The Tempest--Commander Putnam and Mr. Madison's War

by James L. Haley

  The winter was as cold as any could remember, and he and Freddy did drive the wagon out to Marsh’s Pond—since he was to eventually own it, he took to calling it Marsh Pond, amused that people one day would think it so named for a reedy wetland around it, which did not exist, and would not know the connection to the family. They dismembered two dead trees, a maple and a chestnut, which they sawed into lengths that fit into the wagon bed. Bliven used their time together to question Freddy about Pennsylvania and his Quaker faith—Freddy still referred to them as Friends—and learned that a century before the Revolution, when the Puritans from whom the Congregationalists descended still enjoyed the power of state compulsion, the Quakers were run out of the area. Four who kept returning to Boston to preach their faith were publicly hanged. That was a generation even before the hysteria about witches in Salem, but the Quakers became keenly aware of where they were not wanted, and to this day there was no meeting of Friends in western Connecticut.

  Hauling the dead wood required five trips, which, coming back through town, was a hard pull even for their two shire mares, and they piled the wood behind the barn where passers-by could not see it. The widely shared opinion that firewood would reach record prices came to pass, leaving the poorer families searching for ways to become ever more thrifty with their wood, and their money. Keeping the heavy, long-dead logs hidden from public view was only prudent. Through the winter Bliven read and wrote until he thought he would go mad without fresh air, and then he would exercise himself productively on the woodpile.

  He brought himself abreast of the politics of the dispute with Great Britain, learning that the United States had again petitioned the British to lift their Orders in Council and leave off seizing American ships and sailors. In Parliament, the Tory government of Spencer Perceval was preoccupied with the madness of the King, and managing a transfer of the monarchical powers to a regency under the Prince of Wales, a man who was as silly and preoccupied with fashion and his mistresses as the old King had been dedicated to duty before he lost his mind. The drift—irrevocably, it seemed—was toward war.

  With the first signs of spring it was time to prepare for planting, which, as war talk increased, Bliven determined to diversify, to give his parents as much independence as possible when he should be called back to sea: wheat, oats, corn, root vegetables, and table garden. He gave Freddy a raise and made certain of his contentment to manage the farm until Bliven should return. When the spring session of Congress met, the political content of the newspapers increased sufficiently to give him a near enough idea of the state of things.

  The greatest vexation was why such an assignment should have been given to him. Perhaps Dale and Eaton, and others, had told the Department of his fascination with history, or perhaps he merely flattered himself that they should esteem him so highly. Sometimes policies already decided upon needed various viewpoints to aid in politically defending them, this he knew, but surely the desired voice would speak with greater gravitas than he could. There was no way to divine it, but he needed to send them something before becoming occupied with planting. Thus when he organized his pages of notes and memoranda, and set pen to paper, he could only assume that his superior officers had their own reasons for tasking him with it, and he must write the most cogent summary and recommendation that he could.

  LITCHFIELD, CONNECTICUT

  10TH MARCH 1812

  Dear Sir:

  Conformably to instructions given me in Washington City in October last, I have the honor to report my impressions of the intelligence supplied me at that time, relative to our harbor defenses and naval disposition, with my recommendations for how they might most effectively be utilized in the defense of the country.

  The disparities of the coming conflict are well known, yet it is useful to have the exact numbers freshly stated, lest the imbalance of the contest ever be forgotten for a moment. The sum of our resources as of this date are as follows: three heavy frigates of a forty-four-gun rating, the Constitution, President, and United States; four medium frigates of thirty-eight or thirty-six guns, Congress, Constellation, Chesapeake, and New York; four light frigates of twenty-eight or thirty-two guns, Essex, Boston, Adams, and John Adams; four sloops-of-war of sixteen or eighteen guns, Wasp, Hornet, Argus, and Siren (omitting the Oneida, sixteen, which was built and serves upon Lake Ontario); and four brigs of twelve or fourteen guns, Vixen, Nautilus, Enterprise, and Viper. Our harbors are guarded by divisions of a flotilla of one hundred and seventy numbered gunboats, mounting in aggregate one large and one or two small guns each.

  With these resources, we face the most powerful navy the world has ever seen. Of figures cited by the President, the English possess in total 112 ships of the battle line, 145 frigates, and smaller vessels to a total—the exact estimates vary depending upon what classes of smaller vessels may be discounted—of from 900 to 1,060 sail.

  This report will assume the willingness of the government, recognizing the gravity of a new war with Britain, to spend whatever is necessary to place all nineteen cruising vessels in preparedness to sail. Thus, the New York, the Boston, and the Adams, while each requires extensive repairs before putting to sea, will be assumed for our purposes to be ready to report to the fleet by the time hostilities commence.

  It may be proper, by way of general introduction, to note that throughout history, select nations have become wealthy on maritime commerce: the British, and before them the Dutch, and before them the Hanseatic League, and before them the Venetians, and in ancient times the Phoenicians. The United States has aspired to join this elite of commercial history, for we have built and deployed a fleet of merchant ships that aggregates not less than one million tons, or round about two thousand five hundred several ships of varying sizes. However, to defend this mighty engine of commerce, we have provided the above-enumerated Navy of nineteen vessels. That is, we have one effective warship for the protection of every (approximately) one hundred fifty commercial ships. Truly never, in the history of the world, has a country been so derelict in protecting such a vital source of its wealth, and future generations will be justified in looking back with censure, not to say wonder.

  In the present emergency, however, this liability may possibly be turned to advantage by looking upon the merchant fleet as a source of privateers, which will be considered in more detail hereinafter.

  Of Gunboats

  Let us consider first the matter of the gunboats. Over recent years, the greatest investment in our Navy has been in the construction of gunboats, to the remarkable number of approximately one hundred and seventy. No doubt, this has been because they can be built quickly and inexpensively, and their construction gives the illusion that something meaningful is being accomplished for the national defense. It seems certain that these appropriations were easier to pass through the Congress, because the prospect of gaining one hundred and seventy vessels built for the one and a quarter million dollars that they cost, sounds more persuasive than the mere four heavy frigates that could have been built for the same amount of money.

  As a class, our gunboats average fifty feet in length, are powered by eight or ten oarsmen, some with the aid of a sail, and each one mounts a single eighteen- or twenty-four-pounder long gun in the bow, and perhaps one or two small carronades or swivel guns in the waist. These latter are of limited utility, as their recoil sets the boats to rocking uncontrollably. Few of the gunboats have a covered deck, and they are exceptionally miserable for their crews in bad weather.

  Historically, the greatest effectiveness of gunboats lies in waterborne assault against a shore battery or fortification. They are small and mobile, and from a distance of some hundreds of yards present an almost impossible target for shore guns, yet a squadron of eight or ten of them can equal the broadside of a large sloop-of-war, which would present an infinitely more vulnerable target during such a bombardment.

  This circumstance, however, of a naval attack upon a land fortific
ation is not likely ever to present itself in the defense of our shores in a war with England. If we have allowed ourselves to believe that gunboats would be effective in defending against invasion, or even a raid in strength, we have deceived none but ourselves. Indeed, history affords us one example only of a successful encounter of a number of gunboats with a large warship. This was at the late battle at Alvøen, outlying the city of Bergen, where a Dano-Norwegian schooner and about five gunboats (the accounts differ in the exact number) overmatched and forced the withdrawal of the frigate H.M.S. Tartar, thirty-two, with the loss of her captain and a dozen of her crew.

  Even in this successful action, however, it is to be noted that the Norwegians enjoyed the advantage of a dead calm, in which the Tartar could not maneuver, which allowed them to take up positions of relative safety, and also of a dense fog, which further prevented effective fire from the frigate. To think that such circumstances will ever align to aid American gunboats in defending against an English attack is to grasp at a straw.

  One other aspect of the action at Alvøen is worthy of note. The Tartar’s business at Bergen was to enter the port and take as prizes the merchant vessels she found there. This was prevented by the Norwegians having erected a chain barrier across the entrance of the harbor. As a possibility of providing safe refuges for our merchant vessels, this plan might be considered for small harbors such as Newport, where the existence of Fort Adams, and the presence of rocky islets on which such a chain could be anchored and defended, make it feasible. Most of our harbors, such as Charleston, which is of similar size, lack fortifications, or such as New York, are too large for a chain to extend across.

  We must also anticipate that if the English mobilize such a fleet as can press the war home to us, the invasion of unfortified harbor towns must take place at their pleasure, which would render harbor defense moot, whether by a chain guard or with gunboats. Equally, our large estuaries, such as the Chesapeake Bay, whose entrance is some seventeen miles across, are indefensible and must be conceded whenever the enemy shall choose to enter them, if they arrive in force.

  Before such a great enemy fleet can assemble, we may expect harassment of our coastal towns by the many smaller enemy vessels cruising singly off our shores. Against these, if one venture into a harbor, gunboats may be of some utility, if they separate themselves to divide the enemy’s fire.

  Of our coast on the Gulf of Mexico, and of defending New Orleans, little can be said except to advise assembling a large local militia, amply reinforced and guided by experienced officers commanding regiments of regular troops, capable of resisting any British attempt at invasion. Events in the Atlantic will likely make it all but impossible to thwart a blockade of its shipping with our larger vessels, for the British naval bases in the West Indies, once brought to strength, can easily overmatch anything we can do in opposition. In other words, we must concede them their blockade but deny them the city. That much is feasible, by stationing numerous gunboats and privateers in such a way as to support the guns of Fort St. Philip, which may be proof against an assault upon the city from the Mississippi River. Less certain of an outcome would be an attack from the east, for without any fortifications, the only defense of Lake Pontchartrain would be by an assemblage of gunboats.

  Of British Preparedness

  Of what, then, among this depressing disparity of resources, can any advantage be taken? Foremost, it is to be observed that British disdain for us, and arrogance, has led them to so discount the possibility of our ever resisting their aggressions that they have not planned for it. They have so disregarded us that, at the last report, there was but one British ship of the battle line anywhere close to our theatre of action, and that one the quite old H.M.S. Africa, sixty-four, at Halifax. Their number of frigates cruising from that place seems to be four, the Aeolus, Belvidera, Shannon, and Guerriere. Of these, the most dangerously successful at raiding our commerce has been the last-named Guerriere, a captured French thirty-eight, commanded by an exceedingly audacious and very young captain, James Dacres, who is said to be from a naval family and is keen to distinguish himself.

  The ships operating from Bermuda are less known, for intelligence from that remote tiny island, six hundred miles off the Carolina coast, is difficult to come by. Considering, however, that most of the harassment of our merchant fleet near our shores has been carried out by smaller vessels of from twelve to twenty-two guns, whose number may be estimated at from forty to sixty ships, and most are not known to frequent the anchorage in Halifax, we must conclude that Bermuda is an exceedingly active station—so much so that if it were possible to capture the island in the surprise commencement of the war, and deny that anchorage to the enemy for a time, this would leave their smaller warships at sea and forced either to Halifax or the West Indies for supply. If we commence hostilities precipitously, and send out our frigate strength casting as wide a net as possible, there is a chance of capturing a number of these brigs and sloops-of-war and bringing them into our own service before the English know what is on them. This could double or even treble our force of available auxiliary vessels before the enemy can effectively respond.

  How long that may be cannot be known. It must necessarily require four to six weeks from the time war is declared for them to learn of it, and an additional four to six weeks for reinforcing ships to be positioned there from the bases in their West Indies islands or for a larger force to sortie from their bases in England. This latter may not even be possible, for it would leave their home coast open to attack by the French, and it must take many months for ships that can be spared to be recalled from the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Swift and sure action on our part is therefore most urgently to the case.

  Of Privateers

  It would not be responsible to venture into a war without taking sober prospect of the political sentiments at home, as indeed the President discussed in the October meeting. As he expressed, the hostility to the notion of defending our national rights upon the sea, on the part of our Northern states, whose commerce is so reliant upon seafaring trade, is greatly to be wondered at. That the wealthiest of ship-owning concerns are willing to accept British seizure of some certain number of our merchant ships, and impressment of sailors from among their crews, as an annoying but acceptable cost of doing business, truly cannot be seen as either patriotic or even humane.

  The hard fact is, however, that for the duration of hostilities there will be little trade to be gotten up with anyone, without great hazard to their ships, crews, and cargoes. What patriotism will not motivate, let greed supply. Let Letters of Marque be issued with liberality, to enroll them as privateers upon the most generous terms, to keep all or the greatest part of whatever British shipping they can capture. If, say, only one in five of our merchant vessels takes up our cause, the loosing of five hundred American privateers upon the sea lanes, preying upon British merchant vessels for the value of their cargoes and as prizes, must bring enormous pressure upon their Parliament to end the conflict. One may also expect our American sea captains to be able to acquit themselves against smaller British cruisers, and this will go a long way to even the disparity we now face in the naval conflict. The issuance of Letters of Marque, therefore, must be pursued with the greatest diligence. Thought should also be given to establishing new foundries or enlarging existing ones, for the need for five thousand or more guns of various sizes from six to twenty-four pounds is more than the present supply, and more than private enterprise should be tasked to find for themselves.

  Of Strategies Now Advanced

  To date, two different general strategies have been put forward to guide the President and the Secretary in making a policy. One, from Commodore Rodgers, recommends the maintenance of one formidable battle squadron of four frigates and perhaps two ancillary vessels, to overtake and damage British commercial convoys en route from the West Indies, and to carry the war to British shores themselves. The other, from Commodore Decatur, recommends dis
patching each of our ships to independent action, to scatter, each to engage when it is opportune, and to avoid action when safety requires it.

  Each plan presents dangers and opportunities. Of the first, we know that Commodore Rodgers is a brave and able commander. The squadron that he envisions would very likely be the victor, if the enemy squadron at Halifax could be brought to battle. His primary objective, however, is to prey upon the very rich British West Indies convoys that carry the produce of those colonial islands across the Atlantic, and those convoys at this time are but lightly escorted. He then proposes to raid coastal towns of the British homeland, and get away before an overwhelming force can be sent out against them. A single successful raid upon such a convoy would create a huge economic loss for the enemy as to bring pressure in Parliament to make peace with us. It might be borne in mind, however, that forays against undefended points of the British coast, while certainly giving vent to our well-founded indignation, as the commodore expresses in his proposal, and which may avenge some of the wrongs we have suffered, may be seen by neutral nations as merely piratical, and could perhaps damage us in diplomatic standing.

  It must also be recognized that this plan contains risks. If we concentrate such a large proportion of our entire fleet strength in one squadron, and it be defeated, there would hardly be any way to recover from it. It is, as it were, to risk our whole fate, not just upon a single throw of the dice but upon every throw. We should also consider that the English officers have decades of experience in planning and executing fleet actions, where our entire history, in the Revolution, in the Quasi-War with the French, and in the Mediterranean, has been in individual ship-to-ship contests. At these we have excelled, but the tactics of fleet engagement is a level of complexity at which we are yet untried. It does not question the valor of our ablest commander to question the wisdom of risking so much with a fight on the enemy’s terms.