The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  Observing the situation on the front line, Barclay de Tolly sent Wolzogen to Kutuzov to obtain further orders. Knowing Kutuzov’s character well, he instructed Wolzogen to ‘get his reply in writing because one has to be very careful with Kutuzov’. Wolzogen found Kutuzov on a hill near the Moscow Road, surrounded by a suite of ‘rich young noblemen, who indulged in all kinds of pleasures and had taken no part whatever in the terrible and earnest events of the day. Colonel Toll was with them and was busily eating a capon’. Wolzogen reported on the state of the Russian Army with his German directness, noting that ‘all important posts had been lost’ and ‘the regiments were all extremely tired and shattered’. Such depressing reports naturally infuriated Kutuzov, who felt embarrassed in front of his suite. ‘With which low bitch of a sutler have you been getting drunk that you come giving me such an absurd report?’ he yelled at Wolzogen. Ever aware of the power of propaganda, Kutuzov then quickly gathered his thoughts, hinting at what he expected from others:

  I am in the best position to know how the battle went! The French attacks have been successfully repulsed everywhere, and tomorrow I shall put myself at the head of the army to drive the enemy without more ado from the sacred soil of Russia.

  At this, Kutuzov looked challengingly at his entourage, which applauded him with enthusiasm. Wolzogen was offended by such a ‘disgraceful reception’ and especially because ‘I had only reported what I had seen with my own eyes during the turmoil of battle, whereas I knew that Kutuzov had spent the whole day in rear of the army among champagne bottles and delicatessen.’ Understanding Kutuzov’s ‘sly, unfair motives’ at treating him thus, Wolzogen went on to note:

  Certainly, I said to myself, his associates will not realize the true state of the Army and, so as not to be able to condemn his prepared bulletin on the battle as lies, will leave him in the belief that the Russians have won a glorious battle. Besides, he assumed correctly that Napoleon […] would not renew the battle; consequently, the Russians would remain in control of the battlefield overnight.

  Wolzogen was correct in his reasoning. The Russian Commander-in-Chief knew well what had happened that day but, always a shrewd diplomat, he could not allow news of the failed battle to spread. This is why he reprimanded Wolzogen for an ‘inappropriate’ report but welcomed Rayevsky, who, arriving moments later, brought positive news. As Rayevsky recalled, Kutuzov

  received me more kind-heartedly than usually because a few moments earlier somebody described our state of affairs in negative light […] He told me, ‘So you believe we should not retreat?’ I responded that, on contrary, I believed we should attack the enemy the very next day, since in such inconclusive battles the side that is most tenacious always wins. This was not bragging on my side. It might be that I was mistaken but at the time I sincerely believed in this.

  Kutuzov then talked to Toll and dictated a plan of attack for the following day, while Toll prepared another order for Barclay de Tolly. Rayevsky was told to deliver oral instructions to Dokhturov, currently commanding the 2nd Army, while Wolzogen received a written order for Barclay de Tolly. The order stated that:

  from all the movements of the enemy I [Kutuzov] conclude that he [Napoleon] has been weakened no less than us during this battle, and that is why, having started with him, I have decided this night to draw up the Army in order, to supply the artillery with fresh ammunition and in the morning to renew the battle with the enemy.515

  After reading the order, Barclay de Tolly ‘shook his head’ and told Wolzogen that he did not know where he was going to find enough men for this disposition:

  If we could attack the French on the spot and straightaway, this might perhaps be feasible; but next day the troops, who had exerted themselves for twelve hours without any food and could still not get anything to eat during the night, would be so exhausted that a further attack would be out of question.516

  Barclay then travelled to meet Kutuzov and talked to him for a quarter of an hour before returning to Gorki Hill. Accompanied by three of his adjutants (including Löwenstern, who described these events), he dismounted on the hill and admitted that he was starving. He had a small glass of rum and a piece of bread, while still calmly observing the enemy movements in the distance. The battle had a remarkable effect on the soldiers’ perception of Barclay de Tolly, who was seen galloping into the thick of the action in a full-dress uniform adorned with numerous decorations and orders, and directing troops in one dangerous spot after another. As he inspected his worn-out regiments, he was greeted by spontaneous ‘Hurrahs’, which, as one Russian officer justly noted, ‘greatly contrasted with the insulting and unfair accusations that had been heaped upon him up till then’.517

  But what kind of solace could this afford to the General amid the battlefield covered with his dead troops? ‘A fog soon covered the battle field …’ Löwenstern wrote,

  and complete stillness descended. Only now we were able to calmly discuss the events of this memorable day. None of us considered the battle lost. Trophies were equal on both sides. It is true that the main battery (of Rayevsky) was in the enemy’s hands but Barclay was still hoping to recapture it the following day as well as to recover the ground lost on the extreme left wing and launch an offensive movement.

  That night, Kutuzov issued orders congratulating his troops with a victory and ordered to prepare for another round of fighting. The Russian troops remained eager to resume the battle, albeit largely unaware of the actual condition of the Army. Muravyev-Apostol recalled receiving ‘the order that the troops should not take off their knapsacks since the battle would be continued the following day’.

  Generals, meantime, were busy rallying their troops. Barclay de Tolly regrouped the remnants of his army at what is often described as the ‘third Russian position’, the Army having moved about 1,500m to the rear. The VI Corps was near Gorki, with the IV Corps behind it, while the cavalry and the V Corps were in the reserve. Barclay de Tolly also ordered a reconnaissance of the French position and, upon hearing the Grand Redoubt was occupied only by ‘scattered groups that were busy withdrawing’, he instructed Miloradovich to seized this important location with several battalions and establish a battery by dawn. The night-time sortie, however, was unsuccessful. Barclay de Tolly then suggested to Dokhturov that he should ‘reinforce the troops of the 2nd Army, gathered on the left flank of the IV Corps and […] occupy the area between him and Baggovut’s corps’. To strengthen his position, Barclay de Tolly also ordered the construction of a redoubt on the heights near Gorki and some 2,000 Opolchenye troops were ordered to start building it. Kutuzov confirmed these arrangements.518

  Meantime, on the Russian right flank, the soldiers of the 1st Jäger Regiment were still guarding the banks of the Kolocha. As Petrov recalled:

  During the night of 27 August [8 September], the patrols dispatched from our regiment reported every hour that the French advance posts were withdrawal further and further. Finally, around the midnight, our patrol officer, returning from his watch, reported to the regimental commander that the enemy was not detected in the area between Rayevsky’s Battery and the Stonets Redoubt and to the right to the Kolocha river. To gather more intelligence and explain the whereabouts of our enemy, one NCO and ten Jägers were ordered to take off their boots, swim across the Kolocha, and determine if the French were still in the village of Borodino. The patrol returned in an hour reporting that the enemy was not in Borodino but on the hill behind the village on the right bank of the Voina, where a thick chain of their cavalry was noticed. Our commander [Karpenko], an experienced staff officer with advance post service in various campaigns, quickly realized the importance of this news and sent his regimental adjutant to apprise Barclay de Tolly. In the meantime, [Karpenko] assumed that the next day would certainly start with an order to attack and instructed his company commanders to increase the number of cartridges issued. After this, the troops were allowed to place their weapons in trestles [‘na kozly’] and rest; the men lay down on the ground
and had a quiet sleep on the steep bank of the Kolocha […] Around 5am on 27 August, we dispatched a company of artisans to gather woods from bivouacs to the bank of the Kolocha, where a floating bridge was constructed in order to facilitate the crossing to the village of Borodino as everyone eagerly awaited the order to attack. Instead, we are ordered to remove our advance posts and proceed to Mozhaisk following the army as it began retreating to Moscow; the Cossacks were told to observe the enemy whose cavalry pickets could be seen on the position that the enemy occupied on 25 August [6 September].519

  Late that evening, Kutuzov returned to his headquarters at Tatarinovo, where he convened a council of war to decide what to do next. According to Bennigsen, ‘That evening we were still not aware of the huge losses we had suffered during the day. We therefore considered, for a while, retaking our central battery during the night and continuing the battle on the morrow.’520 Toll and his staff officers were instructed to inspect the army and their reports began arriving around 11pm. They brought the frightening news of Russian casualties and the full picture of the Army’s condition was gradually revealed. Tens of thousands were killed, wounded and missing, entire regiments destroyed and divisions reduced to hundreds. Kutuzov still had six regiments (four Jäger units and two Life Guard Semeyonovskii and Prebrazhenskii Regiments) remaining in reserve but they were certainly insufficient to shore up the Russian positions. After a discussion with his generals, Kutuzov, realizing the futility of remaining on the battlefield, ordered a retreat to a new position, several miles away, near Mozhaisk. The Russian Army was divided into three columns led by Dokhturov, Miloradovich and Platov, with a fourth consisting of artillery. Barclay de Tolly was initially unaware of these arrangements and learned about it only after midnight.

  The Russian headquarters was, meantime, discussing the direction of further retreat. Should it be to Moscow? Or maybe to Vereya or Borisov, which might compel Napoleon to follow the Russian Army towards Kaluga instead of advancing to Moscow? Kutuzov argued that the Army should withdraw along the Moscow Road, and so it did.

  Kutuzov knew that he was now on dangerous ground. This very action – a reprehensible retreat – had brought down his predecessor just ten days ago, and Kutuzov was certainly not willing to share Barclay’s fate. So he carefully calculated his next steps. A shrewd propagandist, he turned to preparing the Russian public for news of another retreat. The fact that Napoleon had ordered his troops to pull back to their original positions played into Kutuzov’s hands, since he could foster the illusion that the Russians had really won the day and remained in firm control of the battlefield. The battle was hardly over when one of the first letters was sent to Rostopchin, Governor of Moscow:

  Today was a fierce and bloody battle. With divine help, the Russian Army refused to concede a single step, even though the enemy was in much superior numbers. Placing my faith in the Lord and the Moscow saints, I hope to resume the battle with fresh forces tomorrow.521

  Then came the first of a series of letters to Alexander, in which Kutuzov highlighted Russian gallantry and resolve. He explained that the heavy loss suffered in the battle reduced the number of troops at his disposal and made the position at Borodino too vast to be defended. Therefore, he decided to withdraw to Mozhaisk, where he hoped to received reinforcements and fight another action. He assured Alexander that he was not interested in ‘the glory of merely winning battles but rather in achieving the goal of destroying the entire French Army’. The official army bulletin reiterated these points, claiming the French ‘were driven back at all points and forced to retreat while we remained the masters of the battlefield’. It even noted that Platov ‘chased [the French] rearguard to a distance of 11 verstas [11.7km] from Borodino’. Knowing that even his private letters would eventually become public, he penned a letter to his beloved wife Ekaterina, telling her ‘I am well my dear, and am not beaten: I have won the battle with Bonaparte.’522

  Most Russian sources suggest that the Russian Army spent the night on the battlefield, while the French withdrew to their initial positions. The rank-and-file certainly did not feel vanquished and participants, who later wrote memoirs, reflected this prevailing opinion. It was further strengthened by official reports, especially Kutuzov’s, which portrayed the battle as a victory. The fact is, both armies spent the night on the battlefield, although some Allied units had to withdrew in order not to bivouac amongst the dead bodies that covered the ground. These withdrawals were seen by the Russians as a general retreat by the Grand Army and this ‘legend’, as some Russian historians describe it, quickly spread. Witmer, a prominent Russian historian, justly commented that ‘this legend gained such deep roots and entered [popular] history because it flattered our national self-esteem’.

  50. Death of Auguste de Caulaincourt. (Lithograph by Motte)

  51. General Tuchkov leading the charge on the Old Smolensk Road. (Safonov)

  52. Battle of Borodino. (Lejeune)

  53. Ney leading III Corps against the Bagration Flèches. (Jean-Charles Langois)

  54. Napoleon directing his troops at Borodino. (Lithograph by Martinet)

  55. Council of War at Fili. Kutuzov, seated left, addresses his generals. (Kivshenko)

  56. Napoleon on the heights overlooking Moscow. (Vereschagin)

  57. Earthworks of Rayevsky’s Redoubt, restored in 1912. (Robert Mosher)

  58. View of the northern flèche from the direction of the French attack. The flèche was restored in 1912 and 1962. The remains of an unknown soldier were buried inside in 1962. (Robert Mosher)

  59. View of the left flèche. Restored in 1912 and 1962, General Neverovsky’s remains were buried nearby in 1912. (Robert Mosher)

  60. Shevardino Redoubt, seen from the location of Napoleon’s subsequent command post: the view is to the north-west. The redoubt was reconstructed in 1912 during the centennial celebration of the battle. (Robert Mosher)

  61. Russian veteran with medal for service in 1812.

  Aftermath

  The night after the battle proved breezy and rain drizzled over the thousands of bodies lying in the open fields. That night the distraught Konovnitsyn listed losses in his private letter

  Numerous are wounded and killed. Tuchkov is wounded in his chest, Alexander Tuchkov is killed […] Ushakov’s leg was torn off. Driezen is wounded, Richter as well […] My division is virtually non-existent [and] there is hardly a thousand men in it …523

  Barclay de Tolly was shaken by his experiences: ‘I searched for death and did not find it,’ he told another general. Three horses had been shot from under him and still his life was spared. ‘My ardent wish to die did not come true,’ he wrote to Tsar Alexander. The troops remaining in the front line, although high in sprits, suffered from exhaustion and hunger. In the 1st Jäger Regiment, the officers ‘fell to the ground from exhaustion and hunger’. After a few minutes of this ‘half-dead condition’ as Petrov described it,

  Our courageous and adroit Captain Tokarev […] stood up and asked our Colonel to leave the regiment for ten minutes to go to the battery that was deployed not far from us. The Colonel gave him permission and Tokarev, mounting his horse, galloped at once. A few minutes later he returned with a triumphant appearance and holding a small bundle in his hand. Jumping of the horse in front of us, he quickly opened it on the ground […] There was an indescribable treasure inside – five or six biscuits and two ordinary herrings […] ‘Gunners gave it to me.’ [Tokarev explained] ‘I told them, ‘Gentlemen! Spare something edible for the staff officers of the 1st Jäger Regiment, who are exhausted to death after the battle but still remain at their spot ahead of the entire army.’ And they gave me almost everything they had, including this …’ – he said as he revealed a flask filled with alcohol.

  And so the three Russian officers shared this ‘magnificent’ meal on the banks of the Kolocha, remembering the experiences of the bloody day gone by.524

  Kutusov Retreats

  The Russian retreat began soon after midnight when t
he artillery was moved to Mozhaisk. Around 3am the remaining forces proceeded in its wake. By dawn, only Platov’s rearguard remained on the battlefield. Learning of the Russian withdrawal, Murat ‘again came to ask [Napoleon] for the cavalry of his Guard. “The enemy’s army,” said he, “is passing the Moskwa in haste and disorder; I wish to surprise and extinguish it.’’ The Emperor repelled this sally of immoderate ardour …’525

  During the night, the Russian outposts harassed the French lines and some Russian sources suggest that Cossacks might have recovered (albeit briefly) the Grand Redoubt, which was all but abandoned by the French. Ségur’s memoirs tell of Russian ‘unseasonable clamours’ that hassled the French: ‘There was an alert, close to the Emperor’s tent. The Old Guard was actually obliged to run to arms; a circumstance which, after a victory, seemed insulting.’

  Many Russians were unhappy over the abandonment of the battlefield, especially in light of Kutuzov’s order congratulating them with victory. Grumbling, they obeyed, and many French officers noted the care with which the retreating Russians took the time to bury their dead along the road. Fantin des Odoards wrote in his diary: ‘In all fairness, it must be said that these people whom we call barbarous take great care of their wounded and have the piety to bury their dead …’526

  Still, hundreds of Russian wounded were gathered in Mozhaisk, where they found themselves stranded due to lack of transportation. As Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky described: