Libya - The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi

by Alison Pargeter

  In the eleventh century, a second, much larger wave of Arab conquerors arrived and spread across Libya, altering the ethnic complexion of all three regions. These new arrivals, who were from the Bani Salim and Bani Hilal tribes, had originated in Najd in the Arabian Peninsula, but had settled in Egypt until they were forced out following a famine. This was no small-scale affair: thousands of tribesmen, accompanied by their families and flocks, flooded into the sparsely populated Cyrenaica and beyond. The Bani Hilal moved primarily into Tripolitania, while the Bani Salim settled in the east. These tribes, and the Bani Hilal in particular, behaved like most invading forces: they seized land and water resources for themselves and turned many Berbers (as well as Arab tribes from the earlier invasion) into their clients and vassals.6 They also mixed and intermarried with the Berbers, resulting in the almost total Arabization of what we now call Libya. This was particularly the case in the east, which is one of the most ethnically and religiously homogeneous regions in North Africa today.

  It is not clear exactly why these Arab invaders succeeded where others failed. However, the lack of resistance may well have been related to the shared Bedouin culture and lifestyle, and to the fact that both Berber and Arabs practised nomadism as a means of social organization.7 What is clear, however, is that, despite the stream of foreign occupiers with their different cultures and religions, it was the Arabs who were able to put a truly lasting stamp on the local population. Arab identity remains strongest for Libyans today and in spite of repeated attempts by Colonel Qaddafi at the end of the 1990s to foster a sense of African identity among the Libyan population, Libyans remain resolutely proud of their Arab and Islamic heritage.

  The Ottomans

  The next group of conquerors who were to have a lasting presence were the Ottomans, who seized the port of Tripoli in 1551, and whose rule was to endure until the early twentieth century.8 Yet while their presence may have been lengthy, like most of their predecessors the Ottomans were never able to fully subjugate the whole of the territory. Successive Ottoman rulers struggled to bring the recalcitrant tribes of the hinterland, especially those in the east, under their control. This was particularly true during the first two hundred years of Ottoman rule, when Tripoli was governed by a Turkish bey, who answered directly to his masters in Constantinople. During this time, Ottoman control was restricted mostly to the coastal towns, and there were only ‘occasional and half-hearted forays into the hinterland to collect taxes’.9

  Constantinople's attitude towards its territories at this time was to give them ample freedom to conduct their own affairs. This somewhat laissez-faire approach meant that there was no major objection on the sultan's part when, in 1711, an upstart Ottoman military officer, Ali Pasha Qaramanli, seized control of Tripoli and established his own dynasty. Yet for all their efforts, the Qaramanlis were not much better at bringing the unruly tribes under their control. Although they succeeded in extending their rule eastwards, beyond Tripolitania and into Cyrenaica, aside from in the coastal cities, where urban dwellers were forced to pay taxes, they had little real impact on the locals or on the Bedouin tribal structures that still held firm. They also failed, for a long period, to make any real inroads into the Fezzan, where an independent trading state called Awlad Mohamed had been founded by a Sharifan (one who claims descent from the Prophet) who came from Fes in Morocco.

  The Qaramanli period was a turbulent one and was characterized by bloodshed. This bloodletting was not only prompted by the dynasty's bid to bring the rebellious tribes under its control, but was also a result of its own internal squabbles, as various family members vied for power. When Ali Pasha Qaramanli fell ill, for example, one of his sons was so intent on taking over that he killed his brother in cold blood in his mother's quarters. This episode led to civil war in Tripolitania.

  By the 1830s, the twists and turns of the Qaramanli dynasty were becoming too much for Constantinople. The continued instability was all the more worrying for the Imperial Palace, which was also fretting about European expansion in North Africa. As a result, Sultan Mahmoud II decided it was time to reassert authority over Tripoli and moved to establish direct rule over the territory once again. Given what was at stake, this time around the Ottomans were determined to subjugate the entire population. They launched three major campaigns to extend their control over Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. Yet despite these efforts and the tiny population size,10 it still took them more than twenty years of bloody conflict against rebellious tribes to bring western Libya and the Fezzan under their rule. Cyrenaica meanwhile remained largely out of reach.

  The Ottoman failure to penetrate Cyrenaica was due in part to a formidable presence that had developed in the eastern regions. This was the famed Sanussiya – a Sunni Sufist religious order that shaped the evolution of the east of the country in the most profound of ways. This order was first founded in Mecca in the early nineteenth century by the scholar Sayed Mohamed Ali Al-Sanussi, known as the Grand Sanussi, who originated from Mostaganem in present-day Algeria. After Al-Sanussi was forced out of the Hijaz (in the west of what is now Saudi Arabia), he settled in Cyrenaica, establishing his first religious zawiya (lodge) in the eastern coastal city of Al-Baida in 1843.

  The Sanussiya followed a strict religious doctrine that sought to reform and purify Islam. They rejected the more folkloric types of the faith that were popular at the time, looking down on the ‘vulgar’ use of processions, music and piercings of the flesh that were sometimes used by other orders to get closer to God.11 Such carryings on were not uncommon at that time. Piccioli vividly describes a ghoulish scene he witnessed in the zawiya of Saint Sidi Husain Hamza, where, to the accompaniment of fierce rhythms beaten out on drums and tambourines, an old cripple, intoxicated with devotion, proceeded to cut himself in the stomach with a dagger several times before seemingly slitting his throat. Piccioli also recounts how ‘Other fanatics were rocking themselves; some were swallowing keys, others live scorpions, others bits of broken glass. The whole of that gloomy arcade was filled with the same fever of blood and pain.’12 It was exactly these kinds of grisly and theatrical practices that the Sanussiya shunned, preferring a more sober, orthodox approach that focused on the original teachings of the Prophet.

  The Sanussiya doctrine was particularly well received by the illiterate Bedouin of Cyrenaica, who were described by one observer as ‘an undemonstrative people’; it was difficult to imagine them ‘piercing their cheeks with skewers, eating glass or swaying into convulsions’.13 Yet their receptiveness was driven not so much by an attraction to the theological arguments of the order, as by its simple message, which sought to strip Islam back to basics, and by the charisma of its pious leader, who claimed descent from the Prophet Mohamed. Aside from the educated elite who actually lived in the lodges, most Bedouin who followed the Sanussiya had only the slightest knowledge of the brotherhood's religious teachings. Its simple adherents rarely knew any of the special prayers or litanies – their use of such things was restricted to having a scribe write the words on paper, to be sewn up in leather and tied to their bodies for protection.14

  The success of the Sanussi order in Cyrenaica was also down to the fact that the region had a strong tribal system. The order was able to capitalize on this great social organizer, coordinating its lodges with existing tribal structures and creating alliances with tribal leaders.15 This also enabled the order to benefit from the fact that there was close interrelation between tribal power and control of the trade routes across the Sahara from Central Africa to the Cyrenaican coast and Egypt.16 In this way, the Sanussiya came to control much of the trade in the area and beyond, enabling the order to spread far and wide. By the late 1880s, it had extended not only throughout Cyrenaica (excluding the urban areas) and into the deserts of western Egypt, but also down into Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan. Interestingly, the order failed to really take hold in the more cosmopolitan Tripolitania, especially near the coast, where it had to compete with other urban-based religious ord
ers.

  Thus the Sanussiya became not only the dominant religious force, but also the most important political force in Cyrenaica. The order acted as a kind of independent state, which at the peak of its power provided security, education and justice to the entire region. As a result, the east evolved into a kind of self-contained unit, where tribalism and Islam – both still defining features of the region today – were preserved.

  Given the order's immense power, the Ottomans ultimately concluded that the best approach was to work with the Sanussiya, rather than against it. They therefore allowed the order in the hinterland to operate more or less independently, agreeing to award it suzerainty status within the empire – something that gave it tax-exempt status. Meanwhile, they focused their efforts on securing Tripolitania and the Fezzan, bringing some newfound order and security to the western and southern regions. This new sense of order had a major impact: trade began to flourish, settlements began to be established in rural areas, and there was greater urbanization in the northern regions. From the mid- to late nineteenth century, these areas were sufficiently secure for the Ottomans to begin instituting some of the administrative reforms they were introducing to other parts of their empire. By the early 1880s, the Ottomans had introduced a relatively comprehensive administration in Tripoli, and education and commerce were beginning to blossom. These changes created a new urban elite, many of whom joined the Ottoman administration.

  Tripoli changed even more dramatically with the emergence of the Young Turks movement in the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century. This modernist and progressive movement opposed the sultan's regime and demanded more extensive reforms. There were plenty of these Young Turks in Tripoli. The city had become something of a centre of Turkish dissidence, after Constantinople had taken to banishing troublesome officials there as a kind of hardship post, hoping it might knock some of the rebellious spirit out of them. A number of local young, upwardly mobile men began to imitate these young Turkish rebels and, despite the traditionally conservative nature of society, began to drink alcohol and to talk politics. Newspapers also appeared at this time, as did new courts and proper postal services. The changes were so great that one European visitor to Tripolitania in 1907 remarked: ‘during the last twenty years the capital of Tripolitania had been enriched by a whole series of institutions concerning justice, finances, commerce, public education, and even hygiene and public assistance: One thinks oneself at first glance in an important European centre.’17

  However, beyond these urban developments, during all their centuries of rule the Ottomans were never able to unify the three distinct provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, and never succeeded in creating a common identity among the people they governed. Moreover, just as these urban developments were advancing, Libya was to experience its next colonial invasion: the arrival of the Italians in 1911 was to change the course of Libya's history in the most dramatic of fashions.

  The Italians

  Italy's bid to conquer Libya was a reflection of its own changing circumstances. Following Italian unification in 1861, Rome sought to emulate its European counterparts, who were deep in the throes of imperial expansion, by acquiring some colonial possessions of its own. Given that Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan were the only provinces in North Africa to have escaped European colonial advances at this time, they were the obvious targets for Rome's new colonial ambitions. Italy began by establishing an economic presence in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, opening branches of the Banco di Roma in Tripoli, Benghazi and other key cities, and investing in local agriculture, light industry, mineral prospecting and shipping.18

  In 1911, however, the Italians embarked upon a full-scale military invasion. They were able to occupy the coastal cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, Derna, Homs and Tobruq easily enough. But, like so many before them, the Italians found themselves unable to expand beyond the coast. The somewhat ‘green’ Italian forces were shocked to find themselves up against fierce resistance from a number of Ottoman garrisons, which were supported by local volunteers who may not have had any particular love for the Turks, but who preferred to support a fellow Muslim power against an invading Christian force. However, the Ottomans were not what they used to be. With their empire weakening, they concluded that their best bet would be to sign a secret treaty with the Italians. This accord, signed in October 1912, gave Rome nominal control of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, while the Ottomans retained residual rights, including the supervision of religious affairs.

  The fact that these two colonizing forces had cut such a deal was stupefying to the locals, who, when they discovered what had happened, felt utterly abandoned by the Turks. Determined not to give any more ground to these foreign invaders, the local inhabitants fought back. This was particularly the case in Cyrenaica, where the Sanussi Order, now led by Ahmed Al-Sharif Al-Sanussi, the grandson of the order's founder, led the resistance. Groups of hardy tribal fighters holed themselves up in the eastern mountains and waged a guerrilla campaign against the Italian forces. They were not unsuccessful. Although the Italians pushed hard into Cyrenaica in 1913, and took a number of coastal towns, like so many of their predecessors they were unable to penetrate into the deserts below.19 Indeed, despite their ambitions, the Italians were essentially left with just the coastal strip to call their own.

  Yet it was not only the locals' determination to defend their land that prevented the Italians from expanding their presence beyond these coastal areas. In May 1915, Italy entered the First World War, and this forced the country to redirect its military energies elsewhere. Rome was also experiencing growing economic and political challenges at home, which meant that it simply did not have the resources to pursue its colonial ambitions in North Africa. As a result, less than a decade after it had embarked upon its colonial adventure, Italy was forced to scale down its presence in Libya. In 1919 it issued the Legge Fondamentale – laws under which Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were granted their own parliaments and governing councils. The following year it awarded Idris Al-Sanussi, head of the Sanussi Order since 1916, the position of Emir of Cyrenaica, enabling him to administer a number of oases autonomously. This appointment was to have important implications for the future of Cyrenaica, essentially legitimizing the Emirate of Cyrenaica as a virtually autonomous region led by the Sanussiya.20

  Italy's granting of autonomy to the east was not lost on the Tripolitanians, who wanted to secure a similar deal for themselves. In 1922, they made a formal request that Idris Al-Sanussi extend his emirship into the western region. However, by then it was too late. Rome had appointed a new governor in Tripolitania, the hardnosed Giuseppe Volpi. Volpi introduced martial law, annulled the Legge Fondamentale, and set about reconquering the province for the glory of Italy. His efforts were to be given a major boost in October 1922, when a Fascist government came to power in Rome. Fascist leader Benito Mussolini, who was determined to turn his back on the woolly policies of Italy's previous liberal governments, sought to amplify Italy's role as an imperial power. He therefore reinvigorated Italy's assault on Libya and made it clear that this time around there would be no half-hearted attempt at subjugation.

  Yet for all their zeal, it still took the Fascists nine years to bring the whole of the territory under their control. Once again, the east proved the hardest challenge. With the support of the local population, the tribal fighters continued the resistance from their hideouts in the rugged Jebel Akhdar (Green Mountains) of Cyrenaica. They were led by Omar Al-Mukhtar, a Sanussi sheikh and Qu'ranic teacher, who hailed from Janzour near Tobruq on the eastern coast, and who was a master of guerrilla tactics. It was Al-Mukhtar's skill and steadfastness which meant that the guerrilla fighters, who were greatly outnumbered by the Fascist forces, were able to stave off Italian domination for almost a decade.

  The Italians responded to such determined resistance with a ruthlessness and brutality that was shocking even by the standards of the time. They engaged in savage campaigns of repression, killing figh
ters (as well as suspected rebels and civilians) with what can only be described as detached abandon. According to certain reports, some 12,000 Cyrenaicans were executed during 1930 alone, and a similar number the following year.21 Indeed, the gallows were a regular feature of life during the nine-year struggle. Such was the ideological vigour behind the campaign that the Fascists went so far as to make postcards depicting Libyans being hanged; they would exchange these ‘keepsakes’ on special occasions. There were horror stories, too, of rebels being dropped from aeroplanes.

  The Italians knew that the key to defeating the stubborn east was to isolate the fighters from their supply lines and from the local population that was giving them support. They therefore built a 300km fence along the Egyptian border to cut off supplies, sealed wells and confiscated herds. They also rounded up two-thirds of the civilian population of eastern Libya and deported them to concentration camps, thus depriving the resistance of its social base.22 Thousands of men, women and children were forced to walk hundreds of kilometres to these camps in the harsh winter of 1929, many of them dropping dead from illness or exhaustion along the way.

  Such tactics eventually proved too much for even the most resilient of guerrilla fighters. In September 1931, Omar Al-Mukhtar was finally ambushed, put on trial and publicly hanged in the Suluq concentration camp. The seventy-year-old Al-Mukhtar's last words were the Qu'ranic phrase often used at time of death: ‘To God we belong and to Him we shall return.’