible. The lack of logistics complicated the problems of transporting supplies that were stored in new depots along the border. As a result, during the first days of the war in June–July, the retreating Russian armies were compelled either to abandon huge magazines to the French or destroy them.

  During 23–25 June, Napoleon’s army crossed the Russian border at the River Nieman, motivated by the grandiloquent rhetoric of a new imperial proclamation:

  Soldiers!

  The second Polish War has begun. The first war ended at Friedland and at Tilsit; at Tilsit, Russia swore an eternal alliance with France and war against England. Today she is violating her pledged word. She is unwilling to give any explanation for her strange conduct until the French Eagles have crossed back over the Rhine, leaving our allies there to her discretion. Russia is led on by fatality! Her destiny must be accomplished. Does she then believe us to be degenerates? Are we then no longer the soldiers of Austerlitz? She places us between dishonour and war. Our choice cannot be doubted, so let us march forward! Let us cross the Nieman! Let us carry the war into her territory. The second Polish war will be glorious for French arms, like the first; but the peace we shall conclude will carry with it its own guarantee, and will put an end to that proud influence Russia has exercised for fifty years over the affairs of Europe.

  As the Russian armies retreated, discontent about the conduct of the war quickly increased among Russian officers and soldiers. Russia had not sustained a foreign invasion since that of Charles XII’s Swedes in 1709, and even that was defeated at Poltava. A contemporary recalled: ‘The victories of [Field Marshals] Peter Rumyantsev and Alexander Suvorov made the very word “retreat’’ reprehensible.’15 Throughout the 18th century, Russia fought victorious wars against Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, Persia and Poland. The 1799 Campaign in Italy, conducted by Alexander Suvorov, was regarded as a true reflection of Russian military spirit, and the setbacks in the Alps were overshadowed by heroic Russian exploits. The defeat at Austerlitz in 1805 was largely blamed on the Austrians, while the memories of Friedland were soothed by victories in Finland and Wallachia. So, on the eve of the French invasion, an offensive psychology prevailed in the Russian military. Many officers were unwilling to accept defensive warfare within Russia and were inflamed by a belligerent ardour to fight Napoleon. According to one Russian nobleman:

  All letters from the Army are filled with aspiration of war and ani
mation of the souls […] It is said that soldiers are eager to fight the foe and avenge the past defeats. The common desire is to advance and engage Napoleon in Prussia, but it seems that the Sovereign’s advisers are against this notion. They decided to wage a defensive war and let the enemy inside our borders; everyone aware of this German [italics added] strategy […] is extremely upset, considering it as the greatest crime.

  And a few days into the war Colonel Zakrevsky complained:

  We are retreating to that dreadful Drissa position that seems to doom us for destruction. [Our commanders] still cannot agree on what to do and, it seems, they make the worst decisions. The cursed Pfuel must be hanged, shot or tortured as the most ruinous man …

  A letter written by General Rayevsky expressed similar sentiments: ‘I do not know what the Sovereign’s intentions are […] Pfuel’s voice is stronger than anyone’s […] Lord save us from such traitors.’ But Ivan Odental perhaps expressed the Army’s frustration best, writing: ‘it seems to me that Bonaparte gave our leaders large doses of opium. They are all dozing off while [worthless] men like Pfuel and Wolzogen are acting instead of them.’16

  Despite increasing criticism of Pfuel’s strategy, the Russian armies continued to withdraw towards the Drissa Camp. The 1st Western Army reached the camp on 8 July, when Alexander finally realized the laws of Pfuel’s plan and discarded it. Urged by his advisers, Alexander then left the Army without appointing a supreme commander. Barclay de Tolly took over the command of the 1st Western Army and also enjoyed authority over the 2nd Western Army based on his position as Minister of War.

  On 14 July Barclay de Tolly abandoned the Drissa camp, detaching General Peter Wittgenstein with some 20,000 men to cover the route to St Petersburg. Barclay de Tolly then withdrew toward Smolensk, fighting rearguard actions at Vitebsk and Ostrovno. In the south, Bagration withdrew first on Minsk and then to Nesvizh and Bobruisk, eluding Napoleon’s enveloping manoeuvres and gaining minor victories at Mir and Romanovo. When Marshal Davout’s forces finally intercepted the 2nd Western Army at Moghilev, Bagration fought a diversion at Saltanovka on 23 July, while his troops crossed the Dnieper to the south and marched toward Smolensk through Mstislavl. On 2 August, the two Russian armies finally united at Smolensk, bringing their total strength to 120,000 as opposed to some 180,000 in Napoleon’s main force.

  Meanwhile, in the north, French forces Marshal Oudinot attacked Wittgenstein, protecting the road to St Petersburg, taking Polotsk on 26 July. But in combats near Klyastitsy on 30 July–1 August, the French suffered a defeat, forcing Napoleon to divert Saint-Cyr to support Oudinot’s operations. And in the Baltic provinces, Macdonald’s corps was fighting near Riga, while the Russians redirected reinforcements from Finland. Finally, in the south, Tormasov defeated French forces at Kobrin and then pinned down Schwarzenberg and Reynier in the Volhynia region. On 31 July Chichagov’s Army of the Danube moved from Moldavia to support Tormasov.

  Thus, by August 1812, Napoleon’s initial plan to destroy the Russian forces in a decisive battle had largely failed. The two main Russian armies eluded piecemeal destruction and united at Smolensk, while the Grand Army suffered high losses from strategic consumption and desertion.

  43. Borodino Battle-Array (Jomini)

  52. Battle of Borodino (Lejeune)

  Campaign Chronicle

  By the time they reached Smolensk, the Russian armies were already reeling from an ongoing crisis of command. The continuous retreat stirred up discontent among the troops, with many senior officers opposing Barclay de Tolly’s defensive strategy. Relations between the two commanders-in-chief deteriorated after they began to exchange recriminating letters, each unaware of the difficulties the other faced. Yet this discord was far from a simple quarrel between two generals: it also represented political friction between foreign officers and members of the Russian aristocracy, most of whom preferred a straightforward stand-up fight and bitterly resented the surrender of every inch of Russian soil, blaming the outsiders for all their misfortunes. Needless to say, chances of a harmonious partnership between Barclay de Tolly (a Livonian of Scottish ancestry) and Bagration (a Georgian prince) were thus severely compromised.

  Indeed, the two commanders gradually came to represent opposing fractions within the officer corps. Barclay de Tolly was surrounded by the so-called ‘German Party’, consisting of émigrés or the descendents of settlers. The latter were usually thoroughly Russified, but they still had foreign-sounding names, and many professed Protestantism or Catholicism, unlike the Orthodox Russians. The ‘Russian’ group naturally resented numerous foreign officers, who filled Alexander’s army in the wake of Napoleon’s European conquests. For many Russians, such an influx of foreign officers seemed to have undermined the very spirit of the Russian Army and many identified with Bagration’s complaint that: ‘our headquarters is so full of Germans that a Russian cannot breathe.’ Besides, many newcomers were incompetent or inexperienced but took advantage of their social standing and connections to obtain promotions, as Bagration observed: ‘wishing to become field marshals without reading any military journals or books […] Today the rogues and impudent upstarts are in favour.’

  2–7 August: Mutiny of the Generals

  Leading the Army against the French, Barclay de Tolly acted under great stress and would later note that ‘no other commander-in-chief operated in more unpleasant circumstances than I did.’17 Although his Scottish family settled in Russia in the 17th century and loyally served its new motherland for decades, Barclay de Tolly was still perceived as a foreigner by the ‘real’ Russians. According to Jacob de Sanglen, head of the Military Police, on the eve of the war he warned Barclay de Tolly that: ‘it is troublesome to command the Russian troops in their native language but with a foreign name.’18 Barclay de Tolly could not boast ancient nobility or titles – and he never became a wealthy estate and serf owner as many around him did – but his successful career and high social status caused envy and hostility among fellow officers, and this was exacerbated by his foreign origins.

  The Russian prejudice against foreign officers had deep roots, and by 1812 it was ingrained in both the Army and society. Russian senior officers gradually formed an anti-Barclay opposition party aimed at his dismissal. Barclay’s own staff members, headed by Major General Yermolov – ‘the sphinx of modern times’ as he was described for his inscrutable, conspiratorial mind – intrigued against him. Unaware of the actual circumstances and exasperated by the retreat, officers taught the rank and file to call Barclay de Tolly by the nickname ‘Boltai da i tolko’ (‘All talk and nothing else’). Soldiers complained about the continual retreat since: ‘they were prejudiced against the word “retirada’’ [retreat], considering it alien to the dignity of the courageous soldiers, whom [Field Marshals] Rumyantsev and Suvorov trained to advance and gain victory.’

  Thus, confidence in the Commander-in-Chief was undermined and every new stage of the retreat intensified the malicious rumours about him. It was hard for Barclay de Tolly to parry thrusts of criticism since his cautious, albeit sensible, policy contrasted with the popular ideas of Bagration and his fire-eating supporters. One of the Russian officers understood that Barclay’s defensive strategy was ‘prudent’ but also noted ‘the extremely negative impact’ it had on the commander-in-chief: ‘The common view about him was that of a treacherous German; naturally, this was followed by mistrust and even hatred and contempt that were openly expressed.’19

  Bagration, with his impeccable reputation and eagerness to fight, certainly fared much better in the eyes of the common soldier. A contemporary remarked: ‘The difference in the spirit of the two armies was that the 1st Army relied only on itself and the Russian God, while the 2nd Army also trusted Prince Bagration […] His presence, eagle-like appearance, cheerful expression and keen humour inspired soldiers.’ Similar sentiments are echoed by Yermolov, who noted a dramatic difference in the state of the armies as they reached Smolensk:

  The 1st Army was exhausted b
y the continuous withdrawal and soldiers began to mutiny; there were cases of insubordination and agitation […] At the same time, the 2nd Western Army arrived [at Smolensk] in an entirely different state of mind. The music and joyful songs animated soldiers. These troops showed only pride for the danger they had overcome and the readiness to face and overcome a new danger. It seemed as if the 2nd Western Army did not retreat from the Nieman to the Dnieper, but covered this distance in triumph.20

  Such were the passions on the eve of the junction at Smolensk, and the impending meeting of the two generals was naturally expected to be intense.

  Yet, to everyone’s surprise, when they encountered each other on 2 August both commanders displayed unusual tact, realizing the importance of restoring a workable partnership.

  When Bagration arrived, accompanied by his generals and aides-de-camp, Barclay de Tolly met him wearing a parade uniform complete with medals, sash, and plumed bicorn in hand. The two commanders then had a private conversation and each apologized for any injustice he might have caused the other. Bagration praised Barclay’s withdrawal from Vitebsk and Barclay de Tolly complimented Bagration on the skilful manner in which he had eluded Napoleon’s trap.

  Bagration was pleased with this meeting and though senior in rank, agreed to subordinate himself to Barclay de Tolly. Unity of command was thus achieved for the moment. Alas, such cordiality between the generals would survive a mere seven days.

  7–14 August: Offensive at Last

  With the Russian armies concentrated at Smolensk the question was what to do next? Should the armies continue retreating or take advantage of their combined strengths and launch an offensive? The majority of officers, and Russian society in general, demanded a more vigorous conduct of the war. Minor successes at Mir, Romanovo, Ostrovno, Saltanovka, and Klyastitsy were already portrayed as great victories, which only intensified calls for an offensive. In early August, Pavel Pushin, serving in the 3rd Battalion of the Semeyonovsk Life Guard Regiment, noted in his diary the general restlessness prevailing in the Army: ‘We all are burning with impatience to fight, each of us is willing to shed blood to the very last drop, and, if commanded properly, we will inflict heavy losses on the enemy.’ Three days later the Army learned about Count Wittgenstein’s victory at Polotsk and the news only intensified the sentiments.