A History of Brooklyn Bridge Park

by Nancy Webster

  The same pragmatism would inform her advocacy efforts for Brooklyn Bridge Park. “I was president of the Dumbo Neighborhood Association in 2005 when the park’s master plan was released. Some members of the steering committee were upset that the plan included housing as a way to generate revenue. But the Coalition’s support of the plan and the explanation that a limited amount of housing had the potential to generate the most revenue to support the park and take up the least amount of park space made a lot of sense to me.”44

  Webster’s support for the plan, however, was not shared by others on the steering committee who voted to oppose the park’s General Project Plan. With that, Webster decided to step aside and devote her time to furthering Brooklyn Bridge Park. “I could not support a position opposed to the park that I viewed as short-sighted and parochial,” said Webster. “I didn’t want to just oppose things. I wanted to help make positive change happen in my neighborhood, and for me there was nothing more exciting than Brooklyn Bridge Park.”45

  NINE

  A PARK AT LAST

  “We’ve engaged a huge number of people who appreciate how beautiful these shoreline parks can be. That’s the future. It’s so many people. It’s not this small group. It’s an army now.”

  DAVID OFFENSEND

  WITH CONSTRUCTION ON PIERS 1 AND 6 FINALLY UNDER WAY, supporters of Brooklyn Bridge Park encountered a major obstacle to the park’s realization during the Wall Street collapse of October 2008. The stock market crash and the resulting national and global financial crisis had a devastating impact on the economy and administrative budget of New York State, with massive job losses (more than 17,000 in New York City alone in the twelve months following the crash), plunging tax revenues (which were reduced by more than one-third during the same period), and a virtual standstill in real-estate transactions and commercial development.

  Even before the crisis, newly elected governor Eliot Spitzer had assumed a wait-and-see attitude toward Brooklyn Bridge Park and the state’s financial commitment to its construction, repeatedly voicing his general support for the park but questioning whether the state possessed the financial resources to honor the previous administration’s $85 million commitment to the project. In a public hearing shortly after Spitzer’s election, Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) spokeswoman Jessica Copin was less than reassuring to park supporters in stating the governor’s position on the park and other outstanding public development projects. “We can’t give any information as the new Administration is reviewing and accessing all the projects,” Copin explained.1 Later in the year, Spitzer suggested that proceeds from the sale of state-owned land adjacent to the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center in Manhattan might be used to cover the state’s commitments to Brooklyn Bridge Park and other public development projects, but a proposal for the sale of property and transfer of funds was never formally enacted, and the park’s future remained uncertain.2

  Following Spitzer’s resignation in March 2008, his successor, former state senator and lieutenant governor David Paterson, quickly reassured Brooklyn residents that, in spite of the state’s ongoing financial difficulties, his administration remained firmly committed to the park’s realization. Speaking at the Brooklyn Bridge Conservancy’s annual “Sunset” fund-raising gala on June 3, Governor Paterson, who had never addressed the issue of the park during his earlier term in the New York State Senate, proclaimed to those in attendance, “Brooklyn Bridge Park is a New York treasure. I am pleased to be here and to celebrate the upcoming construction of the larger piers area, which will enhance this already outstanding park.”3

  The state’s balance sheet told a different story, however, and one that held far less promise for the timely realization of Brooklyn Bridge Park. Between the 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 fiscal years, the gap between the state’s incoming revenues and anticipated spending mushroomed from $1.7 billion to $13.7 billion, with projections for increasing budget deficits for several more years. It was clear, based on these figures, that it would be years, at best, before the state could make good on Governor George Pataki’s $85 million pledge to the park and that a different financial plan would have to emerge if construction on the park was to continue as planned.

  In January 2009, Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed that the city assume sole control of Brooklyn Bridge Park, along with Governor’s Island in New York Harbor, for which the state had covered the operating costs. According to Bloomberg’s plan, the city would cover the expenses for the two projects using a $300 million fund originally allocated for the expansion of the Javits Center on Manhattan’s West Side.

  “We would use that money to continue to develop these two things which are great parts of the city,” explained Bloomberg during a press conference in March. “The city has more of an interest. I think the state government has their [sic] own problems. It’s a good deal for the state. If not, they can take them over or close them down.”4

  Even in the midst of such crippling financial shortfalls, it was understandably difficult for the governor’s office and ESDC to relinquish control of—and future credit for—a project that had captivated the public for more than a decade and that had finally come so near to realization. An entire year would pass—with city officials openly worrying that the state’s fiscal problems could undermine the project and the park’s future remaining in limbo—while state and city authorities negotiated behind the scenes to resolve the problem in a way that would both cover the expenses required for the park’s construction and ensure that the state had a continuing, if limited, role in the park’s ongoing development.5

  The arduous, behind-the-scenes task of restructuring the control of the park fell heavily on two recently appointed public officials with no previous governmental experience. Peter Davidson, a native of Brooklyn Heights and relative of former Brooklyn Bridge Park Coalition leader Anthony Manheim, assumed his position as executive director of the ESDC after a successful career as an entrepreneur, an investment banker, and the chairman of the J. M. Kaplan Fund. Robert Lieber, a former managing director at Lehman Brothers, joined the Bloomberg administration as Deputy Mayor for Economic Development after a year of service as the president of the New York City Economic Development Corporation.

  Davidson and Lieber shared an impatience with the inefficiencies of large government bureaucracies, a problem that was compounded by the competing political interests of the state and the city over the ownership of the park. “I was immediately stupefied by the insanity of the entire process,” recalls Lieber, “where every decision was based on politics, instead of merit. A 50–50 balance of responsibilities between city and state governments is a disaster model.”6

  Both men were determined to find a way to resolve the problem, however, and for months before the announcement, they worked quietly together behind the scenes to produce an arrangement that would be acceptable to both the state and city governments.

  A variety of factors converged to enable the state to gracefully relinquish control of the project to the city. First, Davidson had determined, in consultation with Governor David Paterson and Deputy Secretary for Economic Development and Infrastructure Timothy Gilchrist, that the ESDC should assume “a lighter touch” in its oversight of the city’s infrastructure, restricting its involvement to subway systems, taxing policies, and roads. “From a strictly philosophical point of view,” explains Davidson, “there was no longer any reason for the state to be involved in the construction of the park.”7

  Second, New York was facing a financial shortfall that, combined with the complex legislative process to which state appropriations were routinely subjected, made it virtually impossible for the administration in Albany to honor its earlier commitments to the park. In addition to the city’s stronger financial position at the time, the mayor enjoyed far greater flexibility in committing and securing project funds, even during a period of financial instability.

  “The state has to go through an elaborate legislative process before anything can be appro
ved,” explains Daniel Doctoroff. “The city has a strong-mayor form of government where the mayor proposes a budget and the city council negotiates around the edges. So when the mayor stands up and says I’m going to commit $150 million to this and we’re going to need another $50 million, then you can rely on that commitment.”8

  Finally, both Davidson and Paterson were relative newcomers to their positions in state government and were consequently not nearly as identified with or invested in the ambitions and commitments of their predecessors. While there were still many people in state government who argued that the governor and the ESDC were bound “to see the project through to completion,” Paterson and Davidson reached the conclusion that releasing the major responsibilities for the project to the city’s control was the right thing to do.9

  Both Davidson and Lieber give particular credit to newly installed Governor David Paterson for publicly endorsing their plans. “Paterson totally understood what we were doing and the reasons we were doing it,” Davidson insists, “and he was very supportive from the beginning.”10 “Governor Paterson got it done,” agrees Lieber. “If he had said ‘no,’ then none of this would have happened.”11

  FINALLY, ON MARCH 10, 2010, Mayor Bloomberg, Governor Paterson, State Senator Daniel Squadron, and Assemblywoman Joan Millman announced a plan by which the state pledged to relinquish to the city responsibility for and control of Brooklyn Bridge Park, in exchange for which the city committed an additional $55 million ($36 million of which was earmarked for the construction of the Pier 2 and John Street sections of the park), in addition to the $139 million it had already committed to the project, for the next phases of construction.12 According to the terms of the agreement, the ongoing planning, construction, maintenance, and operations of the park would be administered by a newly created operating entity, to be known as the Brooklyn Bridge Park Corporation (BBP Corporation), which would be governed by a seventeen-member board. The Development Corporation’s Regina Myer was selected as the president of the new entity.13

  To ensure that the community’s interests were adequately represented in the future planning for and development of the park, the agreement also authorized the creation of the Community Advisory Council, through which local residents could continue to voice their concerns regarding the park’s development, and the Committee on Alternatives to Housing (CAH), with State Senator Squadron and Assemblywoman Millman retaining the right to veto plans for residential housing at Pier 6 and John Street if the planned developments failed to address the concerns of the adjacent communities.

  “New York State has been unmatched over the past several years in jumpstarting transformative projects that spur economic development and create jobs,” said ESDC executive director Peter Davidson at the time. “And when a development is successfully underway, we find the right partners and systems to help us achieve the best long-term outcomes for our projects. That time has now come with Brooklyn Bridge Park, and this new structure is a win for the state, a win for the city, and a win for the local community in making this shared long-term vision a reality.”14

  In addition to the shortfall in the state budget, the BBP Corporation was confronted with a dramatic expansion in the anticipated budget for the construction of Brooklyn Bridge Park, with the projected cost having doubled from the $150 million cited in the Illustrative Master Plan, presented in 2000, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed in 2002, to more than $300 million by 2010. “Peter Davidson at ESDC really felt strongly that the city was the right steward for the park,” recalls Myer of the rationale behind the state’s willingness to cede control of the park to the city. “The outstanding problem was that, although $150 million had initially been allocated, our cost estimates projected that the park was actually going to cost at least $300 million to build. It became clear to ESDC that the state couldn’t commit the resources that were necessary to fully build out the park, since the New York State budget for the entire state park system was about $100 million. It was very unlikely that the state would commit that level of resources in the city.”15

  According to Robert Lieber, the mushrooming construction and maintenance expenses for the park were the inevitable result of ongoing underestimations of the real cost of completing the project, including the cost of refurbishing the decaying piers on which much of the park would be built. “Piers rot,” explains Lieber, “and it’s expensive to repair them.” The practice of ignoring essential expenses until the last minute, says Lieber, “goes back to the days of Robert Moses, when you estimated the cost of a project at $50 million, even though you knew it would really be $100 million. Then once you got started, it was impossible to stop.”16

  In the case of Brooklyn Bridge Park, the underestimations were more often a reflection of wishful thinking on the part of park advocates, determined to devise an affordable and self-sustainable model for the park’s realization, than of deliberate miscalculation. The revised financial projections for the project were real, however, and it would be left to the city, the community, and the BBP Corporation to agree on a plan for funding and maintaining the park.

  ON MARCH 22, 2010, less than two weeks after the announcement of the agreement by which the state ceded primary control of Brooklyn Bridge Park to the city, Mayor Bloomberg and Governor Paterson announced the opening of the nine-acre Pier 1—the first section of the piers to be officially opened to the public (figures 27 and 28). More than twenty-five years had passed since Anthony Manheim’s initial conversations, in 1983, with the Port Authority over the disposition of the Brooklyn piers; sixteen years since the Brooklyn Bridge Park Coalition and the borough’s elected officials had endorsed the “13 Guiding Principles” for the park’s development; and twelve years since the formation of the Local Development Corporation (LDC).

  The highly publicized ceremony was held at the top of the Granite Prospect, a set of granite steps built into the landscaped lawns of Pier 1 above the promenade and native salt marsh that sprawled along the waterfront (figure 29). “The piers along the Brooklyn waterfront south of the Brooklyn Bridge have for years sat vacant or underutilized,” said Mayor Bloomberg, “acting as a barrier between Brooklyn residents and their waterfront. Today we’re removing that barrier and reclaiming this waterfront for Brooklynites and New Yorkers.”17 “All of our hard work has clearly paid off,” continued Bloomberg, “There are few places in the city, even in the world, where you’ll find a setting like this one on Pier 1.”18

  “It was such a pivotal moment for the park,” recalls Jennifer Klein, director of capital operations for Brooklyn Bridge Park. “You didn’t see the rain; all you saw was greenery. It was a feeling of pride and accomplishment and excitement about what we’d done and what we were going to continue to be doing. Being a part of that from the moment of taking down those sheds to the earth rising up to thirty feet, it was such an incredible high, a feeling of elation and satisfaction that we finally did it. And not only that—it came out so beautifully.”19

  IN ADDITION TO INCREASING SUPPORT for the park in the media and among the public, the opening of Pier 1 had a positive effect on the relationship between the Conservancy and the BBP Corporation, the leaders of which gradually assumed a more collaborative and less competitive approach to supporting the park’s development.

  FIGURE 27

  Looking toward Pier 1 from the Brooklyn Bridge, ca. 1980.

  COURTESY OF BROOKLYN BRIDGE PARK CONSERVANCY

  FIGURE 28

  Looking toward Pier 1 from the Brooklyn Bridge, 2010.

  © ETIENNE FROSSARD, NEW YORK, N.Y.

  FIGURE 29

  Opening day of Pier 1, March 22, 2010. Pictured are (left to right) City Council member Brad Lander, State Senator Daniel Squadron, Public Advocate Bill de Blasio, Assemblywoman Joan Millman, Deputy Mayor for Economic Development Robert Lieber, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe, Governor David Paterson, Empire State Development Corporation executive director Peter Davidson, Brooklyn Bridge Park Conserv
ancy chairman David Kramer, Brooklyn Bridge Park Development Corporation president Regina Myer, Brooklyn Bridge Park Conservancy executive director Nancy Webster, Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz.

  © JULIENNE SCHAER

  “It was so important to have [the Conservancy and the BBP Corporation] working together,” says former Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe. “The board members and the staff leadership of both organizations were crucial. One always had a sense that the neighborhood was there to back you up when you were dealing with certain elected officials. And that was essential. I was extremely impressed by the loyalty and the decency that they all displayed. They were able to marginalize some of the opposition to the park through their patient and persistent decency. It was the same polite stubbornness that stopped Robert Moses from ramming the BQE [Brooklyn–Queens Expressway] down Brooklyn Heights.”20

  WHILE THE BBP CORPORATION and the Conservancy were focused on the construction and programming of Brooklyn Bridge Park, and as the public was discovering and flocking to the newly opened Pier 1, the debate over housing in the park continued among the leadership of the Cobble Hill, Willowtown, and Dumbo (Down Under the Manhattan Bridge Overpass) neighborhood associations.

  On November 30, 2010, the Committee on Alternatives to Housing held the first of two public hearings. Convened by BBP Corporation president Regina Myer, the hearings held by the CAH were open to the public and designed to provide greater opportunities for the local community in decisions about the role of residential development in the financial model for the park. State Senator Daniel Squadron and Assemblywoman Joan Millman had opposed housing in the park in their election campaigns of 2008 and were instrumental in the creation of the committee. In addition to their pivotal roles on the committee, the two state legislators had each been granted veto power over the proposed residential developments for John Street and Pier 6 by the MOU. Along with many of the local residents in attendance, Squadron and Millman were joined in their opposition to housing by City Council members Brad Lander and Steve Levin, both of whom spoke out forcefully against the existing plans for residential development in the park.21