When Crime Pays

by Milan Vaishnav

  17. “Pappu Yadav in His Book: Cong, BJP Offered Rs 40 Crore,” Outlook, November 27, 2013.

  18. In his affidavit submitted to the Election Commission of India prior to the 2004 Lok Sabha election, Mohammed Shahabuddin disclosed charges in 19 pending criminal cases.

  19. Sankarshan Thakur, “Give Me Guns, I Shall Give You Votes,” Tehelka, April 10, 2004.

  20. Ashok K. Mishra, “Shahabuddin Gets Life for Murder of CPI-ML Activist,” Economic Times, May 9, 2007; “Shahabuddin Is a Habitual Criminal; Says Siwan DM,” Patna Daily (blog), April 21, 2005, http://web.archive.org/web/20070927230254/http://www.patnadaily.com/news05/april/042105/siwan_dm_justifies_ban.html (accessed November 15, 2016); Rajesh Chakrabarti, Bihar Breakthrough: The Turnaround of a Beleaguered State (New Delhi: Rupa, 2013).

  21. Saba Naqvi Bhaumik, “The Saheb of Siwan: The Tale of an Indian Godfather,” in First Proof: The Penguin Book of New Writing from India, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Penguin, 2005).

  22. Chakrabarti, Bihar Breakthrough, 71.

  23. Amarnath Tewary, “From the Barrel of a Gun,” Outlook, April 2, 2001.

  24. Thakur, “Give Me Guns, I Shall Give You Votes.”

  25. Jyotsna Singh, “Jail No Bar for Bihar Candidates,” BBC News, April 21, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3645317.stm (accessed December 16, 2008).

  26. Vandita Mishra, “As Girls Cycle to School and Shahabuddin Becomes a Fading Memory in Siwan, a State Reimagines Itself,” Indian Express, June 5, 2010.

  27. Sankarshan Thakur, “Lawmaker Lawbreaker,” Tehelka, September 17, 2005.

  28. Aman Sethi, “Rule of the Outlaw,” Frontline, December 17–30, 2005; Mark Tully, Non-Stop India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2011), 69–72; Chakrabarti, Bihar Breakthrough, 80; and “Former BJP MP Umakant Yadav Gets Seven-Year Jail Term,” Indian Express, February 8, 2012.

  29. Ashish Khetan, “Cash-for-Votes Scandal: A Trap. And a Cover-Up,” Tehelka, April 2, 2011.

  30. Mian Ridge, “Indian Government Survives No-Confidence Vote,” Christian Science Monitor, July 23, 2008.

  31. “Modi Describes Parliament as ‘Temple of Democracy,’” Press Trust of India, May 20, 2014, http://www.business-standard.com/article/politics/modi-describes-parliament-as-temple-of-democracy-114052000994_1.html (accessed May 21, 2014).

  32. Data compiled by ADR; for more information, see http://myneta.info.

  33. Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 216.

  34. Data compiled by ADR; see http://myneta.info.

  35. This SMS helpline is an initiative of ADR. For more information, visit http://adrindia.org/media/helpline-sms.

  36. Data compiled by ADR; see http://myneta.info.

  37. Ashutosh Varshney, “Two Banks of the Same River? Social Order and Entrepreneurialism in lndia,” in Partha Chatterjee and Ira Katznelson, eds., Anxieties of Democracy: Tocquevillean Reflections on India and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

  38. Based on data from ADR, 17 percent and 21 percent of municipal corporators in Mumbai and Delhi, respectively, declared involvement in criminal cases. Data are available at http://myneta.info.

  39. Trilochan Sastry, “Towards Decriminalisation of Elections and Politics,” Economic and Political Weekly 49, no. 1 (January 4, 2014): 36.

  40. Author’s calculations based on affidavits submitted to the Election Commission of India by candidates contesting the 2004, 2009, and 2014 national parliamentary elections.

  41. I first made this point about India’s “electoral rhythm” in Milan Vaishnav, “Crime but No Punishment in Indian Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/24/crime-but-no-punishment-in-indian-elections (accessed January 30, 2014).

  42. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 1962).

  43. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

  44. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Disclosure by Politicians,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 2 (April 2010): 179–209.

  45. For instance, according to the 2011 Indian census, India’s most populous state of Uttar Pradesh is home to roughly 200 million people, more than the entire population of Brazil. Maharashtra, with 115 million people, has as many residents as Mexico.

  46. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, “New Dimensions in Indian Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 52–66.

  47. Matthew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, “Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?” Comparative Politics 45, no. 4 (July 2013): 418–36.

  48. Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos, “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia,” Journal of the European Economic Association 11, no. 1 (January 2013): 5–44; International Crisis Group, “Cutting the Links between Crime and Local Politics: Colombia’s 2011 Elections,” Latin America Report No. 37, July 25, 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/37-cutting-the-links-between-crime-and-local-politics-colombias-2011-elections.aspx (accessed September 1, 2014).

  49. James Ockey, “Crime, Society and Politics in Thailand,” in Carl A. Trocki, ed., Gangsters, Democracy and the State in Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); John T. Sidel, “Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of ‘Local Strongmen,’” in John Harriss, Kristian Stokke, and Olle Törnquist, eds., Politicising Democracy: The New Local Politics of Democratisation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

  50. Anthony Harriott, Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2003); Omobolaji Ololade Olarinmoye, “Godfathers, Political Parties and Electoral Corruption in Nigeria,” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 2, no. 4 (December 2008): 66–73.

  51. Charles Onyango-Obbo, “Forget the ICC, Here Are the Real Lawbreakers in Kibaki Succession Race,” East African, March 3, 2012. In December 2014, prosecutors were forced to withdraw the charges against Kenyatta after the Kenyan government declined to cooperate with their investigation.

  52. Campbell Robertson, “Well-Known Felon Still Draws a Crowd, but Louisiana Has Moved On,” New York Times, October 23, 2011.

  53. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, “The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21, no. 1 (April 2005): 1–19.

  54. I readily acknowledge, of course, that the electoral market is shaped by social realities and imperfections that prevent it from consistently operating as a “free market” in the purest sense. I discuss many of these messy realities in the pages that follow.

  55. Ashutosh Varshney, Battles Half Won: India’s Improbable Democracy (New York: Penguin, 2013).

  56. Reformers must be mindful of the Latin idiom Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (The burden of proof is on he who declares, not on he who denies).

  CHAPTER 2. THE RISE OF THE RENTS RAJ

  1. “Over 100 Die after YSR’s Death, Son Appeals for Calm,” Indo-Asian News Service, September 4, 2009, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/over-100-die-after-ysr-s-death-son-appeals-for-calm/story-45a9sIfQwFZ0t7vjFXYAiN.html (accessed October 12, 2014).

  2. Saurabh Sinha, “Death Came without Warning for YSR,” Times of India, November 2, 2009.

  3. “Over 100 Die after YSR’s Death,” Indo-Asian News Service.

  4. Shekhar Gupta, “The Tragedy and the Trend,” Indian Express, September 7, 2011.

  5. Yogendra Kalavalapalli, “After 10 Years, What’s Going to Be Andhra Pradesh’s Capital?” Mint, July 31, 2013; Committee for Consultations on the Future of Andhra Pradesh, Final Report (New Delhi: Government of India, 2010), htt
p://pib.nic.in/archieve/others/2011/jan/d2011010502.pdf (accessed June 15, 2013).

  6. J. S. Sai, “In the Killing Fields of Rayalseema, Fear Dominates the Election Scene,” Rediff, September 3, 1999, http://www.rediff.com/election/1999/sep/03ap.htm (accessed October 24, 2014). Although hard data are difficult to come by, one account estimates that between 1990 and 2005, 670 members of the Congress Party and 560 from the Telugu Desam Party, the two main parties in the Rayalaseema region, were killed due to factional rivalry. See W. Chandrakanth, “Rayalaseema’s Bane,” Frontline, February 12–25, 2005.

  7. K. Balagopal, “Beyond Media Images,” Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 24 (June 12–18, 2004): 2425–29.

  8. Ibid.

  9. Sreenivas Janyala, “Young Guns Revive Rayalaseema Wars,” Indian Express, January 3, 2013.

  10. Praveen Donthi, “The Takeover,” Caravan, May 1, 2012.

  11. A. Srinivasa Rao and Sowmya Rao, “The Making of the Most Powerful Family in Andhra Pradesh,” India Today, September 4, 2009.

  12. Balagopal, “Beyond Media Images,” 2428.

  13. K. C. Suri, “Politics of Democracy, Development and Welfare,” Seminar 620 (April 2011), http://www.india-seminar.com/2011/620/620_k_c_suri.htm (accessed January 23, 2012).

  14. Balagopal, “Beyond Media Images,” 2428.

  15. Ibid., 2425.

  16. Suri, “Politics of Democracy, Development and Welfare.”

  17. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, “Famous Populist, Secret Liberaliser,” Economic Times, March 30, 2011.

  18. Suri, “Politics of Democracy, Development and Welfare.”

  19. Donthi, “Takeover.”

  20. A. Srinivas Rao, “How Jagan Reddy Became the Richest Lok Sabha MP in India, and What Is His Real Worth?” India Today, May 28, 2012.

  21. Amarnath K. Menon, “Jagan Mohan Reddy: The Prince of Cash,” India Today, December 6, 2010.

  22. Data from 2009 onwards available at http://myneta.info. The 2004 figures are from Menon, “Jagan Mohan Reddy.”

  23. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Land Allotment: Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2011–12 (New Delhi: Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012), http://gssaap-cag.nic.in/sites/all/themes/marinelli/Reports/2011-12/Land%20Allotment/English/LandAllotment_Complete_Report_2011-12.pdf (accessed October 21, 2014).

  24. “Y S Rajasekhara Reddy’s Land Doles Cost Andhra Rs 1 Lakh Crore: CAG,” Times of India, March 30, 2012.

  25. Chinnaiah Jangam, “The Story of a Jailed Prince: Feudal Roots of Democratic Politics in Andhra Pradesh,” Economic and Political Weekly 48, no. 25 (June 22, 2013): 11–15.

  26. A. T. Jayanti and Ch. V. M. Krishna Rao, “Though Distant, My Only Rival Is Chandrababu Naidu, Says Jagan Mohan Reddy,” Deccan Chronicle, April 11, 2014.

  27. S. Nagesh Kumar and N. Rahul, “CBI Arrests Jagan; Call for Bandh Today,” Hindu, May 27, 2012; “Indian MP Jagan Mohan Reddy Freed from Prison,” BBC News, September 24, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-24216527 (accessed November 13, 2015).

  28. Donthi, “Takeover.”

  29. Indeed, India’s political, economic, and social transformations have been anything but linear or without reversals. This admission is not meant to minimize the distance India has traveled in a relatively short period of time, but to provide a more accurate portrayal of its nuanced realities.

  30. Ramachandra Guha, “Democratic to a Fault?” Prospect, February 2012.

  31. John Dunn, Breaking Democracy’s Spell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 103.

  32. Ashutosh Varshney, Battles Half Won: India’s Improbable Democracy (New York: Penguin, 2013).

  33. This tripartite formulation is in line with a typology put forward by economist Pranab Bardhan. In dissecting the tension in modern India between rentier and entrepreneurial capitalism, Bardhan elucidates three sources of rents: traded natural resource-intensive goods, non-traded natural resource-intensive goods and services; and politics. See Pranab Bardhan, “Reflections on Indian Political Economy,” Economic and Political Weekly 50, no. 18 (May 2, 2015): 14–17.

  34. Rajni Kothari, “The Congress ‘System’ in India,” Asian Survey 4, no. 12 (December 1964): 1161–73.

  35. James Manor, “Indira and After: The Decay of Party Organization in India,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 272 (1978): 315–24.

  36. Yogendra Yadav, “Electoral Politics in the Time of Change: India’s Third Electoral System, 1989–99,” Economic and Political Weekly 34, no. 34/35 (August 21–September 3, 1999): 2393–99.

  37. There is a debate, not fully resolved, as to whether the momentous victory of the BJP in India’s 2014 general elections heralds the end of the third electoral system and the beginning of a fourth. See, e.g., Milan Vaishnav and Danielle Smogard, “A New Era in Indian Politics?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 10, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/10/new-era-in-indian-politics (accessed June 12, 2014).

  38. Of course, the British legacy in India was not uniformly negative: a talented, skilled civil service and an extensive railway network were but two of the positive inheritances from which India stood to gain. Yet, independent India was ill served by many other aspects of the British Raj, such as a predatory land revenue system and an economic orientation geared toward natural resource extraction designed to feed colonial manufacturers back home.

  39. Devesh Kapur, “India’s Economic Development,” in Bruce Currie-Alder, Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Medhora, eds., International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

  40. Ibid.

  41. Jawaharlal Nehru passed away in 1964 and was immediately succeed by Lal Bahadur Shastri. Upon Shastri’s death in 1966, Indira Gandhi assumed the prime ministership, an office she would hold until 1977 (and again from 1980 to 1984).

  42. Arvind Panagariya, India: The Emerging Giant (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 6.

  43. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, “Economic Reforms for the Nineties,” First Raj Krishna Memorial Lecture, University of Rajasthan, 1995, http://planningcommission.gov.in/aboutus/speech/spemsa/msa033.pdf (accessed August 1, 2014).

  44. The distinction between “pro-business” and “pro-market” reforms in India was originally made in Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, “From ‘Hindu Growth’ to Productivity Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition,” IMF Working Paper WP/04/77, May 2004.

  45. Panagariya, India: The Emerging Giant, chap. 5. Although it is not covered here, India also experienced a fourth transformation in the realm of foreign policy. In the initial post-independence period, India was committed to a strategy of “nonalignment.” Notwithstanding this doctrinal commitment, over time—and especially after 1971—India enjoyed a warm relationship with the Soviet Union, thanks to the commonalities between the two countries’ economic ideologies as well as the vagaries of the Cold War, which saw India’s rival Pakistan forge close relations with the United States. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, India’s foreign policy posture also shifted. In recent years, India has developed deep economic and security ties with the West, including a “strategic partnership” with the United States. For more on India’s foreign policy transformation, see C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

  46. Divya Vaid, “Caste in Contemporary India: Flexibility and Persistence,” Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 391–410.

  47. Ibid.

  48. Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

  49. Christophe Jaffrelot and Sanjay Kumar, eds., Rise of the Plebeians? The Changing Face of Indian Legislative Assemblies (New Delhi: Routledge, 2009).

  50. Christophe Jaffrelot and Gilles Verniers, “The Representation Gap,” Indian Express, July 24, 2015.


  51. Dipankar Gupta, Interrogating Caste: Understanding Hierarchy and Difference in Indian Society (Penguin: New Delhi, 2000).

  52. Chandra Bhan Prasad, D. Shyam Babu, Devesh Kapur, and Lant Pritchett, “Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era,” Economic and Political Weekly 45, no. 35 (August 28, 2010): 39–49.

  53. Simon Chauchard, Why Representation Matters: The Meaning of Ethnic Quotas in Rural India (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

  54. Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Ten Theses on State Politics in India,” Seminar 591 (November 2008), http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/591/591_y_yadav_&_s_palshkar.htm (accessed January 21, 2014).

  55. For instance, a novel study by political scientists Amit Ahuja and Susan Ostermann examined the role discrimination plays in India’s robust online marriage market. Working with a set of pre-identified prospective grooms, the researchers found that more than two-thirds of Dalits, but only about half of upper castes, demonstrated a willingness to cross caste boundaries for marriage. See Amit Ahuja and Susan Ostermann, “Crossing Caste Boundaries in the Modern Indian Marriage Market,” Studies in Comparative International Development (forthcoming). Another study by a group of economists employed a similar technique to measure discrimination in employment opportunities. The researchers sent out hundreds of fictitious online job applications to firms, randomly manipulating the caste-based surnames of the “applicants.” They found that software employers showed no signs of discriminating on the basis of caste, but that call center firms regularly discriminated against low-caste job seekers. The reason, the economists surmise, is that call center firms prize “soft skills” for which credentials alone are not enough to go by, which is not the case in the software industry. See Abhijit Banerjee, Marianne Bertrand, Saugato Datta, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Labor Market Discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a Field Experiment,” Journal of Comparative Economics 37, no. 1 (March 2009): 14–27.