A Balcony Over Jerusalem

by John Lyons

  And while Rouhani may be a more attractive international face, hardline elements around the Supreme Leader still hold significant power. In government-run bookshops at railway stations I noticed Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf for sale – prominently positioned. When I asked one bookseller what it was about, he said: ‘Hitler – My Fight. It’s a very good book.’

  Along the streets of Tehran, quotes from the Koran in Farsi, Arabic and English were posted on government buildings. They included: ‘Do not be inquisitive about other people’s lives and do not backbite one another’; ‘Do not walk the earth arrogantly.’

  Travelling around Iran, our preconceptions were further challenged.

  In the southern city of Shiraz, we spent a day with a 25-yearold primary school teacher who acted as our guide. He’d recently served his compulsory 18 months in the army, and his views of the Basij surprised me. ‘The Basij militia is unpopular with younger Iranians because of how brutal they were during the 2009 problems. But they can also do good things – they’re an emergency team. Whenever the government needs them, and for whatever, the Basiji will help. Iran is surrounded by countries with problems and chaos such as Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan but Iran has calm and stability and I think that is because of the Basij.’

  At a museum in Shiraz we met an Iranian sheikh in his 50s who lectured at the University of Shiraz. He was surprised to see foreigners in Iran. He invited us to dinner that evening, along with a friend of his who spoke good English, a 26-yearold international law student at Tehran University who managed his family’s business. This student was from a wealthy family, possibly part of the next generation of leaders in Iran.

  The student had reservations about the regime of Ayatollahs that imposes religious restrictions. But when it came to the security of Iran he displayed a deep nationalistic sentiment: the brutal eight-year war between Iran and Iraq is seared into the consciousness of all Iranians. ‘Since 1979 we have not lost a centimetre of our land in any war,’ he told us. ‘The Iran–Iraq War lasted eight years and we had 13 countries against us but we fought courageously and won. The only country that helped us in that war was Syria.’ Despite the deep divisions in Iran between those loyal to the Islamic leaders and those who want a Western-style democracy, we came across this mindset wherever we went. The streets of many cities were lined with posters of ‘martyrs’ from that war.

  The student also gave us an insight into the way many young Iranians view Israel. There is a sense in Iran that Israel is unlikely to attack, because Israel understands that even if it did prevail over Iran it would be dealt serious damage. This student did not want a war with Israel, but he made it clear that deeply held Persian pride would rise up should one begin. ‘In any war with Israel both of our countries would lose. But If Israel attacks us we will fight back and we will flatten Tel Aviv and Haifa. We are not frightened to fight if attacked. The Jews fear death more than we do. Iranians believe that it is better to die young defending our homeland rather than to die as a sick old man in hospital.’

  He spoke about Iran’s mentality of proxy wars. ‘In Iran our military commanders have made a decision that a direct war with Israel would bring upon us too great a cost. That is why we prefer to fight through other people – that is why we give support to Hezbollah and Hamas and the Assad regime.’ Asked what support Iran gives Hamas, he said: ‘Weapons and advice. Some of the top Iranian military officers go to Gaza.’ But how do they get into Gaza? ‘Egypt does not want them going through the Egyptian end, Rafah, so they get in there by boat.’ When I pointed out that Israel is running a naval blockade of Gaza, he smiled. ‘They get in there.’ The commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Ali Jafari, is reported to have confirmed that Iran has not sent weapons to Gaza but ‘gave them the technology of how to make Fajr-5 missiles and now they [Hamas] have their hands on plenty of them’.3

  In Shiraz we also met a 24-year-old female photographic student, who told us: ‘Things are good in Iran for the young. The scarf is not a problem for me. I keep it back at this level but if I go into a mosque I pull it forward.’ Social media such as Facebook and Twitter had been banned in Iran since the Green Revolution, but she told me young Iranians know how to circumvent the restrictions. ‘We just need to know the filter. That way we have access to everything. It’s not something we talk about. We can basically do anything we want to as long as we don’t show off. We have a good life. It’s a relaxed place.’

  In fact, within minutes of arriving at one of the hotels we stayed in, Jack and Nicolas were given by hotel staff the information needed to circumvent the government ban on Facebook.

  In the city of Isfahan, deep in the religious and geographic heart of Iran, two Islamic clerics from the Imam mosque had their own views on the regime’s restrictions. Over a cup of tea, they gave us an insight into the thinking of the younger generation of clerics.

  Sheikh Davoud Jafari was a cleric with perfect English who had studied abroad. His ambition was to become an ayatollah, ‘but it is in the hand of God how long this will take’. While conceding the need for reform in Iran, he supported many of the regime’s policies. He said that the internet had been used to organise protests against the government in Iran, but he added, ‘I think the government should relax its limitations on social media. Social media has been used by the students in Tehran, who are not the majority of Iranians. In 2009 there were probably 58 per cent of Iranians in favour of Ahmadinejad and 42 against because of the strong support for Ahmadinejad from country areas.’ He said ‘a group of people’ wanted change but there was an even bigger group contented with the status quo. The protest movement had been based in the cities, but the majority opinion – which he claimed supported the regime – had ‘won’.

  Sheikh Jafari watched the BBC and CNN for foreign news. I asked him if, unlike their former President Ahmadinejad, Iran’s imams acknowledged the Holocaust. They do, he said, adding that President Hassan Rouhani ‘is cleverer than Ahmadinejad’. He told us there was a synagogue close to our hotel and said we should visit it to see that there was no problem with freedom of religion in Iran. (Later we did just that. There was no security; we simply walked in and introduced ourselves. We spoke to many worshippers, who insisted it was not dangerous being Jewish in Iran.)

  The other sheikh sharing a cup of tea with us, Sheikh Mohammad Reza Zamani, was more conservative. Unlike Sheikh Jafari, he defended his regime’s internet restrictions. ‘Our government acts like a parent for the nation. There are a lot of very bad images on the internet that would not be good for the young, that will invade their minds, and it is better they do not have it. Our government tries to act like a good parent to the nation.’

  Elsewhere, though, views of the regime were much more negative. In Yazd, southeast of Isfahan, a shopkeeper at a handicrafts store shook his head, indicating ‘no’, when I asked if life in Iran was good. When I asked what he thought of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei, he looked towards a woman wearing a black chador – a religious woman – and waited until she left the shop. ‘No good,’ he said. I asked what would happen if that woman heard him say that. He gestured a finger across his throat, as if to suggest beheading, then added: ‘People hanged. No good in Iran.’ This was another reminder that in the Middle East beneath appearances the reality can be dark.

  Iran will be crucial in determining the future of the Middle East. I’d become convinced of that after seeing what was going on in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and so many other parts of the region.

  The international community needs to understand how modern Iran sees the world. The national outlook is dominated by the battle against Sunni Islam.

  The theme pushed by the State-owned media in Tehran is that Iran is the leader of a Shia – rather than merely Iranian – army. That Shia army also includes the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran is thus able to command a ‘Shia crescent’ from Iran through Syria to the Mediterranean in Lebanon. This is, in effect, the front line for the S
hia forces in the Battle for Islam.

  The Shia army also includes key commanders and forces of the Iraqi Government – although the situation there is more complicated than in Syria and Lebanon. The Shia government in Iraq is the only government openly, and strongly, supported by both Iran and the US.

  The Shia crescent and its supporters are now facing the traditional Sunni crescent, which includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain. Iran sees Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as its main enemies – much more of a threat than Israel.

  In Bahrain, whose Sunni royal family is protected by Saudi Arabia, the Shias form 70 per cent of the population and made up the majority of the pro-reform demonstrators during the Arab Spring. Iran supported the Shia majority in their efforts to overthrow the minority Sunni royal family. Saudi Arabia’s interest in this strategic play was obvious when it sent tanks across the 25-kilometre-long King Fahd Causeway linking the two kingdoms to help put down civil unrest and protect the Bahraini royals in March 2011.

  But a new, much more extremist Sunni crescent has opened up to Iran’s northwest: northern Iraq and northern Syria. This crescent was established in 2014 after the dramatic victories of Islamic State.

  Iranians view Islamic State as a creation of the Wahhabist sect based in Saudi Arabia. There is a strong sense in Iran that Saudi Arabia has got what it has deserved by nurturing al-Qaeda and other Sunni groups: an even worse terrorist group that is now out of control.

  Ultimately, the Battle for Islam – the battle between Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims – can be resolved only by the two powerhouses of each side – Iran and Saudi Arabia. The only solution is if these two superpowers in the Islamic world decide to call off the dogs of war and sue for a genuine peace. Which means instructing their followers – including the most fanatic among them – to end this conflict.

  This is unlikely to happen, but it is not impossible. It would require both sides of the Islamic civil war to put aside 1400 years of animosity. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are now paying the price for this war – from acts of terrorism against against each other to having to spend enormous resources fighting this war.

  Both Iran and Saudi Arabia need to decide which is more important: pragmatic self-interest or religious fanaticism. If they decide on pragmatism, they can end this quickly. If they decide fanaticism, the world is set to become a much more dangerous place as the rest of us get caught up in this unholy war.

  CHAPTER 19

  The View from Palestine

  January 2015

  ON A FREEZING EVENING ON 4 JANUARY 2015, TWO DAYS before we left Israel, Sylvie and I sat by a fire in Bethlehem with a group of journalists, diplomats and NGO (non-government organisation) workers. The man sitting next to me – a leading Palestinian businessman – was regarded as a moderate. But what he had to say was chilling.

  Any Palestinian businessman in the West Bank needs to deal regularly with Israeli officials, who have control over all aspects of business, including tax. While he opposed Israel’s occupation, this man believed it was important for Palestinians to work to improve their lot.

  But what had angered him were events surrounding a vote by the 22-member UN Security Council on 30 December, just six days earlier. Jordan had submitted a resolution demanding a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank by 2017. Nine votes had been needed for the resolution to pass; 15 members had voted yes, five had abstained, and only the US and Australia had voted no.

  Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat had commented that Palestinian leadership had known that the resolution would fail because of the make-up of the Security Council, but that they had decided to push it anyway. The businessman told me that had the Palestinians waited three days until Australia was off the Security Council, Malaysia or Venezuela would have gone onto the council and voted to support the Palestinians. He saw it as stunning incompetence. (Australia was a rotating member of the Security Council. The US, as a permanent member, had a power of veto, which they would have used. What angered the businessman was that Australia added a certain ‘respectability’ to the US position and that he would have preferred if the US had been shown to be alone in its Security Council support for Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank.)

  Then the businessman really opened up: ‘Armed struggle is coming. I can guarantee you 100 per cent that Palestinians are going to take up weapons.’

  I told him it was my understanding that the Israelis, through their massive system of informants, knew what was happening in every square inch of the West Bank.

  ‘Israeli propaganda,’ he retorted. ‘The Israelis’ strongest town in the West Bank is Bethlehem – they know everything. But in other places the Israelis are not so strong. I could take you to places where the Israelis know nothing. The weapons are already there – and when the time comes they will get more from the mafia. The mafia in Israel will sell weapons to anybody.’

  Most Palestinians are reluctant to talk about armed campaigns. They talk about ‘peaceful resistance’, but once you get to know them they become more honest: a new armed conflict, or ‘uprising’, against Israel remains an option.

  According to this businessman, about 2000 militants would join an uprising against Israel. ‘They will not fight in the open, as they know they will lose. It will instead be by stealth – it will be bombings, it will be snipers, it will be attacks in different parts of Israel. They will terrify Israelis. It would not be hard to get 2000 people out of 2.9 million in the West Bank to join the fight. The weapons are already there.’

  The businessman cited the case of Palestinian prisoner Jamal Tirawi, who was released from prison in 2013. Before he was returned to the Balata refugee camp, the Israeli Army searched the refugee camp for weapons and found none. Then the Palestinian Authority security forces searched the camp and found none. Yet a couple of hours later to celebrate the release of Tirawi, scores of Palestinians came out carrying weapons. A European diplomat who was present was stunned by the number of weapons that had appeared despite the searches.

  In our six years in Israel, one of the most interesting conversations I had was in December 2009 with Ahmad Aweidah, among the most powerful financial figures in the West Bank. Born in Jerusalem, he was educated at the University of St Andrews in Scotland, and worked for the Société Générale banking group in France and then Paltel (Palestinian Telecommunication), the largest company in the Palestinian Territories. He now ran the Palestine Securities Exchange – responsible for US$7 billion in deposits.

  I wanted to meet Aweidah because of his reputation as one of the brightest of his generation. He was not regarded as an ‘Israel hater’ and was often mentioned as a future leader. So I drove to meet him at his office in Nablus in the West Bank.

  Aweidah called himself a moderate – which is why it was ominous that he wanted a one-State solution.

  ‘In terms of one State, I think we should go with the Martin Luther King call of one man one vote … It’s better than continued conflict, is it not? I think the two-State solution is no longer viable. I think the only solution now is one State where the Palestinians are the majority and the Jews are a protected minority, just like the whites are now in South Africa.’ The new State, Aweidah said, could be called ‘Israeltine’: ‘a combination of Israel and Palestine’.

  Aweidah outlined how it would work. ‘Under one State, Jews and Arabs would share power at a local level for things like education and health, while things like water would be decided at a national level. The Jews would have their own canton and the Arabs would have their own canton. It would be a federal structure. The Palestinian canton would not be responsible for the defence of the country. I am happy for the Jewish canton to remain in charge of defence through the IDF. Not a single Palestinian would serve in the IDF. Jerusalem would be everybody’s. Jews would be able to live in Hebron not as settlers but as full citizens. The Irish and the English resolved their conflict. The English and the Scots. There have been many other conflicts that have seemed as intractable as this on
e.’

  I suggested there would be a lot of resistance from Israelis because it would mean the end of the Jewish State. ‘But it would be the birth of the Jewish canton,’ he retorted. ‘Don’t worry, we will be good to them – they will be treated as a protected minority. We are not interested in oppressing them. Historically we don’t have a problem with Jews. Anti-Semitism is not an Arab or Muslim thing, it’s primarily been a Christian thing.’

  While the US still talks about a two-State solution, most Palestinians I met had abandoned the idea. They said the last chance for this was under Netanyahu. Indeed, it is usually only visiting foreigners who cling to the idea.

  The parents of the Palestinian children at Jack’s school had given up on a two-State solution. When Barack Obama was elected in 2008, they rekindled some interest, but after Benjamin Netanyahu blocked Obama’s efforts they gave up hope.

  ‘What have we got from 15 years of negotiating since Oslo?’ asked Aweidah.

  Today we’re sitting behind a wall with 600,000 Jewish settlers. So what will we get from another 15 years of negotiations – one million settlers? The Jews say ‘Never again’ about the Shoah [Holocaust]. We now say ‘Never again’ about losing more years negotiating and getting nothing. The settlers are actually rendering the two-State solution impossible and pre-empting the one-State solution. With the current growth of settlements, soon it will be impossible to divide the land anyway.

  The attitudes of many Palestinians hardened after the election of Netanyahu in 2009. ‘Netanyahu still believes we are going to get up and leave,’ said Aweidah. ‘They have tried every trick in the book to push Palestinians out. They want the land, they don’t want the people. We say 15 years and we are the majority.’