The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  Eugène of Württemberg hardly managed to regroup his men when ‘enemy cavalry in superior numbers’ attacked his troops. He immediately issued orders for the Volhynskii and Tobolskii Regiments to organize battalion squares, while the two other regiments were kept nearby in reserve. Allowing the enemy to approach at close distance, the Russians then opened volley ire and repelled several enemy charges. During this combat, Lieutenant Kiselev of the Tobolskii Regiment was dispatched ‘with the skirmishers to halt the enemy skirmishers, followed by several Horse Artillery guns and cavalry that sought to lank our squares. He accomplished this task with exemplary gallantry, arresting the enemy until the arrival of our cavalry’.

  Simultaneously, Sub Lieutenant Popov I of the Volhynskii Regiment was sent with

  a squad [‘vzvod’] to recapture a gun that was seized by the enemy and which the enemy cavalry was already moving away. However, Popov’s commendable courage recaptured this gun from the enemy’s hands and delivered it to Colonel Glukhov’s Company [Half Company of the 1st Battery Company].

  Despite its heavy losses, the 4th Division held its grounds against the enemy charges and was soon supported by Creitz’s Dragoons. Eugène of Württemberg saw Barclay de Tolly in the heat of the action and was surprised by ‘his utter resignation and the conduct of this most chivalrous of men, who had been completely misjudged by Russian public opinion’. Barclay de Tolly soon ordered him to halt and deploy the 2nd Brigade more to the right-hand side, where General Miloradovich needed support. As Barclay de Tolly was conversing with Eugène of Württemberg, General Miloradovich’s adjutant, Bibikov, rode up and asked him to ride at once to his commander. The Duke asked which way and, as Bibikov raised his arm to point it out, a cannon-ball ripped it off. Ignoring his agonizing pain, Bibikov pointed again with his remaining arm and responded, ‘There! Hurry!’346

  As Barclay de Tolly and Eugène travelled to meet Miloradovich, who awaited them near the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Division, an eyewitness recalled that: ‘a cloud of dust swept down on us from the left like an avalanche and the closer it rolled the more monstrous its dimensions appeared’. Almost as soon as the command ‘Battalions form squares!’ rang out, the French cavalry came charging. The Russians organized squares where Barclay de Tolly, Miloradovich and Rayevsky sought shelter. ‘We were completely surrounded’, recorded a survivor,

  and each of our squares was left to work its own salvation like some warship driven before a storm […] The yell of ‘En avant!’ rang in our ears and the force of the onslaught of these mighty masses almost took our breath away […] The French cavalry emerged from the dust with a gleam of armour, a rattling of their scabbards and a flashing of the sun on the metal of those helmets of theirs with the horsetail switches. Drunk with victory, this majestic, heroic horde of cavalry pressed home its attack against our iron wall …347

  Although the enemy cavalry charges were repulsed, the 4th Division suffered severely from artillery fire and some 300 men of the Volhynskii and Tobolskii Regiments alone were killed. Around noon, the IV Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy finally arrived to support Eugène of Wurttemberg. One brigade of the 4th Division, commanded by the only surviving staff-officer, Major Wolf, was moved slightly to the south, while the Duke himself, acting on Barclay de Tolly’s order, led his other brigade (Kremenchug and Minsk Regiments), on a roundabout road running to the right of Psarevo, to help Baggovut on the extreme left flank.348

  Eugène of Württemberg’s memoirs contain interesting details on this episode of the battle but fail to identify who the French horsemen were. Bogdanovich referred to ‘carabiniers’ (probably those of the 4th Cuirassier Division of II Corps), Nafziger and Duffy to the III Cavalry Corps, while Bleibtreu thought it was Subervie’s 16th Light Brigade of Pajol’s Division. Dittfurth and Kukiel argued that the horsemen belonged to Montbrun’s Corps.349 Thiers, Tranier, Popov and Zemtsov describe the involvement of Latour-Maubourg’s troops in the attack, which seems reasonable, since neither the III nor II Cavalry Corps operated east of the Kamenka brook at that moment; Grouchy’s corps also had no cuirassiers that are mentioned in reports and memoirs.

  The IV Cavalry Corps spent the morning near the Kamenka brook and ‘was ordered to advance and cross the ravine and charge the cannon of the infantry, which were at [Semeyonovskoye], a very important position for the enemy …’35° During this attack, some cavalry units came across the infantry of Eugène of Wurttemberg. Russian historian Popov argued that the attack also involved Rozniecki’s Polish Lancers and Lepel’s Westphalian Cuirassiers. This supposition is supported by the nomination reports for Colonel Nikitin’s two Horse Artillery companies operating south of the redoubt. Documents on the 10th Horse Artillery Company commend bombardiers Savelyev, Inozemtsev, Kolesnyuk, and others for their gallantry in repelling the charge of ‘enemy Uhlans’.351 It is also possible that some troops of Burthe’s 8th Light Brigade were involved in some of the charges, since the history of the 5th Hussar Regiment maintains that the hussars seized two guns here. Russian historian Zemtsov argued that some Westphalian Hussars of von Hammerstein’s cavalry could have been involved as well and tried to explain Bogdanovich’s note about ‘carabiniers’ attacking the Russian troops by suggesting some Russian participants may have confused the uniforms of the Westphalian Cuirassiers, who wore white collets resembling those of carabiniers (for more details, see page 168).

  Thus ended the first major attack on Rayevsky’s Redoubt. The fighting had been intense in and around the redoubt and both sides suffered high losses. The French artillery, after Morand’s division entered the redoubt, was forced to cease its direct bombardment of the position, in order to avoid injuring its own troops, which allowed the Russians to utilize their firepower. Russian reports are packed with commendations for artillery officers, nominated for awards due to their effective actions against the French infantry. The combat inside the redoubt was vicious and, according to Yermolov, ‘not a single prisoner was taken, and few managed to escape out of the entire French brigade’. Rayevsky reported that ‘barely anyone escaped from the French’.352 The 30th Line had less than 300 survivors after (as Laugier puts it) the regiment ‘was literally shot to pieces’. François’ Company alone lost sixty-eight men. And Griois could see ‘the whole esplanade in front of the entrenchment covered by the dead’. The gallant General Bonnamy was spared but, as Yermolov noted, he was ‘so badly injured that one may say he was impaled on the points of our bayonets’. Bonnamy was captured by Feldfebel Zolotov of the 18th Jàgers, who was promoted to sub lieutenant after the battle.353

  Some participants claimed that to save himself from a certain death, Bonnamy cried out that he was Murat, King of Naples. Radozhitsky described how he heard a major of the Yeletskii Regiment, who had a slight speech defect, yelling as loud as he could ‘Lads [‘byatsy’]! Muyat [sic]is captured!’ which made the soldiers laugh. ‘This false Murat,’ Radozhitsky noted with embellishment, ‘was grabbed by the scruff of the neck by a Russian grenadier with big moustaches and dragged to the Commander-in-Chief’.354 The news of Murat’s capture was celebrated at headquarters but Kutuzov showed a cautious optimism. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky writes: ‘An adjutant at once rushed with the news to Kutuzov’s headquarters. On hearing this, the Prince’s entire entourage broke out in cheers, he, however, said, “We will await confirmation.” ‘ According to Clausewitz:

  several voices proposed to make this news known to all the troops, but some calmer heads among the general officers thought the fact so improbable as to require further confirmation: it was, however, believed for half an hour, although no King of Naples made his appearance, which was accounted for by the supposition of his being severely wounded.355

  Glinka described in his memoirs as ‘Murat’ (alias Bonnamy) was finally brought to Kutuzov in

  a frightfully battered state and reeling from side to side, whether from wounds or other causes. ‘Doctor!’ was Kutuzov’s cry on seeing him, and after exchanging a few words with the wounded man, he had him carrie
d away. Under the uniform of the French hero were found two undershirts and, beneath them, his whole body was ripped with wounds.356

  Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky reminisced that news of ‘Murat’s capture’ spread through the Russian Army like wildfire. Major von Heideggen of the 4th jägers heard it from a Cossack, and Major von Wolf, of Eugène of Wurttemberg’s staff, heard it, too. Wolf then told the Duke: ‘It will all be over before they call us up …’

  The Russians suffered high losses, but probably the most important of them was General Kutaisov, ‘a young hero, well known for his gallantry, good heart and intelligence’ as one Russian officer described him. Yermolov recalled that: ‘Kutaisov parted with me in the very beginning of the attack on that hill and I never saw him again ..It was said that Kutaisov and Paskevich had been seen together amidst the crowds of soldiers who pursued the French beyond the redoubt. In the words of Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, ‘It fell on Kutaisov’s lot to lead our infantry against the French […] Shaking hands with Paskevich, Kutaisov moved forward in a bayonet attack – and no one saw him alive anymore.’ Meshetich, probably based on rumours, wrote that Kutaisov ‘led the nearest cavalry regiment, yelling “Forward, attack, defend your battery!’’ ‘357

  Some time later, Kutaisov’s horse returned to camp with its saddle covered with blood and bits of human brain and, as Grabbe noted, ‘there was no uncertainty about the fate that befell on him, though his body was never found and the circumstances of the last minutes of his life remain unknown to us’. According to Divov:

  [During the attack, Kutaisov] noticed that the guns of Colonel Veselitsky [who commanded the 24th Battery Company] were wasting its ammunition and sent me there to deliver his request [to preserve ammo.] Upon my return, Kutaisov was already gone from the place I left him. Despite all our efforts, [we] were unable to find [him]. Later we saw his brown battle horse, standing idle not so far from the battery where we were standing. We approached it and saw that it was covered with blood and splatters of brain, which convinced us in irreversible loss of this admirable commander.358

  Still, many cherished a hope that Kutaisov was alive, perhaps wounded and captured by the French. Later that month, Nikolai Durnovo, in St Petersburg, recorded in his diary that: ‘a courier brought the news about the decisive battle [at Borodino]. Kutaisov has disappeared and it is believed that he was captured.’359 Yet, with no reports on Kutaisov’s fate, such hopes gradually faded. It was in early October that Kutuzov finally decided to write a letter to Kutaisov’s father, whom he’d known since the days of Tsar Paul I: ‘I dare not to take my quill so as not to become the first herald of this heartbreaking news,’ Kutuzov wrote. ‘If the mourning of the entire army at the grave loss of your esteemed son on the battlefield of honour can somehow alleviate your grief, please accept my sincere condolences.’ Thus, Kutaisov’s ‘life ended still in the age of the blossoming youth, enjoying a brilliant career and occupying important position,’ Yermolov lamented. ‘His loss was mourned not only by his friends: gifted with valuable abilities, he could have rendered great service to his Fatherland in the future.’ Glinka shared the grief:

  Looking at him, it was easy to imagine the young Paladin [one of the twelve legendary knight retainers of Charlemagne] from the Middle Ages! And it was even easier to contemplate this due to the fact that the grand Battle of Crecy where the knights, cast in iron, contested each other, was also fought, as was our Borodino, on 26 August of the year 1346! Youth, stature, gallantry, everything combined in Kutaisov, this vivacious and cheerful warrior!

  Describing Kutaisov’s actions in the battle, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky later wrote that: ‘this talented and fearless artillery commander moved with composure from one battery to another. Several times during the battle, Kutuzov summoned him and they discussed the course of the battle.’ When Kutuzov suggested reinforcing the troops with guns from the reserve artillery, ‘Kutaisov was so convinced we would hold the ground that he told Kutuzov, “I see no need in sending for the reserve artillery.’”360 As the battle intensiied, Kutaisov visited one of the batteries and, while standing there

  a cannon-ball flew above him and several gunners ducked their heads: ‘Shame on you for ducking,’ Kutaisov told them loudly but a moment later, another cannon-ball whizzed by and this time it was Kutaisov who ducked his head. ‘This one does not count,’ he said laughing, ‘It was my acquaintance, they cast it right in front of me.’361

  Yet, the assessment of Kutaisov’s role in the battle was not unanimously positive. Almost a month after the battle, Lieutenant General Ferdinand Winzegorode wrote to Alexander I: ‘No matter what is claimed, the aftermath shows that the battle was lost […] And one of the causes of this defeat lays, as I am assured, in the disorder that spread in the artillery after the death of Count Kutaisov.’362 A similar sentiment is expressed by Kutuzov’s ordinance officer:

  As a result of uncertainty about instructions left by Kutaisov, we had less artillery than [the] French in all directions and, in many cases, our field pieces had to operate against enemy battery guns. Kutuzov frequently downplayed this incident but he said this only out of politics.363

  Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky highlighted that Kutaisov’s

  death had important consequences for the course of the battle, since it deprived the 1st Army of the artillery commander in a battle where artillery played a leading role. Ambiguity about Kutaisov’s orders produced incidents when some companies, having exhausted their ammunition, were unaware where to replenish them, while in other cases our light artillery was engaged against the French heavy guns. When the Battle of Borodino was later discussed, Prince Kutuzov frequently said that if we failed to achieve a complete success […] one of the reasons was the death of Kutaisov.364

  Among other participants, Grabbe, Norov and Bolgovsky were both critical of Kutaisov’s actions, with the latter observing that: ‘after the loss of General Kutaisov, our artillery operated disjointedly and without any coordination’.365 Such arguments were shared by Bogdanovich, who wrote in his classic account of the battle:

  Without a doubt, the death of Kutaisov was the reason why many [of] our batteries remained uselessly in the reserve and our artillery failed to show its full capacity […] Kutuzov himself believed this and later often remarked that the battle would have had a more favourable outcome for us if Kutaisov remained alive.366

  Although similar opinions can still be found in modern publications (both Russian and Western), Kutaisov should not be held solely responsible for the perceived failure of the Russian artillery. Back in the 1860s, Liprandi -himself an artillery officer at Borodino – campaigned against such attempts to question Kutaisov’s actions, justly arguing that:

  it is inconceivable to assume that on the eve of the decisive battle […] [Kutaisov] would have made no arrangements on supplying any battery in need of replenishing its ammunition […] The secret or uncertainty of such arrangements could not have died with him. His entire staff and regimental commanders were still alive and in place […] Their location was well known and, in such cases, every battery commander knows what to do [to get ammunition] without consulting with corps artillery commanders, who also must have received instructions either the day before or earlier in the battle.

  Liprandi’s observations were further elaborated by Larionov, who produced a meticulous study of the Russian artillery at Borodino. It showed that

  all 296 guns of the reserve artillery took part in the Battle of Borodino. The main artillery reserve was under direct control of Kutaisov and all of its companies were committed to the battle on his orders. The Russian artillery, in the most vulnerable places, was continuously reinforced from the reserves, which ensured solid defence of these directions […] Of the artillery companies of the 1st Western Army, only 2nd Don Cossack Horse Artillery and the 8th and 44th Light Companies, which were left on the extreme right flank, did not participate in the battle.367

  Thus, evidence suggests that Kutaisov’s death, although a serious blow to the Russian
Army, did not have as serious a consequence as claimed later.

  By 11am the first assault on Rayevsky’s Redoubt was repelled. The French setback resulted due to a number of factors. There was virtually no coordination of action between the French forces in the centre (Eugène) and right flank (Murat, Ney and Davout), which led some scholars to suggest that Napoleon was responsible for the loss, since he should have provided better direction. Both sides suffered considerable losses, but the French casualties were particularly high. Barclay de Tolly estimated them at 3,000 men, since ‘the heights and the valley surrounding it were covered with enemy corpses for a distance of several hundred paces’.368

  Extreme Southern Sector – The Old Smolensk Road and Utitsa

  On the extreme right flank of the French Army, Poniatowski’s Corps of some 10,000 men had advanced with the first rays of light. Although the shortest route to the Old Smolensk Road was through the woods, the Poles had earlier ascertained that it would be impossible for them to transport their artillery through the dense and marshy Utitsa forest, which was also defended by enemy jägers. As a result, they had to backtrack to Yelnya, where they turned eastward. This march took longer than expected and the Polish attack was delayed when Davout’s forces assaulted Bagration’s positions. Leading the way was the 16th Division, followed by the reserve artillery of forty guns and the 18th Division. Sébastiani’s cavalry was moving in squadron columns south of the road.

  The Old Smolensk Road sector was the weakest spot in the Russian positions. Tuchkov commanded about 23,000 men, almost half of them irregular troops. The Opolchenye men, although ardent in their enthusiasm, lacked proper training and were largely armed with pikes and axes. Tuchkov’s initial position was four lines deep, with the irst two lines occupied by the 1st Grenadier Division (deployed in line) and the two rear lines occupied by the 3rd Division, which was arranged in battalion columns. The Moscow and Smolensk Opolchenye were deployed further behind. However, on the morning of 7 September, Tuchkov’s position was weakened by the departure of two jäger regiments (20th and 21st), which were assigned to Shakhovsky’s detachment in the Utitsa woods, and four regiments (the Chernigovskii, Muromskii, Revelskii and Selenginskii) of the 3rd Division, which had been sent to help Bagration around the flèches. Thus, Russian grenadiers carried the brunt of the initial attack of the Polish Corps.