GCHQ

by Richard Aldrich

  7 Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, Vol.2, p.584; Burrows, By Any Means Necessary, pp.250–5.

  8 Reilly (Moscow) to (FO), Nos. 954 and 957, 11.07.60, 213/4/G, FO 371/173538.

  9 Reilly (Moscow) to (FO), 14.06.60, NS1381/82, FO 371/152002.

  10 Horne, Macmillan 1957–1986, p.225

  11 Reilly (Moscow) to (FO), 12.07.60, 213/4/G, FO 371/173538. The subsequent JIC paper was JIC (60) 43 (Final), ‘Soviet Threats Against Reconnaissance Flight Bases Following the U-2 Incident’, and is summarised in DEFE 13/342.

  12 Reilly (Moscow) to FO, 19.07.60, 13/44, FO 371/173540.

  13 ‘Soviet Reply Note on RB-47 Incident’, Moscow Home Service, 18.05 GMT, 15.07.60, SU/387.A1/1, SWB. See also Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.1, p.148.

  14 Macmillan to Eisenhower, 12.07.60, Z13/23/G, FO 371/173539.

  15 ‘Memorandum on Buzzing of Soviet Ships’, Tass in English, 17.47 GMT, 16.07.60, SU/387.A1/1, SWB.

  16 Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.1, p.141.

  17 Michel (FO) to Wilkison (H/PUSD) 21.07.60 and Wilkinson to Michel, 22.07.60, 13/44, FO371/173540.

  18 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp.484, 493.

  19 Macmillan (PM) to Home (Foreign Secretary), M271/60, 01.08.60, DEFE 13/15.

  20 Mtg held in the PM’s Rooms at the House of Commons, JIC 1850/60, ‘Radio Proving Flights’, Daunt, 10.11.60, ibid.

  21 Minutes, ‘Surveillance Meeting’, 26.04.60, 16/W/160, ADM 1/27680.

  22 Minute by head of Military Branch II, 10.03.61, ibid.

  23 Memorandum from PS to V.C.A.S. to PS to S. of S., ‘Aircraft Approach Restrictions – Operation TIARA/GARNET’, 10.60, AIR 20/12222. The JIC paper prepared for Macmillan was JIC (60) 62 (Revised), 01.09.60.

  24 Bufton (ACAS(I)) memo, ‘Comments on JIB’s memorandum’, 08.60, enclosing Hunt (Cab) to Bufton, JIC/1482/60, 09.09.60, AIR 8/1953.

  25 On continuing British submarine intelligence operations in the 1960s see Riste, Norwegian Intelligence Service, p.228.

  26 Speech by Keith Hall, Director NRO, Naval Research Laboratory 75th Anniversary Event, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/1998/grab–698.htm

  27 Smith (IG), ‘Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Material’, 14.04.49, File 310.13, Box 9, Army Int. TS-Decimal File, 1945–52, Entry 47A, RG 319, NARA

  28 Ralph Erskine, ‘The Admiralty and Cipher Machines’; CPB (52), 1st mtg, Appendix E, CPB/52/1, ‘NATO Crypto-material: Plan for Production, Distribution, Accounting and Security Control’, note by the Secretary, 25.09.52, HW 9/28.

  29 FCO to British Defence Liaison Staff (NZ), 19.06.69, FCO19/90, discussed in Matt Russell, BID/60 (Singlet) http://www.jproc.ca/crypto/bid60.html.

  30 Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.1, pp.212–18.

  31 SM-2721-52, Memo of the Reps. of the British COS, ‘Report of the UK/US Communications Security Conference, 1952’, JCS 1951–3, CCS311 (1-10-42) Sec.15, RG 218, NARA.

  32 Alvis was indeed a good system, and was eventually operated in many countries, including Canada and Australia. It was still in use in Canberra in the 1980s.

  33 The paper was LCSB (62) 6, 22.05.62.

  34 ‘Provision of On-Line Cryptographic Equipment for NATO’, note of a meeting in Mr Trend’s Room at the Treasury, 07.06.62, 73/155/01, T 225/2074.

  35 Captain Robert F.T. Stannard, CBE, DSO, RN, took over from Major General Sir William Ronald C. Penney, KBE, CB, DSO, MC, as D/LCSA on 01.11.57. I am indebted to Peter Freeman for this information.

  36 Summarised in Stephenson (FO) to Trend (Treasury) 29.06.62, T 225/2074.

  37 Ibid.

  38 UK-46-MWD-N-59 and UK-47-N-59, discussed in Reeve (MoD) to Mitchell (T), 28.08.61, enclosing ‘MWDP Agreements Signed Since the MWDP Meeting 22.12.50’, T 225/1758.

  39 As we shall see in the next chapter, this assertion was far from true.

  40 ‘Provision of On-Line Cryptographic Equipment for NATO’, note of mtg 10.07.62, T 225/2074.

  41 Stannard (LCESA) to Stephenson (FO), BM55/0504, 29.01.63, T 225/2074.

  42 The official who took the call was not impressed, and noted: ‘He got nowhere as far as I was concerned.’ Hartley (Washington) to Walshe (DEA), 04.09.56, item.2, CRS A1838, NAA

  43 Hagelin to Australian Embassy (Washington), 10.56, item 65, ibid. See also Crypto AG (Switzerland), ‘Analysis of the CX-52 Machine from the Point of View of Cryptographic Security’, 02.54, item.59, ibid.

  44 ‘I am…in correspondence with LCSA on the subject.’ Rolf (DSB) to Walshe (DEA), 14.12.56, 48/253/630, item 13, ibid.

  45 JPW min. Communications Branch, N1223/19.07.58, item.78, ibid., NAA. See also Rolf (DSB) to Walshe (DEA), ‘Hagelin Brochures’, 02.12.57, item.70, ibid.

  46 Hagelin to Hartley (Washington), 27.09.58, item.91, ibid.

  47 Clark, The Man Who Broke Purple, pp.185–9.

  48 Campbell, Interception Capabilities, p.vii.

  49 The first mention of this subject horrified NSA when it appeared in Bamford, Puzzle Palace, pp.321–3.

  50 ‘Gates’, Odom (NSA) daily log, 06.11.86, File 8, Box 25, Odom papers, LC. Their suspicions allegedly focused on John McMahon, a senior CIA officer who had been Deputy Director and the predecessor to Gates until 28.03.86.

  51 ‘Wieck’, Odom (NSA) daily log, 23.01.86, File 7, Box 25, Odom papers, LC.

  52 Wayne Madsen, ‘Crypto AG: The NSA’s Trojan Whore?’, Covert Action Quarterly, No.63 (Winter 1998), pp.36–7.

  53 ‘No Such Agency, Part 4: Rigging the Game,’ Baltimore Sun, 04.12.95; ‘NSA’s Crypto Sting’, Baltimore Sun, 10.12.95. The fullest account is given in the biography of Hans Bühler: Strehle, Verschlüsselt [Encrypted]: Der Fall Hans Bühler.

  54 For references to Swedish sigint cooperation see for example Wright, Spycatcher, pp.113, 186.

  55 See the detailed coverage of Montgomery’s conversations during his visits to Yugoslavia and Switzerland in PREM11/1224.

  56 LCSB/23/68 (Conclusions), ‘The State of Communications-Electronic Security and Measures to Improve it, 1968’, CAB164/312. See also Gardiner (CESD) to Cottrell (Cabinet Office), 13.11.68, ibid.

  57 Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.1, p.221.

  58 CPB (52), 1st mtg, Item 8, ‘Current Technical Problems’, 06.10.52, HW 9/28.

  59 Mins of TC/LSIC, 25.05.61, T 225/2496. Ken Perrin was in the chair.

  60 Benjamin, Five Lives in One, pp.145–6. However, Michael Hanley, the Director General of MI5, specifically warned Benjamin not to trust Wright’s judgement on the issue of moles.

  61 Wright, Spycatcher, pp.84, 108–14.

  62 Ibid., pp.110–13, 240–1.

  63 ‘What is Being Done About Radiation’, Stannard (D/LCSA), address to 38th mtg of the [Canadian] Cipher Policy Committee, Apr. 1958, File TS 1325-3 ‘Communications Security – Crypto Systems’, Canadian Department of National Defence, Box 31, RG 24, CNA.

  64 Ibid.

  65 The handbook was designated AMSP522.

  66 LCSC (59) 10 (Final), ‘Radiation: Review of Measures Taken or in Hand’, 19.06.59, File TS 1325-3 ‘Communications Security – Crypto Systems’, Canadian Department of National Defence, Box 31, RG 24, CNA.

  67 Burrough to Ryland, 03.06.69, attached ‘Report of the CESD Working Party’, DEFE 32/18, cited in Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, p.692.

  68 Drew (MoD) min. ‘The Templer Report’, 03.02.61, ibid.

  69 Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.1, pp.227–9.

  70 PSIS was created during the 1950s, and eventually had numerous sub-committees.

  71 Min. to Collier (T), ‘GCHQ’, reporting a conversation with Clive Loehnis, 11.04.62, T 213/844.

  72 Ibid.

  73 Collier (T) to Millward (GCHQ), 18.05.62, T 213/844.

  74 GCHQ spending had gone from £4,894,000 in 1953–54 to £7,903,000 in 1962–63, while the total sigint spend had gone from £10,239,000 to £20,520,000 in the same period. Wyatt note, ‘Increase in Sigint expenditure in the last decade compared with changes in other G
overnment expenditure’, 10.10.62, ibid.

  75 Wyatt (T) to Trend (T), ‘The Sigint Review, 1962’, 05.62, ibid.

  76 Winter, ‘British Intelligence and the July Bomb Plot’, pp.468–94.

  77 Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, p.11.

  78 Loehnis (D/GCHQ) to Stephenson (JIC), D/0948/1/14, 24.06.64, T 213/884.

  79 Collier (T) to Trend (T), ‘The Sigint Review’, 13.07.62, ibid.

  80 This paper no longer exists in the Treasury file, having been pulled back by GCHQ even as the review ended, but discussion of its contents is extant.

  81 Wyatt (T) to Collier (T), ‘The Sigint Review’, 17.08.62, T 213/884.

  82 Ibid.

  83 Collier (T), note of meeting between Hampshire and Trend, 30.10.62, ibid.

  84 Wright, Spycatcher, pp.246–7. Wright misdates the Hampshire review to 1964, and mistakenly attributes the initiative to the incoming Labour government of Harold Wilson. However, in other respects his detailed account is remarkably accurate.

  85 Collier (T) to Trend (T), ‘Hampshire’, 26.10.62, T 213/884.

  86 Wright, Spycatcher, pp.246–7.

  87 Thimont (T), to Collier (T), 24.11.64, T199/1089. This subcommittee included the Treasury Third Secretary who looked after expenditure in support of overseas policy.

  88 Wyatt (T), ‘Review of Sigint: Note for the Record’, 14.09.62, T 213/884.

  89 Private information.

  90 Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, p.10.

  91 Collini, ‘A Life of H.L.A. Hart’, pp.108–14.

  92 Rees, Looking for Mr Nobody, p.85.

  93 Lacey, Hart, pp.92–3.

  94 Wright, Spycatcher, pp.246–7.

  95 Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, p.11; ‘Hampshire’, Telegraph, 15.06.04.

  96 Lacey, Hart, p.339.

  Chapter 12: Harold Wilson – Security Scandals and Spy Revelations

  1 King, The Cecil King Diary, p.128

  2 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.383.

  3 Entry for 03.07.63, Benn, Out of the Wilderness. p.37.

  4 Young, ‘George Wigg’, pp.198–9; Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp.522–5

  5 ‘The Organisation for Security in the Diplomatic Service and Government Communications Headquarters’, Aug. 1966, PREM13/1203, fully reproduced in Young, ‘George Wigg’, pp.203–8.

  6 Ibid.

  7 Godber (SoS for War) to Thorneycroft (SoS Defence), 16.07.63, DEFE 13/17.

  8 Drew (MoD) to Secretary, ‘Sergeant Patchett’, 03.12.63, ibid.

  9 SIC (Germany) (64) 4 (Final), D/6800/1402/28, 06.07.64, discussed at ‘Ad Hoc Committee on Personnel Security in Sigint Units in Germany’, 17.03.65, AIR 2/17290.

  10 LSIB, minutes of a limited mtg on 29.04.65, D/7246/1402/28/LSIB, 11.05.65, ibid.

  11 Report of the Security Commission May 1983, Cmnd.8876, p.38.

  12 Regina vs. Douglas Ronald Britten, Central Criminal Court, No. 7602/B/68, Old Bailey, 04.11.68, pp.12–13, BA 19/45.

  13 The recruitment seems to have been KGB rather than GRU. See Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p.414.

  14 Britten never learned the real identity of ‘Vasiley’, who had previously served as a KGB officer in Greece, a posting he had much preferred.

  15 Regina vs. Douglas Ronald Britten, Central Criminal Court, No. 7602/B/68, Old Bailey, 04.11.68, pp.4–5, BA 19/45.

  16 Ibid., p.6

  17 Private information.

  18 Thomas, Signal Success, pp.368–9.

  19 Regina vs. Douglas Ronald Britten, Central Criminal Court, No. 7602/B/68, Old Bailey, 04.11.68, pp.4–5, BA 19/45, p.6

  20 Ibid., p.23.

  21 West, A Matter of Trust, p.161.

  22 Regina vs. Douglas Ronald Britten, Central Criminal Court, No. 7602/B/68, Old Bailey, 04.11.68, pp.4–5, BA 19/45, p.6

  23 Ibid., pp.10, 23.

  24 Bunnett (MoD) to Armstrong (TS), PUS/68/1601/54/3, 10.09.68, BA 19/45.

  25 Regina vs. Douglas Ronald Britten, Central Criminal Court, No. 7602/B/68, Old Bailey, 04.11.68, BA 19/45.

  26 Pincher, Too Secret, p.463; West, MI5, pp.161–2

  27 Blake, No Other Choice, pp.222–57

  28 Jessup to Rostow, ‘Reflections on the Blake Case’, 01.11.66, File: Memo for Rostow, Box 2, National Security File/Intelligence File, LBJL.

  29 Ziegler, Wilson, pp.267–8.

  30 Wilson, The Labour Government, p.478.

  31 Pimlott, Wilson, p.444

  32 Ziegler, Wilson, pp.267–8.

  33 Creevy, ‘A Critical Review’, p.213.

  34 Ziegler, Wilson, pp.267–8.

  35 Creevy, ‘A Critical Review’, p.213.

  36 Pimlott, Wilson, p.444.

  37 Jones (FO) min., 06.11.44, FO 850/137.

  38 Le Bailly (DGI), ‘The Development of the Defence Intelligence Staff: Staff II, 1970–1973’, Folder 6, Box 7, Le Bailly papers, CCC.

  39 Trend (Cab Sec) to Armstrong (CSD), 05.03.68, enclosing ‘Reorganisation of Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee Structure’, BA25/41.

  40 Littler to Pitchforth, ‘Intelligence’, 17.08.67, ibid.

  41 Young, The Labour Governments, 1964–70, p.16.

  42 In 1965 its predecessor, the London Communications-Electronics Security Agency, had taken over the Joint Speech Research Unit and also the Services Cypher Development Unit.

  43 Albeit the working party noted that American comsec and sigint still did not get on well.

  44 ‘Report of the CESD Working Party’, 13.05.69, DEFE 32/18.

  45 Gardiner (CESD) to Cottrell (MoD), 13.11.68, CAB 164/312.

  46 Benjamin, Five Lives in One, pp.143–5.

  47 ‘Report of the CESD Working Party’, 13.05.69, DEFE 32/18.

  48 Burroughs (FCO) to Ryland (GPO), ‘Future of CESD’, 3.06.69, ibid.

  49 Creevy, ‘A Critical Review’, p.212.

  50 Young, The Labour Governments, 1964–70, pp.14–15; Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.2, pp.458–9

  51 Taylor (USN) to Wenger (NSA), 28.06.68, Box 104, CNSG records, RG 38, NARA.

  Chapter 13: Intelligence for Doomsday

  1 Reproduced in Goodman, ‘The Dog that Didn’t Bark’, pp.529–51

  2 Friedman, The Fifty-Year War, p.351.

  3 Aid, Secret Sentry, p.144.

  4 Le Bailly, ‘The Development of the Defence Intelligence Staff: Staff II, 1970–1973’, Folder 6, Box 7, Le Bailly papers, CCC.

  5 Le Bailly to Butler (Cab Sec), 09.12.93, Folder 5, Box 21, ibid. See also Butler (Cab Sec) to Le Bailly, 14.12.93, ibid.

  6 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp.249–56; also private information. The Americans had realised that the invasion was on by midday on 19 August. Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.2, pp.458–9.

  7 Le Bailly to ‘Charlie’, 01.07.82, Folder 3, Box 7, Le Bailly papers, CCC. See also Aid, Secret Sentry, pp.142–6; Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp.241–58.

  8 DMO memo, ‘Future Requirement for SAS Type Operations’, 14.07.58, WO 32/19472. See also memo by Lt Col. Pat Hart, ‘The Special Air Service’, 1958, McLeod papers, 2/5, LHCMA.

  9 257 Signals Squadron provided the communications links from Northag HQ to UK and German missile batteries.

  10 Private information.

  11 ‘Operational Directive to 23 SAS and Special Reconnaissance Squadron RAC’, Annex to B 2014/10 G (Ops and Plans) 11.09.62, WO 32/19472.

  12 Garner, Codename Copperhead, pp.19–25.

  13 NATO Special Committee – Nuclear Planning Working Group: Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (paper by the UK), 12.04.66, CAB 163/38.

  14 AWRE Report 012/73, ‘Clipeus Reference Documents and the UK ADM Policy 1953–1971’, ES4/1372.

  15 DOAE M7404, ‘Exercise Badger’s Lair: The Detectability of Stay-Behind Parties’, 06.74, DEFE 48/279.

  16 LCSC (61) 17 (Final), ‘ “Short Burst” Radio Communications Systems’, 31.12.61, CAB 21/4601.

  17 DOAEM7424, ‘An Assessment of the Value to 1(BR) Corps of ESM Provided by 225 Signal Squadron’, 01.75, DEFE
48/294.

  18 Ibid.

  19 What Northag lacked was a local equivalent of the American Guardrail system. Stacy, US Army Border Operations in Germany, 1945–1983, p.243.

  20 Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane, p.81. I am indebted to Chris Pocock for his comments on U-2 sigint systems.

  21 DOAE Study No 229, ‘The Communications Electronic Support Measures Provided by 225 Signal Squadron to 1 (BR) Corps in War’, 10.75, DEFE 48/806.

  22 DOAE Project 147, ‘The NATO Intelligence System’, 06.69, DEFE 48/496.

  23 ‘Experiments on the Use of Information Gained from Remote Sensors on the Battlefield’, 1976, DEFE 48/318; Nicholls, ‘Unattended Ground Sensors’, pp.6–11. Also private information.

  24 2ATAF was comprised of squadrons from the Belgian, Netherlands, German and Royal Air Forces.

  25 DOAE Project 147, ‘The NATO Intelligence System’, 06.69, DEFE 48/496.

  26 JSP 120 (5), Manual of Service Intelligence Volume 5: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreements (Stanags) Intelligence, 11.73, DEFE 73/12.

  27 Johnson, American Cryptology, Vol.2, p.332.