Artillery officer Radozhitsky, watching from the vicinity of the Gorki Heights, was
thrilled to see as our cavalry moved on the opposite riverbank in long lines of red and blue Hussars and Uhlans and then charged the French cavalry, driving it beyond Borodino; then it made an attack on an artillery battery and the Yelisavetgradskii Hussar Regiment seized two guns. But four enemy infantry regiments, deployed in squares, moved against our cavalry, which attacked each of them but was forced to retreat after being unable to break them.
Not far from Radozhitsky, Mitarevsky also observed the fighting but his recollections are less favourably towards Uvarov’s men. Mitarevsky observed as
our cavalry quickly advanced and then charged forward […] A thought lashed in my mind – as squares would discharge their muskets, our cavalry would charge and overwhelm them, and then it would be easier to deal with them. Yet, it proved quite different in reality: the cavalry approached [squares] to a musket range and then quickly turned back, without the [enemy] squares even firing. ‘Did you see that? asked our staff officer, who just approached us, ‘And there goes their attack!’ We then made a few disparaging comments about them.
Notwithstanding Mitarevsky’s criticism, the Russian cavalry did make several charges and sought to cross the river over the dam, but its efforts were thwarted by the French squares and the canister ire which thwarted two Russian crossing attempts.
Uvarov and Platov then deployed the 2nd Horse Company of Lieutenant Colonel Goring to engage ‘the enemy battery that was set up on the edge of the woods and acted against our Corps’. After a short artillery duel, that battery was forced to retreat but this minor success failed to bring any breakthrough for the Russians.414
A few miles south of the fight, Roth von Schreckenstein was initially concerned by the enemy move that ‘seemed to be a serious flanking attack’. He saw several officers of the 7th Cuirassier Division, among them Colonel Leyser (of the Saxon Gardes du Corps) and brigade commanders Thielemann and Lepel, discussing this new development. Noting that no enemy infantry or artillery was committed to the attack, they quickly agreed that ‘this movement, which initially was quite threatening, would have no serious effect’.415 Clausewitz, who was ‘convinced from the beginning that this diversion could produce no result’, noted in his memoirs that
a diversion by 2,500 horse could not possibly have a decisive influence on a battle delivered on one side by 130,000 men; it could at best put a spoke in the wheel of their plans for a moment, and astonish them more or less.416
It was already afternoon and the Russian Army – struggling to hold ground on the left lank and the centre, and with most of its reserves already committed – was in urgent need of respite. Uvarov’s raid might have delivered it but, as we have seen, it quickly stalled. Still, as Clausewitz suggested, ‘the Russians could contemplate no offensive movement other than that confided to General Uwarow [and so] all eyes were now turned to that officer’. Kutuzov sent several adjutants and staff officers to ‘see whether anything could possibly be done in this quarter’,417 and Colonel Toll, together with General Ozharovsky, also visited Uvarov ‘in order to find means so that the raid, or to be precise, diversion, attempted by [Uvarov’s] forces, had more noticeable effect on the events of that day. However, everyone came to conclusion that it was impossible to do.’418 Clausewitz agreed with Toll that
all rode back with the conviction that General Uwarow could effect nothing. It both seemed no trifling matter to pass this brook under the ire of the enemy and so many troops were seen standing idle as reserves on the other side that it was plainly impossible for 2,500 horse to affect the result of the battle by any effort in that quarter.
The Russian cavalry forces, meantime, became split after Platov continued his movement westward to threaten the French rear and baggage train. As the Russian regular cavalry made its futile charges on a dam, the Cossack Ataman ‘was a quarter of a league to the right of Uwarow, and looking for a passage over the marshy stream [Voina]’.419 Around noon, his troops had at length found a passage not far from Loginovo and quickly moved across the Voina, where Platov ordered his men ‘to proceed to the right, and, attacking the enemy lank and rear, make a rapid attack against the enemy’.420 Lieutenant Flotow soon saw some Russian troops
secretly moving towards a village [Bezzubovo] on our left lank; the village was defended by four companies and additional troops were sent to support them. But they were not sufficient to repel a superior enemy […] and were forced to retreat beyond defile.421
The Cossack manoeuvre threatened the left flank of Prince Eugène’s troops opposite Uvarov’s squadrons near the dam, and Platov reported that ‘the enemy [probably Italian Chasseurs], located beyond the woods, was routed by the rapid attack of the [Cossack] Regiments and led leaving many casualties behind’. Among those fleeing were the Italian Chasseurs à Cheval of Villata’s 13th Brigade, who were rescued by the Bavarian troops of Major General von Preysing-Moos’ 22nd Light Cavalry Brigade. The 4th and 5th Chevau-léger engaged the Cossacks and were supported by a two-gun battery under Lieutenant Belli de Pino that fired canister at the charging Cossacks. However, General Ornano soon ordered the battery to withdraw, fearing the enemy might capture it.422
It is unclear how far Platov’s Cossacks advanced into the rear of the French Army. Platov reported that ‘Colonel Balabin, acting on the flank and partially in the rear of the enemy, harassed and slew the enemy, capturing plenty of prisoners…’ Soviet scholars claimed the Cossacks went as far as Valuyevo, which was in the rear of the Grand Army.
The news of the Russian appearance on the western bank of the Voina reached Napoleon just as he was about to order his Young Guard to advance in support of troops fighting near Semeyonovskoye and the Grand Redoubt, but ‘a heavy fire beyond the stream [Voina], out of the brushwood, upon the left wing’423 made him postpone this decision. The Russians across the field could see ‘commotion on the heights extending from Borodino to the Kolotsk Monastery […] and it was remarkable to see how hastily were many of the camp tents removed!’424 Unaware of the strength of the enemy raiding party, Napoleon realized that it could spread confusion among his troops and threaten his baggage train and lines of communication. On his orders, troops were dispatched to support Eugène, though it is unclear exactly which units were involved. Russian scholar Popov suggested the 1st Chevau-léger Lancier de la Garde Regiment, but Chlapowski noted that the unit did not participate in the fighting that day, while Krasinski and Zaluski argued that Napoleon sent only a squadron of this regiment, which was assigned to his escort. Furthermore, Dautancourt referred to Colbert’s brigade, consisting of the 2nd Chevau-léger Lancier de la Garde Regiment (Dutch), while General Anthouard mentioned the chasseurs a cheval units. Napoleon then went himself to investigate what was happening on the left flank. Although many French memoirs fail to record this trip, Dautancourt and Pelet tell us that Napoleon travelled to the Kolocha river and, after making a quick observation, returned to his headquarters near Shevardino.
One can contrast this testimony with the claims of many Russian/ Soviet historians that Napoleon personally led one of the Guard divisions to reinforce his left lank and remained there for hours to stabilize it. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky claims that Napoleon remained with Eugène on the left lank until 3pm and his absence from the headquarters at Shevardino gave the Russians a breathing space in the centre and on the left. Danilevsky wrote: ‘Those who fought at Borodino certainly remember that minute when the determination of enemy attacks declined along the entire line and the firepower became considerably weaker and we, as someone justly noted, “could breath freely [at last.]’’’ Eugène Tarle, described Napoleon ‘flying like an arrow’ to the left flank, where, as Garnich and Beskrovny agreed, he remained for two hours.425
Back at the dam, Clausewitz saw that, with Platov attacking their left flank, the French troops
immediately in our front feared to be locked in the morass and made a side movement. The Cos
sack Regiment of the Guard attached to Uwarow’s Corps could stand it no longer: like a rocket with its tail, they were over the dam like lightning and into the wood to join their brethren.
They were followed by the Yelisavetgradskii Hussars. Opposing them, Colonel Seyssel led his 4th Chevau-léger to help the Italian Chasseurs against the Cossacks, while Colonel Gaddum’s Bavarians of the 5th Chevau-léger hurried to protect the battery. The front lines of Seyssel’s troops became disordered after the fleeing Italians passed through them, and were soon under Cossack attacks from left flank and rear. To face them, Major Sigmund Bieber of the 4th Chevau-léger recalled seeing
the second line of his division, which consisted of the squadrons of Zandt and Hörtling, turn back and fire their carbines. However, this did not help and Seyssel’s entire brigade was soon forced to retreat behind a square of the Italian Guard. It quickly rallied there and charged the [Russians] who reached the square, and drove them back across the stream with heavy casualties.426
Flotow also recalled that ‘to avoid being isolated, [Bavarian] brigades had to retreat towards the approaching infantry square’, while the artilleryman, Captain Wiedemann, saw ‘the Italian chevau-léger regiment driven back to [his] Bavarian battery’, thus preventing him from opening fire. ‘After the [Italians] passed between the guns,’ Wiedemann recalled, ‘it was already too late for us to open ire against the enemy, who was so at such close distance that the battery had to retreat immediately.’ As his subordinates began to remove their guns, one of the limbers broke down and Wiedemann rushed to help remove it. However, as he brought new limber
a cannon-ball fired by a French battery, which bombarded the Russian cavalry, killed the horse and made it impossible to save the gun. The soldiers, who remained with me to remove the piece, were now too close to the cavalry mêlée as the mass of the Russian cavalry advance against us on a wide front.
Captain Wiedemann’s men quickly retreated but were caught up by the Yelisavetgradskii Hussars (some of them armed with lances) and Cossacks, some of whom charged the Captain himself: ‘One Cossack would have certainly pierced me with his lance if not for an Italian Chasseurs à Cheval who threw him off the horse at the very moment when the [Cossack] aimed his deadly lance at me.’ Wiedemann then moved his guns towards the units of the Italian Guard and Delzon’s division, which formed squares to repel the enemy charges. His battery had several guns damaged and Wiedemann could utilize only two remaining pieces, which he quickly led to support the counter-attacking Bavarian cavalry.427
Among the Italian guardsmen Wiedemann observed was Laugier, who found himself ‘face to face with the enemy cavalry. Formed in squares, we advanced in echelon to meet the Russians, who by now reached the Italian batteries, extinguished their fire and overthrown Delzon’s regiments’.428 Supported by the Italian Guard, the Bavarian and Italian cavalrymen counter-attacked. Combe saw the 6th Hussars and the 8th Chasseurs making successful charges against the Cossacks, who quickly retreated, while Dautancourt had his men search thick bushes and woods to capture any remaining Russians and his men did seize several Cossacks.429 Platov’s men retreated across the dam on the Voina and were protected by a Russian battery that engaged the pursuing Bavarian cavalry. Prince Eugène, realizing that the enemy raid was effectively over, turned his Guard units back to prepare for the assault on Rayevsky’s Redoubt.
On the Russian side, Uvarov understood that the French would soon try to divert some of their forces from the left flank to the centre, so he sought to maintain pressure on Napoleon’s flank. Uvarov later reported: ‘I sought to remain in my position and, through my movements, to trick the enemy into believing that I would make another attack.’ He continued his feint attacks until 3pm when he finally received Kutuzov’s order to return to his initial battle position. Clausewitz recalled that the Russian cavalry retreated between 4pm and 5pm and assumed its position behind the Gorki Heights. As for Platov’s Cossacks, some of them seem to have returned to their initial position, while others remained on the western bank of the Kolocha, since Platov reported that his troops harassed the enemy until late that night.430 Liprandi, who seems to have consulted some Cossack participants, noted that as Platov was withdrawing his troops, he ordered his regimental commanders to take note of the terrain and surroundings, in case they had to operate there at night.431
Thus ended the Russian cavalry raid against the French left flank. Compared to other sectors, the fighting here was less intense and both sides lost a couple of hundred men. The Life Guard Hussar Regiment had twelve killed and seventeen wounded, the Yelisavetgradskii Hussars had five killed, fourteen wounded and twenty missing, the Life Guard Cossacks lost three killed and thirty-two wounded, the Life Guard Uhlan and the Nezhinskii Dragoons had no losses at all.432 On the French side, the most substantial loss was the death of General of Brigade Léonard Huard de St Aubin, commanding the 1st Brigade of the 13th Division, who was killed by a canister shot while commanding his infantry.
The purpose and outcome of the raid have been debated, often bitterly, for the past 190 years. Russian generals and staff officers were more disapproving of the whole enterprise than junior officers and the rank-and-file, and participants were, in general, more critical than later historians, especially those of the Soviet era. Although poorly implemented, it should be said that the raid did produce an important result: it diverted French forces at a crucial moment, when they were preparing for the assault on the Russian centre. The two or three hour delay it caused allowed the Russians to rally and regroup, while the French troops, especially Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry, suffered under the fire of the Russian artillery.
Among those praising the raid, Friedrich von Schubert went as far as to claim that the manoeuvre ‘produced tremendous results and added certain indecision to enemy attacks. Napoleon’s own tent was quickly removed and his Guard was organized into square. The Kolotsk Monastery, where the main [French] hospital and infirmary was established, was taken over by panic.’ On the opposite side, Clausewitz, as we have seen, was very critical of the entire venture.433 Many senior Russian officers believed the raid had the potential for tremendous success but was mishandled. They shared Clausewitz’s and Löwenstern’s accusations against Uvarov for sluggish performance and failure to take full advantage of the manoeuvre. Barclay de Tolly believed that: ‘if this attack were carried out with greater firmness and not limited to only wearing out the enemy, it would have had brilliant consequences’. Nikolai Muravyev was certain that, if well executed, this ‘surprise attack could have decided the battle outcome to our favour’ and a similar opinion was voiced by Norov, among others. Furthermore, Golitsyn, who served as ordinance officer to Kutuzov, recalled that Kutuzov coldly greeted Uvarov upon his return from the raid and, hearing his report, told him: ‘I know everything and may God forgive you for it!’434 The fact that Platov and Uvarov were the only generals not nominated for rewards after the battle speaks volumes about the Commander-in-Chief’s dissatisfaction with their actions. In December 1812, Kutuzov even wrote to Alexander, stating that he could not recommend Uvarov for any rewards, since he failed to carry out the raid successfully. As for Platov and his Cossacks, Kutuzov told the Emperor that ‘they did not fight that day as such’.435
A gallant officer, Uvarov saw his reputation somewhat tarnished at Borodino. Nevertheless, he served with distinction in the 1813–14 campaigns and was promoted to the rank of general for his actions at Leipzig. Platov’s case is interesting because participants criticized him for failing to break through to Napoleon’s baggage train, which would have had a major impact on the course of the battle. The Ataman had already established himself as a capable leader of Cossacks, but was also known for arrogance, a tendency to bicker with other generals, and a fondness for alcohol. A. Muravyev noted that one of the reasons for Platov’s poor performance at Borodino was his hatred of Barclay de Tolly, to whom he was formally subordinated. Yet, other participants reveal that there was also one more, often overlooked, factor. Nikol
ai Muravyev blamed the failure of the raid on the
inept orders and intoxicated condition of Count Platov […] who was drunk that day […] [and] Kutuzov refused to give him overall command [of the raid]; the abilities of Uvarov, who was [the] next senior officer after Platov, were mediocre and well known to everyone …
Similar testimony can be found in the personal journal of Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, who recorded that Platov was ‘in a drunken stupor […] which, among other things, made Kutuzov to tell me […] that this was the first time he had seen a full general dead drunk in the midst of a decisive battle.
It was natural, then, that when the first histories of the battle were written, attempts were made to gloss over these awkward and unpleasant incidents. Historians and some participants tried to suppress or falsify the events of the Platov-Uvarov raid. Thus, Liprandi argued that Uvarov retreated, not because he could not break through the French squares, but because ‘he was twice ordered to retreat’ by Kutuzov, who was too cautious to continue this attack. Justifying Platov’s actions, he argued that the Ataman purposely kept his troops in the bushes because he wanted to keep Napoleon believing that the Cossacks were supported by infantry (hiding in shrubs) thus forcing him to divert more forces to the left lank. Liprandi was supported in his effort by Bolgovsky, who also suggested that some Cossacks dismounted, acting as infantry in order to deceive Napoleon. Bolgovsky believed that
had Platov acted strictly in compliance with the orders he received […] the defeat of our army would have been imminent, since while he remained with his men in the defile, he continued to threaten the enemy; had he attacked with his inferior forces, the threat would have disappeared at once.436
The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Page 25
