desiring to personally confirm their veracity, ascended a nearby hill that was showered by grenades and their fragments […] The life of a man on whom Russia placed her hopes was now hanging by a hair. In vain did his adjutants try to persuade him to come down from the hill and, when no arguments convinced him, the adjutants simply took the reigns of his horse and led him out of the ire. After this personal observation, Kutuzov made two orders […] [and under the second order,] Platov, with Cossacks, and Uvarov, with the I Cavalry Corps, were to ford the Kolocha upstream from Borodino and attack the enemy left wing. With such movement, Prince Kutuzov sought to distract Napoleon’s attention and divert some of his forces from our left wing.393
33. French Tirailleur and Voltigeu. (Bellangé)
34. French Fusiller-Grenadier. (Bellangé)
35. French Chasseur à Chaval. (Bellangé)
36. Polish Lancer (Ulan) of the Vistula Legion. (Bellangé)
37. Horse Artillery of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard. (Bellangé)
38. French Carabinier. (Bellangé)
39. Red (Dutch) Lancer of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard. (Bellangé)
40. French Chavau-léger. (Bellangé)
41. Icon procession on the eve of battle. (Ivanov)
42. Counter-attack of the Life Guard Lithuanian Regiment near Semeyonovskoye. (Samokish)
43. Borodino Battle-Array (Jomini)
44. Kutuzov at his command post at Gorki. (Shepelyuk)
45. Napoleon views the Battle of Borodino from the Shevardino Heights. (Vereschagin)
46. Combat at the Bagration Flèches. (Averyanov)
47. Battle of Borodino. (Desarno)
48. Bagration wounded. (Hesse)
49. During one of the Allied attacks, General Kostenetsky, a tall man of extraordinary physical strength, seized a ramrod and led a counter-attack against the Lancers. (painting by A. Averyanov)
This account leaves no doubt who came up with the idea of the cavalry raid and then made a decision to act upon it. It was Kutuzov, without any input from other generals. However, Clausewitz left a drastically different account of how Kutuzov arrived at his decision. After Toll presented Platov’s suggestion, the Russian Commander-in-Chief simply replied ‘C’est bon, prenez le!’ Kutuzov ‘had been listening to all the reports and discussions like one who did not exactly know whether he stood on his head or his heels, and only from time to time said “C’est bon, faites le!’’’ This version is plainly critical of Kutuzov, who shows no initiative and passively observes the low of the battle.
These contrasting accounts eventually produced feuding factions, which sought to correct the historical record. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky’s attempt to embellish Kutuzov’s reputation was certainly due to his status as a court historian, whose writings were regularly censored. However, the historian also had a personal feud with Colonel Toll, which probably made him seek ways to erase his rival from the annals of history. Among participants of the battle, Bennigsen, Wolzogen and Toll were highly critical of Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky and tried to correct Kutuzov’s role in making the decision.394 On the opposite side, Liprandi objected to Clausewitz’s account and called for Russian historians to rely on memoirs of ‘genuine’ Russians rather than of ‘some foreign German’. Liprandi argued that if the cavalry raid idea was first suggested by Platov, he would have been appointed to command it, especially considering the fact that Uvarov was a lieutenant general, while Platov was a full general. He also disputed the notion of Toll being able to influence Kutuzov and instead portrayed Kutuzov as a strong-willed and independent leader.395
This approach was later taken by the Soviet historians and can be traced through virtually all Soviet-era publications. Beskrovny, in his 1951 study, asserted that Kutuzov was the person behind the manoeuvre and it was due to his ‘anticipating Kutuzov’s counter-manoeuvre’ that Napoleon refused to commit his Imperial Guard elsewhere. Tarle repeated Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky’s account and described the raid as Kutuzov’s ‘sudden and truly ingenious decision’ and ‘cunningly conceived and brilliantly executed diversion’. Garnich went as far as to claim that Kutuzov ‘planned this manoeuvre before the battle’ and was supported in this assertion by Beskrovny, who, in his 1968 study, believed that ‘Kutuzov seized [the] initiative from Napoleon by dispatching M.I. Platov and F.P. Uvarov’s cavalry on flanking raid’.396 To support this official version of history, special artworks were commissioned, depicting Kutuzov actively directing Platov (who was not at Gorki at all) and Uvarov to launch the raid. All these claims were far-fetched. Kutuzov could not have conceived the raid prior to the battle, since he was still concerned that Napoleon would make his main attack against the Russian right lank so Platov, acting with Cossacks only, could produce no tangible results. Instead, Kutuzov’s initial order simply instructed Platov to make a reconnaissance of the enemy left flank and the Cossack Ataman’s six regiments were more than enough for forceful scouting.
So, the decision to launch a raid was made. Kutuzov agreed to assign half of Platov’s Cossacks (up to 2,700 men) and Uvarov’s entire I Cavalry Corps (about 2,440 men with twelve guns) for this mission.397 The strength of the Russian cavalry committed to this manoeuvre varies between Russian and Western studies, mainly because the latter often include Platov’s total Cossack force, when in reality he led only six regiments.398 The attacking body consisted entirely of cavalry, without infantry support, and as such could hardly have achieved serious results. Clausewitz lamented that ‘a due estimate of the magnitude of the undertaking was wanting …’
The area between Bezzubovo and Borodino was intersected by several marshy rivulets with steep banks. Just south of Bezzubovo was a small lake, created by a dam on the Voina stream. The banks of the stream were steep, as Lieutenant Heilbronner attested. A small mill with a bridge was situated near the dam. The Allied 21st Light Cavalry Brigade was moved to the left bank of the Voina around 10am, while the 22nd and 13th Brigades were on the opposite bank along with the Bavarian battery of Captain Wiedemann. The French infantry was also deployed along the banks: the 84th Line being near the mill, while the 92nd and 106th further south. There were additional French forces available at the confluence of the Voina and Kolocha, where Chastel’s 3rd Light Cavalry Division, La Houssaye’s 6th Heavy Cavalry Division, and the Italian Guard with artillery were located.
As his cavalry began moving, Uvarov forded the Kolocha near Maloye Selo and deployed the Yelisavetgradskii Hussars and the Guard Cossacks in the front line, with the Guard Dragoons, Uhlans and Hussar regiments behind them. The Nezhinskii Dragoons and the 2nd Horse Artillery Company were moving further in the rear. According to Clausewitz, ‘it was between 11[am] and 12[noon]’ when Uvarov’s troops finally reached the Voina stream. Löwenstern, standing near Gorki, was dissatisfied the way Uvarov handled the attack, noting that ‘either orders were not particularly precise or the General, who was entrusted with this attack, was not sufficiently skilled; in any case, the movement was carried out quite clumsily. General Uvarov, who directed it, showed himself as an incompetent man.’ Uvarov’s slow movement can be partially explained by the rough terrain, but one can agree with Löwenstern’s lament that the Russians ‘could have achieved completely different results if the cavalry, delegated to turn the enemy left flank, were commanded by someone of Vasilchikov’s, Pahlen’s, Lambert’s or Chernyshev’s stature’. Instead, the Russian cavalry advance was ‘remarkably slow-paced and […] seemed to tell the enemy “Beware!” [instead of attacking] […] the entire manoeuvre was executed methodically and unhurriedly .’399
Lieutenant Heilbronner of the 4th Chevau-léger was with his company, assigned to patrol duty along the stream, where he could see
such steep banks that it seemed impossible to me that a cavalry could cross the river here. So I calmly watched the opposite bank that suddenly became alive with enormous masses of enemy cavalry. Numerous horsemen appeared seeking a ford. Suddenly, a long cavalry column approached [the brook] and, descending into the ravine, it c
rossed it. I quickly turned back to withdraw my company but it was too late and a moment later I was in a tight circle of attacking Russian cavalrymen and all of us galloped in confusion through the woods. These were the troops of the [Russian] Guard light cavalry under [the] command of Uvarov, who decided to launch this attack to turn our left flank. I noticed that the enemy cavalry was in disarray and, it was a bit slighting that the enemy cavalrymen did not even notice my small detachment. And so I moved amidst a glittering escort of Guard Hussars and Cossacks, completely unnoticed by them …400
Platov, informed of Uvarov’s advance, ordered his Cossacks to spread along the valley and harass the enemy lines. Cossacks made several charges to probe the French defence and the Ataman reported that he ‘acted offensively against the enemy cavalry and infantry, which was in the woods, and after numerous charges, we routed [the French] cavalry and captured up to 200 [men].’401 With a mass of blue and red uniformed Cossacks moving towards the enemy, Glinka recalled that
the entire valley suddenly flushed brightly with Don Cossacks. They began making circles and flaunting their tricks. The French forward patrols quickly fled [but] the Cossacks sat on their shoulders! The French and Germans tried in vain to fend them off with their long swords and spurred their heavy horses [to escape]: yet, the Don Cossacks, braced to their saddles, flew like arrows on their small horses, circled around, rushed forward and stung them with their lances like incensed wasps. It soon began to resemble a hunt on hares. Russian soldiers, standing near the Gorki Heights […] saw the Don Cossacks’ valour and cheered them: they waived their hands, laughed aloud and yelled, ‘Look at them, look at them! Well done Cossacks! Bravo Cossacks! Show no mercy to the French!’
As soon as the Russian cavalry was noticed, Ornano sent an urgent message to Eugène, which was received as the Viceroy was preparing for a new assault on Rayevsky’s Redoubt.402 Concerned about the flanking manoeuvre, Eugène halted his attack and, sending his adjutant to inform Napoleon, rushed himself to the new theatre of action. As Clausewitz described:
the village [of Borodino] lay on [Uvarov’s] left, in which the troops of [Eugène] had established themselves; before him was the brook, which runs through swampy meadows. On his side of it stood a couple of regiments of cavalry and a mass of infantry […] The French cavalry retired immediately over a dam, which crossed the brook at about 2,000 paces from Borodino; the infantry, however, was bold enough to remain and form square with the dam in their rear.403
Among the French Regiments were the 84th Line, which organized square in front of the dam, while the 1st Croatian Provisional Regiment, the 92nd Line and 8th Light deployed into battalion squares further downstream.404 Mitarevsky, standing near Rayevsky’s Redoubt, claimed the enemy troops were in confusion, ‘running on the right side from the village [Borodino] and moving into the field, where they organized several squares a few moments later’.405 Meanwhile, Glinka recalled that:
The commotion at Borodino did not escape the eyes of [Russian] spectators […] ‘Look! Look! The Frenchies [“Frantsuzishki’’] are making a square: they are in trouble. We are winning!’ [the soldiers shouted] and many of them clapped and yelled ‘Hurrah!’406
According to Prince Eugène, Delzon’s troops
rapidly formed into squares but this formation was not yet accomplished when the Croats received a charge that they repulsed with their fire. The enemy cavalry, reinforced by new squadrons, came to charge the 84th, which received it in the same manner. The forces of this cavalry were increasing each moment, it renewed successfully its charges on the square of the 8th Light and the Croats, of the 84th and the 92nd.407
Eugène got to the front line during one of the Russian cavalry attacks and, as Lejeune described, he ‘was going about amongst his battalions’ when the Russians, ‘who had probably recognized him, ordered a considerable body of Cossacks to charge and try to carry [Eugène] off’.
Prince Eugène had no other recourse but to take refuge inside the square of the 84th Line, where Colonel Jean-Gaudens-Claude Pégot, who commanded the regiment, assured him that he was as safe inside the square as in one of his palaces. At the same time, General Anthouard and Colonel Millot redeployed their batteries to face the new threat and began firing upon the Russian cavalry. Eugène also dispatched orders to Grouchy to send additional cavalry from his corps against the Russians. ‘It was about 11am,’ wrote Lieutenant Combe of the 8th Chasseurs a Cheval, ‘when General Grouchy’s adjutant reached us ordering us to move to the left and cross the road upstream from Borodino …’ Anthouard noted that a large part of the III Cavalry Corps was deployed at that time, while Griois referred to just one brigade (the 11th) and Cerrini acknowledged only the Chasseurs à Cheval regiments of Chastel’s division.408 According to Laugier of the Italian Guard
at that very moment, we were fording the Kolocha, and, while preserving the greatest calm, were hastening our steps, the more ardent for a rumour that the Prince himself was in danger. Meanwhile, the Russian cavalry, growing more numerous, renewed its charges against the squares of the Croat’s 8th Light, of the 84th and the 92nd Line …409
Clausewitz, accompanying Uvarov
suggested in vain that the artillery should first open upon the [enemy in squares]’. But, Uvarov and ‘the Russian officers feared that they would then retire and escape capture. The Hussars of the Guard were therefore advanced, and ordered to charge. They made three ineffectual attacks; the infantry lost neither their composure nor their ranks and returned a steady fire. The Hussars retired, as usually happens in such cases, some thirty paces, and withdrew out of fire. General Uwarow [sic] then discontinued these not very brilliant attempts and caused the artillery to open; at the first discharge, the enemy retired over the defile [and] the whole affairs then came to an end.410
Uvarov’s report adds some details to Clausewitz’s account. The attack was made
despite disadvantageous terrain since we had to cross a deep ravine and a rivulet and, after ascending the opposite bank, to engage the enemy, with the [enemy occupied] village [of Borodino] to our left and the woods full of enemy troops to the right. Despite these difficulties, the attack was carried out in front of the entire army with an unexpected success. The enemy was routed and the battery barely managed to escape, but its two guns were seized by the Yelisavetgradskii Hussars; if not for such unfavourable terrain, they would have been removed at once. The enemy suffered considerable losses during the pursuit.411
Further research reveals that the first attack was entrusted to Major General Vasili Orlov-Denisov, who led the Life Guard Hussar and Cossack Regiments and the Yelisavetgradskii Hussars; they were followed by the Life Guard Dragoon, Uhlan, and Nezhinskii Dragoon Regiments, supported by the 2nd Horse Company.412 The Russian charge, however, faced stiff resistance. Ornano’s cavalry crossed the dam across the Voina, which was protected by several squares organized by the 8th Light, 1st Croat Regiment, 84th and 92nd Line. The 6th, 8th and 25th Chasseurs à Cheval of Chastel’s division were moved to the left bank of the Kolocha, later followed by additional troops from Grouchy’s III Cavalry Corps and the Italian Guard.
During their attacks, the Russian cavalrymen suffered high casualties attacking the squares. Bavarian officer von Muraldt saw
the enemy cavalry […] implementing its plan. By the time the voltigeurs reached us, the wood was already in enemy hands. And hardly had the voltigeurs drawn up to our left, within range of it than individual sharpshooters from the Guard Cossacks were already visible on its fringe. As soon as the enemy facing us saw we had been outflanked, he crossed the Kolotcha [sic], everywhere shallow and easily forded, and, protected by his artillery, attacked our front. Every moment we were waiting for the order to advance against him; but whether our general’s attention was mainly directed towards the attack threatening our lank or for some other reason no such order came; and we could only wait the enemy, who was coming at us flat out. Not until the Russians were 200 paces away did the order come: ‘Carbines up! Fire!�
�� And hardly had we fired out carbines – mostly without effect (as is usual with cavalry) – than we were attacked and overthrown by two hussar regiments […] At the same time, the Guard Cossacks were advancing out of the wood, overriding both our voltigeur companies, and striking into our flank. Attacked from front and in lank, and on such utterly unfavourable terrain, the many of us took to our heels. For a moment, generals, officers and soldiers swirled around in a single confused mass. Everyone was spurring his horse to get out of this jam as quick as ever he could …
Uvarov’s charge forced Bavarian commander Preysing to order ‘one of my brigades to move forward onto a near hill to support the infantry. My troops barely reached it when they were charged by several enemy Regiments’. Bavarian officer Wiedemann recalled ‘several Cossack sotnyas that made a feint attack, brandishing sabres and firing, against the [2]1st Chevau-léger Brigade’. Another participant saw
several sotnyas of Cossacks and Dragoons attacking the 21st Brigade and, although they were fired upon by Captain Wiedemann’s battery and another French battery deployed behind this brigade, they executed a vigorous charge against it. They were hardheartedly met by carabiniers, who opened fire at a close range and forced them to retreat.
The Yelisavetgradskii Hussar Regiment was repelled and it was pursued by the Bavarian regiments, who were, in turn, charged by the Life Guard Uhlan Regiment, which was later commended for ‘halting enemy cavalry and infantry columns that sought to attack and pierce the [Russian] line’.413
The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Page 24
